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Preface
Fiji is a bit like Churchill’s Russia, a ‘riddle wrapped in a mystery inside
an enigma.’ Here is an island nation, easily the most developed in the
South Pacific, with a talented multiethnic population that would be the
envy of many a underdeveloped nation, the hub of regional
transportation and communication links, the home of international
diplomatic, educational and aid organisations—it has everything going
for it. And yet, despite this good fortune, it is strangely prone to debilitating
self-inflected wounds that hobble its prospects and dent its future. The
two military coups in 1987 and the attempted putsch in 2000 have strained
race relations, damaged the economy, infected public institutions with
the virus of  mismanagement and failing accountability, nurtured religious
intolerance and periodic acts of sacrilege against non-Christians,
disrupted improvements to essential infrastructure, education and social
and medical services, and led to a mass exodus of  some of  its best and
brightest citizens.
This indictment may seem harsh, for on the surface things look normal.
Despite all the temptations, inducements and provocations, Fiji has not
descended into a bloodbath of the type common in other developing
regions. There are no unmarked mass graves, no long knives in the night.
Certain institutions—the judiciary, for instance—bravely continue to
uphold the rule of  law despite intimidation and subversion through
political interference. The press is free. But the overwhelming sense in
Fiji is of the essential fragility of things, the sense that things could go
wrong at any time. The almost daily reports of verbal exchanges between
the military leadership and the government about who is the ultimate
custodian of the national interest underlines the point. As I write this
(October 2005), the Fijian Minister for Home Affairs informs the media
that the Commander of  the Fiji Military Forces and his family need
protection because not all the ammunition stolen from the army has
been returned and rogue elements continue to roam the land. And the
government is contemplating passing legislation to give traditional chiefs
immunity from prosecution ‘for certain kinds of activities’, such as trying
to ‘resolve disputes in volatile situations’ however illegal that activity
might be. I suppose it is not so much whether things are not as bad as
they ought to be or could have been. It is, rather, whether things could
be, could have been, much better.
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Why is Fiji prone to periodic political turbulence? What is its source
and how can it best be resolved? I address these issues historically by
focusing on the last two decades of  Fiji’s post-independence life,
including the period since George Speight’s attempted putsch in 2000.
These years, full of drama, chaos, anxiety and apprehension, capture the
essence of the conflict in Fiji, its roots and routes, the issues that inflame
public opinion, the rhetoric that is used to mobilise support in the
electorate for particular political purposes and the end to which that
support is put. There are various ways of charting the contours of a
country’s political evolution. Here, after the introductory survey chapters,
I use elections to measure the tone and temperature of political discourse
in Fiji. I choose elections as the vehicle for my analysis because it is
during elections, more than at any other time, when deeply held views
and contentious issues are brought to the fore, when the public gets
engaged, however briefly or fleetingly, with major public issues of  the
day, when the limits of  political parameters are truly stretched and tested
and exposed, and when politics is at its rawest.
The fundamental cause of  Fiji’s problem, I argue, is its obsession
with race, with its entrenchment in the political process and in public
policy. The inevitable result of  this preoccupation is that every issue,
every concern, is seen through the prism of ethnic, as opposed to national,
interest. Ethnic fears and prejudices are cynically exploited for political
purposes during elections. The appeal to ethnicity and ethnic identity is
fostered through a racially compartmentalised electoral system in which
two-thirds of the seats in parliament are elected on racial rolls, and the
remaining on open non-racial rolls. The logic of  the system is for political
parties, which are essentially racially based, to consolidate their own
ethnic constituency and wrest enough numbers from their opponent’s to
win power. Divide and Rule. When political competition is equated with
ethnic competition in a zero-sum struggle, the potential for conflict and
tension increases dramatically.
Not only electoral politics but public memory is racially archived as
well. Fiji citizens entering or leaving the country are required to state
their ‘race’ on the arrival and departure cards. They are required to declare
their race when taking out a driver’s licence or opening a bank account.
The government has adopted a race-based affirmative action policy in
favour of the indigenous Rotuman and Fijian communities, and there is
a ‘blueprint’ to promote Fijians in commerce and industry where their
success is unremarkable (though slowly growing). The penultimate year
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of secondary education is fee-exempt for Fijian students but not for
children from other ethnic groups. Fifty per cent of  all the taxi licences
are now reserved for the indigenous community, and the higher echelons
of  the public service are dominated by them as well. Schools which are
designated ‘Fijian’ receive special government subsidy, but not non-Fijian
schools, even though in many cases over 50 per cent of their students
are indigenous Fijians. In short, race stares at you in most areas of  the
public sector. Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara, Fiji’s first prime minister, often
said that race was a fact of life in Fiji. If present policies continue, it will
become a way of  life for its people. The reality, of  course, is that race is
one among many and perhaps more important facts of life such as
unemployment, poverty, urban violence, collapsing infrastructure,
corruption in public life, misuse of  public office. The list is endless.
There are other causes of tension as well. Among the most important
of  these is land. By law, native land—some 83 per cent of  the total land
area of  Fiji—is held in inalienable right by the indigenous Fijians. In the
1990s, the government transferred all the former Crown Land to the
Native Land Trust Board with the result that now nearly 90 per cent of
all land is in Fijian ownership. On the other hand the bulk of  the
commercial farmers, particularly in the sugar industry, are Indo-Fijians.
To the Fijians land is more than a commodity to be disposed of  in the
market place or a simple commercial proposition. The attachment to
land is deep, almost mystical, as a source of  pride and identity. Not all
the land is cultivable. And in recent years, the Fijian population itself
has increased and demanded the termination of  leases when these expire.
The Fijian predicament is understandable, but so, too, is the dire situation
facing the Indo-Fijian community. The 30-year leases which they acquired
in the late 1960s began expiring in the late 1990s, with the landowners
refusing renewal, or renewing them on terms favourable to themselves.
Forced off  the lands on which they have lived for generations, the
evictees, unskilled and often unlettered, start a new, uncertain future
while their formerly productive farms decline or revert to bush. The
nation suffers, and the anguish of  eviction is deep.
Another source of conflict is about who should be allowed the rein
of political leadership in Fiji. Fijians, though not all of them by any
means, insist that national leadership should be in Fijian hands. Without
that, Fiji will know no peace. Fijian interests should be paramount in
Fiji. For their part, the Indo-Fijian community insists that ideology, not
primordiality, should form the foundations of  Fiji’s political system, that
the state should be race-neutral in its obligations and responsibilities to
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its citizens. The Fijian view that they can trust only their own leaders
derives from the political culture of the twentieth century that
encouraged the three races to entrust their future to their own ethnic
representatives. Their high ranking leaders, sometimes even paramount
chiefs, were also their political leaders, people of towering personalities
and overarching influence, trained by the British to assume power when
Fiji became independent. But they have all moved on, and no clear
successor of broad influence and authority is clearly visible. Many aspiring
Fijian leaders are embroiled in local and regional issues. Moreover, they—
and Indo-Fijians’ leaders, too—lack the experience and cross-cultural
skills to provide the kind of leadership needed for a divided multiethnic
nation like Fiji.
There was a time, long gone now, when the two major communities
had little in common. Fijians lived a subsistence lifestyle and Indo-Fijians
were in the commercial agricultural sector. The opportunities for
interaction between them were limited—and discouraged by the
authorities. But in recent decades, modernity and the challenges and
opportunities of globalisation have perforce fostered closer interaction.
I cite two examples from popular culture to illustrate this point. Bollywood
movies, which once attracted an exclusively Indo-Fijian audience, are
now so popular with Fijians that some of the films are dubbed in Fijian.
This would have been unthinkable a decade ago. And rugby, once a
mystery game to most Indo-Fijians, is now followed by them with great
knowledge and passion. When Indo-Fijian grandmothers go ‘ga-ga’ over
Sevens’ maestro Waisale Serevi, it is time to take notice of  change. There
are many other such examples of cross-cultural intersections and
insurrections which pervade the daily life in Fiji.
The unity, imposed by the colonial government and nurtured by
paramount chiefs through the course of  the twentieth century, is now
becoming frayed. This was once a taboo subject, but it is now the topic
of  public talk.  There are many reasons for this. The absence of  paramount
chiefs at the helm of national leadership is one. When they were alive,
the chiefs’ wisdom and guidance were seldom questioned or questioned
only in hushed tones. The effects of  modern education have undermined
the traditional ideology that the business of  government is solely the
business of  chiefs. More and more Fijians are living in urban and peri-
urban areas, exposed to all the challenges and opportunities which
urbanisation brings. There is now in Fiji a large and growing Fijian middle
class, filling the gap left by departing Indo-Fijians, which is much more
firmly enmeshed into the modern economy than ever before. Fijian
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women and men selling root crops, vegetables, fish, crabs, prawns in
urban stalls or on footpaths or along highways in large numbers could
not have been imagined a decade ago. Money economy has penetrated
the Fijian households and the Fijian hinterland in profound, life-altering
ways. Traditional institutions are coming under increasing pressure.
Social and economic fragmentation in the indigenous community is
also accompanied by greater and very public debate about power-sharing
and redistribution of  power among the Fijians. Western Fijian dissent
and demand for appropriate representation in national decision-making
to reflect the contribution their region makes to the national economy
has long been well-known. Gold, pine, sugar and tourism are all located
in western Viti Levu. But there are other sources of friction and
dissension as well. The eastern provinces rose to ascendancy in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth century and consolidated their hold as
the century progressed, to the quiet disappointment of  their former rivals.
In the 2000 putsch, no attempt was made to hide the fact that the rebels
had, as one part of their agenda, the restoration of the primacy of the
Kubuna confederacy. George Speight spoke of  Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara
in insultingly disrespectful terms and demanded his resignation.
These internal debates will continue to influence the pattern and
direction of Fijian—and national—politics, now more so than in the
past. For long, the fear of  Indian dominance was an important factor
propelling the political unity of  the Fijians. But that fear has been declining
as Fijians realise the power—military and civilian—they have in their
hands and as Indo-Fijian population continues to decline through as
lower birth rate and emigration. It is projected to be 37 per cent of the
national population in the next few years. This demographic shift has
important implications for the way politics will operate in Fiji in the
future. It seems inescapable that the future directions in national politics
will be determined by the interests and impulses of  the indigenous
community.
Many essays in this volume appeared in different incarnations over a
period of years, written in different moods for different purposes and
audiences. They have been revised or otherwise amended to give the
book structure, intellectual coherence and narrative flow. They are my
attempt to decipher the patterns of a recent past of a country to which
I am inextricably linked both emotionally and intellectually, and in whose
recent public life I have played a minor role. The essays, then, speak
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from a position of active interest and concern, not from disinterested,
detached observation. If  this volume contributes to a more informed
debate about Fiji’s recent past and prognostications about its future,
especially in Fiji itself, it will have achieved its purpose. Et res non semper,
spes mihi semper adest.
Afterword
Since this book was written, an election has taken place (May 2006),
Fiji's tenth since independence. I discuss this election in Chapter 10.
After the elections, a multi-party government came into existence. This
experiment has raised the hope among the people of Fiji that a new
beginning towards more inclusive, non-racial politics may be on the
horizon. But it is too early to tell.
A note on sources
In different forms the essays in this volume began life as talks and seminar
presentations and articles published in Pacific Studies, The Contemporary
Pacific, Journal of  Pacific History and Asia Pacific Viewpoint. They have, for
the most part, been inaccessible to ordinary readers and observers of
political developments in Fiji. I hope that this collection will rectify this.
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1
The road to independence
1874–1970
Some basic facts first. Fiji Islands, covering some 1.3 million kilometres
of the South Pacific Ocean, lie between the longitudes of 175 and 178
west and the latitudes of  15 and 22 south. Most of  Fiji’s population
lives on the two major islands of  Viti Levu and Vanua Levu. Its total
population of 772,655 (1996 census) comprises 394,999 Fijians (51.1
per cent) and 336,579 Indo-Fijians (43.6 per cent), with the remaining
41,077 coming from other ethnic groups (5.3 per cent). Nearly half of
the population now lives in urban or peri-urban areas, a significant
increase over the previous decade when 39 per cent lived there.
Interestingly, now over 40 per cent of  indigenous Fijians live in urban
areas. Tourism is the main foreign exchange earner for Fiji, followed by
the garment industry, sugar, fisheries, gold and such niche products as
mineral water. More recently, remittance from Fiji residents working
abroad has become an important contributor to the national economy.
Fiji became a British Crown Colony in 1874 and attained its
independence in 1970.
Fiji’s self-image at the time of  independence was of  a three-legged
stool. The three legs were the indigenous Fijian, the Indo-Fijian and the
European communities. Each of  them was seen as distinct and separate
in their culture, history and economic position, largely homogenous in
their own internal social and cultural configurations, but interlinked to
the overarching national structure, making their unique contribution
through their own separate compartments. The Fijians provided the land
for economic development, the Indo-Fijians provided the labour and
Europeans the capital. Since the contribution of the three groups was
deemed to be equally valid, none alone (except the indigenous Fijians,
islands of turmoil
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but more on that later) was to enjoy privileges and rights greater than
others. Equality of  group representation, irrespective of  population size,
was to be the basis of political representation. The colonial government
positioned itself as the neutral, benevolent, disinterested arbiter of conflict
between the three main groups. Edward Said’s observation is apt: ‘the
rhetoric of power all too easily produces an illusion of benevolence when
deployed in an imperial setting’ (1993:xix).
This was a comforting metaphor for a complex, conflicted reality. In
truth, none of  the three ethnic groups was homogenous. Religious and
cultural divisions racked the Indo-Fijian community, along with class.
Europeans feared being swamped by part-Europeans with whom they
were grouped together for voting purposes. Class and regional differences
divided the Fijians, as they do today. There was no equivalence—or
balance, to use the colonial vocabulary—between Indo-Fijian labour on
the one hand and European capital on the other. Nor, it has to be said,
was colonial rule as benevolent as its champions argued. The metaphor
served the interests of  the colonial officialdom, but did grave disservice
to Fiji’s complex history, for which the country is still paying a heavy
price. It is to the evolution of that complex history that I now turn.
The foundations of modern Fiji were laid when it became a British
colony in 1874.1 Reluctantly acquired, Britain expected Fiji to become
economically self-sustaining in the quickest possible time. But the
conditions for rapid economic development were absent. European
planters, numbering around 2,000 in the mid 1870s, were insolvent.
Indigenous Fijians were dispirited and restless, having lost one-third of
the population to an epidemic of measles accidentally introduced from
Australia. To make matters worse, large parts of  fertile Fijian lands were
being claimed by European settlers and speculators.
Fiji’s first resident governor, Sir Arthur Hamilton Gordon,
promulgated a set of  policies that settled Fiji’s future for more than a
century. He instituted a system of  ‘indirect rule’ designed, he said, to
‘seize the spirit in which native institutions had been framed, and develop
to the utmost extent the capacities of the people for the management of
their own affairs, without exciting their suspicions or destroying their
self-respect’ (see, among others, France 1969; Legge 1958; Chapman
1964). To that end, he formalised a council of  chiefs to advise him on
Fijian concerns and problems. The council, entrenched in the 1997
constitution, retains its status as the supreme advisory body to
government on matters affecting the Fijian community. It nominates the
president and vice president, and its nominees in the Senate enjoy the
the road to independence
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power of veto over all legislation affecting Fijian land, customs and
customary rights. While the Council continues to enjoy broad respect,
some of its activities in recent years—approving a constitution and then
lending support to those who wanted it abrogated—and its apparent
manipulation by politicians have tarnished its image.
Gordon’s land policies ensured that 83 per cent of  all land remained
inalienably in Fijian ownership, under the correct that, without land, the
traditional Fijian society would collapse and suffer the fate of other
dispossessed communities in the Pacific islands. Today, as Crown land
(Schedules A and B—either not claimed by any landowning units or
whose owners had died out) has come under the jurisdiction of the Native
Land Trust Board, more than 90 per cent of  all land in Fiji is now owned
by the indigenous community although it has to be said that large portion
of it is unsuitable for agriculture.2 Gordon decreed that the Fijian people
should be freed from the pressures of commercial employment and
allowed to progress at their own pace in their own traditional
surroundings, paying tax in kind rather than cash, and tending to their
subsistence lifestyle in their age-old fashion. For nearly a century, the
Fijians had their own separate court system, their own provincial
administration, native regulations and strictly observed schedule of  work
in the villages. Their isolation from the mainstream of  colonial society
was almost complete.
Gordon’s policies were well-intentioned, but over time they became
encrusted in orthodoxy (see France 1969; Thomas 1990).3 A once-fluid
situation, represented by dynastic wars and warring chiefdoms, was frozen
by fiat, uniform codes and customary practices imposed on a diverse
and complex society where none had existed before, and certain
cooperative regions were rewarded in leadership and political status over
others. Chiefly hierarchy and privileges (such as the lala, offering the
first fruits of  the land to chiefs) were entrenched and enforced with law.
Gordon had intended for his policies to be reviewed after 25 years,
enough time, he felt, for a distressed community to achieve some stability.
But when the moment came, officials baulked and the opportunity for
review and reform was missed. Sadly, Fijians watched
uncomprehendingly, cocooned in their subsistence sector, as the world
around them changed and moved on and the tentacles of a capitalist
economy spread.
From the very beginning, Fijians were led to believe that in the colony
their interests would be ‘paramount’; and the phrase ‘paramountcy of
Fijian interests’, mistakenly attributed to the Deed of Cession, was often
islands of turmoil
4
invoked throughout the twentieth century both by the Fijians themselves
and by European settlers to block political change. But the phrase was
originally intended to be used in a protective sense. That is, in the
management of Fijian affairs, the government would give ‘paramount’
importance to the views of  the Fijian people and their leaders. Over the
course of  the twentieth century, particularly as independence loomed,
the phrase came to acquire another, more assertive, meaning—that, in
the broader scheme of things, Fijians would enjoy rights and privileges
over and above those of  their fellow citizens. The view came to be asserted
that only Fijian political control could ensure the paramountcy of Fijian
interests.
To solve the problem of  capital, Gordon turned overseas. Having seen
the success of plantation economies in the Caribbean and Mauritius—he
had been governor of  Trinidad and Mauritius before coming to Fiji—he
chose the plantation economy as his preferred mode of economic
development, and sugar cane as the plantation crop. He invited the
Australian Colonial Sugar Refining Company to extend its operations in
Fiji, which it did in 1882, and remained there until 1973, dominating the
economic life of the colony and in the process exercising preponderant
influence on its affairs (see Moynagh 1981). To work the plantations,
Gordon imported Indian indentured labour. Between 1879, when
emigration began, and 1916 when it ended, more than 60,000 men and
women and children arrived in the colony (see Gillion 1962; Lal 2000b).
When their five-year contracts expired, the government encouraged them
to stay on. Most did. Out of the experience of indenture emerged a new
society, more egalitarian, enterprising and driven by desperation, seeking,
as W.E.H. Stanner puts it, ‘peaceful seepage into every opening left
unclosed and a tenacious defence of every position once occupied’
(1953:179). Isolated, struggling, self-absorbed and vulnerable, the Indo-
Fijian community was just as caught up in its own internal affairs, adjusting
to the requirements of their new adopted homeland, and just as myopic
about its long-term interests as the Fijian community.
Indentured emigration was sanctioned by the Government of India
on the broad understanding that the indentured labourers who decided
to settle in the colonies would enjoy rights equal to the other British
subjects there. Europeans and even some colonial officials disputed the
spirit of the undertaking and questioned its application to Fiji. But the
historical record is clear. The assurance of  equality was periodically
reinstated.
the road to independence
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The whole tenor of the correspondence between India and the colony shows that
it was on this condition that indentured immigration in Fiji has been allowed in the
past, and any measures leading towards lowering the political status of the
immigrants or reducing their economic freedom would, in our opinion, involve a
breach of faith with those affected (Lal 1997a:6).
Throughout their political struggle in the twentieth century, Indo-Fijian
leaders would continue to cite the principle of parity in support of their
cause.
After the end of their indentures, the freed Indians settled on leased
land, and continued to work mainly in the sugar industry as growers and
mill workers, as did their descendants for several generations. The
community diversified and grew, outnumbering indigenous Fijians in the
mid 1940s, in the process spawning publicly aired and politically charged
fears about ‘Indian domination’ (see Gillion 1977; Mayer 1973). But
while remaining on the land, the Indo-Fijians established schools, often
without government help, seeing education as the way out of  the vagaries
of life on leased land. In time, most settlements had a primary and even
a secondary school whose students over the years filled the junior ranks
of  the civil service, and from the 1950s onwards, the professions as
lawyers, doctors, nurses and accountants. Fijians, too, had their own
schools—with longer histories, and government support—but their
educational success was limited. Cultural factors, emphasising group
solidarity and the virtue of subordinating individual interests to communal
interests, rural isolation and poor educational facilities played their part.4
Moreover, Fijian leaders actively discouraged ‘academic’ education for
ordinary Fijians. The few opportunities for higher education were reserved
for people of chiefly rank. As the starkest example of this, the Great
Council of Chiefs declined to offer a university scholarship to Rusiate
Nayacakalou, a commoner who later emerged as the most brilliant Fiji-
born social scientist of  the twentieth century. Nayacakalou completed
his university education on a private scholarship given by an European
business house, Morris Hedstrom (Firth and Tarte 2001).
If the disparity in the educational opportunities for the two
communities was one problem that would haunt Fiji in the future, another
was the monoracial character of  its schools. The Queen Victoria School
(opened in 1907) was exclusively Fijian while most schools in the
sugarcane belt were predominantly Indo-Fijian by virtue of population
distribution. Multiracial schools were mostly Christian and set up in urban
areas. The children of  the two communities, then, attending their own
islands of turmoil
6
racially oriented schools, and firmly tethered to their own cultural ethos
and values, had few opportunities to acquire knowledge of  each other’s
culture and language, and of the deeper impulses which drove them.
And yet, students from these schools would be called on later to play a
vital role on the national stage, a task for which, because of their cross-
culturally limited education, they were spectacularly ill-suited. It is no
wonder that Fiji has faltered in its post-independence journey. The tragedy
is that little is being done even now to rectify the situation. On the
contrary, government policy, through special subsidies and grants, provides
inducement for Fijian children to attend predominantly Fijian schools
even though in many urban areas mixed schools are the norm.
The minuscule European population occupied the apex of the colonial
social and economic pinnacle. They dominated the retail and wholesale
commerce of  the colony, owned copra plantations and shipping
companies and occupied a pride of place in colonial administration. They
had their own racially segregated clubs and exclusive voluntary
associations and schools. In the twentieth century, they began to move
to urban towns and centres. The community was not homogenous,
though, with fine lines of demarcation differentiating the various
nationalities that comprised it. Europeans of all hues saw themselves as
superior to part-Europeans who, for electoral purposes, were grouped
with them. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, some
prominent Europeans, dissatisfied with the policies of the local
government, tried to have Fiji annexed to New Zealand, but when that
alternative failed, they agitated for a privileged place in colonial politics
(Lal 1992). Paramountcy for Fijians, parity for Indo-Fijians and privilege
for Europeans—these three conflicting ideas informed the political
discourse in colonial Fiji.
From the very beginning, the electoral system in Fiji was race-based.5
The colonial government saw this as natural and desirable. In part, it
reflected its own interests: with the three communities locked in their
own separate compartments, the colonial government could play the
role of impartial referee. The government did little to encourage the
communities to forge common, multiracial links among themselves.
Europeans were accorded elected representation in 1904, Indo-Fijians
in 1929 and indigenous Fijians in 1963. Before then, Fijian
representatives in the Legislative Council were nominated by the Great
Council of  Chiefs. Each group had equal representation irrespective of
population size. Under the Letters Patent of 1937, which remained in
force until 1963, the three communities had five representatives each.
the road to independence
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Three of the five Indo-Fijians and Europeans were elected by their group
and two nominated by the governor, while all five Fijians were nominated
by the Council of  Chiefs.
This arrangement was frequently questioned after World War II to
make the political representation more accurately reflect the demographic,
social and economic changes sweeping Fiji, as well as Whitehall’s
commitment to gradual self-government for the colonies. Specifically,
advocates of constitutional change wanted elected representatives to
be more directly involved in policymaking. This demand for constitutional
change was led not by Indo-Fijians, but by a group of  Europeans. Their
goal was not the removal of racial representation; they wanted that
maintained. They wanted the system of nomination abolished for
everyone, including the Fijians. Fijians were opposed to the extension
of  election. Why, they asked, change the system of  government when
that system was working satisfactorily? A democratic system of
government did not suit the Fijian people (see Lal 1997b). A universal
franchise would be open to abuse and corruption and manipulation by
selfish individuals. Chiefs were the natural leaders of  their people and it
was un-Fijian to trust critical decisions to commoners. Fijian fears about
the security of their rights were exacerbated by the rapid increase in
Indo-Fijian population. The Fijian Affairs Board asked Whitehall to take
a firmer line with Indo-Fijian politicians and others misguidedly agitating
for constitutional reform. Colonial rule had been good for the Fijians. It
had preserved their social and cultural institutions—their way of  life.
They therefore saw no need for change.
Indo-Fijian leaders disagreed. They accepted that the rights and
privileges of the indigenous community should not be questioned.
Minority rights should be protected, but, as A.D. Patel, the Indo-Fijian
member of the Legislative Council, put it in 1946, minority communities
had ‘also to appreciate and realise the fact that you cannot expect or
hope for privileges and rights in excess of those enjoyed by the majority’.
He continued to argue for a non-racial common roll form of  voting,
which he had pursued since the late 1920s, and would continue to do
throughout his political life. Common roll, he believed, was the only
way forward for a racially divided society, the only way ‘a common
denominator of a political outlook will be developed’ (Lal 1997a:29).
But he agreed that a common roll could not be introduced unless everyone
accepted the idea. His plea fell on deaf, nay, hostile ears.
Lack of consensus about the pace and direction of constitutional
change suited the colonial government, placing it in the position of not
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having to take a stand or propose initiatives on controversial political
issues. Privately, though, its views were deeply divided. Among many
there was sympathy for the Fijian position and a marked antipathy for
Indo-Fijians. There was a sympathetic understanding of  the Fijian
predicament, leavened with a good deal of adulation of, and romanticism
about, the Fijian way of life (see Roth 1953). Moreover, many felt a
moral responsibility for a people who had ceded their islands voluntarily,
had pledged total loyalty to the Crown, and had shed blood for the cause
of the Empire. The fact that Fijian leaders looked to Britain for guidance,
after having reposed complete trust in her institutions and policies,
increased the sense of  obligation and responsibility correspondingly. The
government had little understanding of the cultural and social impulses
that drove the Indo-Fijians, for whom colonial rule was not the solution
but the cause of  Fiji’s problems. Remembering the hardship of  indenture
and acts of petty discrimination their forebears had endured, they saw
little of  value but much to criticise in colonial rule. And they were not
averse to airing their grievances outside the colony and seeking external
alliances for their cause, much to the irritation of  colonial officials.
There was an Indian problem, many agreed, but it could just as easily
have been labelled a ‘Fijian problem’. As Governor Grantham told London
in 1946, ‘apart from the relative growth in population, it might be better
termed the Fijian problem, since it is rather a question of  raising the Fijian
so that he is able to hold his own with the Indian in the modern world,
than holding back the Indian so that he does not outstrip the more easy-
going Fijian’ (Colonial Office document 83/252, cited in Lal 1997b). Fijian
interests should be protected, the Commissioner of Labour  told the
Legislative Council in 1946, but the Fijians had ‘reciprocal obligations to
the other races in this colony to recognise their economic and political
aspirations and facilitate their attainment’. The Europeans and Indo-Fijians
had made their contribution to the colony ‘and they are entitled to be
admitted into full membership of  the colonial family’. Yes, there were
divisions and distinctions, but the ‘interests of the three races are not as
so many independent threads, but strands which are interwoven into one
economic fabric which are interwoven into one economic fabric; and each
strand is essential to the strength of the whole’ (Colonial Office document
83/252, cited in Lal 1997b). To those who invoked real or imagined
promises to the Fijian people, the governor replied candidly
[t]he obligation of the government to the Fijians can be stated comprehensively in
a few sentences; we must preserve all that is good of  their culture, but not outworn
customs and ways of life; we must give them the opportunities and the means to
expand that culture; we must protect them from exploitation and disease; and
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otherwise so govern and lead these people as ultimately to achieve their full
integration into the political and economic life of a composite society comprising
all the races of the colony (Legislative Council Debate, July 1946).
In the 1950s, questions that had been shelved or brushed aside began
to resurface with the appointment of  Sir Ronald Garvey as governor.
Garvey, an old hand in the Pacific, was independent-minded, self-
confident and acutely aware of  the local realities. He wanted to move
the constitutional train along because he was convinced that
[f]airly steady progress is being made [towards common citizenship]. Both colour
and social barriers are being broken down and the desirability and, indeed,
inevitability of unity is taking shape. It is a policy which I constantly preach myself
and it is having its imperceptible effect throughout the whole community (Colonial
Office document 1039/9).6
In 1954, Garvey asked the Great Council of  Chiefs to consider directly
electing three of their five representatives to the Legislative Council to give
the Fijians an experience of  electoral politics. He told the chiefs that the
‘chiefly system on which so much depends should march with the times and
should not ignore—for too long—the modern trend of  democracy’. To those
who invoked the Deed of  Cession in support of  gradualism and permanent
paramountcy of  Fijian interests, Garvey responded with characteristic but
unprecedented bluntness. He said in 1957
[s]urely the intention of this Deed, acknowledged and accepted by chiefs who were
parties to it, was that Fiji should be developed so as to take a significant place in the
affairs of the world but that, in the process, the rights and interests of the Fijian
people should be respected. To read into the Deed more than that, to suggest, for
instance, that the rights and interests of the Fijians should predominate over
everything else, does no service either to the Fijian people or to their country. The
view, for the Fijians, would mean complete protection and no self-respecting
individual race wants that because, ultimately, it means that those subject to it will
end up as museum pieces. The Indians are equally eligible to have their interests
respected. By their work and enterprise, the Indians in Fiji have made a great
contribution to the development and prosperity of  their country, and to the welfare
of its people. They are an essential part of the community and it is unrealistic to
suppose that they are not or to imagine that the position of Fijians in the world
today would benefit by their absence (Fiji Times, 15 October 1957).
Governor Garvey approached the Colonial Office in 1956 with fresh
constitutional proposals. His ultimate goal was common Fijian citizenship,
he said. Perhaps his most radical proposal was a ‘multiracial bench’ of
four members, one each from the three main racial groups and one to
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represent ‘other races’, such as Chinese and other Pacific Islanders, all
of them elected from a colony-wide constituency. This was the first
time that such a proposal had been made. But Garvey was not supported
by his more cautious, conservative officers who argued that the concept
of a multiracial bench would be opposed by the Europeans and Fijians
who would see the proposal as ‘the thin end of the wedge’ driving to a
common roll, and paving the way for reforms far too radical for the
colony to bear. Furthermore, would not members not elected by their
own group be seen as the puppets of  those who elected them? Garvey
was undaunted, saying that ‘if we are aiming at a growth of a
consciousness of Fijian citizenship overbidding differences of race and
religion, I think it has considerable merit’ (Garvey to Sir Thomas Lloyd,
11 Febuary 1956, in Colonial Office document 1036/10).7 Maintaining
the status quo was no solution to Fiji’s political problems.
Garvey’s proposal was discussed by the old colonial hands in
London—the ‘back room boys’, Garvey called them derisively—who
raised all the usual arguments about the need for Whitehall to ‘keep a
firm grip of  the initiative’, and act ‘just in advance of  pressure, but only
just’ (Colonial Office document 1036/10, file 33). The racial factor could
not be discounted lightly. ‘It is true that constitutional advance does not
wait upon a country’s demand, but the circumstances of  Fiji are rather
special and to go too fast would...play into the hands of the Indians’
(Colonial Office document 1036/10, file 77). ‘If there is no pressure for
a change, we should be the last to stimulate it’ (Colonial Office document
1036/10, file 77), was the advice of  one colonial officer. Predictably
Garvey’s motive was questioned. Was he actuated by the desire to end
his term of  office by ‘some significant advance’? The Secretary of  State
replied to Garvey’s proposals on 20 March 1956
[i]t seems very unwise to do anything to encourage it [constitutional reform] to
grow more quickly unless we have some fairly clear idea where we are going. In some
respects Fiji is a very difficult proposition from the point of view of constitutional
advance. We are all, very naturally, inclined to think of  such advance in terms of
British institutions, leading in the direction of  an elected assembly, universal adult
suffrage, the party system, the vesting of executive power in unofficial Ministers
and so forth. Yet we are learning by experience elsewhere that the traditional British
pattern, however suitable for places of a certain size, is difficult to work out in small
territories, even where there is a homogenous and relatively well advanced
population; it is still more difficult to apply in such a place as Fiji, where race means
more than party, and where a dilemma is created by the numerical preponderance of
the Indians on the one hand and our obligations to the Fijians on the other. It may
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well be that what we ought to aim at in Fiji is some form of constitution different
from the traditional pattern. In this connection you may like to look at the enclosed
document about another of our problem areas—Mauritius—not because the ideas
which are being tried out there are necessarily all applicable...but as an illustration of
the fact that new ways are being sought to establish forms of democracy and of
representative institutions in places where the conditions favourable to the
‘Westminster model’ do not exist (Sir Thomas Lloyd to Garvey, 20 March 1956, in
Colonial Office document 1036/10).
Garvey was disappointed but not surprised. The fears of  the
floodgates were, in truth, groundless, he said. In taking the initiative, he
reminded the Colonial Office, he was ‘not playing with a scorpion’s tale’
(Garvey to Sir John Macpherson, 14 October 1956, in Colonial Office
document 1036/10, file 33). His modest proposals would have resulted
in ‘some quickening of interest in a direction where we are failing to
make progress even though we are far better equipped than many who
have raced ahead of us’. If Fiji were to wait for integration to take place
at the local government level, before proceeding to any constitutional
change, ‘we shall have to wait a long time for progress in that direction’.
When recommending the appointment of a commissioner to advise on
constitutional matters, Garvey said he was not thinking of  anyone entirely
unfamiliar with Fiji. He had in mind Sir Arthur Richards, now Lord
Milverton, a widely respected former governor, who had, with Sukuna,
engineered the creation of  the Native Land Trust Board.
By the late 1950s, Fiji hardly resembled the place in had been at the
beginning of the decade. The working class, increasing in size and
visibility, had begun to organise. A series of  lightning strikes in the 1950s,
culminating in the December 1959 riots, shook Fiji. A crippling strike in
the sugar industry was in prospect, after a peaceful interlude of nearly
two decades. The population was increasing rapidly and becoming better
informed about events in Fiji and overseas, thanks to a thriving print
media and the advent of  the radio. Fijian soldiers were returning to Fiji
after four years of  service in the Malayan jungles, where they had gone
to fight the Chinese communist insurgency. Two major commissions of
enquiry were under way, one by geographer O.H.K. Spate into the
economic and social problems facing the Fijian people (Spate 1959),
and another by Sir Alan Burns into the natural resources and population
trends in the colony (Burns et al. 1960), both recommending a
fundamental change of direction.
The government could no longer afford to stall or stonewall. In his
budget address to the Legislative Council in 1960, the new governor, Sir
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Kenneth Maddocks, tested the waters by suggesting the need for
constitutional reform, hoping that the next election (in 1963) might be
held under a new Letters Patent (Letter from Maddocks to H.P. Hall, 17
January 1961, in Colonial Office document 1036/612). The aim was to
pave the way for a ministerial system of government—initially to be
called the Member System—under which unofficial members of the
Legislative Council would be invited to undertake supervisory roles for
government departments, contribute to policy formulation and oversee
its implementation, all under the principle of collective, cabinet-type
responsibility. The proposal was intended to be the first step towards
full internal self-government.
The government’s constitutional proposals were debated during the
April 1961 sitting of the Legislative Council, the motion introduced by
the Acting Colonial Secretary. His tone is almost pleading, begging
European and Fijian members to have an open mind on reform. For the
first time, the government was taking the lead, somewhat along the lines
Garvey had envisaged in the 1950s. The Colonial Secretary asked the
members to ‘try and establish for ourselves a long term objective’. The
winds of decolonisation were moving closer to the Pacific. Samoa was
on the verge of independence and Fiji could not afford to be indifferent.
‘I know it would be nice to consider Fiji in a vacuum and isolated and do
as we wish, but unfortunately we cannot’. He continued
…we are part of the world and there are forces moving which, whether we like it or
not—and I know many of us do not like it—are going to have a profound influence
on us and on our future. We need to consider these forces; what they are and what
steps are necessary to meet and mould them to our ends. We want to do it in our
own unhurried time. We do not want to wait till the forces are built up against us
and we have to do things as a matter of  urgency. Let us think ahead, see what is
coming, be ready for it and do all that we have to do in our own time, and by our
own choosing...do not let us forget the forces outside. It is no good forgetting
them; they are there and they are real (Legislative Council Debate, April 1961).
By ‘forces out there’, the government meant the pressure from the United
Nations’ Committee on Decolonisation, which watched developments
in Fiji closely, much to the irritation of  the colonial government as well
as Fijians and Europeans.
During the same legislative council debate, the Colonial Secretary
responded to those who maintained that the majority of the people were
satisfied with the status quo. He is worth quoting at length.
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Almost everything starts with a minority. Minorities have a way of  growing, and
when minorities have a popular idea, any government that ignores such a minority
does so at its peril. A minority can be likened to a small stream. It is there, something
quite small and water is soft. It can be used for many purposes. If you dam the
stream the waters build up behind the dam so you build a bigger dam, but one day
you cannot go on and the burst comes. We do not want a burst here. What we want
is to look together into the future and be sure that this stream of ideas, this minority
perhaps, this thing called democracy is not dammed up or held back but is guided to
our purpose. We want no burst dam (Legislative Council Debate, April 1961).
Unsurprisingly, the Indo-Fijian members supported the motion while
European members opposed it. But what mattered more now than ever
before was the reaction of  the Fijian leaders. As in the past, Fijian opinion
was not solidly against change. Although the majority opposed the motion,
they did so for differing reasons. Among those who remained unconvinced
of  the government’s policy was Ratu Kamisese Mara, the ascendant Fijian
political leader and Fiji’s first prime minister. The government’s policy
was ill-conceived and ill-timed, he said, because it ignored the spirit and
implications of the Deed of Cession and the special place of the Fijian
people in their own country. The chiefs had ceded Fiji ‘to be part and
parcel of the United Kingdom’, in the same way that the Channel Islands
and the Isle of Man were integral parts of the United Kingdom. That
special relationship was recognised in the title Fijians used to refer to
the Queen: Radi ni Viti kei Peretania, the Queen of Fiji and of Great
Britain. Ratu Mara urged caution and advised a gradualist approach.
Constitutional development should follow, not precede, social and
economic integration. Ratu Penaia Ganilau another high chief and future
governor general and president of Fiji, agreed—no constitution, no matter
how good, would work unless ‘we have a common background of
accepted principles’.
The government listened politely, knowing that it had no alternative
but to take the lead, but also aware that it must avoid embarrassing the
Fijian members. It sought to allay their fears without compromising the
principle of  constitutional reform. The government denied that its
proposals detracted from the promises of the Deed of Cession, and
assured the Fijian leaders that it would entrench provisions safeguarding
the native ownership of land as well as others that touched on customary
matters. To the argument that social and economic integration should
precede political reform, the government argued that ‘unity does not
have to grow from the bottom. In fact, when there are present
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communities speaking different languages, having different religions,
living mostly in a different economy and having different customs’, unity
‘can spread downwards’. Suva was not doing anything that London itself
had not adopted as official policy. The Colonial Secretary reminded the
Legislative Council that as early as 1943, the United Kingdom had pledged
itself to ‘guide Colonial people along the road to self-government within
the British Empire’, adding that ‘it is no part of our policy to confer
political advances which are unjustified by circumstances or to grant
self-government to those who are not yet trained in its use’ . For Whitehall,
though, the latter qualification had out-lived its usefulness.
In 1963, Fiji got a new Letters Patent that provided for an enlarged
Legislative Council, consisting of 19 official and 18 unofficial members
(see Meller and Anthony 1968). The three main communities had six
members each—the principle of  parity was preserved—four elected from
racial rolls and two nominated by the governor. Property qualification
for voters was abolished, and for the first time, a universal franchise was
extended to the Fijians. The following year, the membership system was
introduced. The issue after 1963 was not if self-government and
independence would come to Fiji, but rather the terms and conditions
upon which they would be acceptable to its various ethnic communities.
By the mid 1960s, the political landscape of Fiji had altered
dramatically. Fijian fears, alluded to above, had intensified. The industrial
disputes of 1959 in Suva and in the sugar industry in 1960, aroused, or,
rather, reinforced, the threat of Indo-Fijian domination. The calls for
reform in the Fijian system of  administration, for traditional structures
to be loosened to enable greater personal enterprise among those Fijians
who wanted it, for the natural resources of the country to be used in an
economic way for the benefit of the country as a whole, for the system
of Fijian Administration, which had kept the indigenous community
isolated from the mainstream, to be liberalised, startled a people used to
gentle counselling, flattery and effusive praise for their traditional way
of life. Their leaders expressed their anger, and London listened. ‘I see
no future in the Burns recommendation that the Fijian administration
should be wound up as soon as possible’, wrote Julian Amery, the
Parliamentary Under-secretary of State for the Colonies, in 1960. ‘The
Fijians are determined to resist any move in this direction. They realise
that whatever its defects the tribal system does provide a leadership
capable of defending the Fijian communal interest against what they
regard as the Indian threat. Without their chiefs they would be leaderless’
(Amery, ‘Report on Fiji’, in Colonial Office document 1036/612).
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Still, Fijian leaders realised that they could not go on resisting whatever
constitutional proposals the government presented. And so the Fijian
Affairs Board, the executive arm of  the Great Council of  Chiefs,
presented their views in a document that subsequently came to be known
as the ‘Wakaya Letter’.8 In it, they stated their preconditions for
constitutional reform. Addressed to Nigel Fisher, the Parliamentary
Under-secretary of State for the Colonies, the letter reminded the Crown
of  the special significance of  the Deed of  Cession for the Fijians. It was
the Fijian view that ‘the possibility of severance of this link with the
Crown—a link forged in a spirit of  mutual trust and goodwill—should
never be contemplated’ (cited in Lal 1992:189). Before any further
constitutional changes were considered, the letter stated, the terms of
the relationship, which they mistakenly likened to the relationship
between Britain and the Channel Islands, should be clarified and codified.
The letter went on
…there would have to be a precise restatement of the guarantee on Fijian land
ownership. We visualise that the native land trust legislation should not be changed
or added to without the prior consent of the sovereign and the agreement of the
Council of  Chiefs. We also stand by the expressed desire of  the high chiefs in the
preamble to the deed of cession that Fiji should be a Christian state and that
therefore no constitutional or administrative changes should take place that would
deviate from that intention. The provision of the Fijian affairs ordinance that all
legislation affecting Fijian rights and interests should be referred to the Fijian Affairs
Board or, on the recommendation of the board, to the Council of Chiefs, should
be retained and likewise the governor’s direction to the Public Service Commission
to work towards a balance of  the races in the civil service (cited in Lal 1992:189).
If these concerns were addressed, the letter concluded, the Fijian chiefs
would consider contemplating further constitutional changes.
The letter was a powerful negotiating tool, designed to extract the
maximum concession from Suva and London. The Colonial Office was
sympathetic to Fijian concerns but firm about the need not to ignore the
interests and concerns of  the non-indigenous communities. The
government in Suva privately assured the Fijian leaders that the special
position of the indigenous community would be safeguarded, and not
placed under ‘the heels of an immigrant community’, in the words of
Governor Derek Jakeway, who was himself, in the mid 1960s, active
behind the scenes helping the Fijians to organise politically.
Europeans, used to a privileged position, felt threatened about their
place in any future constitutional arrangement. The Suva riots, multiracial
in character and overtly anti-European in intent, had shaken them as
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never before. Alone, they knew, they stood little chance of  maintaining
their disproportionate representation in the Legislative Council; and they
had few friends in places where it really mattered, such as Whitehall.
Hence, they sought closer alignment with the Fijian leadership.
Understandably, it was an alliance of  mutual convenience. The
Europeans needed the political protection the Fijians could provide,
and the Fijians, appreciating the Europeans’ vulnerability, knew they
could count on European support against the Indo-Fijians. This alliance
of interest against the threat of a perceived common enemy would last
the rest of  the decade and, indeed, well into independence. It was formally
institutionalised in the Fijian Association-backed Alliance Party that
emerged in early 1966.
The Indo-Fijian scene was energised by the return to the Legislative
Council, after the absence of  more than a decade, of  A.D. Patel. Patel,
Indian-born but a Fiji resident since 1928, was a leader of unequalled
intellectual brilliance—a Gandhian at heart, a fierce and fearless critic
of  colonial rule and an untiring advocate of  common roll (see Lal
1997a). He united the usually fractious Indo-Fijian community and
formed Fiji’s first political party, the Federation, in 1963. Two ideas
lay at the heart of  Patel’s political vision. One was independence, or
at least a large measure of internal self-government, eventually leading
to independence. If Samoa and the Cook Islands, small, vulnerable
and resource-poor, could become independent, why not Fiji, he argued?
Independence was a matter of time, Patel believed, not if but when it
came, and he wanted Fiji to be prepared for it.
The other idea was common roll. He had been its advocate from the
beginning. Communal roll, which Fijians and Europeans wanted, would
be ruinous for the country.
Of all the people, Indians are bitterly opposed to communal representation because
they have seen its painful result in the course of time. It may not be very serious
now, but as time goes on, once people get used to the idea of  racial separation, racial
attitudes harden and people start thinking in racial terms and racial interests which
leads not to one nation but, in the course of political developments, it leads to
claims of  several nations (A.D. Patel, cited in Lal 1997a:189).
‘Communal roll’, he continued, ‘symbolised divided loyalties, and
inhibited the formation of  secular parties, with success in politics
depending on reflecting communal interests and prejudices. Compromise
will be rendered difficult and relative party strength may be frozen for
long periods because a party can grow only with an increase in the size
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of the community upon which it is based’. On the other hand, common
roll would ‘encourage the citizens to organise political parties along
national lines and in the long run compel everyone else to think in terms
of his country rather than a particular race, community or religion’. It
was ‘only through making one nation out of Fiji that we can achieve the
sort of future we want for everybody’ (Lal 1997:192).
The passion with which Patel pursued the idea was reciprocated by
the passion with which its opponents—which included all Fijian and
European leaders—rejected it. The system of communal representation
was well established in Fiji; it had worked well, they argued; a system of
guaranteed racial representation produced no fears of any one group
dominating others; it realistically accepted the differences of culture,
language, custom and religion. These two positions illustrate the two
contrasting, even diametrically opposed, visions of Fiji; and they have
continued to haunt Fiji’s subsequent political history. Indeed, in many
ways, they lie at the heart of  the political problems besetting Fiji today.
In July 1965, Whitehall convened a constitutional conference, and
invited the elected representatives of the three communities to London.9
All the established positions were expressed, with Europeans and Fijians
agreeing only to limited internal self-government and the Indo-Fijian
delegation hoping for a final blow to colonial rule in Fiji. Important
advances were made. The Legislative Council was expanded to include 36
members: 14 Fijians (9 elected on communal roll, 3 on multiracial cross-
voting and 2 nominated by the Great Council of Chiefs); 12 Indo-Fijians
(9 communal and 3 cross-voting); and 10 Europeans (7 communal and 3
cross-voting). The system of cross-voting was seen as a limited concession
to common roll in which multiracial electorates voted for seats reserved
for candidates of  different races. The Fijian and the European delegation
were delighted with the outcome, and for good reason: the Europeans’
privileged position was maintained, and the Fijians had, for the first time,
got two additional seats. Fijian-European solidarity was consolidated.
The Indo-Fijians were disappointed. They had lost parity with the
Fijians (see Lal 1992). The communal roll had been maintained, their
plea for at least partial introduction of  common roll falling on deaf  ears.
And the Indo-Fijian community was now more isolated than ever,
electorally segregated from the other communities. The Fijian roll, for
instance, was expanded to include all the other Pacific islanders and the
European roll opened up to accommodate the Chinese. Why should the
Chinese be on the European roll when they had culturally less in common
with Europeans than the Indo-Fijians, Patel asked, but to no avail.
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He accused the Colonial Office of not playing a fair mediating role at
the conference (preoccupied as it was at the time with the crisis in Aden),
by not persuading the Fijians and Europeans sufficiently enough to accept
at least partial common roll by effectively capitulating to combined
European and Fijian pressure. I am presently investigating the thinking
of the Colonial Office, so can only provide a tentative assessment of
the subject, but my overwhelming impression is that London had a deep
sympathy for the Fijian people and was concerned not to let them end
up in a secondary position in any future political arrangement. Their
rhetorical advocacy of  Westminster democracy was secondary to their
sensitivity to Fijian feelings. London also had a prudent appreciation of
its dependence on Fijian security forces to maintain law and order.
Nor did everyone in London share the vision of Fiji as a cohesive
multiracial nation, although most hoped for at least some movement in
favour of  non-racial politics. Julian Amery reported confidentially to the
Colonial Office in 1960 that ‘The Fijians and Indians are more distinct
as communities than Jews and Arabs in Palestine, Greeks and Turks in
Cyprus or even Europeans and Bantu in South and Central Africa’
(Colonial Office document 1036/11). Understandably he did not add
that London itself was partly responsible for this unfortunate state of
affairs. It was ‘impracticable to think in terms of  a single Fijian nation or
of a common roll at any rate for the foreseeable future’, he advised. The
concept of a ‘single multiracial community as the goal towards which
Fijians and Indians alike should strive’ was illusory, he added. ‘The Fijians
will no longer accept this; and the more we lay the emphasis on
multiracialism, the more suspicious they will become that we plan to sell
them out to the Indians’. Indeed, Amery recommended setting up a
separate system of administration for Indo-Fijians, as a counterpart to
the separate administration for the Fijians. In view of  this, a non-racial
vision for Fiji was doomed from the start.
In September 1966, fifteen months after the constitutional conference,
Fiji went through another election, for the first time on party lines: the
Indo-Fijian-based Federation Party and the Fijian Association-backed,
nominally multiracial Alliance Party launched in 1966. Both parties won
in their constituencies, the Alliance winning two-thirds of the Fijian
communal votes and the Federation a similar percentage among the Indo-
Fijians. After the elections, Ratu Mara became the Chief  Minister. The
1965 constitution had produced the result both Suva and London wanted,
and it seemed there was no urgent reason to review the constitution that
the Federation Party had accepted under protest. The new government
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jettisoned the bipartisan approach of the past. Patel feared that unless
the constitution was reviewed, the entire Indo-Fijian community would
be consigned to the wilderness of  frustrated and possibly endless
opposition (Lal 1997a). And so, on 1 September 1967, the Federation
Party walked out of the Legislative Council in the middle of an Alliance
attack on the motion it had introduced rejecting the constitution and
demanding a new one that was based on more democratic principles.
The ensuing by-election was fought in an intense atmosphere of great
bitterness and tension (see Anthony 1969; Norton 2004). When the
Federation Party won all the Indo-Fijian communal seats, and with
increased majorities, too, many nationalist Fijians threatened violence,
bringing the country to the edge of  a crisis. But cooler heads prevailed
and emotions subsided. Nonetheless, the message was clear—the 1965
racially unbalanced constitution would have to be re-examined, and the
wishes of  the Federation Party could not be ignored. Nor, on the other
hand, could Fijian views be discounted. The battle lines were clearly
drawn. Apprehending the gravity of the situation, Governor Jakeway
urged Mara and Patel to resume dialogue. They did in August 1969, as
representatives of  the two parties met in Suva under the chairmanship
of Ratu Edward Cakobau for a series of confidential discussions to
identify areas of agreement and disagreement between them.10 In an
atmosphere marked by cordiality, the leaders talked frankly and freely
about their concerns and fears, stating their views about the constitution
and possible ways out of  the current impasse. A.D. Patel, who died a
month after attending the first meeting, pressed his case for common
roll and immediate full independence. After his death, Patel was succeeded
by Siddiq Koya, also a lawyer by training, who proved less doctrinally or
ideologically committed to common roll, and who was more conciliatory
and pragmatic. Mara’s relations with Koya were more cordial, as they
never had been with Patel. Mara had the measure of Koya, where he
feared Patel’s guile.11 Influenced by a wider and deeper knowledge of
history, particularly of  the Indian subcontinent, raised at the dawn of
Mahatma Gandhi’s struggle against the British, philosophically
committed to the idea of a non-racial society to the point of stubbornness,
Patel was not one to give in easily. Koya, on the other hand, accepted
the reality on the ground and sought to work pragmatically within its
parameters and constraints where as his predecessor had sought to change
them, to alter the terms of  the debate.
In the confidential discussions between August 1969 and March 1970,
common ground was reached on many issues. To allay Fijian fears about
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their rights, the Federation Party proposed an upper house, the Senate,
where the nominees of the Great Council of Chiefs would have the
power to veto any legislation that affected specific Fijian interests. It
also proposed to go into independence without election to avoid the
acrimony that an election campaign would inevitably entail, because it
felt that Ratu Mara, then widely popular, was the best leader to be at the
helm to effect a smooth transition to independence, and because the
Federation Party itself  was diffident about the broad acceptability of  its
own leadership.12 In truth, they acknowledged that all the power was on
the other side, and that they would have to accept the role of opposition
for a long time into the future. There was also the hope that by making
concessions and adopting a moderate stance, space might be created for
racial reconciliation and harmony and for genuine multiracial politics to
emerge.13
On one issue, though—the composition of the legislature and the
method of  election—the two parties disagreed. The Federation Party
presented its case for a common roll, though without the conviction or
authority of  the past. Predictably, the Alliance opposed the idea, while
promising an open mind on common roll as a long-term objective. Both
parties decided to defer the issue to the impending constitutional
conference in London, with the Federation agreeing that, in the event of
an impasse, it would accept a formula ‘approved and settled by the British
Government’. Lord Shepherd, Minister of  State for Foreign and
Commonwealth Affairs, who went to Fiji to witness first hand the progress
and the authenticity of the local negotiations, was clearly delighted by
the Federation’s concessions—as, of  course, was the Alliance Party. He
insisted that the consensus be formally recorded. The consensus was
that ‘if no agreement was reached and circumstances remained as at
present, it would be necessary that the constitutional instruments for
independence should reflect, subject to any formal changes arising from
independence, the provisions of  the existing constitution’ (Foreign and
Commonwealth Office file 32/571). That is, the same constitution that
the Federation Party had rejected in 1965 as ‘undemocratic, unjust and
iniquitous’. In their quest for an orderly transition to independence, the
party leaders had sacrificed their long-held principles for political
expediency. As they saw it at the time, a smooth transition to
independence was their primary aim, with the hope that things might
change for the better in the future. They did not.
The penultimate conference paving the way for Fiji’s independence
was held in London in April 1970. Words spoken at the opening session
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at Marlborough House by both parties alluded to racial harmony, nation-
building, common future, gratitude to the United Kingdom and close
links to the Crown, trust, mutual understanding and goodwill.14 The
political turbulence that had accompanied the enactment of the 1965
constitution seemed a distant memory. Shepherd queried the over-
representation of the Europeans, which Mara justified as a reflection of
their contribution to the economy. He did not say—did not need to
say—that the Europeans invariably voted with the Fijians, and that their
disproportionate numbers in parliament was a guarantee of Fijian political
dominance.
On common roll, Mara was adamant: it was nothing but a ruse for
Indian domination of Fiji. Fijians would never accept it. ‘These fears are
like the devil. Many people can prove that there is no devil, yet they are
fearful of  devils’ (Transcript of  pre-London talks in Suva:94). The
Federation Party presented its case for common roll, and expected Lord
Shepherd to impress on the Alliance the need to make at least some
token gesture towards accepting it. The Alliance refused and Shepherd
proposed that acceptance of  common roll be a long-term objective. NFP
Secretary Karam Ramrakha objected, but officials in London and Suva
both knew where party leader Koya stood. For him, it was a long-term
objective too. To break the impasse, Shepherd resurrected the idea of  a
Royal Commission to look into the method of election after
independence. Mara and Koya endorsed the proposal. In 1975, a
commission was appointed with Sir Harry Street as chairman, and
recommended moving away from communal roll to a system of
proportional representation.15 But by then the Alliance was firmly in
control, and refused even to debate the report in parliament. National
Federation Party cried foul, but one is left with the impression that its
leaders, with a few exceptions, did not mind the Alliance’s about-face
on its Marlborough House commitment. The Indo-Fijian population
growth was slowing down, and many saw guaranteed racial representation
to be in the community’s long-term interest.
The final constitution was in its most fundamental aspects an extension
of the principles and values that had underpinned the 1966 constitution.
It preserved the status quo. Fiji was to have a bicameral legislature with an
appointed Upper House (Senate) and a fully elected Lower House (House
of  Representatives) of  52 seats, with 22 each reserved for Fijians and
Indo-Fijians and 8 for the general electors (Europeans, part-Europeans,
Chinese and others). Of  the 22 seats reserved for the Fijians and Indo-
Fijians, 12 were to be contested on communal (racial) rolls and the
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remaining 10 on national (cross-voting) seats. This meant that candidates
themselves were required to be Fijians, Indo-Fijians and general electors,
but they were all elected by registered voters. In the House of
Representatives, then, Fijians and Indo-Fijians had parity. The general
electors’ privileged position was also preserved: though they comprised
only 4 per cent of the population, they had 15.4 percent of the seats,
compared to Fijians and Indo-Fijians who had 42.3 per cent of the seats
each. General elector over-representation was accepted, indeed advocated,
by the Fijian leaders, who knew from experience that the general electors
would support them, as they had invariably done in the past. In the 22-
member Senate, the principle of Fijian paramountcy was explicitly
recognised by giving the 8 nominees of the Great Council of Chiefs the
power of veto over legislation specifically affecting Fijian interests and
privileges.
The independence constitution, then, represented continuity with Fiji’s
racially divided past. It was based on the assumption that ‘race’, or
ethnicity, was, and would long remain, the most important determinant
of political behaviour of the people and that Fijians would control
political power if they remained united and voted solidly as a racial
group. But Fiji was changing rapidly. New forces of  modernity and
globalisation were altering the fundamental social and political structures
of  society, reducing the relevance of  race in everyday life. The gulf
between the public culture constructed on the pillars of  communalism
and the realities of  everyday living was growing.
Two days before Fiji became independent on 10 October 1970, Sir
Robert Foster penned his last despatch as governor of  Fiji. In it, he tried
to capture the mood of the moment, the sometimes-tumultuous events
which had led to it, and embroiled it in conflict and tension, and offered
his prognosis on what the future held for the young nation. ‘Seldom can
a country have prepared for independence with such aplomb’, he told
London. The diverse people of Fiji ‘do not yet think of themselves as a
nation’ (Foreign and Commonwealth Office file 32/606), and Julian
Amery’s words about the differences between the two communities,
written a decade ago, still retained some salience. Foster commented on
developments which had facilitated the smooth transition to
independence: the sobering effects of the 1968 by-elections, and the
conciliatory posture of  Siddiq Koya and his warm relations with Mara.
The future looked reasonably bright. But in his despatch was the
suggestion of  dark clouds on the horizon. The land problem—not
ownership but leasing arrangements—remained as intractable as ever.
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Time had been bought by setting up a committee to examine amendments
to the Landlord and Tenant Ordinance. ‘But a solution to the land
problem is no nearer. I doubt whether the problem will ever be solved
without far more radical changes in the system of land tenure than Fijians
have hitherto been prepared to contemplate’ (Foreign and Commonwealth
Office file 32/606). The second major problem, unresolved at the
conference—shelved, to be confronted after independence—was the
electoral system. ‘A calm search for a just solution to the problem of
representation has in the past proved virtually impossible; feelings ran
far too deep for that. One is therefore bound to regret that in effect a
time bomb will lie buried under the new constitution, and to pray that it
may be defused before exploding. The two parties have however publicly
committed themselves to an act of faith that must give reasonable ground
for hope’ (Foreign and Commonwealth Office file 32/606).
Prescient words. There was reasonable hope—all that could be hoped
for—as Fiji took its first steps into its independent future.
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On the surface, calm and goodwill characterised race relations and political
life in the post-independence years. Development proceeded apace as new
jetties, wharves and roads were built; modern amenities such as electricity,
piped water and paved roads reached remote villages in the islands. More
and more people of all ethnic groups and social backgrounds streamed
towards cities and urban centres in search of employment or better
education for their children. Elections were held periodically; the sanctity
of  the ballot box was respected (partly, as it turned out, because one party
was regularly returned to power and because the status quo was not
threatened); and parliament served as the principal, and much respected,
forum for political debate. On the surface, things looked fine, but forces
were at work that would undermine this ostensible calm.
An important feature of the final constitutional negotiations in London
was the agreement between the Alliance and the National Federation
Party (NFP) that the method of election would provide only for the first
House of Representatives elected after independence, in 1972. The
electoral system thus was set up to be an interim solution. In their joint
statement of 30 April 1970, both Mara and Koya agreed to appoint a
Royal Commission that would work out a permanent electoral system
for Fiji’s plural society. A Royal Commission was appointed in 1975,
with Professor Harry Street, Sir William Hart and Professor Sir Keith
Lucas as its members (Parliamentary Paper 1975/24). In its report, the
Commission accepted the importance of ethnic factors in Fijian politics
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and recommended the retention of communal seats with the same weight
to counter racial fears and to provide reassurance and a sense of security
to ethnic minorities. But it also suggested that racial reservation for the
25 national seats be removed, turning them into common electoral roll
in five constituencies ‘with no restriction of race or religion for either
voters or candidates’. It further suggested that election for these seats
should be on the basis of  single transfer vote. This careful formula
attempted to reconcile the particular ethnic interests of the different
communities with the urgent necessity to forge a sense of nationalism
that transcended ethnic loyalties.
The Alliance Party rejected the recommendations on the grounds that
they were not binding and that in any event the constitution, of which
the electoral system was an integral part, was a permanent arrangement.
Broadly interpreted, the Alliance stance was correct, but in relation to
the provisions for altering the electoral system, it was in conflict with
the Joint Statement of 1970. It appeared to be at variance with the position
Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara had adopted at the 13th Plenary Session of the
London Constitutional Conference, where he had argued that the
Commission's findings ‘would be taken into consideration and then
become part of the constitution otherwise its recommendations could
be subject to the whim and fancies of any Parliament’ (Parliamentary
Paper 1975/24). This had been the understanding of  the NFP leadership,
which pointed out to the Royal Commission that ‘both sides to say the
least would accept the recommendations of the Royal Commission on
moral grounds if nothing else’. By 1975, Mara had shifted his stance
because the ‘interim arrangement’ had preserved his party’s advantage
as the 1972 elections clearly showed. The issue was not tested on the
floor of the parliament, but the rejection of the recommendations was a
foregone conclusion given the Alliance’s preponderant majority.
The Alliance’s stand contradicted the view of  the British
representative at the constitutional talks, Lord Shepherd, who held that
the ‘constitution is a living creature, subject to growth, susceptible to
change; it is a sign of life, vigour and maturity to be ready for change
when change is required’ (Legislative Council of Fiji 1970:19). The
Alliance was clearly not ready for change. The NFP leadership had also
learnt a bitter lesson. As Ahmed Ali put it, ‘their wish was meaningless
islands of turmoil
26
and the expected flexibility of independence had proved elusive; the
rigidity of the colonial era still held sway; the old arguments against
total rejection of common roll persisted despite expert advice’ (Ali
1980:180). The Alliance’s new position marked the end of  the
‘honeymoon period’ between Koya and Mara and the beginning of bitter
relations between the two that would culminate in Mara’s vow in 1977
not to work with Koya again. Koya’s own position within his party was
considerably weakened by his inexplicably close relationship with Mara
not bearing fruit. His political days were numbered.
The constitution continued to be a controversial issue. Many Fijians
still appeared concerned that only a Fijian-dominated Alliance
government would protect their heritage and rights. A government headed
by high chiefs had been in power since independence, and for many
Fijians this was only natural and just and they wanted it to continue.
Some scholars argued that the Fijian élite would accept the paraphernalia
of  electoral politics only to the extent that it served their interest, and
that any deviation from the established path would not be tolerated.
Events following the general elections of 1982 gave credence to the
view that the Fijian attitude to sharing power with others was hardening.
The 1982 general election was a closely contested affair which the
Alliance won with a four seat majority and a plurality of 2,000 out of
1,003,000 votes (Lal 1983a). Soon afterwards, irate Fijian landowners
in western Viti Levu threatened to evict their Indian tenants for not
‘fulfilling their pledges to vote for the Alliance’ (Lal 1983b). The
paramount chief of Sabeto said of the Indian tenants that as they ‘are
the ones who opposed us, I will have them no more’. In the Senate,
several Fijian Senators came dangerously close to speaking in a manner
popularised by the nationalist leader Sakiasi Butadroka, declaring that
‘blood will flow’ if  Indians did not ‘cling’ to Fijians. Some even argued
for the deportation of opposition leaders who were alleged to have
insulted Fijian political chiefs.
The vehemence of the remarks was matched by the silence they
received in response by the Fijian community. In parliament calls were
made to revise the constitution to provide for Fijian parliamentary
dominance. The most significant support for this view came from the
Great Council of  Chiefs. At its 1982 meeting on the chiefly island of
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Bau, opened for the first time since cession by a reigning British monarch,
the council castigated the opposition for allegedly criticising Fijian chiefs
during the election, and took the unprecedented step of passing a
resolution calling for the reservation of  two-thirds of  the House of
Representatives as well as the positions of governor general and prime
minister for indigenous Fijians. This view found an astounding amount
of  sympathy, mainly among literate urban Fijians. A survey by the Suva-
based Market Research Bureau showed 70 per cent of urban Fijians
were in favour of  reserving the offices of  prime minister and governor
general for indigenous Fijians, while 64 per cent supported the reservation
of seats in parliament. In contrast, only 55 per cent expressed no objection
to the election of  an Indian as prime minister.
Ratu Sir Penaia Ganilau, then president of the Great Council of Chiefs,
expressed deep sorrow at the apparent loss of chiefly influence and urged
Fijians to preserve their unity under chiefly guidance. The Bau resolution
was seen by the NFP as being anti-Indian, though in truth, as one Fijian
observer, Savenaca Nacanaitaba, commented, it was directed as much
against commoner dissenting Fijians as it was at non-Fijians (Fiji Times,
29 July 1982). The chiefs, he suggested, were attempting to impose a
‘culture of  silence’ upon their people. Significantly, 40 members present
at the meeting, including Prime Minister Mara and some of his cabinet
members abstained from voting on the motion, although Mara did speak
against it. He subsequently defended himself by calling the resolution a
‘waste of time’ (Lal 1983b).
His critics argued that if, as the leader of  a multiracial society, and as
a committed multiracialist, he had spoken against what was primarily a
racially discriminatory motion, much of the anxiety that the resolution
caused among non-Fijians would have been avoided. But abstention
made political sense in the circumstances. It enabled Mara to extricate
himself from a difficult situation while allowing room for leverage in the
future. In 1974, assured of  wide support across the political spectrum,
Mara took decisive action against Butadroka’s motion to deport Indo-
Fijians and put Fijians in political control. But the political climate had
changed since then. In 1982, an Alliance victory was possible only because
of  the solid support of  the Fijian community. Now to repudiate the
wishes of  the community’s leaders for political supremacy would have
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meant jeopardising his party’s base. Thus, by abstaining, Mara did not
overtly alienate his own constituency, while reminding the Indo-Fijian
community of his moderate stand amidst extremism. Underlying the ire
of the Fijian landlords against politically unreliable Indo-Fijian tenants,
and the call for the revision of the constitution by the Great Council of
Chiefs, lay a resurgent Fijian ethnonationalism. It was asserting its voice
and seeking practical realisation of  the concept of  Fijian paramountcy.
In effect, it represented a concerted challenge to the notion of political
coexistence. Five years later, things would come to a head.
Land
A more emotive issue than the distribution of political power was land
and its use by different communities. Enveloped in prejudice and
misunderstanding, the question of land always aroused great communal
passion in Fiji. Land ownership was not at issue—that question was
permanently solved by the constitution (and common sense)—access to
it and security of tenure were. The bulk of the Indo-Fijian population
lived in the sugar cane belt of Fiji, constituted over 80 per cent of the
sugar cane farmers in the 1980s, and produced 90 per cent of  the country’s
sugar, most of it on leased native land of limited tenure. The Indo-Fijian
tenant community wanted more secure tenure, extending beyond 30 years.
Fijian landowners, apprehensive of losing control over a vital resource
and some themselves wanting to enter commercial agriculture, resisted.
The ensuing stalemate generated bitterness, further fuelling ethnic tensions.
The land problem had become more acute, and certainly more
politicised, in the last two decades since independence. However, its
roots lay in the 1920s when, after the end of indenture, an expanding
and rapidly diversifying Indo-Fijian community began to make increasing
demands regarding the land. By the 1930s land had already emerged as a
contentious issue in Fijian–Indian relations. The Indo-Fijian tenants were
complaining of the difficulty of obtaining land and of the vexation and
expense involved in negotiating terms with individual Fijian landowners.
Ken Gillion (1977) describes the reasons for the Fijian apprehension.
In the 1930s, they [indigenous Fijians] were becoming more aware of their economic
weakness. Their numbers were on the rise just as were the Indians’, the land was
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needed for their children, and they wanted to grow more cash crops. In some cases
when they could not afford to pay compensation for improvements, they were
refusing to renew leases when they came up for renewal. Sometimes the land was
then used for their own cultivation, but often it reverted to bush (Gillion 1977:90).
In 1936, in response to a CSR-inspired crackdown on recalcitrant
landlords, the Council of Chiefs, encouraged by Ratu Sukuna, agreed to
have the government assume control of ‘all native land not required for
immediate use and to administer such land in best interests of the Fijians’
(Gillion 1977:191). This resolution led, four years later, to the passage
of  the Native Land Ordinance. Under it, an independent body, the Native
Land Trust Board, was set up to manage and administer all native lands;
its establishment brought a semblance of stability to land transactions
between Fijian landowners and Indo-Fijian tenants. The length of  leases
was standardised to 10 years with the expectation, but not guarantee, of
renewal.
The Native Land Ordinance also provided for a native reserve policy
to demarcate gradually and set aside in perpetuity certain native lands
‘for the use and maintenance of proprietary units’. How many native
leases were put into reserve is not known, but the policy was a major
source of  friction between the tenants and the landlords. Driven off  the
reserved land and forced to fend for himself  and his family without the
communal or kinship support available to the Fijians, the Indo-Fijian
tenant complained of  harassment and hardship. His former farm went
largely uncultivated and frequently reverted to bush; even when farmed,
it operated far below its full economic potential. The Fijian landowner
viewed the reserve policy differently, as a protection against the
unquenchable thirst for ever more land by Indo-Fijian tenants. He saw
reserved land and shorter leases to Indo-Fijians as incentives for him to
enter the world of commercial cultivation and compete effectively with
his Indo-Fijian counterparts.
The Native Land Ordinance of 1940 established the pattern of land
tenure for the next two decades. In 1966, the Agricultural Landlord and
Tenant Ordinance once again attempted to settle the problems of  lease
renewals, following continual complaints of unfair treatment from both
the landowners and tenants (Legislative Council of Fiji 1966). The primary
purpose of the legislation was to give tenants greater security than before.
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It provided that a first or second ten-year extension would be granted to
the tenants if the landlords could not plead enough hardship to justify
terminating the lease. The new legislation left both parties dissatisfied.
The Indo-Fijian tenant continued to complain about the insecurity of tenure
while the Fijian landowner felt that the Agricultural Tribunal, which
adjudicated the disputes, usually favoured the tenant because he was not
able to plead hardship to the extent that the tenant could. Consequently, a
working committee to review the ordinance was set up. It presented its
report to parliament in 1975. The essence of its recommendation to amend
Agricultural Landlord and Tenant Ordinance (ALTO) was the
establishment of 30 years as the minimum period of tenure, with provision
for renewal. The new bill provoked two distinct responses from the Indo-
Fijian tenant community. One section accepted it as the best terms they
could obtain in the circumstances; the other saw it simply as an extension
of  the existing uncertainties. The NFP, representing the Indo-Fijian tenant
community, split on the issue. Opposition leader Koya, also President of
the Federation of  Cane Growers, opposed the bill, while K.C. Ramrakha
and Irene Jai Narayan along with eight others crossed the floor to support
it. The NFP rift, long in existence, was now in the open and would adversely
affect the party’s fortunes in the 1977 elections.
Land was again at the centre of a major controversy in Fiji in 1979,
driving a wedge between the prime minister and the opposition leader,
and effectively killed talks on a government of  national unity, which
was being tentatively mooted. At the NFP convention in Ba in 1980,
the Leader of the Opposition Jai Ram Reddy criticised the Alliance
government’s policy, approved as early as 1975, of  reserving large areas
of Crown land, including Provisional Crown Schedule A land. Reddy
asserted that reservation would affect 62,240 acres of  Crown land, at
least 192 existing leases and some five government projects. He
questioned the need to reserve Crown land.
Given Fijian strength in this area and the Indian vulnerability is it necessary to take over
what little Crown land there is and convert it into Native land? You may have the power
to do it, but the power to do what is right and good is also the power to do what is
wrong. I would have thought that a reasonable government would preserve as much
Crown land as possible consistent with the principles of fairness to all in order to settle
future evictees from Native lands now waiting to be resettled (Reddy 1980).
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For Reddy, the reservation of  Crown land was a further attempt to weaken
the Indian tenant community and compound its already considerable
vulnerability.
Ratu Mara’s response to Reddy’s criticism typified Fijian attitudes on
the subject of land. First, he described Fijian magnanimity in granting
leases and lamented the lack of Indo-Fijian appreciation.
Much of the capital for their [Indians’] successful ventures for the education of
Indian professionals, came from cane money from leases on Indian land. Without
resorting to the Bhumiputra type of xenophobic legislation used in Southeast
Asia, the Alliance government supports the policy of  free economy, even though it
may follow Darwin’s tenets of  the survival of  the fittest.
Indo-Fijians already controlled business and industry, and the Fijian
people had not asked for a share in these, despite Indo-Fijians' demand
for secure land leases, said Mara
[i]f  [Reddy’s] contention is to be accepted, then all Indian tenancies, which cover
much of  the good land in Fiji, must be held by them in perpetuity. All the most
valuable properties in urban areas must be their preserve and of  course commerce,
industry, transport and other professions must be completely controlled by them.
Instead of  constructive dialogue on a vital national problem, racial
stereotyping, distrust and misunderstanding once again won the day, as
they have so often in Fiji’s colonial and independent history. The vital
question of  why Crown land was being reserved, and whether the full
implications of that action had been adequately discussed with
representatives of  the Indian Alliance, let alone the NFP, was left
unaddressed.
The Fijian attitude on land had become much more politicised in the
1970s and the 1980s. As Brian Farrell and Peter Murphy (1978) correctly
emphasised, the simple fact of possession gave Fijians ‘power’ that others
did not enjoy; ‘it is an effective cultural buffer to inroads made by Indians
and Europeans’ (1978:2). Threats of violence and upheaval were never
too far from the discourse on land—‘blood will flow in this country if
Indians do not understand the deep emotional feelings Fijians have for
their land’, Ratu Mara said (Fiji Times, 3 March 1978). These sentiments
were repeated by others in the following years. The leases under the
Agricultural Landlord and Tenant Act (ALTA) began expiring in the late
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1990s and many have not been renewed, to the detriment of  the economy.
The government wants native lands leased under a new act, the Native
Agricultural Landlord and Tenant Act, which gives landowners greater
leverage than under the ALTA, which is what the tenants want. But
given the sensitivities and the political stakes involved, the land problem
will not be resolved anytime soon.
Education
It was often said that what land was to the Fijians, education was to the
Indo-Fijians, although, of course, both the communities needed both land
and education. The Indo-Fijians’ success in the educational field, the Fijians’
lack of  it especially at the higher levels, and the government’s sometimes
desperate strategies to cope with the gap, constituted the core of  the
problem. Ironically enough, the Indians’ success was caused in large measure
by the nagging insecurity of  land tenure. Education was seen early on as
an important instrument for social advancement, upward mobility and
economic security. The Indo-Fijians’ push for education began early. As
Gillion observes, the Indo-Fijians started with nothing ‘except the keenness
of the Indian parents and their willingness to sacrifice for their children’
(1977:119). Private committee schools, often with little or no assistance
from the colonial government, produced a steady stream of educated school
leavers who filled the civil service and the teaching profession. When the
University of the South Pacific opened in 1968, the majority of the students
were Indo-Fijians, as they are today.
The Fijian experience was less successful, despite the early effort of
the colonial government and the Christian missions. The reasons for this
are complex. The 1969 Education Commission, appointed to draw up
an agenda on the future direction of education in Fiji, noted among
other reasons that the geography of  Fiji, the isolation of  rural Fijian
teachers from any intellectual stimulus, the shortage of qualified Fijian
primary school teachers, rural poverty and social distractions contributed
to the problem of  Fijian education (Government of  Fiji 1969). To grapple
with the widening gap, the commission recommended that 50 per cent
of  Fiji government university scholarship funds be reserved for Fijians
on a ‘parallel block’ basis; that is, in the event of the quota being
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unfulfilled, the unallocated balance should be devoted to other specifically
Fijian educational needs, such as repeats for university students. These
provisions were to extend for a period of nine years, with a preliminary
review at the end of six. Increasing competition for a restricted number
of  places at the University of  the South Pacific’s Foundation program
brought the issue to a head in the 1977 elections.
Using the parallel block principle, the government awarded university
scholarships to Fijian students with the university entrance pass mark of
216, while Indo-Fijian students needed a mark of  261 to qualify. Education
became a highly emotive issue when cold statistics and abstract principles
impinged on individual lives of  Indo-Fijian students and parents. The NFP,
which had tacitly accepted the principle of preferential treatment outlined
in Development Plan VII, took up the issue, eager for political mileage.
Koya denounced the policy in ringing terms. ‘It is bound to produce
recriminations, frustrations, bitterness, the destruction of  the image and
reputation of the university and indeed the government of the day in the
eyes of the world’ (Fiji Times, 18 March 1977). The Alliance reminded him
and his party of  Fijian concessions on land. Mara defended his government’s
policies as being necessary for lagging Fijians to ‘catch up’ with others.
Koya linked Fijian demand for parity in education to the Indo-Fijian call
for greater representation in the military, whose almost exclusively Fijian
composition was a source of  anxiety among Indo-Fijians. Failure to accept
parity in both these areas was an ‘example of a political party indulging in
hypocrisy’, said Koya (Fiji Times, 18 March 1977).
In the immediate aftermath of  the 1982 general elections education
was once again at the forefront. Frustrated by the continuing poor
performance of  Fijian students at senior high school and university level,
the Fijian Teachers Association, an umbrella organisation of  ethnic Fijian
teachers, asked for the reservation of  70 per cent of  government
scholarships for university studies for Fijians. The new Minister of
Education, Ahmed Ali, rejected the idea, but did make strenuous efforts
to upgrade facilities in Fijian schools and to staff them with better trained
teachers. In addition, he closed down the Nasinu Teachers College and
turned it into a dormitory for University of  the South Pacific’s Foundation
(mostly Fijian) students to provide them with more tutorial help and an
environment more conducive to studying. In the 1990s, the government
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moved further ahead with legislating support for Fijian education through
special schemes. The Qarase government explicitly endorsed a race-based
program for Fijian education through its ‘blueprint’. It waived fees for
form seven Fijian students, and provided state assistance to Fijian-run
schools, but not to Indo-Fijian schools even though, in many cases, these
schools had high numbers of  Fijian students.
The policy of  discrimination—or affirmative action—that governed
the Alliance government’s educational efforts was alleged by its critics
to exist in other spheres of national life as well, especially the civil
service. Theoretically, all civil service appointments were made by the
Public Service Commission. Promotions and opportunities for advanced
training were in principle based on merit and qualification. In practice, it
was alleged that the situation was far different. Jai Ram Reddy, in his
address to the NFP convention in Ba in 1980, aired the feelings of many
in his party and community when he asserted that ‘Fiji is implementing a
policy designed to ensure that all strategic levels of government are staffed
by loyal personnel which in effect means that Fijians are placed in
positions of command in order to deliberately create an “out group”,
namely the Indians’. The bitterness and distrust that this produced
‘conflict alone may resolve’, he said, using Mara’s words (Reddy 1980).
In 1980, the deputy leader of the opposition, Irene Jai Narayan, put
forward a motion in parliament expressing concern at the racial imbalance
in the civil service. She urged that in addition to racial balance, there be
parity at all levels in the civil service. Ratu Sir Penaia Ganilau, then
acting prime minister, replied that the principle of parity applied only at
the point of  entry, and that promotions and other opportunities for
advancement depended entirely on merit. He called Mrs Narayan’s
charges ‘cheap political propaganda of  the worst kind’ (Pacific Islands
Monthly 1980, cited in Nation 1982). To be fair to the government, there
had been few cases of systematic discrimination on the basis of race
and political affiliation, especially when compared to what happened in
the post-coup years when nepotism and political patronage ran rampant.
But, as John Nation pointed out in 1981 at a seminar held at the
Australian National University, by the 1980s the feeling within the Indian
community is that power over the civil service is in Fijian hands.
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The direction of  the Alliance government’s development program
and its utilisation of foreign aid were controversial both among Fijians
as well as Indo-Fijians. Western United Front and the Fijian Nationalist
Party argued, as we shall see shortly, that western as well as
underprivileged Fijians had been neglected, and the Indo-Fijians alleged
racial discrimination against their community. They pointed to the major
development projects of the previous decade, and the crowning
achievements of  the Alliance government, the pine industry, cattle
schemes, cane expansion at Seaqaqa, and fisheries development, all of
which had been directed towards the development of the Fijian
community. The major exception was the negotiations of  the Lomé
Convention, where a bipartisan approach to the vital sugar industry
resulted in better prices for the largely Indo-Fijian sugar farming
community. The Alliance government was clearly caught in a no-win
situation. Many Fijians continued to complain about backwardness and
neglect, seeking preferential treatment in selected areas of national life.
The Indo-Fijians accused the government of being blatantly pro-Fijian.
It was out of dissatisfaction with prevailing currents of politics that the
Fiji Labour Party emerged in 1985.
Political parties
In the 1980s, the Alliance and the National Federation Party were the
dominant political parties, but they shared the national stage with two
splinter Fijian parties, the Fijian Nationalist Party (FNP) and the Western
United Front (WUF). The Alliance had won consistently at the polls
since 1966, except for its first and only temporary defeat at the April
1977 elections. The experience of  government, uninterrupted leadership,
and the crucial support of  the Indo-Fijian and European business sector
gave it an edge over its rivals. Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara had been at the
helm of  party’s leadership since its inception, and though there was overt
criticism of  his autocratic style, his tantrums and his banyan tree like
effect on all around him, his position was not seriously challenged. Indeed,
at critical times, such as in the 1982 elections, it was his stature that
ensured the Alliance’s success. In the 1980s, although he still walked
tall, the aura of invincibility that surrounded him in the immediate
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aftermath of  independence had weakened. The corrosive effects of  ethnic
politics and persistent criticism of his policies and style, from both Fijians
and Indo-Fijians, had tarnished his earlier lustre.
The basic, communally-federated structure of  the party remained
intact. The Alliance was marginally more multiracial than its rivals,
though since independence its claim on Indian votes had declined
significantly. The Fijian Association was the backbone of  the party, and
Fijian solidarity behind it had been the most important factor in its
electoral victories. The loyal support of  the general electors, despite
their sometimes bitter disagreements over candidate selection at election
time, helped to consolidate the party’s dominance at the polls.
The weakest spoke in the Alliance wheel was the Indian Alliance. Its
credibility was seriously damaged by its consistent failure to attract
significant numbers of Indo-Fijian voters to its ranks and by the departure
from the party of  its founding members. Sir Vijay Singh, a former Alliance
attorney general, left the party in 1979, after being dismissed from the
cabinet following weeks of controversy and speculation about the extent
of his involvement in the now-infamous ‘flour mills of Fiji’ court case.
He joined the NFP in 1982. M.T. Khan, another former Alliance cabinet
minister, was not reinstated in the cabinet after he was unsuccessfully
tried for corruption. He too joined the NFP and was a candidate until
his death just before the election in 1982. The climax of Indian desertions
from the Alliance came with the resignation in 1982 of James Shankar
Singh, president of the Indian Alliance, on the grounds of ‘irreconcilable
differences’ with Mara (Fiji Times, 11 January 1982). Failure to win the
party ticket, personality clashes and a feeling of relative insignificance
in the internal affairs of  the party were all reasons for the desertions.
Most of them also argued that the Alliance had abandoned its genuinely
multiracial philosophy of the early 1970s and had taken a distinctly pro-
Fijian stance.
The departure of the Indian Alliance old guard on the eve of the
1982 general elections was to some extent compensated for by two new
sources of  support in the Indo-Fijian community. The Indo-Fijian
business community, primarily Gujaratis, allied itself  more closely with
the Alliance and the Fijian elite through joint commercial ventures. The
Alliance promised ‘business as usual’—the Indo-Fijian businessmen could
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not ask for better. The other major source of  support came from the
Muslims. The leadership of  the Fiji Muslim League, the national umbrella
organisation of  the religious minority, had long been a supporter of  the
Alliance. In 1982, many of its ordinary members switched parties,
alienated from the NFP as a result of  the bitter 1977 elections. Perhaps
more significant than the disenchantment with the NFP was the
burgeoning sense of a distinct Muslim identity within the Indian
community. The demand for Muslim separatism has a long history, but
in the 1980s, it reached new heights. In a survey carried out in late 1979,
two-thirds of the Muslim population indicated a desire for separate
political representation in parliament. On the question of linguistic
preference, 62 per cent gave Urdu as their first choice, 27 per cent Arabic,
8 per cent Fijian and a paltry 3 per cent desired Hindustani, the Indian
lingua franca (Ali 1980:150). They therefore distanced themselves from
the NFP, perceived as a Hindu party, and created stronger ties with the
Alliance, encouraged by its cordial and accommodating attitude. But
these changes did not seriously alter the basic party structure; the
communally-federated structure remained. The dominance of  high chiefs
at the top gave the Alliance an aura of  legitimacy as well as stability,
enabling the use of traditional avenues to reconcile and resolve internal
differences.
In contrast, the NFP was plagued by a continuous history of
internecine struggle for leadership that seriously damaged its credibility
as an alternative government. One difficultly for the party was its own
ethnic constituency, the Indo-Fijian community, which was deeply
divided along religious, cultural and regional lines. The roots of  the
division and factionalism go back to the immediate post-indenture period
of  the 1920s. An equally important factor was the party’s problematic
leaders, who invariably came from the legal community. Personality
clashes rather than informed policy differences were the main cause of
the interminable infighting.
Siddiq Koya, a leading criminal lawyer from the big, boisterous sugar
province of  Ba, took over the leadership of  the party after A.D. Patel’s
death in 1969, and remained as the leader until 1977 when Jai Ram
Reddy succeeded him. But Koya returned to party leadership again in
1984, after Reddy resigned from parliament over a dispute with the
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Speaker of the House. The mantle of leadership never rested comfortably
on Koya’s shoulders. Party Secretary Karam Ramrakha, for example,
resigned in 1972 over Koya’s alleged unconsultative style. Koya’s own,
surprisingly cordial, relations with Mara immediately after independence,
which soured after 1975, provided ample ammunition to his opponents
within the party. Simmering tensions among the different factions came
to a head during the 1976 ALTO debate in parliament.
Two senior party members, Ramrakha and Irene Jai Narayan, and eight
others defied Koya and voted with the Alliance to get the bill passed. The
differences were expeditiously patched up for the April 1977 elections,
which the NFP won with the carefully crafted, though publicly disavowed,
support of the Fijian Nationalist Party officially committed to the
deportation of  the Indo-Fijian community. Stunned by its narrow victory
(26 seats out of 52), and unable to reconcile its internal differences about
leadership, the NFP fumbled for a solution for four days, at the end of
which the governor general, Ratu George Cakobau, ‘exercising his deliberate
judgement’, appointed Ratu Mara prime minister. Certain members of  the
NFP were accused of betraying their leader by telling the governor general
that they would not support Koya for prime minister. Karam Ramrakha,
who was suspected by some of talking to Cakobau—an allegation he denied
on oath, wrote, ‘The brute and undeniable fact is that when Mr Koya
went to the governor general to become prime minister, the governor
general, and the governor general alone, refused to make him prime minister’
(Fiji Sun, 24 January 1987). Ramrakha’s contention is valid—it was Cakobau
who breached the Westminster convention which requires the parliament
to resolve the question and not have the governor general decide in advance
what the outcome of  the parliament’s vote of  confidence should be.
The April 1977 elections and the events which followed split the
NFP into two bitterly opposed groups, which later crystallised into the
‘Dove’ faction led by Koya, and the ‘Flower’ faction led by Ramrakha
and Narayan. At the September elections, with few policy differences to
go on, the two factions turned upon each other with unprecedented
bitterness in a campaign remembered in the Indo-Fijian community for
the cynical manipulation of cultural and religious symbols and affinities
of  the voter. Fielding parallel candidates in several constituencies, the
NFP handed the election to the Alliance on a platter. The Alliance won
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the election with an unprecedented 36 seats. The Flower faction won 13
seats (58.2 per cent of Indian communal votes) and the Dove 3 (41.8
per cent). Koya lost his Lautoka seat and his position as the leader of
the opposition to Jai Ram Reddy.
Reddy was the leader of the opposition from 1977 to 1984. In many
respects, his experience in office parallelled Koya’s. There was a short
period of  fruitful cooperation with Mara and his government (1977–
79), followed by a period of bitter relations (1980–84) that resulted in
an almost total breakdown of  communication between the two. The
latter’s rise in national and NFP politics was meteoric. A New Zealand
trained lawyer, he was appointed to the Senate by Koya in 1974. He first
stood for election in April 1977 and became NFP leader just five months
later. His first major achievement was to bring about reconciliation
between the two warring factions of  the party. Although tensions between
him and Koya remained, Reddy was able to bring about a semblance of
party unity that had seemed virtually impossible in 1977. But unity was
achieved on Reddy’s terms; many former Doves were, or complained of
being, excluded from party affairs and in the selection of candidates for
the 1982 election in which his own supporters gained the majority. The
unsuccessful Doves crossed over to the Alliance and became a painful
thorn in the NFP’s side by keeping alive lingering doubts about the
genuineness of  party unity.
Under Reddy’s leadership, the platform of  the party was broadened
to increase its appeal to non-Indian voters as well as to enable former
Indian Alliance members to join the party without losing face. The old
ideological foundations of  the party, its commitment to common roll,
for instance, were relegated into the background or silently discarded as
more emphasis was placed on sectarian social and economic issues. Reddy
explained his political philosophy in an interview with the Fiji Times in
these terms ‘I am not a great believer in any “isms”. Our political creeds
have to be relevant to our needs. We have a community already divided
on racial lines. We do not want to add to this by introducing yet another
division, a class warfare. I do favour a pragmatic, middle of the road
approach to our problems’ (Fiji Times, 14 August 1981).
 Consistent with this approach, Reddy advanced a new economic
platform that seemed to be at variance with the NFP’s earlier
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proclamations. Under Koya, the NFP had embraced a populist posture
though with what seriousness it is difficult to tell. Thus in 1972, Koya
spoke of nationalising vital industries, creating a welfare state, providing
compulsory and free education, among other things. Although by 1977,
some of the earlier rhetorical excesses had been discarded, Koya still
advocated nationalisation when necessary, and promised to ‘legislate
against monopolies and cartels and other organisations which indulge in
unfair practices’.
Reddy took a different path. In its manifesto for the 1982 general elections,
the NFP proclaimed ‘the NFP1-WUF Coalition subscribes to the economic
philosophy of competitive free enterprise’ because the ‘allocation of resources
based on private initiative and effort produce the best economic results’.
Under its administration, the NFP promised, ‘the role of government will be
restricted to public administration, provision of  social services, maintenance
of  law and order and the construction of  the necessary infrastructure to
assist the private sector investment’. And foreign investors would be ‘assured
of their right to the repatriation of their capital and profits’. The manifesto
laid to rest whatever fears the Fiji business community had about the NFP
being a ‘left of  the centre’ party. In an effort to win a larger constituency,
Reddy cut the NFP’s ties with its past.
A final hurdle for Reddy was the dismal support for the NFP among
the Fijians. The party had made various attempts in the past to get more
Fijians into its fold, but with little success. The first experiment had
been the merger of the Fijian National Democratic Party with the then
Federation Party, leading to the creation of  the National Federation Party.
In 1970, the NFP embarked on the ill-fated ‘operation taukei ’ though, as
we have already seen, it was only able to attract a mere 2.4 per cent of
Fijian communal votes in the 1972 election, a figure which subsequently—
and unbelievably—declined even further. Aware of  the need to attract
more Fijians to increase the NFP’s appeal as an alternative government,
Reddy had told his party as early as 1974 that, without a multiracial
base, the NFP was doomed to remain a ‘permanent opposition’. His
softening of  the NFP’s earlier confrontationist posture was, in part, a
device to that end. Not surprisingly, therefore, he formed an electoral
coalition with a splinter Fijian party, the Western United Front, in 1982.
But for reasons mentioned above even the coalition failed to realise the
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goal of  broadening the party’s ethnic base. The net, perhaps unintended,
result of  Reddy’s pragmatic endeavours was to cut the NFP loose from
its traditional ideological moorings and to fashion it in the image of the
Alliance.
Party politics dominated by the Alliance and the NFP, and dedicated
publicly to the promotion of multiracialism and political coexistence,
was challenged in the April 1977 general elections by the Fijian
Nationalist Party (see Premdas 1980). Embracing emerging Fijian
nationalism, the party rejected both multiracialism and equal political
coexistence and instead espoused the cause of ‘Fiji for Fijians’. Such a
platform was not proposed for the first time in 1977. In 1972, Villiame
Savu’s Fijian Independent Party had espoused similar causes, wanting
the Fijians ‘alone to decide the destiny of their land’. The founder of the
Fijian Nationalist Party, former Alliance Assistant Minister Sakiasi
Butadroka, first came to national prominence in October 1975, when he
moved a motion in parliament demanding the repatriation of Indo-Fijians
to India, a sentiment that seemingly reflected the feelings of large sections
of  the Fijian community. At the same time, he also cut loose at the
eastern chiefly establishment, especially Ratu Mara, accusing him of
promoting the ‘dictatorship’ of Lau at the expense of other provinces,
an allegation vehemently denied by Mara. Butadroka launched the
platform of  his party in December 1976, demanding Fijian paramountcy.
The interests of the Fijians must be paramount at all times.
The Fijians must always hold the positions of governor general, prime minister, as
well as the ministries of Fijian affairs and rural development, lands, education,
agriculture, home affairs, commerce and industry and cooperatives.
More opportunities should be given to Fijians to enter business and commerce.
The Fijian administration should be strengthened with government financial backing
and support.
A Fijian Institute should be established to teach Fijians business. Indians should
be repatriated to India after Fiji gained full independence.
More government development projects should be concentrated in rural areas.
All lands illegally sold should be returned to Fijians (Fiji Times, 20 December 1976).
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Butadroka’s message, delivered in emotional, accusatory tones,
attracted mostly rural, illiterate and underprivileged urban Fijian voters.
The Alliance’s apathy helped the Nationalists to make deep inroads into
the traditional Alliance constituency. In the April 1977 elections,
Butadroka won the fiercely contested Serua-Namosi seat, obtaining 4,640
(52.1 per cent) of  the total Fijian communal votes. Altogether, the FNP
took away 20,819 (24.4 per cent) of the Fijian communal votes from
the Alliance, causing it to lose six marginal national constituencies to
the National Federation Party. Low Fijian voter turnout compounded
the Alliance’s fate at the polls. Butadroka had made his point: the victory
of the NFP showed that the constitution did not protect the paramountcy
of Fijian rights, an ideal cherished by many Fijians of all political
persuasions. Enraged by the NFP’s success and delighted with his own
‘victory’, Butadroka resorted to making inflammatory racial statements
which contravened the Public Order Act and landed him in gaol. His
absence from the campaign for the September elections, and the Alliance’s
concerted attempts to win back Fijian voters chastened by its unexpected
loss, led to the Nationalists’ defeat and to an overwhelming victory for
the Alliance. Butadroka lost his seat, and the overall electoral support
for his party declined from 24 per cent to 11 per cent.
Out of parliament from 1977 to 1982, the Nationalists maintained a
low profile. The party also shifted its extremist stance somewhat. While
keeping its Fiji-for-Fijians stance, the party adopted a less racially slanted
position on the eve of  the 1982 elections. Instead, the Nationalists now
paid more attention to the preservation and enhancement of  Fijian interest.
The Nationalists now advocated that the constitution of Fiji should be
amended to allow Fijians to occupy 90 per cent of the House of
Representatives seats; that all Freehold and Crown Schedules A & B lands
as well as traditional fishing rights be returned to Fijians; and that Fijian
schoolchildren should be provided with free and compulsory education.
These policies, which should have been music to the ears of  frustrated,
extremist Fijians, elicited little electoral support in the 1982 elections.
The FNP obtained only 7.7 per cent of total Fijian communal votes,
although Butadroka himself made a strong showing, winning 30 per cent
of  the votes in Serua-Namosi. The rout of  the Nationalists was not
surprising. Its own rudimentary organisation was no competition for its
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more sophisticated and better-funded rivals. Many of  its platforms were
regarded correctly as being unrealistic and constitutionally
unimplementable. The events surrounding the April 1977 elections, when
the FNP helped to bring about NFP victory, cast a long and terrifying
cloud over the thinking of those Fijians unprepared for a NFP
government. The Alliance’s own assiduous attempts to court the Fijian
voter of  the extremist persuasion cut the ground from under Butadroka’s
feet. The fact that soon after the elections the Alliance endorsed a former
Nationalist candidate for the Suva municipal elections effectively
demonstrated the extent to which the party was prepared to suppress its
multiracialism to win back its constituency. The 1982 elections showed
that the Nationalist platform was widely shared in the Fijian community.
Just how widely would become clear five years later.
The Nationalists were joined by another splinter Fijian party, the
Western United Front. The WUF, too, was founded on a grievance. Its
main aim was to promote the particular interests of western Fijians who
were alleged to have been neglected by the Alliance government. Western
Fijians had long complained of regional discrimination and step-brotherly
treatment. In the 1960s and early 1970s, several attempts were made to
re-assert a distinct western identity, but the separatists were contained
through traditional reconciliation ceremonies. The WUF was the latest
and probably the most ambitious attempt to articulate western grievances
in some coherent political fashion. The guiding force behind the
formation of  the WUF was Ratu Osea Gavidi, who had won his Nadroga-
Navosa Fijian communal seat twice in 1977. Although a high chief with
Western education, his popularity rested more on his defiant stand on
the issue of  contracts for pine harvesting. In fact, it was the pine issue
which galvanised the western Fijians and led to the formation of  the
Western United Front.
Pine planting began in Fiji in the late 1950s and early 1960s, and by
1979, 28,000 hectares were under pine, mostly in western Viti Levu (see
Gregor 1980). To govern the entire pine operation, the government
created the Fiji Pine Commission (FPC) in 1976 to ‘facilitate and develop
an industry based on the growing, harvesting, processing and marketing
of pine and other species of trees grown in Fiji’ (Fiji Pine Commission
Act no 5 of 1976). The pine industry was not the exclusive domain of
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the Fiji Pine Commission, however. The other major partner was the
land-owning mataqali, assisted by the Fiji Forestry Department. The
Commission invited proposals from interested companies to harvest
mature pine. Four proposals were received: from the M.K. Hunt
Foundation, Shell/New Zealand Forest Products, British Petroleum (BP)
Southwest Pacific Limited, and the United Marketing Company owned
by a convicted US businessman, Paul Sandblom (see Martin 1981). The
Commission accepted BP’s initial proposals, because they appeared more
flexible and promised a rational management of  the industry. The
landowners, led by Gavidi, leaned to the UMC proposal because it
apparently recognised legitimate landowner rights, offered them a greater
share of  the profits, and allowed participation at all levels of  the industry.
The Fiji Pine Commission remained unconvinced, and the government
declared Sandblom a prohibited immigrant.
The simmering conflict between Ratu Osea Gavidi and the Fiji Pine
Commission, and through it the government, erupted in the open as
landowners boycotted several of  the Commission’s pine planting programs.
To the western landowners, the Alliance government’s action was seen as
another unacceptable interference in their right to utilise their resources as
they saw fit. The Western landowners preferred, as the NFP-WUP
Manifesto spelled out, ‘the establishment of a decentralised, socially
compatible, technologically appropriate and economically viable processing
system for both native and exotic forests and [assisting] direct participation
by forested lands in the exploitation of such forest resources’. The
government, on the other hand, preferred more centralised control of a
resource that has the potential to become a major revenue earner for Fiji.
The pine dispute unearthed subterranean private resentment among
western Fijians at the perceived iniquitous treatment at the hands of the
eastern chiefly establishment. It served to highlight other grievances such
as the paucity of  western Fijians in the civil service and other statutory
bodies, disparities particularly glaring in view of the overall western
contribution to the national economy. The issues were brought into
sharper relief during a House debate on the allocation of $435,868 for
the renovation of  certain historic sites on the chiefly island of  Bau. Tui
Nadi, Ratu Napolioni Dawai, attacked the proposal as unjustified, and
pointed to the more pressing needs of  western Fijians: water supply,
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roads, dormitories for school children from outlying islands. Dawai
resigned from the Alliance and joined the WUF.
The new party was launched in traditional Fijian style on 17 July
1981 in the presence of  20 ranking western chiefs. Ratu Osea, elected
president, outlined the party’s goals
• to protect and encourage the unity of western Fijians
• to protect the interests of landowners and defend their rights
to develop their resources according to their aspirations
• to seek changes in the Ministry of Fijian Affairs and Rural
Development to improve the lives of western Fijians
• to improve educational facilities of western Fijians and provide
them opportunities in commercial and industrial enterprises.
Clearly, the WUF had a specific regional focus and a distinct regional
constituency. To become effective nationally, it needed to be more broadly
based. Cooperation with the Alliance was obviously out; Mara had
castigated the party a day after its launch as a ‘disruptive’ force which
preached ‘ridiculous political ideologies’ (Fiji Times, 18 July 1981). An
attempt was made to form a progressive front with the FNP but this was
abandoned after an irate Butadroka reportedly assaulted Solomone
Momoivalu, an Alliance Minister of State, for accusing him of practising
voodoism to attract Fijian voters. Gavidi then turned to the NFP in
early 1981 because it was ‘the most prominent political party opposed
to the Alliance’. A NFP–WUF Coalition materialised on 11 January 1982.
The exact terms of  the arrangement were never publicly stated, but Reddy
explained its significant aspects in the short-lived Coalition Bulletin.
In this arrangement, each party is to maintain its independent identity and objectives.
In other words, there is no submergence of one party into another. It must be
remembered that the two parties are totally independent, with interests that each
would like to protect. I don’t envisage that where parties are independent and are
being led by strong leadership with principles that they themselves espouse there is
any real danger of  anyone becoming subservient. It is a partnership of  equals
(Coalition Bulletin 1982).
The independent interests included such vital and sensitive issues as
land and common roll, both of which were shelved. The coalition of an
exclusively Fijian splinter party with a predominantly Indo-Fijian party
was widely seen as a milestone in Fijian politics. To its supporters, it
heralded a new era in multiracial politics; to its opponents, it represented
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an expedient political coalition with the sole purpose of dislodging the
Alliance from from its political perch. There is little doubt that the NFP-
WUF coalition was a politically convenient arrangement. WUF and Gavidi
needed the extensive political machinery of the NFP to launch themselves
on the national scene. The fact that Gavidi had broached cooperation
with the FNP before he had approached the NFP was a clear enough
indication that he did not necessarily share the NFP’s views. Reddy and
the NFP appeared to gain from the coalition an apparently swelling pool
of dependable Fijian support that had eluded the party since its inception.
Yet the coalition also entailed risks for both leaders. For Reddy, coalescing
with a regionalist party detracted from his carefully-nurtured though
potentially volatile national image as incipient prime minister. For Gavidi,
cooperation with the NFP was equally risky, given the extent of  ethnic
polarisation endemic in Fiji’s electoral system, especially during elections.
But the risks appeared worth taking in view of the more than even chance
of  victory at the polls.
The results of the 1982 elections demonstrated the electoral failure
both of the WUF as well as the coalition. Gavidi narrowly lost his seat
(47.9 per cent of the votes) to the Alliance (50.5 per cent). The other
WUF candidate to make a decent showing was Ratu Napolioni Dawai
who got 22.8 per cent of  the communal votes in the Ba-Nadi constituency.
Overall, the WUF received a mere 7 per cent of the total Fijian communal
votes. Three factors were responsible for the WUF’s poor performance.
One was Gavidi’s poor campaign strategy that frequently took him away
from his constituency, giving the impression that he took his own
supporters for granted. Second, coalition with a predominantly Indian-
based party produced harmful results in an atmosphere of  tense ethnic
polarisation. The third factor was the Alliance’s concerted attempts to
win back the vital Nadroga-Navosa Fijian communal seat. The coalition
ended for all practical purposes with the campaign—unsurprisingly, given
that it had failed to articulate an alternative vision of  Fiji’s future that
went beyond seeking narrow political advantages over its rival.
The 1982 election was a typical affair, consistent with past trends. In
one respect, however, it differed from the past—the allegation of foreign
involvement in Fiji’s electoral process. This was the major issue in the
last half of the campaign. It set into motion a train of events which led
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to ethnic tensions not seen in Fiji since the by-elections of 1968. The
first disclosures of foreign involvement in the Fiji elections were made
by the Australian Broadcasting Commission’s Four Corners program which
highlighted the role of Australian multinationals in Fiji and probed
allegations of  misuse of  Australian aid for political purposes by the ruling
Alliance party. In particular, it dwelt on the contents of  a privately-
commissioned report (by Motibhai and Company) titled ‘Report of
Consultants to the Prime Minister of  Fiji on the Economic and Political
Outlook and Options and Strategy and Political Organization’, prepared
by Australian consultant Alan Carroll and his associates. The Carroll
Report recommended strategies for winning the election that included,
among others, utilising the existing cultural and religious divisions in the
Indian community, buying off  the FNP leader Butadroka, and accelerating
pending prosecutions against WUF leader Gavidi to take him out of the
running. The coalition accused the Alliance of  implementing the
recommendations as well as using Australian aid money to promote its
political fortunes. The Alliance denied the allegations. An angry Mara
dubbed the television program as ‘an act of sabotage against a sovereign
nation’ and vowed not to forgive or forget its producers nor those officials
of  the coalition who were alleged to have colluded with the Australians.
But the Alliance’s masterstroke was to seize upon and twist the opening
lines of  the Four Corners programme that Fiji’s present political leaders
were descendants of chiefs ‘who clubbed and ate their way to power’
and to publicise this ‘cannibal quote’ and the entire television programme
‘as a gross insult to Fijian chiefs and tradition’, while expediently shelving
the critical questions that were raised.
As the appointment of a Royal Commission to investigate the various
allegations was under way, Mara made a sensational allegation of  his
own. In an interview with Australian journalist Stuart Inder, 12 days
after the Fiji elections, he charged the coalition with colluding with the
Soviet Union and receiving from it a sum of one million dollars to unseat
him from power because he was the major impediment to Soviet expansion
in the South Pacific. Further, Mrs Soonu Kochar, Fiji’s Indian High
Commissioner, was accused of meddling in Fijian politics, and her retired
husband was linked as the go-between for the Soviets. Subsequently, in
a letter Mara released to the Fiji media, he identified Siddiq Koya as the
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coalition member responsible for making the deal with the Soviets. The
two sets of allegations were investigated by the Royal Commission of
Inquiry headed by retired New Zealand judge, Sir John White
(Government of  Fiji 1983). The investigation of  Mara’s Soviet allegation
was frustrated by the Alliance’s successful withholding of  the crucial
evidence on grounds of  national security.
The overwhelming feeling within Fiji was (and remained) that the
initial allegation of Soviet involvement was baseless and that the Alliance,
in fact, had no proof. Some saw it as a ruse to divert attention from the
other issues before the Commission. At the end of the protracted hearings,
Sir John White produced an inocuous document that absolved all parties
to the dispute of  any deliberate malpractices. Rosemary Gillespie, the
Carroll team member who leaked the Carroll Report and other documents
to the ABC and a star witness at the hearings, not inappropriately dubbed
the final outcome a ‘whitewash’, an exercise in futility.
An unfortunate consequence of the Royal Commission hearings was
the rekindling of the embers of ethnic tension generated in the campaign,
and the hardening of attitudes on both sides of the House. A cycle was
complete: the politics of old had once again returned to the fore, poisoning
race relations and undermining the possibilities of  national dialogue on
a host of problems facing Fiji. Five years later, Fiji would discover to its





On 7 April 1987, Fiji held its fifth general election since attaining
independence. After a long three-month campaign and a week’s polling,
the newly formed Fiji Labour Party-National Federation Party Coalition
won a convincing and historic victory over the long-reigning Alliance
party, capturing 28 of  the 52 seats in the Fiji parliament. Dr Timoci
Bavadra, the new prime minister, assumed power with quiet dignity but
unmistakable firmness, and quickly set in motion a government intent
on delivering early on its various election pledges. Bitterly disappointed
with the unexpected results of the election, Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara,
the Alliance leader, conceded defeat in a terse statement and urged his
party to accept the verdict of the ballot box. This surprisingly smooth,
textbook transfer of power led Sir Leonard Usher, the doyen of local
journalists, to write, ‘It had been a long—too long—campaign, and at
times some unpleasant elements of bitterness had crept in. These were
now set aside. Democracy, clearly, was well and alive in Fiji’ (Usher
1986:146). As it turned out, this optimism was premature.
The 1987 election results both affirmed the dominant trends in Fiji’s
ethnically based electoral politics and heralded the faint beginnings of a
new era that promised to break away from it. In the circumstances, it
was the promise—as well as the fear—of further divergence from the
established patterns of political behaviour that received the most
attention. For the first time in Fiji, it was not one of  the small but extremely
powerful coterie of paramount maritime chiefs but a western Fijian of
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middling chiefly rank who was at the helm of  national leadership. For
the first time, too, the Fijians of  Indian descent were able to achieve a
significant measure of  national political power. The new cabinet, whose
members were young, exceptionally well educated and nominally left-
leaning, inspired hope of a break from the communally divisive politics
of  the last 17 years. The promise of  change threatened those intent on
maintaining the status quo; among them were some members of  the former
Mara administration and the Alliance party. The malcontents formed a
militant indigenous force, the ‘Taukei Movement’, which embarked a
carefully orchestrated campaign to break the newly elected government.
Within a week of the election, Fiji was rocked by a violent and terrifying
campaign of arson, sabotage, roadblocks and protest marches, climaxing
with the military-led overthrow of  the Bavadra government on 14 May.
The coup leaders attempted to reinstall the defeated Mara government,
but were thwarted by determined but peaceful internal resistance and
considerable external pressure. Frustrated by their inability to achieve
their immediate goal, and ostracised and rebuffed by the international
community, they then struck with a second coup on 25 September,
severing Fiji’s links to the British Crown.
The traumatic sequence of events that followed the election contrasted
with the long and uninspiring campaign that preceded—and precipitated—
it. The 1987 election provided both the text, as well as the pretext, for the
coup of  14 May. In this chapter, I focus on certain important aspects of
the campaign in order to understand its character as well as the causes of
the historic outcome. In particular, I look at the political parties that
contested the election, the important campaign issues and strategies, and,
finally, the voting patterns that led to the Coalition’s victory. Towards the
end, I provide a brief  account of  the coup and its aftermath, eschewing
the task of a more comprehensive coverage because the subject has received
extensive treatment in scholarly literature.
Political parties
The 1987 election was contested by four political parties or coalitions,
two of  which were born on the eve of  the campaign. The Alliance party,
led by Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara, had been continuously in power in Fiji
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from 1966 to 1987, except for a brief four days in April 1977. Its long
reign in office was the result of  many factors, including, strong leadership,
effective use of political power and patronage, solid support by its traditional
constituency, the indigenous Fijians, and, not least, the absence of  a credible
alternative among the frequently warring opposition parties. In 1987 the
Alliance appeared to be the political party best placed financially to last
the distance in a long campaign. To further improve its prospects, the
Alliance fielded a safe team, dropping four cabinet members and seven
backbenchers who were considered to be liabilities and thus potential
targets for political point-scoring. Some of  the discarded members formed
their own parties or contested the election as independents.
The Fijian Association constituted the backbone of  the party,
consistently capturing over 80 per cent of  the Fijian communal votes.
Chastised by the temporary loss of power in April 1977, brought about
by a split in the Fijian communal vote, the Fijian Association began to
expand and consolidate its base and, turning a blind eye to the party’s
public proclamations on multiracialism, welcomed to its ranks members
of  nationalist Fijian parties. Thus in 1987, the Alliance gave a blue-
ribbon Fijian communal seat to Taniela Veitata, a Fijian Nationalist Party
candidate in 1977, while another former FNP strategist was recruited to
help diffuse the impact of Fijian splinter parties in marginal national
constituencies. Fijian unity above all else, and the promotion of  ethnic
Fijian interests, became the over-riding goal of the Fijian Association
and the Alliance party in the 1987 campaign.
The General Electors Association (GEA), composed of Europeans,
part-Europeans, Chinese, and others of mixed descent, was the smallest,
though financially perhaps the strongest, of  the three Alliance branches.
Ever since the advent of party politics in Fiji in the early 1960s, the
GEA had thrown its weight solidly behind the Alliance. History, race,
economic interest and a keen sense of power all helped to forge this
politically expedient bond of  trust. But in 1987, for the first time, a rift
appeared in the GEA ranks, with the younger as well as the working
class members of  the part-European community joining the Labour party.
Others deserted the Alliance complaining of stepchild-like treatment.
The shift was small but significant, and it helped the Coalition in crucial
marginal constituencies, such as Suva.
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Of the Alliance’s three constituent bodies, the Indian Alliance was the
weakest spoke in the wheel. Its credibility in the Indo-Fijian community,
always low, was seriously compromised by the defection of  many of  its
disillusioned former leaders to the rival NFP. Unhappy with its performance
and prestige, Ratu Mara ignored the Indian Alliance establishment altogether
and recruited Indo-Fijian professionals and political opportunists personally
loyal to and dependent on him to boost the party’s prospects in that
community. In 1987, he bagged what he thought was the prize catch of
Irene Jai Narayan, who was not only a skillful politician—she had held her
Suva Indian communal seat continuously since 1966—but was also a
former president of  the rival National Federation Party and the deputy
leader of the opposition. Ousted from the NFP after an internal power
struggle in 1985, she had briefly flirted with Labour, then joined the Alliance
in November 1986. Political survival rather than a genuine conversion to
Alliance philosophy appeared to be the main reason for her switch, as Mrs
Narayan justified her action thus, ‘Let’s face it, whether one likes it or not,
the Alliance will remain in power for a long time. It is difficult for an
independent member to do much’ (Fiji Times, 8 November 1986).
Mara selected Mrs Narayan for the crucial Suva national seat. This
was a critical tactical mistake which was to cost the Alliance dearly, as
the Alliance leader had badly underestimated the Indo-Fijian electorate’s
unwillingness to forgive Narayan’s defection to a party that she had so
vehemently criticised all her political life. And Narayan’s own
unexpectedly virulent attack on her former party and her erstwhile
colleagues, mounted with the fanaticism of the twice converted, damaged
her prospects further. As one voter told me, ‘If  Mrs Narayan had fallen
from a mountain top, I would have caught her in my lap. But what do
you do when she has fallen in your esteem?’ The response of the Indian
Alliance leadership, or what was left of  it, to being ignored and bypassed
was a quiet withdrawal of its support for the party and a silent move to
the Coalition camp. In the end, the Alliance was left banking on the
charisma of  a single candidate for a crucial seat, while the Coalition
remorselessly exploited Narayan’s formerly vitriolic attacks against the
Alliance to great effect. But these were errors that surfaced only at a
later stage in the campaign. For much of  the time the Alliance was
confident of  a victory and dismissive of  its opponents.
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Unlike the Alliance party, the Coalition was launched on the eve of
the election. It was a coalition of two parties drawn together into an
expedient, and initially reluctant, political union for the larger purpose
of defeating the Alliance. The older partner in the Coalition was the
mainly Indo-Fijian-supported National Federation party. We have already
discussed its fluctuating fortunes in the previous chapter. On the eve of
the 1987 elections, the National Federation Party’s unity was fragile,
and its public esteem low. Several of  its sitting parliamentarians had
switched to the FLP, as had many longtime party loyalists, disheartened
by years of  damaging, internecine fights at the top. Coalition with another
party was the only alternative to avoid almost certain political demise.
That prospect was provided by the emergence of  the Fiji Labour Party,
whose rhetorically non-ethnic platform, multiethnic composition and
vehement opposition to the ruling Alliance made it an attractive partner.
The trade union-backed Labour party was launched in July 1985, primarily
in response to the questionable tactics used by the government to address
the economic problems that plagued Fiji. One such tactic was the wage
freeze imposed in 1984, to boost an economy severely damaged by hurricanes,
droughts, rising foreign debts and burgeoning civil service salary bills. The
government wanted to use savings from the wage freeze—to the tune of
F$36 million—to expand the primary sector and assist the employment-
generating business sector (see Narsey 1985). The unions criticised the freeze
as unnecessary and oppressive, especially to lower income groups, and,
moreover, as a breach of  the spirit of  the Tripartite Forum.1
Anger about the government’s economic strategies was further fuelled
by the bitter and prolonged conflict between the Ministry of Education
and the teachers’ unions. The Volunteer Service Scheme, devised by the
government to give fresh graduate teachers employment on a cost-share
basis, incurred the wrath of graduating teachers, who accused the
government—rightly as the courts subsequently agreed—of reneging
on the earlier promise of  regular employment. The government’s policy
of large-scale arbitrary transfer of teachers, part of a wider policy to
integrate Fiji’s communally oriented schools, smacked of  an arrogant
and confrontational attitude. The Education Minister, Dr Ahmed Ali,
was accused by both Indo-Fijian and Fijian teachers of ‘adopting an
anti-teacher stance designed to undermine the professional status of
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teachers in the country’. Indeed, Ali’s policies unwittingly provided the
foundation for a common front between the Indian-based Fiji Teachers’
Union and the exclusively taukei (indigenous) Fijian Teachers’ Association,
both of  which protested against the government’s educational policies
(Fiji Times, 8 November 1986).
Coming at a difficult economic time, and carried out in stark contrast
to the Mara administration’s earlier record of  consultation and dialogue,
these actions politicised the traditionally apolitical trade union movement,
which in turn led to the launching of the Fiji Labour party in July 1985.
New on the scene, brimming with enthusiasm and armed with progressive
social and economic policies contained under the general rubric of
‘democratic socialism’, the FLP promised, among other things, public
ownership of vital industries, minimum wage legislation for the
manufacturing sector, and increased local participation in such vital
industries as tourism.2 Not surprisingly, the party attracted significant local
attention. Just four months after being launched, Labour won the Suva
City municipal elections and made a strong showing in the North Central
Indian national constituency by-elections. But for all the euphoria and
early unexpected success, the FLP remained primarily an urban-based party,
led by white-collar trade unionists. To become a national force strong enough
to contend for government, the party had to broaden its base.
Initially, however, the FLP scorned the idea of  a coalition. As party
secretary Krishna Datt claimed in July 1986, ‘[bo]th the Alliance and the
NFP work within the framework of capitalism and the FLP cannot share
their ideologies’ (Fiji Times, 20 July 1986). Yet a few months later, chastened
by the hard realities of Fiji politics and realising the folly of confronting
the Alliance alone, the FLP changed its tune and initiated discussions
with the NFP, which it had recently criticised as being a party of  ‘a handful
of businessmen and lawyers’. By October the two parties had held seven
private meetings, and by December a coalition had been arranged. The
terms of  the arrangement were never made public, though several features
later became clear. One was a seat-sharing formula, according to which
the NFP agreed to give the FLP six of its 12 blue-ribbon Indian communal
seats as well as half  of  the winnable Indian and Fijian national seats.
This formula enabled the Labour to project itself  into the hitherto
inaccessible rural areas, while the NFP was spared the almost certain
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humiliation of losing its traditional iron-clad grip on the communal seats
to Labour’s Indo-Fijian candidates. Another notable feature was the
acceptance by the predominantly Indo-Fijian-based NFP of an ethnic
Fijian, from another party, as the leader of  the coalition. This was both
a tacit acknowledgement of weakness by the NFP as well as a concession
to the non-ethnic philosophy of the Coalition. It also represented a
significant shift in Indo-Fijian political opinion, which only a decade
earlier had rejected a Fijian leader for the party (Ratu Julian Toganivalu).
But the reality of ethnic politics in Fiji was that an Indo-Fijian prime
minister would not be acceptable to the majority of the taukei, and, for
the NFP to achieve any measure of political power, a coalition with
another party with a Fijian leader, and a political philosophy broadly
compatible to its own, was the only route to victory.
The third outcome of  the coalition arrangement was the formulation
of  a compromise manifesto that whittled down some of  the FLP’s radical-
sounding economic policies, such as encouraging worker participation
in the management of industry and the nationalisation of selected
industries, and that removed from the electoral arena such perennially
contentious issues as land tenure and education. Finally, both parties
agreed to present a combined, fresh slate of  candidates. A start was
made by endorsing only five of the 22 sitting Opposition
parliamentarians.
The Labour Coalition, however, was not the only coalition to contest
the 1987 elections. There was another, consisting of  a faction of  the
NFP and the Western United Front, the NFP’s 1982 election partner.
The NFP-WUF coalition was the handiwork of Shardha Nand, the
deposed secretary of  the NFP, and other politicians discarded by the
Labour Coalition’s candidate selection committee, including Siddiq Koya.
They massaged their personal grievances into a political cause, presenting
themselves as champions of Indo-Fijian rights placed in danger by having
a Fijian (Dr Bavadra) as the leader of the mainly Indo-Fijian-supported
opposition party. Taking the logic of  ethnic politics to its extreme
conclusion, they argued that only an Indo-Fijian could be trusted to lead
the Indo-Fijian community. Among other things, this faction of  the NFP
demanded a separate Ministry for Indian Affairs along the lines of its
Fijian counterpart, 99-year leases on Crown lands, and the allocation of
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jobs in the public sector according to the percentage of seats occupied
by each ethnic group in Fiji’s parliament, that is, 42 per cent each for the
Fijians and the Indians and the remaining 16 per cent for general electors.3
The Western United Front was a reluctant and silent partner in the
coalition. Its leader, Ratu Osea Gavidi, the charismatic campaigner of
1982, was quiet and generally inaccessible, spending more time battling
his irate creditors in court than fighting political opponents in elections.
Since 1982 the WUF itself had become somewhat of a spent force. The
policies for harvesting pine, the dispute about which had led to the
formation of  the party, was now a non-issue, and many western Fijians
outside of the Nadroga/Navosa region had been enticed back into the
Alliance fold. Further, the WUF had lost credibility with many NFP
leaders because of its withdrawal from the royal commission investigating
allegations suggesting that Soviet money was used by the original NFP–
WUF coalition in the bid to defeat the Alliance in the 1982 election.
The NFP–WUF coalition campaign began promisingly, but its prospects
vanished when Koya and other candidates withdrew, ostensibly to avoid
being tainted with the spoiler’s role. In the end, most of  the Indo-Fijian
members of the coalition, widely perceived as grasping opportunists,
suffered defeat, losing their deposits by getting less than 10 per cent of
the total votes cast in their constituency. Gavidi lost (42 per cent of  the
votes) to his old Alliance rival, Apenisa Kuruisaqila (53.5 per cent).
Of all the political parties, the Fijian Nationalist Party maintained the
lowest profile in the 1987 campaign. The party maintained its stridently
anti-Indian stance while at the same time advocating a platform designed
to promote Fijian interests. It proposed the ‘thinning out’ of  Fiji Indians
through an active policy encouraging emigration, to be funded by the British
government which had introduced Indians into Fiji in the first place. The
FNP made an issue of the paucity of Fijians in commercial and industrial
sectors, which it saw as a direct result of a conspiracy by the Indo-Fijian
and European business classes. It drew attention to the disparity between
the numbers of Fijians and Indo-Fijians employed in the public sector,
blamed the Alliance for the problem, and demanded that this disparity be
redressed. Finally, and unsurprisingly, it demanded an exclusively taukei
parliament through revision of the 1970 Constitution; absolute Fijian
control of the political process was seen as a precondition for Fijian
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economic and social progress. In the end, however, while there was personal
support and sympathy for Butadroka, who won 37.9 per cent of the votes—
an increase of 7.3 per cent over the 1982 figure—the FNP failed to
recapture old ground, though its candidates drew sufficient Fijian support
in marginal national seats to help the Coalition defeat the Alliance.
The campaign
The campaign for the general election began early in the year, partly in
anticipation of  a February poll. It was long and unremarkable, lacking,
for instance, the dramatic tension of the last stages of the 1982 campaign
when the contents of the so-called Carroll Report were revealed in an
Australian television program, or the intense and ultimately self-
destructive struggle between the competing factions of  the NFP in the
September 1977 elections. But the campaign had its own unique features
that helped to define its character. Learning from past experience, both
the Alliance and the Coalition dispensed with the problematic public
spectacle of touring the country to select candidates from a list prepared
by constituency committees. Instead, each party appointed a small
committee that made the selection, and whose decision was final and
irrevocable. This swift, if somewhat heavy-handed, action gave them
more time to focus on each other instead of having to contend with
internal selection squabbles. It also produced an avalanche of  defections
as the frustrated aspirants switched parties. In the end, however, most
of  the defectors suffered ignominious defeat at the polls.
Another significant difference between the 1987 election and previous
ones was that, for the first time since the advent of elections in Fiji, the
leaders of  both the ruling and leading opposition parties were ethnic
Fijians. This fact diluted—though never completely eliminated—the
exploitation of racial fear during the campaign. However, the divisive
race issue was supplanted by other emotional distinctions, such as
regionalism and class. Many Fijians saw in the election a contest between
commoner Fijians from the west led by Dr Bavadra, and the traditional
chiefly élite and eastern Fijians led by Ratu Mara.
As the campaign progressed, the strategies of the two rival parties
revealed themselves. Confident of  victory, the Alliance adopted a
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dismissive attitude toward the opposition. Ratu Mara set the tone in
November 1986 when, referring to the Labour politicians, he asked:
‘What have the Johnnys-come-lately done in the promotion of national
unity?’ (Fiji Times, 28 November 1986). He returned to this theme time
and again throughout the campaign. Dr Bavadra became the target of a
sneering newspaper campaign. In a typical advertisement the Alliance
said: ‘Bavadra has never been in parliament. He has no EXPERIENCE.
He has no INFLUENCE. The Council of Chiefs do [sic] NOT listen to
him. The international scene where we sell our sugar has NEVER heard
of  him. He cannot get renewal of  leases for farmers’ (Fiji Times, 15 March
1987). In the opening Alliance campaign address over Radio Fiji, Mosese
Qionibaravi, the deputy prime minister, called Bavadra an ‘unqualified
unknown’. The Coalition was often portrayed as weak, vacillating and
not to be trusted. One typical campaign advertisement ran: ‘The
opposition factions are fragmented and quarrelling among themselves.
Their policies are confused and shift constantly as one group or would-
be leader gains ascendency. Principles are proclaimed as fundamental
and are then dropped when pressures are applied by vested interests, or
for political expediency’. The Alliance on the other hand presented itself
as the very model of stability: ‘united in purpose, strong and fully
accepted leadership, clear and consistent policies, and a political
philosophy with values that have been proved by experience’.4
Other important features of  the Alliance campaign strategy were to
appeal for Fijian ethnic solidarity and to instill fear among the taukei
about the consequences of  a Coalition victory. The unmistakable Alliance
message was that only an Alliance government headed by paramount
chiefs could guarantee the security of  Fijian interests. Once again, Ratu
Mara led the Alliance charge. ‘Fijians have the political leadership despite
being outnumbered in this country’, he said, and ‘if they failed to unite
that leadership would slip away from them’ (Fiji Times, 24 September
1986). And Mara accused the Coalition of  trying to undermine Fijian
leadership by taking up Fijian causes with the intention of discrediting
the Alliance, such as the Nasomo land dispute in Vatukauloa, the plight
of  the cocoa growers in Vanua Levu, and competing claims of  ownership
of  Yanuca island in which his own wife was involved. Mara’s racial appeal
became so blatant that he was taken to task in a Fiji Sun editorial, the
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only political leader to be criticised in this way throughout the entire
campaign.
In past elections, Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara called for political parties not to indulge
in politics of fear, and not to fight the election on racial lines. But now the Prime
Minister himself has begun a racially oriented campaign. His call for the Fijians to
unite to retain political leadership is unwarranted. If every individual race began
campaigning on these lines, the country would be in trouble (Fiji Sun, 24 September
1986).
Fear was an important aspect of  the Alliance campaign strategy, fear
not only of the taukeis losing control over their land but also of being
forced to embrace an alien ideology. The Alliance warned the Fijian
electorate, particularly those residing in rural areas outside the purview
of modern influences, about the evils of democratic socialism—the
Coalition’s creed borrowed from the Anglo-Australasian tradition. It was
a system, the Alliance claimed, ‘in which LAND, FACTORIES, MINES,
SHOPS, etc. are ALL OWNED by the STATE and the COMMUNITY.
This is opposed to the present system in Fiji where ownership of Fijian
land rests exclusively with Fijian mataqali, and businesses belong to
individuals or shareholders in a public company’. The fact that some of
the trade union leaders had visited Moscow (as indeed had some
government ministers) was presented as indisputable proof of the
Coalition’s sinister designs.
In contrast to the Alliance, the Coalition entered the campaign as the
distinct underdog. It was new and inexperienced, underfunded and
comparatively disorganised, unable to match its rival in the media war.
Its candidates, therefore, ran their largely self-financed campaigns in
pocket meetings in their own constituencies. But the Coalition message
was clear: it charged the Mara administration with abuse of power and
reminded the electorate of the mounting economic difficulties for lower-
income families. Bavadra, in his concluding campaign speech, said, ‘Wage
and salary earners remember the wage and job freeze; farmers remember
their extreme hardships and insecurities; rural dwellers remember the
high prices; parents remember the increased bus fares; squatters remember
physical removal and neglect; teachers remember Dr Ahmed Ali’s reign
of terror in the Ministry of Education; students remember the pain of
their hunger strike; the taukei remember that most of Fijian development
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money goes to a few provinces’.5 The Coalition, for its part, promised a
new direction and a clean and compassionate government. Its election
theme, ‘time for a change’, caught the mood of the electorate as the
campaign concluded. It was, by all accounts, a remarkable transformation,
brought about as much by the Coalition’s own effort as by the voters’
deepening disenchantment with the Alliance’s negative campaigning.
Leadership
Leadership was an important issue in the campaign. The Alliance
projected an image of  unity, purpose and experience. The Coalition, on
the other hand, was portrayed as a bunch of professional critics whose
view of the real world was ‘so flawed that it would not pass as seconds’.
Ratu Mara was once again the party’s trump card, and he vowed to fight
to the end: ‘I have not yet finished the job I started and until I can ensure
that unshakeable foundations have been firmly laid and cornerstones
are set in place, I will not yield to the vaulting ambitions of a power
crazy gang of  amateurs, none of  whom has run anything, not even a
bingo party’.6 He assured the nation that ‘as long as the people of this
blessed land need me, I will answer their call. I will keep the faith. Fear
not, Ratu Mara will stay’ (Final election broadcast). The future of Fiji
and the Alliance party were inextricably linked, it was suggested; one
could not exist without the other. Without his and his party’s leadership,
Mara said, Fiji would go down the path of  ‘rack and ruin’; it would
become another of those countries ‘torn apart by racial strife and drowning
in debt, where basic freedoms are curtailed, universities closed down,
the media throttled and dissenters put into jail and camps’.
Ratu Mara’s long incumbency presented a real challenge for Dr
Bavadra; unlike Mara, Bavadra was a newcomer to national politics, and
virtually unknown outside Fiji. By profession a medical doctor, Bavadra
had held a number of  senior positions in the civil service before retiring
in 1985 to head the newly formed Fiji Labour Party. Bavadra came from
a chiefly background, though he was not himself a paramount chief. He
was a sportsman, and had attended the Queen Victoria School, but his
credentials with the Fijian establishment were tenuous and suspect.7 His
cause was not helped by the Alliance’s concerted effort to paint him as a
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tool of  Indo-Fijian politicians and therefore an untrustworthy guardian
of  Fijian interests. Thus Bavadra was forced frequently to defend his
own ‘Fijian-ness’ as well as his party’s platform.
By the end of the campaign, however, Bavadra had managed to turn
public opinion in his favour. His unassuming character and his common
touch, accessibility and openness, contrasted with Ratu Mara’s
characteristic aloofness, and projected an image of a compassionate man
who could be trusted. His style of  leadership received praise from his
colleagues. Commenting on Bavadra’s ‘first among equals’ approach to
leadership, Satendra Nandan wrote: ‘It is a type of  leadership which a
democracy requires in the modern world, by the command of the people
rather than by an accident of birth. It is a leadership which encourages
growth in a team, rather than the banyan tree leadership under which
everything else dies for lack of light. It is the leadership by a man who is
known nationally as a leader, not identified with one particular province
of  a country; by a man chosen by a genuinely multiracial party, a leader
who is easily approachable, not held in awe but in affection; a leadership
which sincerely believes in collective responsibility for collective decision
for the collective good’ (Fiji Times, 24 March 1987). Never before in Fiji
had the contrast between two competing styles of leadership been
presented so starkly to the public.
Conduct of government
The Alliance campaigned on its record of  experience and stability, while
the Coalition drew support by launching a concerted attack against it.
‘We have all become accustomed to the arrogance of  power, abuse of
and insolence of  office’, said Dr Bavadra (Fiji Times, 24 February 1987).
The Alliance had ‘reneged on the fundamental principles of democratic
responsibility and accountability. It pretends to be democratic but in
fact puts all decisions in the hands of  a very few. This brand of  democracy
aids a few at the expense of the vast majority’. This theme was pursued
throughout the campaign. The Coalition accused the Alliance of practising
the politics of racial separation, similar in effect if not in name to the
apartheid regime of South Africa. The difference between the two was
‘one of  degree, not one of  substance’. In rebuttal, the Alliance affirmed
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its commitment to opposing ‘any suggestion of  constitutional change
that would weaken or destroy the principle of  guaranteed on of  Fiji’s
major racial groups in the House of Representatives’ (Alliance Party
Manifesto 1987:2).
To check what it saw as abuse of  power, the Coalition proposed an
anti-corruption bill, a code of  conduct for parliamentarians, and the
abolition of legislation that allowed secrecy in government, specifically
the Official Secrets Act. For the most part, The Alliance chose to dismiss
the issues raised by the Coalition. As Mara declared, ‘Allow me simply to
say that there is no country in the world today in which similar concerns
do not emblazon the headlines. The fact is that these problems are a by-
product of modernisation. Fiji neither has a monopoly on these problems
nor are they extensive and corrosive here’ (Alliance Party Political
Broadcast). His point was valid, of  course, but the Alliance’s acceptance
of  these issues as political reality contrasted sharply with the Coalition’s
promise to tackle these problems with vigour. The above attitude seemed
to symbolise the Alliance’s apathy to many in the electorate and certainly
hurt the Alliance in the urban and peri-urban areas where violence and
crime had increased dramatically in the previous five years.
The economy
The economy was another important campaign issue. Predictably, the
Alliance trumpeted its record: inflation remained around 2 per cent, the
balance of  payment figures were sound, with foreign reserves at record
levels, and the country was assured of guaranteed prices for its basic
export item, sugar, through long-term international agreements. The
Alliance reaffirmed its commitment to the promotion of  individual
enterprise within a capitalist framework. In short, the Alliance promised
‘business as usual’ along an assured and well-trodden path.
But the Alliance’s optimism about the state of  the economy was based
on shaky foundations. A number of  experts pointed out that the Fijian
economy was in serious trouble from over-planning and over-reliance
on the public sector to generate employment and investment. The
Coalition criticised the Alliance’s management of  the economy, but in
general its economic strategy and philosophy didn’t differ substantially
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from their opponent’s. The Coalition went to great lengths to assure the
business community that it was not anti-business. Its election manifesto
stated that ‘employment creation through an expanding private sector
will form a major thrust of  our economic policies’. To generate private-
sector growth, the Coalition promised to facilitate ‘easy access to long-
term loan finances at low interest rates’. And in his closing campaign
address, Bavadra left no doubt of his support for the private sector: ‘I
reaffirm the Coalition’s recognition and acceptance of  the vital role of
the private sector in the development of the nation. There is no threat.
The private sector must remain. It will remain’.8 This was a politically
sensible stance that prevented the otherwise almost certain large-scale
defection of the Indian business community to the Alliance fold. Their
support in the marginal Suva seat proved crucial for the Coalition.
While the two parties agreed on broad issues of  economic philosophy,
they differed on both the performance as well as the management of  the
economy. The Coalition made an issue of  unequal regional development in
Fiji, pointing out that certain areas had been developed at the expense of
others. A campaign attack alleged that Lau, Ratu Mara’s own province, had
received a disproportionate share of development aid, scholarships and
hurricane relief money (Fiji Sun, 30 March 1987). Mara denied the charge of
favouring Lau, but statistics confirmed the Coalition allegations. For example,
between 1984 and 1986, Lau, one of the smallest of the Fijian provinces,
received F$528,099.05 in scholarships, 21 per cent of all the money allocated
for Fijian scholarships. On the other hand, much larger provinces received
far less: Ba, F$156,085.25 (6.2 per cent); Tailevu, F$364,244.44 (14.5 per
cent); and Rewa, F$221,638.93 (8.3 per cent).9 At the First Annual
Convention of  the Fiji Labour Party, Bavadra said ‘it is important to remind
ourselves that the government resources poured into Lakeba are derived
from wealth produced by others elsewhere in the country. It is time that the
government stopped viewing the rest of  Fiji as serving the interest of  a few
centres in the east. The people of Lakeba are entitled to a share in the
national interest, but just a share. It is time we had a government that is
more truly national in outlook’ (Bavadra 1986:n.p.).
The Coalition also highlighted the plight of the disadvantaged sectors
of  Fiji society that had missed out on the Alliance’s ‘economic parade’—
the grossly underpaid garment factory workers, squatters and other poor
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families. Indeed, the Coalition alleged collusion between big business
and the Alliance government in keeping wages down, and made the still
unrefuted charge that Indian garment manufacturers had contributed
about F$51,000 to the Alliance campaign fund to prevent the legislation
of  a minimum-wage policy for the industry. Pointing to the Alliance’s
record of  high foreign reserves, Bavadra asked, ‘But what use is that
when there is so much unemployment? What use is that if people can’t
afford bus fares? What use is that if business confidence is lacking?’
(Bavadra 1986). Bavadra’s logic appealed to those who felt marginalised
and left out of the economic picture portrayed by the Alliance.
Another difference between the Alliance’s and the Coalition’s
economic policies was the latter’s emphasis on the need to promote greater
local participation in Fiji’s economic development. This was in direct
response to the increasing feeling that the Mara government had become
less concerned over the years to the plight of local entrepreneurs and to
local sensitivities. The difference between the two parties was aptly
captured in their respective approaches to the promotion of the tourist
industry. Both parties supported the promotion of  tourism in Fiji, but
the Coalition went further. It proposed to develop hotel-linked farms
owned by neighbouring villages, to facilitate greater equity in the
participation of local people in the hotel and allied transport industries,
and to provide special incentive allowances to those reinvesting tourist
dollars in Fiji. The Coalition presented itself as a friend to local business
and local entrepreneurs, helping it to allay their fears and win their much-
needed financial support. The Alliance, in contrast, appeared to be a
part of  and for big business.
Taukei affairs and national development
The Alliance and the Coalition differed sharply in their policies and
visions for the nation and for the taukei. Both parties accepted the
provisions of the constitution that entrenched certain vested ethnic
political interests. Not surprisingly, however, while the Alliance
championed its long-held view that ‘race is a fact of life’ and pledged
not to disturb the status quo, the Coalition was committed to non-racialism.
It pressed for a common, unifying national name and identity to forge a
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genuine multiracial nation out of  its component ethnic parts. The
Alliance, on the other hand, rejected the notion of a common designation
for all Fiji citizens, arguing that it would pose a serious threat to specific
taukei rights, particularly land. The Alliance similarly rejected out of
hand the Coalition’s proposal to reform the Native Land Trust Board
(NLTB) to make it more efficient and responsive to both landowners’
needs and tenants’ concerns. As Bavadra noted in July 1986, ‘my concern
is that the NLTB has become too much the tool of  certain vested interests
in this country and that all too often steps taken by the NLTB are not in
the best interests of  the majority of  the landowners themselves’.10 To
improve the situation, the Coalition proposed to establish a National
Lands and Resources Council, composed of tenants’ and landowners’
representatives, that would oversee the NLTB and work to provide a
fair return to the owners as well as ensure greater security of tenure to
the tenant community. But the Coalition made it clear that it would not
‘attempt to change the existing land laws without the full consultation
and approval of the Great Council of Chiefs’ (Bavadra ‘Closing election
address’). The Alliance opposed any reform to the NLTB whatsoever,
and Mara called the FLP’s thinking on the subject extremely dangerous:
‘Fijians should be wary of it because it could lead to the slipping away
of native land’ (Fiji Times, 17 August 1986). Precisely how that was
possible when Fijian land rights were deeply entrenched in the
Constitution the Alliance party left unexplained, but the effect of the
Alliance’s strong public opposition was to plant fears in taukei minds
about the possible loss of their cherished rights under a Bavadra
government.
On Fijian leadership and politics, the Alliance position differed markedly
to the Coalition’s. The Alliance preached the need to maintain Fijian ethnic
unity under chiefly leadership. ‘The chiefs represent the people, the land
and the custom. Without a chief there is no Fijian society’, said Senator
Inoke Tabua, a close Mara associate (Fiji Times, 17 August 1986). But in
recent years, both the role of  the chiefs, as well as the formerly cohesive
nature of  traditional Fijian society, were being threatened by modern
influences—education, urbanisation and mass media. To stem the tide,
and to reinforce chiefly authority, the Mara administration attempted to
reintroduce selected aspects of the old Fijian Administration. A specially
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commissioned report, prepared by Pacific Islands Development Program
of  the Honolulu-based EastWest Center, under the leadership of  ex-Fiji
colonial official Rodney Cole, provided the blueprint for reforms in the
system (Cole et al. 1984).11 Among its specific recommendations were the
retention of many hitherto discarded customary laws and the official
recognition of  village leaders. These recommendations, formally
implemented in March 1987, would, so the administration hoped, buttress
chiefly authority and protect the traditional structure of  Fijian society by
insulating it from the corrosive influences in the larger society. Withdrawal
into the shell of communal isolation rather than the initiation of a national
dialogue was the Alliance’s response to a host of  serious social and
economic problems facing the taukei. This approach received wide support
across many rural areas and in the islands where the taukei were practicing
subsistence agriculture and had minimal contact with other ethnic groups,
but it had little relevance and meaning in urban areas where individual
struggle for existence took precedence over communal solidarity.
The Coalition’s markedly different line on Fijian leadership drew a
clear line between modern political and traditional roles for Fijian chiefs.
The Coalition promised to educate the taukei on their constitutional rights
as opposed to their traditional and customary obligations. As Bavadra
said, ‘so long as the Fiji constitution specifically guarantees individual
political freedoms and associations, no individual irrespective of his
colour, creed or sex is obligated to be subservient to a master, whether it
be a chief  or a political party, other than what his conscience dictates’.12
Neither did the FLP support further insulation of Fijian society from
the mainstream of  Fiji society, as the Alliance promised to do. Bavadra
told a meeting in Suva, ‘by restricting the Fijian people to their communal
lifestyle in the face of  a rapidly developing cash economy, the average
Fijian has become more and more economically backward. This is
particularly invidious when the leaders themselves have amassed huge
personal wealth by making use of their traditional and political powers’
(Fiji Times, 17 November 1986). Needless to say, this attitude presented
a direct and unprecedented threat to the chiefs who had acquired wealth
and influence by juxtaposing their modern political and traditional roles.
They naturally reacted with unremarkable indignation, and predicted a




Foreign policy was not a significant campaign issue in Fiji but received
considerable attention externally. A large part of  the reason for outside
concern was the widely, if  inaccurately, held view that the Coalition
consisted of  leftist radicals bent on wrecking Fiji’s traditionally pro-
Western policies. In fact, the Coalition’s foreign policies were almost
identical to those of  the NFP–WUF coalition’s 1982 platform. In 1982,
the NFP–WUF had promised to ‘maintain an active policy of
nonalignment’; to ‘keep the Pacific region free of big power rivalries,
and in cooperation with countries in the region, oppose all forms of
nuclear testing or nuclear waste disposal in the Pacific’; and to ‘support,
by all peaceful means, the struggle of  peoples of  remaining colonies in
the Pacific for independence and self government’. The Coalition
promised to pursue these same policies, with one curious exception.
Whereas the 1982 coalition had sought to ‘establish and strengthen Fiji’s
relationship with all nations without prejudice to their political
ideologies’, the 1987 Coalition said it would not allow the Soviet Union
to open an embassy in Fiji. The 1982 coalition, it appears, was even
more ‘left-leaning’ than its 1987 counterpart, though, of course, its views
had not received as much scrutiny or publicity.
For its part, the Alliance, too, committed itself  to a nonaligned policy
for Fiji, a nuclear-free Pacific and independence for New Caledonia. But
it added, significantly, that it would pursue its policies ‘bearing in mind
that it [Fiji] is a small nation and needs friends for its security’. One
friend that the government courted assiduously, and with promising result,
was the United States, which had begun to view Fiji as the key player in
regional politics. Fiji’s strategic importance to the United States was
enhanced by New Zealand’s firm antinuclear stance, and the consequent
problems with the ANZUS alliance. In the final analysis, however, as on
many other issues, the difference between the Coalition and the Alliance
on important matters of foreign policy was more one of degree than of
substance. Once in government, the Coalition was intent on pursuing a
prudent and moderate foreign policy course, seeing the need to
consolidate its power within Fiji as its most important challenge.13
As the campaign ended, the two parties painted contrasting visions of
Fiji under their respective rules. Dr Bavadra’s Fiji would be committed to
islands of turmoil
68
social justice and economic equality. The Alliance promised to keep Fiji
on its accustomed path, firmly ensconced within a capitalist framework;
without the Alliance, the electorate was told, Fiji had no democratic future.
In his last election message to the nation Mara said, ‘I firmly believe that
these elections will be crucial to the future of  our homeland. Let there be
no doubt in your mind: Fiji is not so much at a turning point, as it is at the
crossroads. If  we take the wrong direction, we will finish up in blind alleys,
from which there is no return and no way out’.
Voting
Given the communal electoral system, it is not surprising that voting follows
an ethnic pattern. As Table 3.1 shows, Fijians always voted overwhelmingly
for the Fijian-dominated Alliance and the Indians have rallied behind the
NFP. The general electors were consistent in their support for the Alliance,
90 per cent in 1982 and 85 per cent in 1987. Political success in Fiji was
thus contingent on maintaining solidarity in one’s own ethnic community
while actively promoting disunity among the opposition’s. The Alliance
played the game with much skill, preserving Fijian unity while capitalising
on dormant factionalism and disunity in the Indian community. The NFP,
as the figures show, has not encountered much success in splitting the
Fijian communal vote in its favour.
The 1987 election confirmed the historic trend of  predominantly
ethnic patterns of voting, but the figures also belie the emergence of
some new trends. Although Indo-Fijian support for the Alliance remained
constant around 15 per cent, that support was not as broadly based as it
had been in the past. In recent years, the Indo-Fijian business class and
a significant section of the Muslim community constituted the base of
the Indian Alliance; the party’s support among the South Indian
community, or among the reformist Arya Samaj religious group, important
in the past, declined significantly in 1987. And while it remained true
that the majority of Fijians supported the Alliance, it was also significant
that 21.8 per cent voted for other parties and independents, thus indicating
that among many Fijians the Alliance was not regarded as the sole
representative voice of  the Fijian community. On the other hand, the
Coalition was able to make significant inroads into the Fijian constituency,
enough to cause the Alliance’s defeat in marginal seats.
things fall apart
69
An important feature of the 1987 election was a record-low voter
turnout, the lowest since independence. Indo-Fijian turnout declined
from 85 per cent in 1982 to 69 per cent in 1987, while in the same
period the Fijian turnout dropped from 85 per cent to 70 per cent. This
decline affected the outcome in the marginal constituencies. The reasons
for the drop are not clear, though several plausible explanations exist.
One, undoubtedly, was the confusion caused by the omission of  names
from the hastily prepared and improperly checked electoral rolls; names
of voters were inadvertently transferred from one polling station to
another, thereby causing unsuspecting voters to miss the deadline for
casting their votes at a specified time and place. Another reason could
have been the widespread feeling that the election was a foregone
conclusion in the Alliance’s favour, thus causing some supporters to
stay away. Among some Fijians, especially in urban areas, absence from
the polling booth was a protest against the Alliance. The Alliance suffered
from a decline in Fijian voter turnout in all except four of its twelve
communal constituencies, the largest decline being in areas where it was
already particularly vulnerable. In Lomaiviti/Muanikau the Fijian turnout
dropped by 23 per cent, in Rewa/Serua/Namosi by 17 per cent, in
Table 3.1 Voting patterns in Fiji, 1972–87 (per cent)
Party 1972 1977 1977 1982 1987
(April) (September)
Fijian communal vote
Alliance (per cent) 83.1 64.7 80.5 83.7 76.6
NFP (per cent) 2.4  – 0.1 0.8 9.6
FNP (per cent) – 24.4 11.6 7.7 5.4
WUF (per cent) – – – 7.0 3.4
Total no. of  votes cast 76,462 82,651 94,038 121,366 120,701
Indian communal vote
Alliance (per cent) 24.1 15.6 14.4 15.3 15.1
NFP
Labour Coalition (per cent) 74.3 73.2 84.9 84.1 82.9
Total no. of  votes cast 84,753 103,644 103,537 110,830 122,906
Source: Fiji Gazette, various years.
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Kadavu/Tamavua by 16 per cent, and in Ra/Samabula by 13.4 per cent.
Tamavua, Samabula and Muanikau are all a part of  the greater Suva area
and within the Suva Fijian national constituency where a voter turnout
drop and a swing to the Coalition caused the Alliance’s defeat. This was
a constituency that the Alliance had always won with the slightest of
margins, and, in the 1987 elections, it was widely viewed as the seat
most likely to tip the balance of the election. It had a total of 41,179
voters (16,962 Fijians, 20,778 Indians and 3,439 general electors).
The Alliance’s candidates were Ratu David Toganivalu, the deputy
prime minister, and Mrs Irene Jai Narayan. Pitted against these two
seasoned politicians were the Coalition newcomers, Dr Tupeni Baba, a
Fijian academic at the University of the South Pacific, and Navin Maharaj,
former Suva (and Alliance) mayor and businessman. The Alliance
counted on the experience and popularity of its candidates to carry the
constituency. But that was not to be. Maharaj, a veteran of  municipal
politics, mounted an effective door-to-door campaign, and Baba
developed with the campaign to become an articulate and accomplished
spokesman for his party, connecting especially with the city’s younger
voters, both Indo-Fijian and Fijian. Business community support for
Toganivalu was neutralised among the powerful Gujarati community by
Harilal Patel, who contested the Suva Indian communal seat. And Mrs
Narayan, instead of  being an asset, became a liability. Her previous record
of solid opposition to the Alliance was used against her; many of her
former supporters refused to overlook her defection from the NFP to
the Alliance; and the Indian Alliance, feeling discarded and discredited,
refused to campaign for the party. Making matters worse for themselves,
leading Alliance party functionaries, including Mara, devoted an
inordinate amount of time in western Viti Levu hoping, at long last, to
win an Indian communal seat.
Another marginal seat was the southeastern national (Naitasiri/
Nasinu area), which the Alliance also lost to the Coalition. Here, there
were 22,228 Fijian registered voters, 19,974 Indians and 761 general
electors. Several factors helped to defeat the Alliance. But perhaps more
important was the effect of  the Fijian Nationalist Party, which collected
8.5 per cent of the Fijian communal votes that otherwise, it can
reasonably be supposed, would have gone to the Alliance. The Coalition
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candidate, Joeli Kalou, a teacher and a trade unionist, was an
accomplished campaigner, while his Alliance rival, Ratu George
Tu’uakitau Cokanauto, youngest son of  the late Ratu Sir Edward
Cakobau, remained uncomfortable on the hustings, relying more on
traditional political connections than on active campaigning. For its Indian
candidate, the Coalition astutely chose a Muslim, Fida Hussein, for an
area with a large Muslim population. His presence on the ticket helped
to blunt the effect of  the Alliance’s assiduous courting of  Muslim voters.
The Alliance’s downfall in this constituency, as elsewhere, came about
through shrewd Coalition strategy, as well as through the Alliance’s own
complacency and ineffectiveness.
At his first news conference after being sworn into office on 12 April,
Dr Bavadra briefly reflected on the momentous events of the previous
week. He viewed the ‘the peaceful and honorable change of government’
as the reaffirmation of  the ‘deep democratic roots of  our society and the
profound unity of our people’ (Fiji Times, 13 April 1987). He saw in his
triumph the dawn of  a new era, full of  new potential and opportunity.
‘Together’, he said, ‘let us write a new chapter, which, God willing, will
be one which we and our children will be proud of ’ (Fiji Times, 13 April
1987). Unfortunately for him and his supporters, neither the gods nor
his opponents were willing or prepared for change.
The 14 May coup
While the new government set about its work, its opponents—defeated
after almost two decades of  untrammelled rule—organised to oppose
and eventually overthrow it, climaxing with the military-led and Alliance-
condoned coup of 14 May 1987. The Fiji coup is probably the most
written about event in modern Fijian and Pacific islands history. The
story is too well known to need retelling here.14 I shall therefore refer
only to major events and developments to complete the picture. The
immediate interpretation of the May coup was that it was essentially an
ethnic conflict, with the Fijians asserting their power against a government
that they themselves did not control. The ethnic factor was certainly
mobilised, by the Taukei Movement among others, to support the
destabilisation campaign. But the coup was not simply an ethnic conflict.
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A whole variety of individuals and groups felt threatened by the
Coalition’s victory. Some former cabinet ministers feared that the new
government would investigate allegations of abuse and mismanagement.
Politicians at risk of  losing their jobs—some had no other career to fall
back on—contributed to inflaming opposition to the new government.
Prominent leaders supported the usurpers by joining the new post-coup
administration rather than taking a stand for the democratic ideals that
they had previously championed. The election of a middle-ranking chief
as prime minister unsettled some Fijians used to being governed by
paramount chiefs. Bavadra’s championing of  democratic values, his plea
to observe distinctions between modern and traditional roles did not sit
well with some. For others, Bavadra’s ascension from western Viti Levu
to the office of  the prime minister threatened the traditional structure
and distribution of  power in Fijian society. For a whole variety of  reasons,
then, the Labour government had to go.
The full truth of  the complex motivations of  the principal players
will never be known, though they all have advanced self-exculpatory
reasons for their behaviour. Ratu Mara justified his participation in the
first coup administration on the grounds that his house was on fire and
he had therefore no choice but to get involved to save his life’s work,
which led someone to quip that he should have in that case joined the
firefighters and not the arsonists. No direct evidence has linked him to
the pre-coup machinations, although Rabuka remembers mentioning to
the former prime minister the scenario he had in mind during a game of
golf.15 The overwhelming impression in Fiji is that Ratu Mara was not
directly involved, but that it is inconceivable that a politician of his
experience and contacts did not know what was in the offing. There is
also a deep sense of disappointment on all sides that Mara did not do
more to save the fledgling democracy at the moment of  its greatest crisis.
Other observers implicate Ratu Sir Penaia Ganilau, Rabuka’s paramount
chief, of being aware of what was about to take place. There is little
doubt that Ganilau had emotional sympathy with the purported aims of
the coup,16 but whether he sanctioned it is impossible to determine. For
his part, Rabuka has never implicated Ganilau.
Rabuka himself, in 1987 a lieutenant colonel and the third ranking
officer in the Fiji military, captured the limelight and provided a host of
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self-serving reasons as to why he had executed the coup. Above all, he
claimed it was the interest of law and order and in the national interest
of  Fiji. He portrayed himself  as the humble servant of  the Fijian cause.
He talked at length in his first authorised biography (see Dean and Ritova
1988) about his loyalty and devotion to chiefs but then showed no
hesitation in usurping their authority when they stood in his way. He
executed the second coup in September, undermining the Deuba Accord
that the Coalition and the Alliance had signed to lead Fiji back to
democracy. He continued to talk about his love for the army but then
refused to retreat to the barracks. He assured the Indo-Fijians that he
would look after their welfare but suggested they might be better off
converting to Christianity. The saga of  confusion and contradiction went
on. Rabuka sought, to some degree convincingly, to portray himself  as
the champion of Fijian rights, but few believed—or believe—that he
had carried out the coup all on his own, without the prior knowledge of
important sections of  the Fijian society.
Two weeks after the coup, Ratu Penaia Ganilau appointed a council
of  advisors to assist him to restore normalcy to Fiji. Fourteen of  the 18
members of the Council were personally endorsed by Rabuka; only two
its members were from the coalition—Timoci Bavadra and Harish
Sharma. Critics accused Ganilau of  putting in place a process designed
to ‘realise the aims of  the coup’ through legal means. In July, Ganilau
appointed a constitution review committee to conduct public hearings
throughout the country to gauge public opinion on how best to achieve
the goal of strengthening ‘the political rights of the indigenous Fijians’.
Despite deep reservations, the Coalition agreed to participate in the
committee.
The views expressed to the committee were predictable. Most in the
Indo-Fijian community opposed any change to the 1970 constitution
without full national debate. The only exception was the Fiji Muslim
League, which generally supported the Fijian position on constitutional
matters. The Coalition argued that the incumbent political system was
…just, fair and equitable. The system has withstood the test of time and has
become accepted by the majority of  the citizens of  this country. It protects the
special interests of the indigenous Fijians through special provisions of power of
veto by the nominees of  the GCC [Great Council of  Chiefs]. To devise changes to
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the existing constitution on the basis of the preponderance of any particular race
must in the end be harmful to race relations as it would enhance polarisation of our
communities along racial lines. It will also disturb the power in the current
constitution. This could lead to loss of confidence in the long-term stability of the
country to what has been evidenced since the coup.17
Views varied among indigenous Fijians, but on the whole there was
enthusiastic support for the coup and for the recognition of nationalist
Fijian aspirations. Most Fijian individuals and groups who appeared before
the committee wanted Fijians to be in control. The various strands of
Fijian thinking were encapsulated in the submission of the Great Council
of  Chiefs. Its constitutional review committee, headed by Ratu Mara and
Rabuka, demanded that Fiji be made a Christian state, departing from the
sectarian principles of the 1970 constitution. The constitution, the Great
Council of Chiefs argued, should expressly incorporate provisions for
preferential treatment and affirmative action for Fijians in public offices,
statutory bodies and even private companies. It suggested the abolition of
the Senate and the creation of a 71-member House of Representatives
with 40 Fijians (28 of whom were to be nominated by the Provincial
Councils, 8 nominated by the Great Council of Chiefs and 4 nominated
by the prime minister; 22 Indo-Fijians, 8 general electors and one Rotuman
nominated by the Council of  Rotuma. Four of  the 22 Indo-Fijian seats
were to be reserved for Muslims. Apart from demanding Fijian numerical
dominance in parliament, the Great Council of Chiefs also wanted certain
positions reserved for Fijians, including the offices of  prime minister, and
ministries of  Fijian affairs, agriculture, home affairs, finance and industry.
The commander of the Fiji military forces would always be a Fijian, as
would be the Commissioner of  Police, the chairman of  the Public Service
Commission and secretary to cabinet.
With the Great Council of Chiefs and the Coalition espousing
diametrically opposed views about the best constitutional arrangements
for Fiji, it was a foregone conclusion that the constitution review
committee’s report would be a divided one. And it was. With his plans to
return Fiji to normalcy in disarray, Ganilau set in motion a fresh proposal
to move the country forward. He appointed a politically balanced council
of advisors to help him usher in an interim administration under his
control, among whose tasks would be to lay the ground work for a new
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constitution. His proposal, which came to be known as the ‘Deuba
Accord’—after the location where it was formally negotiated—was about
to be enacted into legislation when Rabuka executed the second coup
on 25 September.
Rabuka was not party to the negotiations. His exclusion from the
talks was an error of  judgement on the part of  Coalition politicians. It is
tantalising to ask what sort of future of Fiji might have had had he been
present. Rabuka might not have accepted the inclusion of Indo-Fijian
Coalition members in the caretaker administration. But seeing Bavadra,
Mara and Ganilau on the same side might have dissuaded him from the
route he subsequently took on 7 October when he unilaterally declared
Fiji a republic. On 9 October, Rabuka swore in a Military Administration
consisting of  Fijian nationalists and members of  the Taukei Movement.
The Military Administration was in power from October to December.
It was a period of wanton disregard for human rights and rampant racial
extremism. Coalition leaders were harassed and some were put in prison.
A series of decrees curtailed the freedom of speech and movement. All
political activity was banned, and a strict observance of  the Sabbath
enforced. Civil servants could be dismissed on the grounds of  ‘public
interest’. Making matters worse for the administration was a rapidly
deteriorating economy. The rising cost of  living, the increasing inflation, a
compulsory 25 per cent salary cut for all public servants at a time when
the Fijian dollar had already been devalued by 35 per cent compounded
the misery. Projects soon to be started were put on hold, and foreign and
local investors eyed their prospects warily. International condemnation
was unsparing. Ratu Mara correctly surmised that unless the economy
were revived, Fiji would face bankruptcy by the end of  the year.
With the military administration in disarray, Rabuka was persuaded
to hand power back to his chiefs. He did so but not before a number of
his prior conditions were met. No Coalition member was to be included
into the new cabinet, and military representation in the new
administration had to be guaranteed. Mara and Ganilau accepted the
preconditions. With details out of  the way, Rabuka formally approached
Ganilau to accept the presidency of the new Republic of Fiji, which he
did on 5 December. The following day, Ganilau told the nation that ‘the
future protection of the indigenous Fijian interests is in safe hands’.
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Mara accepted his appointment as prime minister with ‘honour and pride’,
telling his people that they had nothing to fear from his administration.
With Ganilau and Mara back in office, one chapter in Fiji’s recent past
had closed, and another was about to open.
Notes
1 The Tripartite Forum—composed of  the Fiji Trade Union Congress, Fiji Employees
Consultative Association, and the government—was formed in 1976 to reach ‘common
understanding [on issues] which affect national interest such as industrial relations, job
creation, greater flow of investment and general social and economic development of
the country’.
2 The full manifesto is reprinted in Lal 1986.
3 The manifesto was largely the handiwork of Shardha Nand.
4 A typescript of  the address is in the author’s possession.
5 Quote from a typescript of  the concluding address in the author’s possession.
6 Quote from the opening campaign address, a copy is in the author’s possession.
7 For an introduction to Bavadra’s life, see Bain and Baba 1990.
8 From his closing campaign address.
9 These figures are derived from a report prepared by the Fijian Affairs Board and presented
to the Great Council of  Chiefs at their 1986 Somosomo meeting.
10 Bavadra’s speech, First Annual Convention of  the Fiji Labour Party, Lautoka, 19 July
1986. Similar sentiments about the NLTB were expressed throughout the campaign.
11 For a discussion of the problems of Fijian Administration in the 1960s, see Lasaqa
1984.
12 Bavadra’s speech, First Annual Convention of  the Fiji Labour Party, Lautoka, 19 July
1986.
13 Coalition Foreign Minister Krishna Datt told General Vernon Walters that his
government was re-examining its stance on the nuclear issue.
14 For an early literature review, see Lal and Peacock 1990.
15 For Rabuka’s version, see his authorised biography (Sharpham 2000).
16 Though less politically ambitious than Ratu Mara, Ratu Penaia Ganilau was nonetheless
a staunch Fijian nationalist, as seen from his speeches and statements in the 1960s.
17 The quote is from a transcript of  the Coalition’s submission to the Constitution
Review Committee, as cited in Lal 1988.
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Back from the abyss
1992
Fiji’s 1992 election was an important and welcome development, marking
Fiji’s first tentative steps toward restoring parliamentary democracy and
international respectability, and replacing rule by decree with rule by
constitutional law. The elections were held under a constitution rejected
by half the population and severely criticised by the international
community for its racially discriminatory, anti-democratic provisions.
Indigenous political solidarity, assiduously promoted since the coups,
disintegrated in the face of  election-related tensions. A chief-sponsored
political party won 30 of the 37 Fijian seats in the 70-seat House of
Representatives, and was able to form a government only in coalition
with other parties. Sitiveni Rabuka, the self-confessed reluctant politician,
became prime minister after gaining the support of the Fiji Labour
Party—which he had overthrown in 1987—and despite the opposition
of his predecessor and paramount chief of Lau, Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara.
In a further irony, a constitutional system intended to entrench the
interests of Fijian chiefs placed a commoner at the national helm. On
the other side of the political divide, the triumphant 1987 coalition of
the National Federation Party and Fiji Labour Party disintegrated in the
weeks before the elections, split over the best strategy to restore Fiji to
genuine parliamentary democracy.
Fiji had been run by an interim administration since Rabuka
relinquished power to his paramount chief  and former governor general,
Ratu Sir Penaia Ganilau, who in turn invited Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara to
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form an interim government that ruled Fiji from December 1987 to May
1992. The Mara administration was confronted by an array of problems,
two of which required immediate attention. One was resuscitating an
economy shattered by reduced investor confidence, the haemorrhaging
of skilled personnel from the public sector, the flight of capital, the
interruptions in the sugarcane harvest, and the severe downturn in the
tourist industry. The other was the restoration of  the country to at least
a semblance of  civilian rule through the promulgation of  a constitution
that realised the publicly stated aims of the coups while maintaining the
symbolic paraphernalia of  parliamentary democracy. To those tasks, Mara
and his ministers dedicated most of  their efforts.
On the economic front, the interim administration initiated policies
that promised to chart a radically different path for Fiji’s economic future
(Elek and Hill 1991; Stratton and McGregor 1991). Led by Finance
Minister Josefata Kamikamica, it attempted to develop commercial links
with ASEAN countries, in part to lessen traditional dependence on trade
with Australia and New Zealand, whose criticism of the coups had
angered the Fijian leaders (Sutherland 1989). This effort bore some fruit
as Japanese, Korean, Malaysian and Taiwanese companies invested in
tourism, agriculture and other primary production.
The government also began deregulating the economy and eliminating
Fiji’s import-substitution policies. It started a tax-free zone under which
companies exporting 90 per cent or more of their products would be
granted tax holidays for up to 13 years and would be exempt from customs
duties on imported equipment and production materials. By 1991, more
than 300 companies had invested a total of F$102 million, and another
100 were approved.1 The tax-free base was extended beyond the garment
industry, where it had received its initial and greatest success, to include
timber processing for furniture and fittings and manufacturing of light
technical equipment (Pacific Report, 25 July 1991). Critics complained
about the unequal distribution of income generated by the new industries
and about sweatshop conditions (Barr 1990), but the scheme had
improved Fiji’s balance of  payments and provided much-needed local
employment.
These new economic programs required strict regulation of the labour
market and a corresponding reduction in the power of trade unions, which
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were prohibited in the tax-free zones. The trade union movement was the
backbone of the Fiji Labour Party and a continuing source of irritation to
the government (Slatter 1989). In May 1991, the government enacted a
series of repressive labour laws intended to control the trade unions, but
officially justified in the name of  improving the country’s international
competitiveness and internal economic flexibility. The new decrees enabled
the prosecution of trade unions for damages arising from ‘unlawful’ trade
disputes; introduced company-based unions; amended the Trades Disputes
Act to include other forms of  industrial action such as go-slow, work-to-
rule, and the withdrawal of  goodwill; provided for the use of  postal or
workplace ballots for the election of union officials; and abolished
minimum-wage councils. In retaliation, the Fiji Trades Union Congress,
with 25 trade unions and 45 per cent of  Fiji’s full-time workers among its
members, threatened a massive strike. This was averted when the
government retracted the decrees (Islands Business, June 1991).
The scene was also set for confrontation in the sugar industry. Dispute
there centred on two issues. One was the farmers’ demand for a full
forecast price of cane of F$43.70 per tonne, and not the F$34.96 offered
by the Fiji Sugar Corporation—a reduction it justified in the name of
falling international prices, bad weather, increased costs of production
and harvest delays (Pacific Report, 30 May 1991). The other was the
farmers’ demand for prompt elections, postponed since 1987, for the
Sugar Cane Growers’ Council. When their demands were refused, the
farmers threatened a strike, whereupon the government passed decrees
declaring the sugar industry an essential service and proposed 14-year
jail sentences and fines up to F$14,000 for anyone interrupting the running
of  the industry. Once again the government backed down when faced
with further industrial action. Nonetheless, the imminent confrontation
between the government and the farmers sowed the seeds of  bitterness
and distrust that resurfaced later in the political arena.
One beneficiary of the disputes in the sugar industry was the National
Farmers’ Union, formed in the 1980s—the brainchild of  the trade unionist
Mahendra Chaudhry, finance minister in the Bavadra government. The
Union’s success helped to undermine the influence of  its much older rivals,
the Kisan Sangh and the Federation of  Cane Growers. When elections
were held for the Sugar Cane Growers’ Council early in 1992, the National
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Farmers’ Union won a majority of  the seats. It became, in effect, the Fiji
Labour Party’s rural arm and the main reason for Labour’s electoral victory
in the cane belts in the 1992 elections. Chaudhry, too, gained in stature (or
notoriety). The National Farmers’ Union had enabled him to extend his
power base beyond his urban trade union base, and he used his new
connections to great political advantage (Islands Business, June 1991).
Another unexpected winner from the post-coup industrial tremors
was Sitiveni Rabuka, who distanced himself from the interim
administration’s policies to create a niche for himself  as a moderate
consensus builder. In the nurses’ strike and the long-festering Vatukoula
gold mine strike, for example, he sympathised with the strikers. He went
further. In June 1991, he said that Mara’s administration ‘had got their
industrial policies wrong, and ought to resign...This government is a
reactionary government’, said Rabuka, ‘made up of overpaid people who
sit on their laurels and wait for something to happen before they react’.
He even threatened to ‘repossess’ the power he had vested in the president
(Fiji Times, 8 June 1991). A few days later he apologised to the government
for this blistering criticism, and for ‘insulting’ his paramount chiefs. Even
more incredibly, he joined Mara’s cabinet as deputy prime minister. One
interpretation of this development was that he had been co-opted, and
thus marginalised, by Mara. Nonetheless, Rabuka had signalled his
independence. This, together with the government’s confrontational
industrial policies, was an important reason why, after the 1992 elections,
he was able to get Labour’s support in his bid to become prime minister.
Constitution
Several attempts soon after the 1987 coups to produce a broadly
acceptable constitution had failed. Then, in October 1988, the interim
administration appointed the Constitution Inquiry and Advisory
Committee to produce a constitution ‘having regard in particular to the
failure of the 1970 Constitution to provide adequate and full protection
of the rights, interests and concerns of the indigenous Fijian people,
and having regard to the all the circumstances prevailing in Fiji’ (Fiji
Constitution Inquiry and Advisory Committee 1998). The loaded terms
of  reference—how was it determined that the 1970 constitution had
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failed and by whom?—needed little comment. The coup leaders were
described by the committee as ‘members of the security forces who
assisted in the change of government in 1987’. The committee presented
its report early in 1990, and a new constitution was promulgated by the
president in July of  that year.
The new constitution provided for an executive presidency and a
bicameral legislature consisting of an appointed Upper House, the Senate,
and an elected Lower House, the House of  Representatives. The
president, always to be a Fijian chief, was to be appointed by the Bose
Levu Vakaturaga or Great Council of  Chiefs and responsible to that body
alone in the exercise of the powers of office. These were considerable,
including appointing the prime minister (again, always to be a Fijian)
and members of  the president’s advisory council, and presiding over
other important functions of the state.
The Senate consisted of 34 appointed members, 24 nominated by
the Council of  Chiefs and the remaining 10 by the president. The council’s
senators retained the power of veto over all legislation that impinged on
Fijian interests, including land and traditional customs. Given their
strength in the Senate, they could, if  they wished, frustrate the legislative
efforts of  any government, even one dominated by Fijians. In effect, the
chiefs and their nominees in the Senate enjoyed untrammelled powers
to control the legislative agenda.
The elected House of Representatives consisted of 70 members, of
whom 37 were indigenous Fijians, 27 Indo-Fijians, and 10 ‘others’. Here,
the new constitution differed from the old one, which had established
parity between the two major ethnic groups, then roughly equal in
numbers. In another major change, all the members were to be elected
on purely racial rolls, with Fijians voting only for Fijians, Indo-Fijians
only for Indo-Fijians, and others (Chinese, Europeans and part-Europeans,
Pacific Islanders) voting only for their ethnic candidates (the 1970
constitution provided for half the parliamentary seats to be elected from
multiracial constituencies). The racially based rolls left little opportunity
or incentive for multiracial politics, and they discouraged the adoption
of  more broadly based political platforms that transcended racial and
parochial concerns. There was no practical advantage in a multiracial
philosophy, as was painfully evident in the 1992 elections.
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Of  the 37 Fijian seats, 32 were to be elected from the rural
constituencies and the remaining 5 from urban ones. The allocation of
seats became an issue. Why, argued many, should the province of  Ba,
for instance, with more than 55,000 ethnic Fijians, have the same number
of seats, three, as Lau, with a population of 14,000? Why should Rewa,
with 48,000 Fijians, get two seats while Cakaudrove, with 29,000, got
three? Why indeed? And why should urban Fijians, who made up more
than one-third of the Fijian population, have only five seats? The main
reason for this gross malapportionment was to reduce the voting strength
of the urban Fijians whose support, however small, for the Labour Party
had contributed to its 1987 victory. It was also part of  the larger effort
to preserve the Fijian status quo.
The constitution thus became a major issue before and during the
elections. Most Fijians appeared to support it and to welcome the dominant
voice it gave them, although many from western Viti Levu questioned
their electoral under-representation and the rejection of their claim for a
separate confederacy, the Yasayasa Vaka Ra, to complement the existing
three (the Tovata, the Burebasaga and the Kubuna) and give them a national
voice commensurate with their numbers and contribution to the national
economy. In a submission to the Constitution Inquiry and Advisory
Committee, a twelve-member delegation of western Fijians criticised the
constitution for discriminating ‘against the progressively productive, better
educated, forward-thinking Fiji citizens of all races in favour of that minority
segment of  the community that represents (and seeks to reserve for itself)
the aristocratic, undemocratic, privileged pattern of colonial life’ (cited in
Sutherland 1992:190). Their protests went unheard, but were voiced again
in the elections. The Coalition (of  the National Federation Party and the
Fiji Labour Party) rejected the constitution too, denouncing it as racist,
feudalistic, undemocratic and authoritarian, and promised an international
campaign to overturn it. The difference of opinion within the Coalition on
how best to achieve this goal led to its collapse.
Conflict in the Fijian camp
With the constitution formally promulgated in July 1990, the Council of
Chiefs launched a new political party that it hoped would unite the people
under one umbrella, in the manner of the Fijian Administration of
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colonial days. Thus united, the chiefs hoped, the Soqosoqo ni Vakavulewa
ni Taukei (SVT, or Fijian Political Party) would lead the Fijian people to
electoral victory and fulfil the aims of  the coup. The reality turned out
to be different. Even as the party was being launched, some Fijian leaders
questioned the wisdom of  the Council of  Chiefs, as a formal non-political
body, sponsoring a political party. One critic was Apisai Tora, who wanted
the chiefs to remain above the fray of  ordinary politicking. What would
happen to the dignity of the council if it failed to capture all the Fijian
seats? ‘Our firm view’, he said, ‘remains that the Bose Levu Vakaturaga
should be at the pinnacle of  Fijian society, totally removed from the
taint of ordinary politicking’ (Fiji Times, 10 October 1991).
Such views went unheeded, paving the way for further problems. The
first of these emerged over the election of the president of the Fijian
Political Party. Many Fijians wanted a non-political chief, chosen through
consensus, to lead the party and provide it with a semblance of impartial
traditional authority. Once again, the reality turned out to be different.
There were three contenders for the presidency: Ratu William Toganivalu,
a high chief of Bau; Lady Lala Mara, the paramount chief of Burebasaga
and Ratu Mara’s wife; and Sitiveni Rabuka. To the surprise of  many and
the consternation of others, Rabuka defeated the chiefs, winning 9 of
the 19 ballots of  the Management Committee of  the Fijian Political
Party, while Lala Mara got 6 votes and Toganivalu 4. This stunning result
intrigued many Fijians, including the Fijian Nationalist Party leader
Sakiasi Butadroka, who remarked: ‘if the SVT delegates can put a
commoner before a chief, then I don’t understand why the Great Council
of Chiefs is backing the SVT…I don’t know why a chiefs-backed party
can do such a thing’, he said, ‘putting a chief—in this case the highest
ranking chief, Ro Lady Lala—before a selection panel’ (Fiji Times, 4
November 1991).
Rabuka’s ascendancy troubled many Fijians, including some of  his
former (but now disenchanted) supporters, who had expected him to
fade away after the coup. Among the reasons for their disenchantment
were his mercurial character and bursts of  sharp criticism of  Mara’s
administration. His aggressive pursuit of  political power disturbed them,
as Rabuka made no secret of  his ambition to become prime minister. He
demanded complete loyalty from his colleagues and saw his election to
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the presidency of  the Fijian Political Party as bringing him a step closer
to the top job (Fiji Times, 1 November 1991). Other aspirants disagreed,
citing the constitutional provision that the appointment of prime minister
was the prerogative of the president, to be exercised in independent
deliberate judgment.
As he manoeuvred for the prime ministership, Rabuka began to
develop ideological justifications for his ambitions. Although still
proclaiming himself a loyal commoner, he wondered whether it was
appropriate for chiefs to involve themselves in the cut and thrust of
electoral politics. Their proper role was at the local village level, because
‘when it comes to politics, the chiefs do not have the mandate of the
people’ (The Age, 17 August 1991). To underscore his point, he stressed
that ‘there are a lot of  capable commoners who can play a very, very
important role in the Fiji of the next decade’ (Islands Business, July 1991).
Implicitly, he counted himself  among them. He also noted that ‘the
dominance of customary chiefs in government is coming to an end’ and
soon ‘aristocracy’ would be replaced by ‘meritocracy’ (Fiji Times, 29 August
1991). None too subtly, he was invoking the ‘Melanesian’ model of
achieved leadership against the ‘Polynesian’ model of  ascribed leadership.
He compared his paramount chiefs—he had Mara in mind—to the
towering banyan tree ‘where you don’t see anything growing’, and
suggested that they should step aside (Pacific Islands Monthly, August 1991).
No one was indispensable, he said, and ‘those defeated in elections should
take it in their political stride, accept defeat and move out gracefully’
(Fiji Times, 1 November 1991).
Ratu Mara, the intended target of  Rabuka’s barb, was among those
disturbed by Rabuka’s strident ascendancy. He thought Rabuka an ‘angry
young man’, a naive soldier, erratic, ‘speaking off the cuff in any
instigation’, and implicitly unworthy to be his successor (Matangi Tonga,
November 1991). The Fijian Political Party under Rabuka’s leadership
was a ‘debacle’, ‘an organisation in disarray’, Mara reportedly told his
political intimates (Washington Pacific Report, 5 March 1991). Rabuka
retaliated, calling Mara a ‘ruthless politician who has been allowed to
get away with a lot. Maybe it’s because of  the Fijian culture that he is a
big chief and because he was groomed well by the colonial government’
(Daily Post, 11 December 1991). Early in 1992, Mara encouraged the
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formation of  an informal ‘Diners’ Club’ in which he shared his experiences
with a select number of  prominent and aspiring Fijian leaders. Rabuka
was not among them. Mara went further and backed Josefata Kamikamica
as his preferred successor. The rupture between Mara and Rabuka was
complete; yet they were more alike in autocratic temperament and in
their fatalistic approach to their public roles than they care to
acknowledge.
Tensions within the Fijian Political Party erupted openly when
candidates were selected for the 1992 elections. In province after province
aspiring candidates questioned the selection procedures, threatened to stand
as independents, and sometimes formed their own parties even as they
pledged their loyalty to the chiefs. In Macuata, the situation had so
deteriorated that it required Rabuka’s personal intervention. Here, first
ballot choices had to be discarded to accommodate rebellious would-be
independents. One of  the stranger ironies of  the selection process was
that some of  the most ardent supporters of  the coup missed out altogether.
Many of them became bitter critics of Rabuka. Rabuka also had to contend
with new Fijian political parties that challenged the authority and legitimacy
of  the Fijian Political Party. There was Sakiasi Butadroka’s Fijian Nationalist
Party, revamped and renamed the Fijian Christian Nationalist Party in
1991. Characteristically anti-Indian, Butadroka called for more balanced
development in the Fiji provinces; decentralisation of the Ministry of Fijian
Affairs; reversion of all fee-simple and Crown lands to their native owners;
complete Fijian ownership of all rents from the exploitation of mineral
and natural resources; reactivation of  traditional, rural administrative
structures; support for a fourth confederacy and the rotation of  the
presidency among all of them; and an all-Fijian parliament within 10 years,
in recognition of  the Fijian people’s ‘full authority and absolute power’. 2
In April 1992, Butadroka joined forces with Ratu Osea Gavidi’s newly
formed, Nadroga-based, Soqosoqo ni Taukei ni Vanua (STV, Party of  the
People of  the Land), which was essentially a revival of  the long-dormant
Western United Front.
This coalition’s rival for support among Fijians outside the Fijian
Political Party generally (and in western Viti Levu in particular), was
Apisai Tora’s All Nationals Congress, launched on 22 June 1991. Tora,
the cigar-chomping, self-styled Fidel Castro of the Pacific, militant trade
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unionist of the 1960s turned ethnic chauvinist of the 1980s, was the
quintessential survivor of  Fiji politics. Once a member of  the Indian-
based National Federation Party, he joined the Alliance Party in the late
1970s and was rewarded with a cabinet portfolio. After the Labour
Coalition’s victory in 1987, he helped found the Taukei Movement, and
was a member of the various post-coup cabinets until forced out by
Mara when he, Tora, founded the All Nationals Congress.
This party presented itself as a moderate, multiracial successor to the
defunct Alliance Party, which had ruled Fiji for nearly two decades. It
committed itself  to rethinking the interim administration’s social,
economic and industrial policies, promoting regional development to
favour economically depressed provinces, reviewing such statutory
organisations as the Native Land Trust Board and, most importantly,
the constitution. The anti-eastern Fijian sentiment was there, too, as
Tora made ‘no secret of  his desire to end the political dominance of
eastern Fijians, as represented by Ratu Mara and Ganilau’ (Islands Business,
October 1991). Tora remained a steadfast advocate of  the fourth
confederacy, and presented himself  as a progressive—an agent of  change
(Pacific Islands Monthly, July 1991). Tora, Butadroka and leaders of  a few
ephemeral parties that disappeared just as soon as they were launched
came from different ideological backgrounds and had diverse political
agendas. What they all shared was an unmistakable hostility toward the
hegemony of  eastern Fijians and toward the Fijian Political Party, which
they saw as Mara’s instrument.
On the eve of the election the Fijians seemed less united than ever
before. Rabuka’s leadership of  the Fijian Political Party and his prime
ministerial aspirations were contested. Triumphant post-coup Fijian
nationalism was in danger of derailment. The removal of the perceived
threat of Indian dominance that had distorted political discourse in Fiji
for so long had allowed further discussion of internal Fijian issues that
had long remained hidden from the non-Fijian public. As one Fiji Times
editorial put it, ‘the Fijians are now facing so many issues that challenge
the very fabric of traditional and customary life. Things they thought
were sacred have become political topics, publicly debated, scrutinised
and ridiculed’. ‘Now’, the editorial continued, ‘the threat is coming from
within their own communities where the politics of numbers are changing
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loyalties and alliances. For the first time in modern history, the Fijian
community is in danger of fragmentation; democracy is taking its toll.
The chiefs are losing their mana and politicians enjoy increasing influence’
(Fiji Times, 21 March 1991).
Coalition in disarray
Fortunately for Rabuka and others in the Fijian camp, things were little
better on the Coalition side, where internal divisions and differences over
strategy proved even more irreconcilable and destructive. The coalition
between the National Federation Party and the Fiji Labour Party had fallen
on hard times. It had become a moribund marriage of  convenience
marooned in the shallows. Its unity, evident following the coups, had been
subsumed by personal leadership ambitions, following the death of Timoci
Bavadra in 1989, and shattered by deep differences over strategy. The
Coalition had denounced the new constitution vehemently, but the partners
disagreed over how best to work for its repeal. Should they participate in
the elections and initiate a dialogue with the new government in parliament,
or should they boycott the elections and rely on international pressure to
effect the necessary changes?
The National Federation Party, led by its former parliamentary leader
Jai Ram Reddy, decided in late July 1991 against the boycott option,
choosing to participate in the elections under protest. Several
considerations informed this decision. The party leaders realised that
international pressure, by which the Fiji Labour Party placed much store,
would be to no avail, and that in the end the Indo-Fijian leaders would
have to deal with the elected representatives of the Fijian people. Only
if the Fijian leaders rejected dialogue and refused to consider issues of
concern to them would the National Federation Party use the boycott
weapon. Participation in the election did not mean acceptance of the
constitution. ‘If you get elected and do nothing, then you are accepting
it’, said Reddy. ‘If  at every single opportunity, you raise your voice, and
if need be, walk out of the House: that is not accepting the constitution’
(Fiji Times, 28 August 1991).
The NFP leaders also realised that a boycott would be doomed to fail
as many Indo-Fijians would stand for election anyway, and present
themselves as leaders of their people. Indeed, small anti-Coalition, pro-
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election Indo-Fijian political parties had already begun to emerge, among
them the Fiji Indian Congress and the Fiji Indian Liberal Party.
Participation under protest was consistent with the National Federation
Party’s past history. In 1965, for instance, it had been unhappy with the
outcome of the London constitutional conference, which favoured
Europeans and Fijians, but had worked under the new constitution for
two years before staging a boycott in 1967 and precipitating a by-election
a year later. The NFP leaders also heeded the advice of  leaders overseas
that the boycott option should be the last resort (Daily Post, 19 May
1992). As for the FLP leaders, Reddy said: ‘they are by nature negative
and their language is boycott, strike, disrupt, destroy and wreck. They
want to destroy everything in sight’ (Daily Post, 11 May 1992).
The Fiji Labour Party disagreed. How could it participate in an election
under a constitution it had roundly condemned as racist, authoritarian,
undemocratic and feudalistic? To do so would accord legitimacy to that
flawed document and undermine the party’s credibility internationally.
The Fiji Labour Party told visiting Australian Foreign Minister Gareth
Evans in February 1992: ‘we do not wish to be a party to an election
that will not return Fiji to genuine democracy but instead entrench an
authoritarian racist government similar to that of South Africa’ (Fiji
Labour Party Press Release, 4 February 1992). International pressure,
the party believed, would force the government into a dialogue on the
constitution. Said Navin Maharaj, its secretary general, ‘nothing can be
done by going into parliament and success can only come through
international pressure, and that is what we intend to do’ (Daily Post, 27
April 1992). ‘Rabuka has explicitly told us that the Constitution cannot
be changed and likewise the Soqosoqo ni Vakavulewa ni Taukei has not
given any assurance of  any change’, said Mahendra Chaudhry. ‘Do you
think the coup-plotters carried out so much atrocities for the last five
years just to change the constitution?’ (Daily Post, 11 May 1992).
That was the Fiji Labour Party’s public stance. In private, however, it
was characteristically pursuing other options. While it would formally
maintain its boycott stance, the party encouraged its indigenous Fijian
members to forge a broad coalition with parties outside the Fijian Political
Party, including the Fijian Nationalist Party and the All Nationals
Congress, and even to contest election as independents. Such a move
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was, in fact, made in October 1991, and a 38-point joint platform was
prepared. Among other items, it included the promotion of indigenous
Fijian aspirations in accordance with international conventions; the
creation of a fourth Fijian confederacy; the introduction of a national
leadership code of  conduct; the preservation ‘of  the dignity and integrity
and independence of  the Bose Levu Vakaturaga so that it is not manipulated
to support the type of  politics that diminishes people’s respect for the
chiefs’; condemnation of the anti-urban bias of the constitution; and an
urgent review of the constitution to make it ‘consistent with democratic
principles, United Nations human rights conventions and Commonwealth
statements of principles and thus enable Fiji to apply for membership of
the commonwealth as soon as possible’.3
At first the prospects looked promising, but they fell apart when
Butadroka had second thoughts about what the proposals would do to
his own credibility. ‘If  there is any work done with the FLP, our image as
a deeply-rooted Fijian party will be tarnished’, he said. ‘Either you come
in as independent candidates on our party ticket or we stand as adversaries
in the election’. Koresi Matatolu, the All Nationals Congress general
secretary, laid down other preconditions. His party would join, he said,
if Butadroka retracted his call to deport Indians from Fiji and if the Fiji
Labour Party recognised the constitution. Talk of  solidarity remained
just talk.
The FLP leaders had also been seeking to merge the Fiji Labour Party
and the National Federation Party into a single party (Fiji Times, 18 August
1991). Labour reminded the National Federation Party of  its apparent
commitment to a merger in the late 1980s, which the party disavowed. It
rejected the merger option, too, in the interest of  political survival. The
coalition arrangement had worked well, said Reddy, and should continue.
‘We can speak out without treading on each other’s toes. In a merged
party, I would be very unhappy if  the party agreed to nationalisation. Then,
we would project an image of division’. He went further: ‘I am more and
more intrigued, as time progresses, about the real motive behind this move.
Is it unity or is it because the NFP has become too much of a nuisance for
the Labour Party?’ (Fiji Times, 21 August 1991).
Reddy and other NFP leaders were not the only ones opposed to the
merger. Vocal opposition came also from some leading Fijian members
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of  the Fiji Labour Party, among them Simione Durutalo, its founding
vice president. He called the merger proposal a strategic mistake that
would ‘lock everybody back into pre-1987 voting patterns with people
voting on racial lines rather than for parties’, by once again raising the
spectre of Indo-Fijian domination (Fiji Times, 16 August 1991). He went
on that it would be far better for the Fiji Labour Party to prepare its
groundwork and position itself for victory in the 1996 elections than
attempt to win through a merger in 1992: ‘then, if the military comes in,
we will have the people’s support’. The only way forward in Fiji politics,
he said, was to ‘democratise Fijian society’. ‘The Fiji Labour Party is the
only political party able to create an interethnic alliance that can
simultaneously champion the Indo-Fijian interests for long-term political
security as well as indigenous Fijian commoners’ interests and aspirations
for long-term economic security’ (Fiji Times, 16 August 1991). Durutalo
and others became disenchanted with the Fiji Labour Party when its
leaders ignored their advice and refused to reconsider the party’s boycott
strategy. On the eve of  the elections, some of  them left the party or
began to forge links with other Fijian parties.
In a last, almost desperate, attempt to maintain a facade of unity and
to prevent a splitting of  the Indo-Fijian community, the Fiji Labour Party
offered not to disrupt the National Federation Party’s election plans if  it
obtained the government’s assurance that it would immediately address
all issues of concern to the Coalition (foremost among them a review of
the constitution). Without such assurance, the National Federation Party
would boycott parliament. But if the government agreed to its demands,
it would enter parliament and participate in deliberations ‘only to the
extent of  giving effect to redressing those grievances’. Furthermore, the
National Federation Party would ‘consult with and obtain the agreement
of FLP at all stages of the negotiation’ (Fiji Labour Party Press Release,
30 April 1992).
It was a fantastic demand, which the National Federation Party could
not accept ‘without sacrificing for all time NFP’s reputation and integrity’.
One NFP leader likened the ultimatum to the extortionate demands of
a tyrannical landlord. Perhaps the Fiji Labour Party did not really expect
the National Federation Party to accept its conditions. Perhaps it wanted
to use rejection as an excuse to participate in the elections, for by early
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1992 the boycott option had become untenable and was being severely
criticised throughout Fiji. Even its respected international advisers were
of  that mind. Among them was Professor Yash Ghai, who wrote
…[i]t is possible to attack a Constitution and yet take part in the elections. But it is
absolutely essential that the terms on which it [the party] takes part is made clear so
that it [taking part] is not interpreted as an endorsement of the constitution. A
party may wish to take part in the elections with a view to changing the constitution,
or making the political system under it difficult to operate, or not letting its rivals
dominate parliament and government. So while there may be a strong moral case
for a boycott, it may occasionally make sense to take part in elections while
simultaneously attacking the constitution. The really important question was not
to boycott, but whether to endorse the constitution (Fiji Times, 7 May 1992).
Unable to coerce the National Federation Party into acquiescence,
with its own house in disarray, public opinion heavily in favour of
participating in the elections, and facing marginalisation because of the
NFP’s election decision, the Fiji Labour Party acknowledged the inevitable
and late in April announced its decision to participate. By any measure,
this was a stunning volte face. How did the Fiji Labour Party explain its
new position? Said Navin Maharaj: ‘it was only a change in strategy:
from boycott of the election to boycott of parliament’. Why? ‘The change
came about because the NFP has no clear picture’ (Daily Post, 11 May
1992). Its flip-flop left its supporters dismayed and uncertain. Amid
acrimony and vacillation, the Coalition had collapsed.
The one major political party that was not as consumed by bitter
internal divisions was the General Voters Party (GVP). It was in some
ways a resurrection of the pre-coup General Electors’ Association, which
was a small but influential spoke in the Alliance Party wheel. The only
difference now was that the general electorate had been widened to
include not only part-Europeans, Chinese and people of  mixed ancestry,
but also other Fiji citizens of  Pacific islands ancestry who, before the
coup, were registered on the Fijian roll. Like the other ethnically based
parties, the General Voters Party’s concerns were parochial, focusing on
the interests and aspirations of  its own community. It proclaimed itself
in favour of ‘a system of democracy which incorporates the principle of
guaranteed representation of major ethnic groups’ in parliament, and
opposed to ‘any attempt to weaken or remove a legally established right
to the existing ownership of land, whether native or freehold’ (General
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Voters Party manifesto). Large portions of  freehold land in Fiji were
owned by Europeans, and the five General Voters Party seats in
parliament were grossly out of  proportion to their numbers.
The campaign
The campaign itself  was much more subdued than in previous years.
The interim administration’s decree making libel a criminal offence
punishable by up to two years imprisonment and a F$1,300 fine, together
with the memory of the harassment of journalists since the coups, deterred
the media from heavily scrutinising the election platforms and
personalities. The racially segregated electoral system encouraged
candidates to confine themselves to issues of particular concern to their
ethnic communities, or, in the case of the Fijians, their provinces and
regions. National, non-racial issues were present in the election platforms
and in the campaign rhetoric, but were not given serious consideration.
Reddy, for example, talked of  a government of  national unity ‘based
on a formula of  power-sharing which would ensure that every community
is represented at the decision-making level’ (Daily Post, 9 May 1992),
but his proposal was ridiculed by the Labour Party, which said that such
an arrangement would ‘both implicitly and explicitly give credence and
legitimacy to the decreed constitution’, and reduce the National
Federation Party to a ‘subservient position…depending on the mercy of
the Fijian side in parliament’ (Fiji Labour Party Press Release, 11 May
1992). Ratu Mara and Ratu William Toganivalu attempted to distance
themselves from the constitution they had generated, much to the
annoyance of  Rabuka and his allies. But for the most part such issues
remained in the background. Instead, internal fighting in both camps
dominated the news.
In the Fijian Political Party, the main question centred on who would
be prime minister, Sitiveni Rabuka or Josevata Kamikamica. Sometimes
the campaigns on behalf  of  the two men became unpleasant, even vicious.
As was his wont, Rabuka changed his tune often, depending on his
audience. To the fundamentalist members of  the Methodist Church, he
renewed his call to declare Fiji a Christian state and reimpose the Sabbath
decree; from his militant nationalist supporters, he demanded complete
loyalty and promised action, if needed, ‘in order to complete what they
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started’; to the media and to his opponents, he was the very essence of
good sense and moderation, talking of national reconciliation and
dialogue (‘what happened to the Pacific way?’ he asked—without irony,
so far as one could tell (The Review, May 1992)). For his part, Kamikamica,
who was outwardly confident of his chances, highlighted his
administrative experience, distanced himself from the extreme rhetoric
of his more nationalist-minded compatriots, and promised to work toward
genuine multiracialism.
In the former Coalition camp, the exchanges were equally pointed
and unpleasant. Leaders exhumed each others’ records of  public service
since the coups, ridiculed their personal commitments to Fiji—many of
them had visas for permanent residence overseas—and traded insults,
accusing each other of  opportunism, arrogance and treachery. The
vehemence of the attacks was especially surprising in view of the virtually
identical platforms of  the two political parties. The republic’s first election
campaign produced more heat than light, as the confused electorate
pondered their limited choices.
Polling lasted a week. In the Fijian constituencies, the SVT won 30
of the 37 Fijian seats, the Fijian Nationalist Party 3, the Soqosoqo ni
Taukei ni Vanua 2, and independents 2. The Fijian voter turnout averaged
78 per cent. A further breakdown of these figures reveals noteworthy
trends. The SVT achieved its greatest triumph in the small eastern
constituencies of the Koro Sea, getting 89.1 per cent of all votes cast
(27,658). Accounting for its spectacular success was a well-organised
campaign, and the undivided support of  the provincial councils. In the
urban constituencies, too, the party did relatively well, capturing 74.7
per cent of  all the votes. Again a more effective campaign organisation
and an attractive slate of  candidates helped this party.
In the rural constituencies generally, however, the SVT did less well,
winning only 63.3 per cent of  all the rural votes (80,195). In rural Viti
Levu, it won only 49.7 per cent of the total Fijian votes (52,538); the
main reason for its modest showing there being the challenge of the
other Fijian parties, especially the Fijian Nationalist Party and the
Sogosoqo ni Taukei ni Vanua, which together won 26.5 per cent of  all
the Fijian votes. Butadroka, the Fijian Nationalist Party leader, was a
well-known personality and a charismatic campaigner. His grassroots
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style of campaigning, and his uncomplicated political message laced with
earthy humour, won him support, as it had done in previous elections.
His running mate, Ratu Mosese Tuisawau, was a high chief  of  the Rewa
province, appealed powerfully to the Rewans’ sense of pride by
demanding a greater Rewan voice in national Fijian affairs. One of  the
Fijian Nationalist Party’s proposals was the rotation of  the presidency
among the four confederacies, with Rewa next in line. Ratu Osea Gavidi
and his running mate, Mosese Tuisawau, campaigning under the banner
of  the Fijian Nationalist Party and the Soqosoqo ni Taukei ni Vanua,
won the 2 Nadroga/Navosa seats, again by focusing on local issues.
The other major party that had threatened to erode support for the
Fijian Political Party in Viti Levu was the All Nationals Congress. It did
not win any seats, but only narrowly missed out in Ba where it managed
to capture 5,775 votes; it gained 8,384 votes in rural Viti Levu as a
whole (10.5 per cent of the Fijian votes cast). Why did the All Nationals
Congress fail? Tora’s own chequered political career was a factor, as was
the fear among many Fijians that anything short of a clear victory for the
Fijian Political Party could see Fiji facing more political upheaval (as
Rabuka seemed to hint in his speeches).
Labour’s dismal performance in the Fijian constituencies was not
surprising. It was underfunded, underprepared and was late to enter the
fray. Labour put up disenchanted candidates, who were merely expected
to keep the party flag flying, in only a handful of  constituencies. Disunity
among its leaders did not help matters, nor did public criticism of the
party’s election strategy by some of  its leading Fijian members, such as
Simione Durutalo. Many Fijians who had joined the party in 1987 had left,
including such luminaries as Joeli Kalou and Jo Nacola, both ministers in
the Bavadra government—the former contesting the election on the SVT
ticket and the latter as an independent. On the eve of the election, Labour
had come to be regarded among many Fijians as an Indo-Fijian party.
Among the Indo-Fijians, where the voter turnout was 76.7 per cent,
the results confounded all predictions. The National Federation Party,
which had been widely expected to win nearly all the 27 Indo-Fijian
seats, won only 14, the remaining 13 going to the Fiji Labour Party.
Minor Indo-Fijian parties failed to make any mark. The National
Federation Party won 50 per cent of  the total Indo-Fijian votes cast
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(114,005) and the Fiji Labour Party 47.6 per cent. A breakdown of the
figures shows important trends. Labour won most of  the seats in the
cane belts of  Fiji, whereas the National Federation Party, founded as a
cane farmers’ party in the early 1960s, achieved its greatest success in
the urban areas, which should have been Labour’s domain.
Labour’s victory in the cane belt benefited from the success in the
Sugar Cane Growers’ Council of  the National Farmers’ Union, whose
real leader, Mahendra Chaudhry, also led the Fiji Labour Party. In the
countryside, Labour and the Farmers’ Union were seen as one and the
same. The National Federation Party had let the Fiji Labour Party claim
public credit for the Coalition’s role in resolving the dispute in the sugar
industry, which Labour was now portraying as its own, rather than a
joint, achievement. The National Federation Party was not helped by
being portrayed as a party of the Indo-Fijian bourgeoisie. In urban areas,
it was better funded, fielded better candidates and was able to benefit
from bitter divisions within the ranks of  the trade unions. Some of
Chaudhry’s harshest critics, such as trade union leader James Raman,
were NFP candidates. Labour’s victory was as unexpected as it was sweet.
Its sharper message, better organisation, and strong support among Indo-
Fijian voters for whom the National Federation Party’s earlier anti-
colonial struggles were a vague memory, had worked to Labour’s
advantage, ensuring its important role in the Indo-Fijian community for
some time to come. The National Federation Party, on the other hand,
is, and sees itself  as, essentially a communal party, but the interests of
Indo-Fijians are not as homogeneous as they once appeared to be. Its
message was blurred, and its viability as a credible force is unclear.
The race for prime minister
The race for prime minister started even before results were known, as
leading candidates Rabuka and Kamikamica began to campaign for
support among the opposition parties. The exact details and sequence
of events in the hectic few days following the elections will probably
never be fully revealed, but the basic outline is clear. As soon as the final
results were announced, the parliamentary board of  the Fijian Political
Party met, on 31 May, to elect its leader, who would be its candidate for
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prime minister. At this meeting, Rabuka repeatedly won 18 votes,
Kamikamica 2, Filipe Bole 4, and Ratu William Toganivalu 3. With his
party’s mandate, and with the Fijian Political Party lacking an outright
majority to form a government, Rabuka began to explore a coalition
with the General Voters Party (which had won all the five general seats),
the Fijian Nationalist Party, the Soqosoqo ni Taukei ni Vanua, and the
two independents. Again the details are unclear, though we do know
from press statements that the General Voters Party opposed any coalition
that included the Fijian Nationalist Party, whose extremist platforms it
had denounced during the campaign. The General Voters Party preferred
Kamikamica for the top job.
When Rabuka went to Government House on 1 June to be sworn in,
claiming the support of 42 members of the House, President Ganilau
told him to produce the signatures of all those who supported him before
10am the next day. The president, thought to be leaning in Kamikamica’s
direction, was aware of  the split in the Fijian Political Party over the
leadership and was mindful of  Mara’s preference. Equally, he was mindful
of the constitutional requirement to appoint as prime minister the Fijian
best able to command the majority support of all members in the House
of  Representatives, including the twenty-seven Indo-Fijian members.
Obtaining the signatures was not as easy as Rabuka might have
supposed; by the time he returned from Government House, new tensions
had arisen. Some Fijian members who had supported him initially opposed
any formal association with the Fijian Nationalist Party and threatened to
support his opponent. The situation was also complicated by the National
Federation Party’s public support for Kamikamica. Reddy had told Rabuka’s
emissaries that he could not support the major general, whom he did not
and could not trust. He considered Kamikamica a safer bet as he had
verbally assured the National Federation Party of  his willingness to initiate
immediate debate on the constitution. By late the same evening, Rabuka’s
fortunes were uncertain; by then, according to some sources, Kamikamica
had secured the support of  30 parliamentarians (10 Fijian Political Party
members, 1 Rotuman, 5 of  the General Voters Party, and 14 from the
National Federation Party), while Rabuka was supported by 29 from the
Fijian Political Party, 5 Nationalists, and 2 Independent. Faced with this
crisis, Rabuka’s emissaries contacted the Fiji Labour Party in the early
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hours of 2 June. Soon afterward that party wrote to Rabuka. Their historic
letter is reproduced here.
2 June 1992 (CONFIDENTIAL)
Major General Sitiveni Rabuka (Hand Delivered)
Dear Major General Sitiveni Rabuka
The Fiji Labour Party has agreed to lend support to you for the position of
Prime Minister on the basis that our party would be given firm assurance on the
following issues in writing:
A. CONSTITUTION
The new government would immediately initiate a process of review and change
of the 1990 Constitution by a jointly appointed team that would take into
regard the objections that have been expressed by the Fiji Labour Party on behalf
of  the Indian community, urban Fijians and Western Fijians, and take
immediate measures to address such objections.
Such a process to be initiated as soon as parliament convenes.
B. LABOUR REFORM DECREES
That the new government would urgently seek to have the labour decrees
revoked to take account of the objections by the trade union movement in Fiji.
C: VAT (value-added tax)
That the new government would urgently scrap VAT as a matter of  priority.
D: LAND
That the new government would convene a machinery to facilitate discussions
on the issue of  land, particularly relating to the extension of  ALTA [Agricultural
Landlord and Tenant Act]
That as soon as the parliament convenes, such a machinery be deliberated upon.
The Fiji Labour Party is awaiting your urgent and serious consideration of our
request.
Yours Sincerely Jokapeci Koroi (Mrs) (President)
Rabuka replied immediately
Mrs Jokapeci Koroi President
Fiji Labour Party Suva.
Dear Mrs Koroi,
I acknowledge the proposals outlined in your letter (2 June 1992) delivered this
morning.
I have considered your proposals favourably and agree to take action on all the
issues, namely the constitution, VAT, labour reforms and land tenure on the
basis suggested in your letter.
I agree to hold discussions on the above issue in order to finalise the machinery
to progress the matter further.
Yours Faithfully
S. L. Rabuka (Major) General President.
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Significantly, the Fiji Labour Party also obtained an undertaking from
the Fijian Nationalist Party and the Soqosoqo ni Taukei ni Vanua, which,
according to some sources, had been instrumental in initiating the dialogue
between Rabuka and Labour. These two parties’ five parliamentarians
(Butadroka, Gavidi, Lepani Tonitonivanua, Ratu Mosese Varasikete
Tuisawau and Mosese Tuisawau), and the nationalist-minded independent,
Kolonio Qiqiwaqa, wrote to the Labour Party: ‘We give our assurance
that should the President accept his nomination we will support your
conditions as set out by the new Prime Minister’.
This stunning development left many in Fiji and outside gasping and
shaking their heads in confusion. Labour supporting Rabuka? And the
Nationalists agreeing with Labour’s demands, among them the review of
the constitution? Rabuka’s courting of  Labour’s (or anyone else’s) support
is simply explained: he desperately needed the numbers Labour could
deliver. Mahendra Chaudhry suggested that Labour supported Rabuka
probably more for reasons of public consumption than out of genuine
conviction; Rabuka was ‘a changed man’, who had admitted being used
‘by certain chiefs’ for their own purposes (Fiji Times, 2 June 1992). Moreover,
Rabuka had been an ally in the resolution of the industrial disputes, whereas
Kamikamica’s policies had precipitated them. Some Labour leaders saw
Kamikamica as a Mara ‘puppet’, and nothing was less acceptable to them
than Mara’s continuing influence, however indirect or slight that influence
might be. Politics played its part too. By supporting Rabuka, and hence the
next government, the Labour strategists hoped to deal a deathblow to the
National Federation Party.
Some Labour leaders thought themselves the real winners in the 1992
elections. The party that had been given little chance of  electoral success
had managed to insert itself  centrally into the national political process.
Labour, they thought, would be the tail wagging the dog, or, as one of
them said to me, while they could not be kings, they would be king-makers.
Such euphoric thinking was short-lived, for, once installed, Rabuka went
back to his old ways, changing his mind or denying the substance of the
deals he had made. He refused to review the value-added tax, as he had
promised, and he dismissed any urgency to review the constitution. Three
months after the election, he said he wanted a constitution ‘that’s totally
Fijian-oriented’, and expressed sympathy for the Fijian Nationalist Party’s
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wish to repatriate the Indo-Fijians to India (Canberra Times, 1 October
1992). In December, he mooted the idea of a government of national
unity, with what seriousness and commitment remained to be seen. With
his own support base to safeguard, and his public support among ordinary
nationalist Fijians high, Rabuka was in no hurry to keep his promises.
Promises, his utterances implied, were made to be broken.
Rabuka was sitting on the horns of a dilemma. Nationalist-minded
Fijians would remind him of his oft-repeated promise to fulfil his stated
goals of  the coup, while Labour and others would hold him accountable
for his promises to them to lead Fiji toward a more just society. Then there
were people within his own party, with different allegiances and with
personal ambitions, who regarded him as an unwelcome intruder, an
illegitimate usurper of  their own power. Clearly, Rabuka was in an
unenviable position. Leading the Fijian ship of state through turbulent,
uncharted waters would require vision, skill, tact and patience.
Rabuka, however, was not the only one who faced a dilemma. The Fijian
people themselves were caught between the competing demands of two
worlds, neither of which they could easily hope to escape. On the one hand
was the call to retreat from the modern world, seek succour in traditional
custom, and entrust power ‘to a few well-meaning and knowledgeable people’
because ‘majority rule can turn into the rule of  prejudice and the power of
the many to violate the rights of the few’ (Ravuvu 1980:x). On the other
hand was the call by the Fijian Political Party, sponsored by the chiefs, to
promote ‘a more rapid movement from subsistence activities to commercial
enterprises and paid employment...to encourage greater economic freedom
and competition and allow world market forces to determine prices and
production for export and local markets through an efficient and private
enterprise sector’ (Soqosoqo ni Vakavulewa ni Taukei Manifesto). There
was a contradiction here that the elections, caught in the politics of race and
regionalism, failed to address; it could not be ignored, or ignored at the peril
of the people of Fiji.
Notes
1 In May 1992 F$1.00 was equal to US$1.47.
2 From his manifesto, a copy of  which is in the author’s possession.






In February 1994, only 18 months after the first post-coup elections of
1992, Fiji went to the polls again. The snap election was called after the
defeat of  the government’s budget in November 1993. Sitiveni Rabuka’s
opponents on the government benches hoped to use the election to oust
him from office. They had miscalculated. Rabuka and his party, the
Soqosoqo ni Vakavulewa ni Taukei (SVT), returned to power with 32 of
the 37 seats reserved for ethnic Fijians under the 1990 constitution. A
coalition government was formed with the General Voters Party (GVP),
which won four of  the five seats allocated to that community. On the
Indo-Fijian side, the National Federation Party (NFP) increased its
representation from 14 to 20 seats, while the Fiji Labour Party won the
remaining seven.
His mandate seemingly secure and his personal popularity high,
Rabuka was unanimously re-elected head of his party and reclaimed the
prime minister’s office.
In the previous chapter, we saw why, not having an outright majority
of seats in parliament, the SVT was forced to seek the support of other
parties. It managed to secure the support of  Labour after Rabuka agreed
to undertake a review of the constitution, resolve the land problem posed
by the imminent expiry of leases under the Agricultural Landlord and
Tenant Act, and re-examine the anti-labour legislation and the value-
added tax enacted by the interim administration that had governed Fiji
from 1987 to 1992. However, once ensconced, Rabuka reneged on the
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spirit of the agreement. The Labour Party could not continue to support
a leader who procrastinated on his promises to them, nor could it
withdraw its support without appearing petulant. With its plea for dialogue
ignored, Labour abandoned Rabuka in June 1993 and its members walked
out of  parliament. By then the party’s fortunes were floundering; its
milestone decision to back Rabuka had become a millstone.
At the other end of  the spectrum, Rabuka had to contend with the
demands of  Fijian nationalists, who held five seats. The Fijian nationalists
had also supported him against Kamikamica. They wanted the
government to honour its campaign commitment to ‘realise the aims of
the coup’; that is, to achieve the ideal of  Fijian paramountcy. On a number
of occasions, fringe elements of the movement took to the streets and
threatened Rabuka with political reprisals, scorning his efforts to promote
multiracialism. The nationalists could not be ignored, since they
commanded substantial support in Viti Levu.
In May 1993, a group led by Sakiasi Butadroka and Ratu Osea Gavidi
of the Fijian Nationalist United Front launched the Viti Levu Council
of  Chiefs, demanding recognition of  the fourth confederacy, the Yasayasa
Vaka Ra, and the rotation of  the presidency among all four. They also
demanded that the all non-native land be converted to native titles and
landowners’ interests be given priority in the exploitation of resources
on their land (Fiji Times, 22 May 1993). The formation of  the Viti Levu
Council was the latest of many vain efforts by western Fijians to gain a
voice commensurate with their numbers and contribution to the national
economy. Like many previous efforts this too died a quiet, unmourned
death.
Labour and the Fijian nationalists were not Rabuka’s only problems.
He had powerful dissident elements within his own party and in the
Fijian establishment generally, who had never accepted him as a legitimate
leader. The circumstances that brought him to power weighed against
him. He was not forgiven for defeating the paramount chief of the
Burebasaga confederacy, Adi Lala Mara, for the presidency of  the SVT.
Nor, especially, was he forgiven for his startling public criticism of  Ratu
Mara, calling him a baka (banyan) tree under which nothing grew—‘a
ruthless politician who has been allowed to get away with a lot’, a man
who had the temerity to criticise a constitution that had made him vice-
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president (Pacific Islands Monthly, August 1990; Daily Post, 11 December
1990). Nor, again, was Rabuka’s expressed preference for basing social
status on achievement rather than birth well received among chiefly
Fijians.
For his part, Mara ridiculed Rabuka as an angry, simpleminded colonel.
Mara said that Rabuka’s rival, Kamikamica, ‘will make a good prime
minister’ (The Weekender, 23 July 1993). Mara was also critical of  Rabuka’s
stewardship of  the SVT, blaming him indirectly for poor relations with
the Great Council of  Chiefs (Islands Business, February 1994). The tension
between the two men was not surprising; they were similar in
temperament: authoritarian, autocratic, emotional and convinced of their
role as saviours of their people. Mara was also conscious of his chiefly
role and responsibilities and seemed inclined to regard Rabuka as an
upstart commoner. The pro-Mara faction of  the SVT not only refused to
join Rabuka’s cabinet but also became vocal critics. Among them were
Mara’s son, Finau, and Kamikamica, who had refused the offer of  a
position in Rabuka’s cabinet several times. In the Senate, Adi Finau
Tabakaucoro, a minister in Mara’s interim administration, championed
the anti-Rabuka cause.
Rabuka’s own conduct did not help his image or performance. His
itinerant thoughts on sensitive subjects, and his tendency to think aloud
on important policy matters bewildered his colleagues and left him open
to public ridicule. His inexperience was apparent. According to critics,
Rabuka did not behave in a manner befitting the dignity of  the country’s
highest elected official. One Fijian observer articulated a widely held
view that
Rabuka is sometimes unpredictable, tends to be highly emotionally inclined and
apparently tries to please everyone. Despite his most valiant efforts, the result of
this is more often than not he winds up contradicting himself or his cabinet (Islands
Business, June 1993).
Rabuka came across as a simple man with a decent heart who was locked
in a military mind-set of command and obedience, albeit qualified by
impulsiveness, and, at times, capriciousness. His openness, accessibility
and eagerness to please, as well as his inability to discipline dissidents,
contributed to his parliamentary downfall as much as the machinations
of  his opponents.
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On winning office in 1992, the government faced two immediate
tasks. One was to consolidate its position among the taukei, particularly
among its potentially explosive nationalist fringe. The other was to
improve the country’s coup-scarred image internationally. The latter was
relatively easy. Rabuka made state visits to Australia and New Zealand
and represented Fiji at the South Pacific Forum in Honiara. Everywhere
he maintained the appropriately low profile befitting a new leader. The
visits were successful in restoring full diplomatic and defence links with
Australia and New Zealand, and in reassuring friends in the region. Fiji
was still out of  the Commonwealth, although rejoining was a long-term
goal of  the Great Council of  Chiefs. Older Fijians also wished to re-
establish direct links with the British monarchy, but that was unlikely in
the absence of a widely acceptable constitution.
Locally, Rabuka’s performance was not as smooth. His power base
within the SVT caucus and in the provinces was insecure. To consolidate
it, he tried to co-opt potential opponents who had lost in the elections.
Many were rewarded with seats in the Senate, diplomatic jobs or positions
with statutory bodies. In cabinet and other appointments, Rabuka worked
on the principle of provincial balance. Each province had to be
represented in the cabinet and in the higher echelons of government.
Indeed, when some members were demoted or dismissed for poor
performance, they attacked the prime minister. Viliame Saulekaleka,
dismissed assistant minister from Lau, Mara’s province, accused Rabuka
of being anti-Lauan (Daily Post, 30 October 1993). Ilai Kuli, mercurial
sacked minister of posts and telecommunications, treated his dismissal
as a betrayal of the people of Naitasiri. Bua threatened to block the
opening of the F$10 million Nabouwalu Hospital if its representative in
the cabinet, Koresi Matatolu, was removed (Fiji Times, 28 May 1993).
Rabuka may have had his mandate, but he had to work with a team
whose political loyalties were divided—and who had their own mandates.
In his first few months in office, Rabuka promulgated a number of
pro-Fijian policies. The government announced that it would continue
to support the special Fijian Education Unit established in the Ministry
of  Education to monitor the progress of  students. The ministry also
created special educational media centres in Fijian schools to improve
the teaching of science. On the economic front, while continuing its
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privatisation policies, the government proposed measures to propel more
Fijians into the commercial sector, where they were conspicuous by their
absence. These included a small business agency to advise and train
Fijians, providing loans to provincial councils to increase their shares in
Fijian Holdings Limited, giving that investment company priority in
buying shares from privatised government enterprises, and proposing
income-tax exemption for Fijian-owned businesses for up to twenty years
(Fiji Times, 27 August 1993). The government also set aside a fund worth
F$2 million to provide interest-free loans payable over thirty years to
certain mataqali to buy back freehold land (Fiji Times, 25 February 1993).
Late in 1993, it announced the transfer of the administration of all Crown
Schedule A and B lands from the Department of Lands to the Native
Land Trust Board. Eventually, these lands would revert to native title.
Many of  the government’s pro-Fijian initiatives were cautiously
supported by Indo-Fijian members of parliament, though Labour leader
Mahendra Chaudhry asked the government to examine the fundamental
reasons why Fijians were not succeeding in certain fields. ‘There must
be something wrong within the system itself that with all these resources,
the results are not forthcoming’ (Islands Business, August 1993). At the
same time, they pointed out the blatant discrimination against their
community in the public sector. The principle of  balance had been
ignored, said Chaudhry. Of  9,597 civil servants in 1992, 5,897 or 61.4
per cent were ethnic Fijians and only 3,186 or 33.2 per cent Indo-Fijians.
On the boards of statutory organisations, the paucity of Indo-Fijians
was glaring. For instance, there was not a single Indo-Fijian on the board
of  the Reserve Bank of  Fiji, the Fiji Broadcasting Commission, or,
incredibly, the Fiji Sugar Corporation. Opposition leader Jai Ram Reddy
pleaded with the government for fairness and equity, but the government
had no political incentive to address concerns of  the non-Fijians.
Consequently, Indo-Fijian disenchantment grew. Rabuka was indifferent.
No one felt more betrayed than the Fiji Labour Party, whose support
had made Rabuka prime minister. The conditions for that support were
not observed by the government. The 10 per cent value-added tax on
most goods and services was retained as part of  the government’s
progressive tax-reform package. The labour-reform legislation, whose
ultimate intention was to cripple trade unions, was unenforced though it
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remained on the agenda. And though there was some talk, there was no
action on the pressing issues surrounding the renewal of leases after the
expiry of  the Agricultural Landlord and Tenant Act. On his promise to
initiate a review of the constitution, Rabuka retorted
[t]o review means to look at what has been done. It does not mean that we have
committed ourselves to making any changes or abolitions (Pacific Report, 28 June 1993).
In fact, the government had committed itself to a review within five
years but did not regard it as a matter of  any urgency. Then, suddenly in
December 1992, Rabuka mooted the idea of a government of national
unity. Rabuka’s proposal caught the country by surprise. The idea had a
long history. Some form of  coalition government was mentioned in the
negotiations leading to independence, but nothing came of it. In 1977,
the Alliance Party mooted the idea, only to withdraw it when the NFP
criticised it as the party’s effort to bolster its sagging image as a multiracial
organisation. Rabuka’s concept was equally vague and emotional (Fiji
Times, 5 December 1992). In May 1993, Rabuka elaborated
[w]hat I and those who support my idea envisage is a style of government that
brings the communities together, that enables all ethnic groups to cooperate jointly
in the affairs of government and the work of legislature. I want the leaders of
Fijian, Indian and general voters to define the middle ground, the political centre,
where they can pool their wisdom and their abilities in the national interest. I want
to see them united in pursuit of  defined national objectives-objectives that serve
the interests and welfare of us all, Fijians, Indians and general voters. In my vision
of  what I consider to be the ultimate good of  the country, I see very clearly that it
is in all our interest to develop a social and political partnership that transcends
suspicion and distrust, that elevates us as a nation and gives us a combined sense
of  common destiny and purpose (The Weekender, 21 May 1993).
This statement was hailed as a major declaration by the government, though,
in truth, it was much the same as what Rabuka had stated in 1990.
I would like to have a government of national reconstruction. First we look at what
Fiji needs first. You won your seats on these policies, we won our seats on these
policies. You have extreme left views. We have extreme right wing views. Let’s
forget about these extremities where they sort of  merge. That’s where we run Fiji
for the next five years (Pacific Islands Monthly, August 1990).
Rabuka’s national unity government would have eighteen cabinet
members, twelve from the ruling all-Fijian SVT, two each from NFP and
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Labour, and one each from the Nationalists and the GVP. In this respect,
Rabuka’s offer differed little from the Alliance Party’s offer in 1977.
Rabuka’s proposal received a mixed response. The SVT caucus
complained of not being consulted. The Fijian nationalists supported
the concept, but only on condition that their program for Fijian supremacy
‘will still be maintained through the government of national unity’ (Fiji
Times, 11 December 1990). A faction of  the Taukei Movement urged all
Fijian members of parliament to ‘completely reject and throw out of the
window with precipated [sic] haste the devilish concept of government
of national unity’ (Fiji Times, 22 December 1992). They postponed their
protest marches only when Rabuka assured them that promoting national
unity should never be misinterpreted or misconstrued by anyone to mean
that he and his government were giving away the special position
conferred on the Fijians and Rotumans, as the host communities in Fiji,
under the 1990 constitution (Fiji Times, 19 February 1993).
Many in the opposition treated Rabuka’s proposal cynically. Labour’s
Simione Durutalo argued that the unity proposal was nothing more than
an attempt ‘to repackage his 1987 image of an anti-Indian’ (Fiji Times,
19 February 1993). NFP leader Reddy was sceptical but gave Rabuka
the benefit of  the doubt. Again, as in 1981, he raised probing questions.
There had to be some consensus on the basic principles before the
proposal could be discussed further. ‘I am not going to nominate
numbers’, he said, but ‘at the end of the day in a government of national
unity, Indians should be fairly represented. We should have a figure that
bears some resemblance to their numbers, contribution and work, and
not just a token number’ (The Review, March 1993).
In March 1993, the government did what it should have done in the
first place: it presented a paper to the Great Council of Chiefs, adding
that the proposal was not of ‘paramount importance’ (Fiji Times, 18 March
1993). In the Council many chiefs, including Mara, questioned the
prospects for a government of national unity under the 1990 constitution.
Mara’s public doubts and his advice that the government ‘should not
overly make their intention known to others’ (The Weekender, 28 May
1993) sealed the fate of the issue. The council decided on more grass-
roots consultation and sent the proposal to the provincial councils. The
chiefs’ decision was puzzling. A Fiji Times editorial said,
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[c]onsultation is a good thing. But somewhere along the line someone has got to
be able to make the decision. In this case it is the Great Council of Chiefs. If it
cannot deal with the issues that it has been entrusted to deal with, then it should
reconsider its role. Why do the chiefs need to refer back to the people? The people
have picked their representatives to the Council. The people should have discussed
these things before the meeting (Fiji Times, 29 May 1993).
With these proposals languishing, Rabuka was forced to address the
issue of constitutional review sooner than he had anticipated. As the
first step, he set up a cabinet subcommittee to draft the terms of  reference
for an independent constitutional commission. Chaired by Deputy Prime
Minister Filipe Bole, the committee was expanded to include four
members of  the opposition, including Jai Ram Reddy. After several
meetings, the committee agreed on a broad set of  guidelines. The review
would take place before the 1997 general elections, which would be
held under a new constitution. Moreover, the review would not be
confined only to the electoral provisions of the 1990 constitution, ‘but
would be of a broad nature, covering the 1990 constitution as a whole’,
and it would also include a consideration of the system of government
deemed most appropriate for Fiji. The aim would be to produce a
autochthonous constitution that addressed the needs of  the country.
Finally, the constitution would reflect some basic principles ‘that would
serve as the foundation for the promotion and reinforcement of  national
unity in Fiji’ (Reddy 1993).1 The new constitution, Rabuka said,
…is to be an agreed statement of our national purpose, an agreed covenant binding
all our different communities and citizens of Fiji to a solemn commitment to work
for the peace, unity and progress of our country and to promote the welfare and
interests of all its people.2
After intense private negotiations, the subcommittee prepared draft terms
of  reference. Bearing in mind the need to promote ‘racial harmony and
national unity and the economic and social advancement of all
communities and bearing in mind internationally recognised principles
and standards of individual and group rights’, the commission would
…take into account that the Constitution shall guarantee full protection and
promotion of the rights, interests and concerns of the indigenous Fijian and
Rotuman people…Scrutinise and consider future constitutional needs of the people
of Fiji, having full regard for the rights, interests and concerns of all ethnic groups
of people in Fiji…Facilitate the widest possible debate throughout Fiji on the
terms of the Constitution of Fiji and to inquire into and ascertain the variety of
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views and opinions that may exist in Fiji as to how the provisions of the Fiji
Constitution can be improved upon in the context of  Fiji’s needs as a multi-ethnic
and multi-cultural society [and]…report fully on all the above matters and, in
particular, to recommend constitutional arrangements likely to achieve the objectives
of the Constitutional Review as set out above.
These terms caused controversy. Labour thought them too restrictive and
called in its campaign literature for specific reference to the ‘internationally
recognised principles and standards of civil, political, cultural, economic
and social rights as enshrined in the United Nations Universal Declaration
of Human Rights and related covenants’. The interests of indigenous Fijians
and Rotumans should be protected ‘without sacrificing the rights, interests
and concerns of all other people in Fiji’. The 1970 and not the 1990
constitution should form the basis for future constitutional review. The
commission, the Labour Party said, should report within 12 months. Labour
also argued that the terms of  reference should have been drafted by a
parliamentary committee, not by a lopsided cabinet subcommittee.3 The
government had, in fact, changed the sequence of the review process and
authorised the cabinet subcommittee to draft the terms of  reference for
and appoint the independent commission. Labour was being effectively
marginalised in a process it had helped initiate. The procedures for the
review and Reddy’s participation in it became an issue in the campaign
among the Indo-Fijians.
Unfortunately for the government, many of its initiatives were
overshadowed by scandals conveying the impression of disarray and
discord. There was the strike in Fiji Posts and Telecommunications
department in 1992 over the sacking of the chief executive, which led to
the relegation of  Telecommunications Minister Ilai Kuli. Fijian Holdings
Limited was facing allegations of insider trading by leading members of
its management board. Similar allegations surrounded the awarding of a
tender to upgrade the Nadi International Airport to a company, Minsons
Limited, in which Rabuka had shares. The Ports Authority was rocked by
a report detailing uncovered excess expenditure on overseas trips by its
board members, irregularities in sales of equipment, personal insurance
discrepancies and misappropriation of  funds. Questions were asked about
the purchase of  the prime minister’s new residence (owned by the Ganilau
family’s Qeleni Holdings) for F$650,000 when the government valuer had
estimated its value at F$465,000.
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These incidents epitomised the general culture of  corruption in public
life that seemed to have ‘reached alarming proportions’, made even worse
by ‘the lack of action taken by the authorities on some of the more
serious misappropriation cases involving hundreds of thousands of
dollars’ (Fiji Times, 21 August 1993). Politicians and civil servants
demanded bribes openly; greasing the palm was becoming an accepted
fact of life in contemporary Fiji. Jai Ram Reddy raised some of these
issues in his budget speech in November 1993
[w]hen a quarter of a million dollars go missing from our police force; when
exhibits seized by police from suspects go missing from police stations, when
stolen goods exhibited in a court of law disappear; when frauds and dubious
political hangers-on can get into key positions in important public sector
organisations, then it is time for the people of this country to sit up and think
about the rot and it is time for this House to do something for this state of affairs.4
But these allegations paled into insignificance beside the so-called
Stephens affair. Anthony Stephens, adviser to the Fijian nationalists, a
businessman with previous brushes with the law, was arrested in 1988
and detained for forty days in connection with the importation of pen
pistols. Discharged, he sued the government for F$30 million in damages,
but agreed to settle for F$10 million. Under the terms of  a deed of
settlement agreed on between him and the attorney general, Stephens
was to be paid F$980,000 cash in an out-of-court settlement. For the
remaining amount, the government would pay off two mortgages under
Stephens’s name with the Home Finance Company and the National
Bank of Fiji, settle claims with the ANZ Bank for a guarantee to
Stephens’s company, Economic Enterprises, dismiss a bankruptcy action
against him, transfer the Soqulu Plantation in Taveuni, under mortgage
control of the National Bank of Fiji, to Stephens, and settle all matters
relating to three land titles owned by Stephens’s family. According to
Stephens and his associates, money from the settlement would be used
to arrange a F$200 million loan from a Kuwaiti source to further Fijian
business interests.
Astonishingly, the attorney general signed the deed, which was exempt
from income tax, land-sales tax and the value-added tax. As became
clear later, Stephens’s connections evidently reached the highest levels
of government. But before the deed could be executed, it was exposed
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in parliament by Jai Ram Reddy. The deed was merely an attempt to
defraud the government, said Reddy. A public uproar greeted the
revelations, and people wondered who else, besides the attorney general
(Aptaia Seru), was implicated. As a Fiji Times editorial said, ‘the sorry
mess suggests powerful forces, answerable to no one but themselves,
are at work to undermine constituted authority…What remains to be
seen now is government’s commitment to honest and clean government.
Will the Stephens’s claims be properly investigated or swept under the
carpet?’ (Fiji Times, 26 October 1992). Faced with public pressure, the
government agreed to a commission of  review. Sir Ronald Kermode,
retired Supreme Court justice, was appointed to head the inquiry.
In July 1993, Kermode presented a report that was damaging to
anyone even tangentially involved (Parliamentary Paper 45/1993). Etuate
Tavai, the nationalists’ contact in the prime minister’s office, ‘was not a
truthful witness’ and had ‘deliberately misled parliament’. Attorney
General Seru was a weak man who had strayed from the path of  rectitude
under pressure. Most seriously, Kermode found Sitiveni Rabuka’s conduct
wanting. The prime minister had ignored advice from his legal officers
and selectively opted for information that supported Stephens’s claims;
he had interfered in the attorney general’s ‘area of  responsibility by
sending him a minute which directed him to settle a claim that he must
have known was outrageously high’; he ‘had conspired with Stephens to
obtain an overdraft from the National Bank of Fiji by false pretences or
by fraud’; and he had deceived parliament. In a sentence that was widely
quoted, Kermode wrote: ‘in my opinion the prime minister’s actions as
regard the events leading up to the execution of the Deed were not only
improper but prima facie illegal’ (Parliamentary Paper 45/1993).
The opposition asked Rabuka to step aside until an independent
inquiry cleared him of involvement. Rabuka refused to act at all on the
grounds that Kermode had exceeded his terms of  reference, but agreed
reluctantly to a judicial review of  the commission’s findings when some
of his backbenchers threatened rebellion. In fact, Ilai Kuli filed a no-
confidence motion in Rabuka’s government in September 1993, which
he withdrew under pressure from the Methodist Church leader Manasa
Lasaro. For its part, the Taukei Movement, or what was left of  it,
threatened to take to the streets in support of the beleaguered prime
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minister, only to be told that those who planned to take the law into
their own hands should ‘prepare themselves to face the consequences
of their actions’ (Fiji Times, 27 November 1993). The judicial review
was nominally begun but nothing ever came of it.
The Stephens affair provided the opportunity to topple Rabuka during
the November 1993 budget session, when his Fijian opponents voted
with the opposition Indo-Fijians. The substance and direction of  the
budget was consistent with the government’s broad philosophy of
economic development, which included deregulation of the economy
and structural market and labour adjustments to increase Fiji’s
international competitiveness. The government proposed to reduce duties
on most imported goods to 20 per cent (from 50 per cent in 1989);
remove licence control on basic food items such as fish, rice and
powdered milk, with butter and panel wood targeted for zero tariff in
the near future; increase duty on alcoholic beverages, tobacco and fuel;
and extend tax concessions to companies exporting 30 per cent of their
products. The defence force would be returned to its pre-1987 levels
over two to three years and the public sector pay package kept to 3 per
cent of  GNP. Government expenditure was expected to be F$800 million
and revenue to be about F$644 million, providing for a net deficit of
F$105 million or 4.8 per cent of  GDP. This was ‘an unacceptable level’
of  government spending, Finance Minister Paul Manueli said. ‘We must
start to control the size of  the deficit, early, before it starts to control us’
(Budget speech 1994).
For Jai Ram Reddy, that was the heart of  the problem. ‘The government
has been strong on rhetoric but weak on action. There is a yawning gap
between what this government says and what it does, raising serious
questions both about its competence and ability to manage the nation’s
economy’.5 He and others criticised the high level of expenditure and
deficit, misguided expenditure priorities, and socially regressive aspects
such as higher fiscal duties on basic consumer items and transportation
goods. The overall picture of  economic management was disturbing.
Government expenditure had increased from F$723.4 million in 1992 to
F$829.9 in 1993 revised estimates and was projected to increase to F$847.2
million in 1994; the gross deficit had increased from F$120.9 million in
1992 to a F$184.5 million revised estimate in 1993 and was projected to
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F$150.2 million in 1994; net deficit after loan repayment had increased
from F$68.7 million in 1992 to F$105.3 million in 1993 and was projected
optimistically for F$84.0 million in 1994. Government expenditure as a
percentage of GDP had increased from 35.1 per cent in 1992 to 38 per
cent in 1993 and was projected to increase to 36.9 per cent in 1994.
Reddy’s criticism was not surprising; that of  the government’s own
backbenchers was. Kamikamica led the charge. He did not question the
broad direction of  government economic policy, for he had, as interim
finance minister, been author of many aspects of it. The government's
direct involvement in economic activity should be steadily wound down.
And he urged the government to do more to promote specifically Fijian
projects in the educational and economic sectors (Parliament of Fiji,
Hansard, 17 November 1993).The thrust of  his criticism was that the
government lacked financial discipline to implement correct policies. At
least Kamikamica was consistent. Finau Mara acknowledged that the
finance minister had ‘very little choice in this budget’, but he was
instrumental in orchestrating the Fijian vote against it though he was
away in Australia when the vote was taken. Cabinet minister Ratu
Viliame Dreunimisimisi was ‘not convinced that the budget should be
abandoned’ (Parliament of Fiji, Hansard, 29 November 1993), but six
hours later he voted against it.
Emboldened by mild criticism, the government rejected the opposition’s
offer to help it revise the budget. Even the prime minister’s confidential
memorandum to his two deputy prime ministers and the minister of finance
to decrease the deficit by F$35 to F$39 million, increase the police allocation
by F$2 million, and reduce the duty on basic food items was ignored. The
government’s complacency was misplaced. Knowing that the 27 Indo-
Fijian members of  parliament were going to vote against it, Rabuka’s
opponents saw their chance. When the budget came up for the second
reading on 29 November, it was unexpectedly put to the vote. To the
government’s consternation, six Fijian members and one GVP member
(David Pickering) joined the 27 Indo-Fijians in voting against it.
Miscalculation and misplaced trust had cost the government dearly. Rabuka
accepted part of the blame. ‘I think my military officer mentality came
into focus and led me to believe that once a directive is given, everybody
would toe the line, which they did not’ (Fiji Times, 3 December 1993).
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The manner of  the defeat was surprising. In normal parliamentary
practice, the second reading is regarded as procedural. It is followed by
the committee stage (in this case 30 November to 3 December), when
the whole house would constitute itself  a committee and scrutinise the
proposed legislation. At this time, members of parliament can propose
changes and amendments or seek explanation of  particular parts. The
substantive vote on a bill then takes place. But in this case, the budget
bill was defeated before it reached the committee stage. It seems certain
that the Fijian dissidents had not planned to use the budget to bring
down the Rabuka government. Their plans materialised only as the debate
proceeded and only when the position of the Indo-Fijian parties became
clear. They thus seized the second reading of  the budget ‘as their best
politically credible opportunity to bring down the government’ (The Review,
December 1993).
Rabuka questioned the dissidents’ motives in his address to the Great
Council of  Chiefs on 15 December. There were some members of  his
party who voted against the Bill while wanting the government to make
changes before it came up for the substantive vote. This would have
been consistent with the decision of the parliamentary caucus meeting
of  the SVT. The government had been deprived of  the opportunity to
consider amendments at the third reading (committee stage). Perhaps,
Rabuka told the chiefs, ‘there might have been other considerations that
lay behind their determination to vote against their own government’
(Rabuka, Statement to the Great Council of Chiefs 1993). Indeed there
were. As some Fijian dissidents told Manueli, ‘they were going to challenge
the budget not because they were opposed to it, but because they wanted
to change the leadership’ (The Review, December 1993).
Before informing the SVT caucus, the dissident group had informed
Mara of their intention so that ‘he would have more time to prepare
himself for the outcome of the voting’ (Fiji Times, 8 December 1993).
How the dissidents expected Mara to behave is unknown, but this is
what the Fiji Labour Party wrote to Mara
It is quite evident to us that the defeat of the 1994 budget had other quite compelling
reasons than the unacceptability of the budget itself. Over a period of the last few
months, the credibility of the Rabuka Government has been brought [in]to serious
question. The government has been rocked by one scandal after another…However
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Prime Minister Rabuka seems to have cared very little, if at all, about these matters
and has carried on in the fashion of business as usual. These incidents have seriously
eroded the confidence of the opposition members and a number of government
members of  parliament in Prime Minister Rabuka. We feel Prime Minister Rabuka
no longer enjoys the confidence of a majority of members of parliament and
should therefore be asked to tender his resignation, following which Your Excellency
should appoint a new prime minister who has majority support. The new prime
minister should then appoint his cabinet and carry on the task of governing Fiji.
We, Sir, would urge you to explore the above suggestion should it be constitutionally
possible for you to do so.
Whatever the Fijian dissidents and the Labour Party proposed, the
constitution gave the prime minister three options. Within three days of
a crisis, he could advise the president to dissolve parliament and call for
fresh general elections. Second, he could tender his and his government’s
resignation and allow the president to choose another (Fijian) member
of parliament. Only if the prime minister failed to act within the
stipulated three days could the president pursue his own initiative.
Rabuka acted expeditiously. At 7:30pm on the night on which the
budget was defeated, he advised Mara to prorogue the parliament from
19 January and call for a general election within 30 days. Reddy, himself
a lawyer, endorsed Rabuka’s decision, which led Mara to say somewhat
opportunistically, ‘Mr Reddy saved my day’. The Fiji Labour Party used
this comment in the election campaign to hitch Reddy to Rabuka,
insinuating that Mara would have replaced Rabuka had it not been for
Reddy’s contrary advice. In truth, it was not Reddy but the constitution
that saved Mara’s day, for any other decision would not only have been
unconstitutional, but would have implicated him even deeper in the
machinations of  the anti-Rabuka faction. That said, it was in Reddy’s
interest to go to the polls to capitalise on his party’s strong showing in
public opinion polls.
Eight major political parties contested the election, four of them Fijian.
These included the SVT, the Fijian and Rotuman Nationalist United
Front, Soqosoqo ni Taukei ni Vanua (STV), and the Fijian Association
Party. Non-Fijian parties were the General Voters Party and the All
Nationals Congress, and, in the Indo-Fijian community, the National
Federation Party and the Fiji Labour Party. We will look briefly at the
platforms of  the various parties, though it is hard to say whether
manifestos mattered much in voters’ minds.
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The SVT was the main Fijian political party, sponsored by the Great
Council of Chiefs. Sitiveni Rabuka was its president and parliamentary
leader. But although sponsored by the chiefs and intended to be an
umbrella organisation for Fijians, the SVT was not supported by all, as
was evident in the 1992 elections when it got only 66 per cent of all
the Fijian votes and a substantially lower figure in important regions
of  Viti Levu. Others disliked Rabuka’s leadership of  the party and had
not forgiven him for his ‘flagrant flouting of tradition and chiefly
protocol’ in defeating Mara’s wife, herself  a high chief, for the post of
party president (Fiji Times, 4 December 1993). There were problems,
too, in the party’s organisation. Theoretically the management board
ran the party’s affairs, but what was the role and responsibility of  the
14 provinces that subscribed to its coffers? Should not the Great
Council of Chiefs have been consulted over major policy decisions
before the government embarked upon them? These issues were raised
in the campaign. The SVT fielded candidates in all 37 Fijian
constituencies.
Soon after the defeat of the budget, the SVT attempted to forge a
coalition with other Fijian parties. It proposed not to contest seats already
held by the nationalists ‘if the favour was reciprocated’ (Fiji Times, 6
December 1993). Butadroka did not respond. Similar negotiations with
the All Nationals Congress also collapsed when the SVT refused to
reconsider the Sunday prohibitions and the idea of  the fourth confederacy.
The SVT then decided to contest the elections alone on a platform that
stated, among other things, that cabinet members would be chosen on
merit, not on provincial affiliation; there would be a minister of national
planning to coordinate developmental activities; shipping to the outer
islands would be improved; the value-added tax would be reviewed;
deregulation would be balanced against the interests of local
manufacturers; there would be more effective support for law and order;
efficiency in the public sector would be improved; and an SVT
government would give priority to the promotion of  national unity. Where
the SVT’s fortunes looked uncertain, such as in Rewa, Rabuka
contradicted himself by promising that province a seat in his cabinet
(The Review, March 1994). Elsewhere, he hinted that the country could
explode if  his party were not returned to power.
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Rabuka reminded the Fijian electorate of his many pro-Fijian
initiatives. He admitted that he had still a lot to learn, and he asked for
forgiveness. His opponents had criticised his leadership; Rabuka said,
‘no leader could really be effective if from within the ranks of his or her
team there were people who were not prepared to show their loyalty to
the team leader and commitment to play their role as team members’
(Sitiveni Rabuka, Statement to the Bose Levu Vakaturaga).6 Could such
people be trusted to safeguard the future of  the Fijian people? He may
have erred, Rabuka said, but ‘what I have never been, and what I will
never do, is to be disloyal to the Fijian and Rotuman communities, and
to give away what I had personally sacrificed myself to achieve in 1987—
and that is to secure and to safeguard the interests of the Fijian and
Rotuman people’ (Rabuka, Statement to the Great Council of Chiefs
1993). He was astounded at the disloyalty of his colleagues who ‘almost
handed over power of effective control of the national Government of
Fiji to the other communities’. Fijian people were at the crossroads, and
the only way forward for them was to remain united. Loyalty was a virtue
that Rabuka emphasised over and over again. ‘We must be unremitting
in our loyalty to each other, to our chiefs, to this highest of all Fijian
councils, the Bose Levu Vakaturaga’. And Rabuka, the uncompromising
Fijian nationalist, was the people’s saviour.
The SVT’s chief  rival for Fijian votes was the Fijian Association, the
vehicle for the dissident, anti-Rabuka Fijians, headed by Josefata
Kamikamica and quietly supported by Ratu Mara. The idea of reviving
the old Fijian Association as an alternative to Rabuka’s SVT had been
mooted as early as January 1992, two years before the election, though
nothing came of  that initiative (Daily Post, 17 February 1992). The
Association’s founding principles were a mixture of  the pre-coup Alliance
platform and that of  the Mara-led interim administration (1988–92) in
which Kamikamica was a key figure. The party would respect
multiracialism but in the context of promoting and safeguarding
indigenous Fijian interests, it would seek re-entry into the
Commonwealth, and, following World Bank initiatives, it would pursue
privatisation and corporatisation of  profitable enterprises. In truth, the
Fijian Association’s policies differed little from the SVT’s.
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On the campaign trail, the Association had only one issue: Rabuka
was an unworthy leader. Said Kamikamica, ‘the SVT leader, over the
last 18 months, has followed a path full of broken promises,
contradictory statements, reversal of  policy, and dishonourable behaviour.
Fijian and national unity cannot be achieved through cheap political
point scoring just for the sake of rallying together, or for any other selfish
vested interest’ (Fiji Times, 21 January 1994). He pointed to Rabuka’s
involvement in the Stephens affair, his close association with Butadroka’s
brand of  nationalism, and his administrative inexperience. ‘Another five
years of this style of leadership and it will be very difficult for the country
because the network of interests that feed upon each other in a situation
like that will be very difficult to break’ (The Review, February 1994). It
was thus in the national interest to stop Rabuka now. The Fijian
Association was not disobedient toward the Great Council of Chiefs, as
the SVT alleged. It pointed to a number of high chiefs among its party
leaders, including Ratu Apenisa Cakobau (son of  the late Vunivalu of
Bau), Ratu Wili Maivalili of Cakaudrove, and Ratu Aca Silatolu from
Rewa. Moreover, it attempted to promote itself  as the true servant of
the Great Council of  Chiefs. If  elected to government, the party would
work hard to reestablish the chiefs’ links to the British monarch. Rabuka
appealed to another tradition in Fijian society. ‘The sooner we realise we
are out and out, the better it will be for us rather than crying over spilt
milk. We are a proud race. We won’t go crawling back to the British and
the Commonwealth’ (The Review, February 1994). In this stance, Rabuka
echoed the sentiments of  ordinary Fijians.
The third Fijian party in the election was Sakiasi Butadroka’s newly
renamed Fijian and Rotuman Nationalist United Front. Butadroka’s
fortunes had fallen on hard times. Once an Alliance Party assistant
minister dismissed for his anti-Indian remarks—that Fiji’s Indian
population should be repatriated to India—Butadroka had launched his
Fijian Nationalist Party in 1975 and was elected to parliament on his
extremist platform on several occasions. He had formed a coalition, the
Fijian Nationalist United Front, with Ratu Osea Gavidi’s Soqosoqo ni
Taukei ni Vanua (STV), but that coalition collapsed weeks before the
1994 election and contested the elections separately. Butadroka
islands of turmoil
118
championed his causes in his own inimitable style. He opposed any review
of the constitution until non-Fijians unconditionally accepted the
principle of  Fijian political supremacy. Butadroka had been one of  the
founders of the Viti Levu Council of Chiefs, but his reputation for
integrity had been tarnished by the Stephens affair and his base weakened
by the desertion of  his former coalition partner. Ratu Osea Gavidi had
fallen on hard times, too, his STV a pale shadow of  its 1980s counterpart,
the Western United Front. Gavidi’s platform was identical to Butadroka’s,
except for the higher frequency with which Gavidi invoked God’s name.
He was an advocate of western Fijian interests and co-founder of the
Viti Levu Council of  Chiefs.
Apisai Tora’s All Nationals Congress, launched in 1992, was a Fijian-
based party with a multiracial philosophy. A few key issues characterised
the All Nationals Congress platform. One was its repeated view that the
Great Council of  Chiefs should not endorse any one Fijian party, but
should stay above the electoral fray. Unless the disengagement was
effected, said Tora, the traditional usefulness of  the Great Council of
Chiefs would be destroyed
[t[heir reason for existence will be questioned in an increasingly hostile manner.
Their survival will for the first time be a matter of  serious conjecture. We foresee
that their decline will gather such momentum that they will be unlikely to survive
as an institution beyond the next ten years (Fiji Times, 11 January 1993).
Tora was also a strong, longtime advocate of  greater restructuring of
power within Fijian society to give western Fijians more voice in national
affairs. He made ‘no secret of  his desire to end the political dominance
of eastern Fijians’ (Islands Business, October 1991). He was one of the
principal architects of  the fourth confederacy platform. Before the
elections, Tora had explored cooperation with the SVT, but the talks
collapsed when the SVT refused to accept his demand for, among other
things, recognition of  the fourth confederacy. His multiracial
proclamations, coming from a founding member of  the Taukei Movement,
did not ring true.
These divisions caused much anguish among ordinary Fijians. They
were puzzled. How could a constitution that entrenched their political
supremacy have produced so much division and bitterness among their
leaders? One answer was obvious. The removal of  the threat of  Indo-
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Fijian dominance had opened up space to debate issues relating to the
structure and processes of  power within Fijian society that had remained
hidden from the public arena. The absence of the once unifying leaders
such as Ganilau, Cakobau and Mara encouraged democratic debate among
Fijians. Rabuka was no Mara. He lacked Mara’s mana and knowledge of
the mantras of  national politics. Moreover, he was a commoner.
Nonetheless, the extent and significance of the division and
discordance should be kept in perspective. In the end, although the Fijian
parties may have differed about the formula for the distribution of  power
and resources among the taukei, they agreed that Fijians must always
retain political control. Kamikamica and Tora espoused multiracialism,
but only on terms acceptable to the taukei. They advocated (token) Indo-
Fijian participation in government; none wanted a full partnership.
The Fijians, however, were not the only ones who were politically
divided. There was internal friction among the category of general
electors, which included all non-Fijians and non-Indo-Fijians, though it
was not publicly aired. The General Voters Party had done well as SVT’s
coalition partner, securing two senior cabinet positions. However, its
parliamentary leader, David Pickering, a known Mara supporter and a
Rabuka critic, had refused to join Rabuka’s cabinet in 1992. He was a
vocal critic of  Rabuka’s ‘inconsistent statements and indeterminate
stance’ (The Review, August 1993). Not surprisingly, Pickering left the
GVP to stand, and win, as an All Nationals Congress candidate in the
1994 elections, defeating his former party by 893 votes to 554. The real
cause of  friction seems to have been the extent of  the party’s support
for Rabuka. Many general electors were pro-Fijian but not necessarily
pro-Rabuka. A faction of the GVP wanted greater independence, while
the party leaders, whatever their personal misgivings about Rabuka’s
character and consistency, supported him. In the end, despite internal
differences, the GVP won four of the five general seats and returned
once again as the SVT’s coalition partner.
Among Indo-Fijians, the divisions were deeper and more public, with
both the National Federation and the Fiji Labour parties running fierce
campaigns to claim the leadership of a drifting, disillusioned Indo-Fijian
community. Several issues divided the two parties. One was disagreement
over participating in the 1992 elections. The NFP decided to fight the
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elections under protest, arguing that boycotting it would be futile. The
Indo-Fijian community’s future lay in dialogue and discussion with Fijian
leaders, and parliament would provide the forum. Labour favoured
boycott. How could it participate in an election under a constitution
that it had roundly condemned as racist, authoritarian, undemocratic
and feudalistic? To do so would accord legitimacy to that flawed
document and undermine the party’s credibility internationally.
International pressure was the only way to change the constitution.
However, a few weeks before the election, the party revoked its decision
and took part in the elections.
Another issue was Labour’s decision to support Sitiveni Rabuka in
his bid to become prime minister; the NFP had backed his rival, Josefata
Kamikamica. Labour explained its action as a strategic move. When
Rabuka, once in power, disavowed the spirit of the agreement and
disclaimed any urgency to address issues Labour had raised, Labour’s
credibility in the Indo-Fijian community was severely tested. To salvage
its reputation, Labour walked out of parliament in June 1993 only to
return in September, using the terms of  reference for the review of  the
constitution as a pretext. The NFP exploited Labour’s misfortunes.
Chaudhry, it said, had committed the ‘third coup’ by supporting Rabuka
in 1992, its agreement with him ‘neither politically feasible nor legally
enforceable’ (Fiji Times, 15 December 1993). Labour had practised ‘flip-
flop’ politics. Labour countered that the ‘problem with the NFP [is that]
it never struggled in its lifetime and buckles under pressure’ (The
Weekender, 4 February 1994). For the NFP, the main issue was credibility
and integrity. It portrayed itself  as a party following a steady course on
an even keel. Its trump card was its leader, Jai Ram Reddy. A seasoned
politician, Reddy had, especially since the 1992 election, emerged as a
responsible, statesmanlike figure. A national poll gave him an astounding
80 per cent approval. His moderate yet insistent stance on important
issues and his performance in parliament worked to the party’s advantage.
Fijian leaders, including Mara and Rabuka, spoke approvingly of him.
But that, to his opponents, was the real problem. Conciliation and
compromise to what end, they asked. Reddy’s moderation they saw as
weakness and timidity, reminiscent of  the acquiescent politics of  the
Indian Alliance. They sought to discredit his political record by blaming
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him for the years of divisive and factional infighting in the National
Federation Party. For the NFP, Chaudhry epitomised ‘inconsistency,
unreliability and unpredictability both in substance and style’ (National
Federation Party campaign material).
Personalities aside, there were some fundamental differences in
approach and political philosophy that remained submerged in the
campaign. One important difference between Reddy and Chaudhry lay
in their approaches to the pace of political change. Gradualism was
Reddy’s preferred course of  action; the favourite words in his political
vocabulary being conciliation, consensus, dialogue and moderation.
Expeditious change was Chaudhry’s path; sacrifice, struggle, boycott
and agitation the key words in his lexicon. When asked how long Indo-
Fijians might have to wait for political equality, Reddy replied: ‘I don’t
think time is important in politics; it is what you do’ (Islands Business,
January 1991). Indo-Fijians had suffered a great deal, but ‘life goes on
because of  hope, that somehow, some day things will turn around and
everybody will realise that we are all God’s children and we’re all meant
to live and let live’ (Islands Business, January 1991). Reddy’s philosophical,
even fatalistic, approach acknowledged the limited options available to
his people.
Chaudhry was an intrepid, indefatigable fighter who entered national
politics through the trade union movement; he was the long-serving
general secretary of  the Fiji Public Service Association. He was
temperamentally different from Reddy. To him, power conceded nothing
without a struggle and time did count for a lot in politics and in the life
of  a community. Change must come and, for Chaudhry, the sooner the
better. ‘We have to do something about this [racial constitution]’, he
said, ‘because if we live under this constitution for the next 5–10 years,
then they [Indo-Fijians] will end up as coolies’ (Islands Business, March
1991). The same urgency—recklessness in the opinion of his detractors—
informed his approach to the land issue. ‘I don’t believe in transferring
the problems of  our generation to the next generation’, he said. ‘We
should try and resolve this issue. If  it is not possible to have long term
leases…then we better start talking about compensation. And Indians
will have to accept the reality that they must move away from the land
and find a livelihood elsewhere’ (The Review, August 1991). This militant
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Chaudhry was an anathema to his opponents, but, in an ironic way, he
appealed to the dominant radical tradition in Indo-Fijian politics that
had long been the province of  the NFP.
The NFP seemed to have accepted the realities of communal politics
and proposed to work within its framework. Jai Ram Reddy said in
parliament in July 1992,
[l]et us each be in our separate compartments if you like. Let communal solidarity
prevail and I do not begrudge Fijian leaders for wanting to see that their community
remains united. That is a very natural desire. Let the general electors be united. Let
the Indians be united; let everybody be united, but from our respective positions
of unity let us accept that we must co-exist and work together and work with each
other. That is a more realistic approach (Parliament of Fiji, Hansard, 24 July 1992).
Labour’s position differed. Although only a pale shadow of  its 1987
form, denuded of  its multiracial base, its leading Fijian lights having
deserted the party, Labour still seemed to subscribe to the philosophy of
multiracial politics, as opposed to communally compartmentalised politics
of  the type entrenched by the 1992 constitution. To that end the party
fielded general elector and Fijian candidates. It was a token gesture, and
the Fiji Labour Party’s non-Indo-Fijian candidates polled miserably; but
it still represented an act of protest against the racial constitution, whereas
the NFP contested only Indo-Fijian seats.
In sum, the 1994 campaign was a curiously quiet, uneventful affair,
with the ethnic groups locked into racially segregated compartments,
debating issues of  particular concern to their respective communities.
There were few large rallies and virtually no campaigning through the
media. Most people seemed uninterested and disenchanted. This
parochial, tunnell-vision that rewarded ethnic chauvinism and
communalism rather than multiracialism was one of the more deleterious
effects of the 1990 constitution.
Polling occurred from 18 to 27 February. The SVT got 146,901 votes
or 64 per cent of Fijian votes, a decline of 7 per cent from its 1992
figures. Its nearest rival was the Fijian Association with 34,994 votes or
15 per cent. The Fijian Association won all three Lau seats and the two
in Naitasiri. Butadroka’s Nationalists polled poorly, too, capturing only
14,396 votes (6 per cent), compared with its 1992 share of 10 per cent
of  all the Fijian votes. The All Nationals Congress, which had won 24,719
rabuka’s republic
123
votes (10 per cent) in 1992, won only 18,259 (8 per cent) of Fijian
votes. Gavidi’s STV also recorded a loss, from 9,308 (4 per cent) votes
to 6,417 (3 per cent) in 1994. Labour, which fielded just a few Fijian
candidates, got only 555 Fijian votes in 1994. Independents did poorly,
except the SVT-allied Ratu Jo Nacola from Ra, who won his seat
comfortably.
The nationalists’ agenda was appropriated by the SVT. Butadroka
claimed with some justice that his trademark pro-Fijian policies had been
hijacked by the party in power. Butadroka’s running mate in the 1992
elections, Ratu Mosese Tuisawau, stood as an independent. But
Butadroka had also lost ground and respect in his constituency with his
antics in parliament (he was expelled for his virulent criticism of  Mara’s
administration), his strident and now curiously antiquarian anti-Indianism,
and his involvement in the Stephens affair. Gavidi’s STV lost ground for
similar reasons. His political integrity was in tatters over the Stephens
affair, and his pro-western Fijian agenda was silently incorporated into
the SVT’s program. Tora’s loss, and especially his loss of  ground since
1992, was a surprise. Tora’s sudden conversion to multiracialism was
unconvincing, and the SVT fought hard to regain its strength in the west.
The real surprise among Fijians was the poor showing of the Fijian
Association, except in Naitasiri (because of  Kuli’s rapport with his grass-
roots supporters, the indifference of  Tui Waimaro, Adi Pateresio
Vonokula notwithstanding) and Lau. Among those who succumbed to
the Fijian Association in Lau was the SVT’s Filipe Bole. His support for
Rabuka, despite Ratu Mara’s well-known disregard for the man, cost
him his seat. Mara was the paramount chief of the region. As president,
Mara maintained outward neutrality, but as one Fijian observer put it,
‘neither the acting chairman [Tevita Loga, Mara’s traditional herald] nor
Finau Mara [eldest son and a Fijian Association candidate], nor others
would have dared move without prior consultation with Mara in his
capacity as paramount chief ’ (Islands Business, February 1994). Why did
the Fijian Association fail in its birthplace, Tailevu? Traditional politics
probably played a part. The SVT lineup included Adi Samanunu Talakuli,
the eldest daughter of  the late Vunivalu of  Bau (Ratu Sir George
Cakobau), and Ratu William Toganivalu. The Fijian Association’s lineup
of  chiefs lacked stature and authority. Some Fijians also suggested that
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Kamikamica was damaged by Mara’s endorsement. They believed that
Mara harboured dynastic ambitions and supported Kamikamica, or
anyone else, only until his son, Finau, was ready to assume the leadership.
Others suggested that Tailevu was a traditionally conservative
constituency, whose people found it hard to vote against a party sponsored
by the chiefs. The SVT’s allegation that Kamikamica had engaged in a
‘calculated act of political sabotage’ in his ‘continuing remorseless and
unbending ambition for political power in Fiji’ (The Weekender, 2 February
1994) seemed to have stuck.
All this says little about the SVT’s strengths, which were considerable.
It fielded better, or, at least, better-known candidates, and, as the party
in government, used the politics of patronage to its great advantage.
There was no doubt that the SVT’s trump card was Sitiveni Rabuka,
who was returned by his electorate with one of the highest votes among
Fijian constituencies. Many ordinary Fijians responded to him as one of
their own—a man who had sacrificed much to promote their interests.
They ultimately forgave him his lapses of  judgment and inconsistencies.
They saw him as a man who had suffered from disloyalty, bad advice
from colleagues and intrigue from powerful forces outside government.
Rabuka asked for a second chance, and the electorate responded.
Among Indo-Fijians, the total number of registered voters was
159,480. The NFP won twenty of the twenty-seven Indo-Fijian seats
and captured 65,220 votes (55.5 per cent). The Fiji Labour Party got
51,252 votes (43.6 per cent). In the 1992 elections, the NFP had captured
50 per cent of  the votes to Labour’s 48 per cent. The NFP made a clean
sweep of  all the Vanua Levu seats and the urban seats. It also made
gains in the sugar belt of western Viti Levu, to some extent because of
the mill strike in September 1993 by the Sugar and General Workers’
Union, which angered farmers. Other farmers turned to the NFP because
they were suspicious of a compulsory insurance scheme proposed by
the Labour-allied National Farmers’ Union. However, Labour managed
to retain its core support there. Part of  Labour’s problem was of  its own
making, but the NFP increased its support on the strength of its own
performance, especially that of  its leader. Many Indo-Fijians responded
to his quiet tenacity.
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The election returned both the NFP and the SVT with mandates.
The Indo-Fijians had not renounced Chaudhry’s style of  agitational
politics; they merely suspended it for the time being in favour of  Reddy’s
more accommodationist approach. In that sense, Reddy’s mandate was
conditional; if his approach failed to produce timely results, the Indo-
Fijians would return to Labour. A similar dilemma confronted Rabuka.
The SVT leader told his campaign audience that he would never
compromise on his goals to realise the aims of  the coup. At the same
time, he promised to promote national unity through the politics of
inclusion. His task was made all the more difficult; members of his own
party were aiming depose him at any opportunity. Rabuka may have
taken his revenge, but would he have the last laugh?
Notes
1 Typescript in the author’s possession.
2 This quote is from a file of unpublished constitutional review papers owned by the
author.
3 From Labour Party campaign literature in the author’s possession.
4 From a copy of  Reddy’s budget speech in the author’s possession.
5 Reddy’s Budget Reply (typescript in the author’s possession).




Charting a new course
The 1990 constitution, decreed into existence by President Ratu Sir Penaia
Ganilau five years after the military coups of 1987, was assumed by its
architects to be a temporary solution to a troubled situation. Section 161
provided for its review within seven years, that is, before 25 July 1997.
The constitution was undeniably a contested document provoking deep
emotions and often diametrically opposed responses. The Indo-Fijian
community rejected it, and made its repeal, or at least an impartial review,
the central plank in their election campaigns in 1992 and 1994. Equally,
on the Fijian side, there was fervent support for a document that was
widely believed to entrench Fijian political dominance. Nonetheless, after
the 1992 elections, which brought the SVT to power, the government
initiated private discussions with the opposition on the nature and process
of  a constitutional review. Sitiveni Rabuka acknowledged the deep
differences of opinion, but emphasised that ‘these should not deteriorate
into confrontational and tension-filled relations, if our political leaders
exercise and develop relationships based on trust, understanding and respect
for the laws of  our country’ (Fiji Focus, June 1992).
To start the review process, Rabuka appointed a cabinet subcommittee
that was expanded to include opposition members after a discussion
with Jai Ram Reddy and Mahendra Chaudhry on 9 June 1993. The three
agreed that the review would be completed in time for the 1997 general
election to be held under a revised constitution. Further, they agreed
that the review would not be confined to the electoral provisions of the
1990 constitution but would be of a broad nature, covering the entire
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document and including ‘a consideration of the system of government
considered most appropriate for Fiji’. They agreed that the new
constitution should be ‘autochthonous’, developed by the people within
the country, unlike the 1970 constitution that was negotiated in London.
They agreed further to think about some ‘pillar principles’ that ‘would
serve as the foundation for the promotion and reinforcement of  national
unity in Fiji’ (Parliament of Fiji, Hansard, 14 September 1993).
The subcommittee appointed a multiparty Joint Parliamentary Select
Committee (JPSC), made up of 11 government and nine opposition
nominees, to facilitate the review. The JPSC would recommend to cabinet
the size and composition of the review commission, assist the commission
in its work and undertake initiatives to develop consensus about the
new constitution. This was a significant achievement. After protracted
private negotiations, the subcommittee recommended, and in September
1993 both houses of parliament unanimously agreed to set up a review
commission. Parliament also unanimously approved its terms of
reference, but progress was disrupted when the SVT government fell in
November 1993. Early in 1994 the SVT, having returned to power with
an increased majority, resumed discussion with the opposition parties.
The most important unresolved issues were the size and, more
importantly, the membership, of  the commission. In November, the cabinet
agreed on an eight-member commission, chaired by a person from overseas
who possessed ‘vast experience in [a] multiracial, multicultural
environment’—preferably someone from Malaysia—three Fijians, two
Indo-Fijians, one Rotuman and one general voter, and assisted by two
legal counsel, one from overseas and one local (Fiji Focus, June 1994).
Subsequently, for reasons still unknown, the SVT suggested an 11-member
commission, made up of  a Chairman (Fijian), Deputy Chairman (Indian),
two SVT nominees, one general voter, one NFP member, one Fijian
Association member, one All Nationals Congress, one Rotuman and one
state services representative. The government insisted that the commission
consist of local people who represented major political parties or groups
in parliament and who were familiar with local language and customs.
‘Any foreign participation would be confined to the role of  expert
consultants and advisers only’, because ‘the exercise would only be
meaningful if it was undertaken by people whose lives would be affected
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by changes that would be implemented and who had the relevant language
and cultural understanding of  the different sections of  the Fiji’s multiethnic
and multireligious society’ (Press statement).
It also proposed that the members of the commission be appointed
by the major political parties represented in parliament, and not by other
interest groups, such as, the Great Council of Chiefs, or the president,
or the churches, because ‘this would better facilitate communication
with the Joint Parliamentary Select Committee and the public of Fiji as
well as provide an impetus to the bipartisan consensus building process
that was vital to this exercise’. The government envisaged the process
having two stages. First, the commission would compile an interim report
and submit it to parliament for consideration. Parliament’s comments
would then be incorporated by the commission in the final report. The
exercise was expected to take about two years. Things turned out
differently. The government’s proposal for an eleven-member commission
was soon realised to be too unwieldy and expensive. In the end, the
JPSC decided on three members to undertake the review.
Similarly, the government’s insistence that the chairperson should be
an indigenous Fijian was rejected by the opposition, even though the
person the government had in mind was the Chief Justice, Sir Timoci
Tuivaga, who was willing to serve, if  asked. The opposition wanted an
independent outsider, and threatened to boycott parliament if the
government refused to reconsider its position. Without some international
participation, they said, the process would lack legitimacy and credibility.
A number of  prominent individuals were identified, including Telford
George, a former Chief  Justice of  Tanzania and Bermuda and member
of  the commission which had reviewed the constitution of  Trinidad in
1974; Sir Robin Cooke, of the Supreme Court of New Zealand; Sir
Graham Speight, a retired New Zealand judge and former President of
the Fiji Court of Appeal; Eddie Durie, Chief Judge of the Maori Land
Court; Sir Ian Thompson, former Fiji colonial civil servant living in
retirement in Scotland; and Sir Paul Reeves, former New Zealand
Governor General and Archbishop (Daily Post, 6 February 1996). Further
negotiation between the government and the opposition narrowed the
list to Thompson and Reeves, who were interviewed by Filipe Bole,
chairman of  the JPSC. Reeves was offered the chair.
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As someone from the Pacific islands, with known sympathy for the
Maori cause, and with his background in the church and experience of
high public office, Reeves was acceptable to a wide cross-section of the
Fiji community. As its representative on the commission, the government
nominated Tomasi Rayalu Vakatora, a former senior public servant,
senator, minister and Speaker of the House of Representatives; and the
opposition nominated me, an academic specialist on Fiji history and
politics. The commissioners received their warrant from the president
on 15 March 1995. The two legal counsel, Alison Quentin-Baxter and
Jon Apted, received theirs on 19 May. Quentin-Baxter was a retired
Executive Director of  the New Zealand Law Reform Commission with
constitutional experience in the Marshall Islands and Niue. She was a
great asset, with her tireless energy, her meticulous preparation and
impeccable professionalism. Apted was resourceful and intelligent, with
a sound understanding of the local scene. The commission secretary
was another local lawyer, Walter Rigamoto, a Rotuman. The commission
began its work in early June.
The terms of  reference—a historic achievement of  consensus and
compromise, considering the bitterness generated by the coups—required
the commission to recommend constitutional arrangements to meet the
present and future needs of the people of Fiji, and promote racial
harmony, national unity and the economic and social advancement of
all communities. Those arrangements had to guarantee full protection
and promotion of the rights, interests and concerns of the indigenous
Fijian and Rotuman people, have full regard for the rights, interests and
concerns of all ethnic groups, and take into account internationally
recognised principles and standards of  individual and group rights. The
commission was expected to scrutinise the constitution, facilitate the
widest possible debate on the terms of  the constitution, and, after
ascertaining the views of  the people, suggest how the 1990 constitution
could be improved to meet the needs of Fiji as a multiethnic and
multicultural society. The terms of  reference were wide-ranging,
prompting some cynics to wonder what they actually meant and whether
they could be reconciled into a workable formula. These thoughts also
crossed the minds of those in the commission, who devoted a great deal
of  time to analysing the meaning of  the terms of  reference.
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Unlike previous commissions of  enquiry, such as the Street
Commission of 1975, and others set up after the coups, the Reeves
Commission (as it came to be known) was required to review the whole
constitution, not only the electoral system and the composition of
parliament. The review, then, was to be a fundamental, wide-ranging
exercise, covering, besides the two critical areas just mentioned, the
functioning of parliament, the relationship between the executive and
the legislative branches, institutions of government and the mechanism
for improving accountability and transparency, the administration of
justice, citizenship, ethnic and social justice issues, rights of
communities and groups, the operation of local government bodies,
public revenue and expenditure, emergency powers, and a Bill of Rights,
among others.
The commission adopted a carefully designed plan of action. The
first stage would involve receiving submissions from the people of Fiji.
Consultation would be open, transparent, thorough and inclusive. To
ascertain the view of the people, and thus fulfill one of the requirements
of  the terms of  reference, the commission decided to hold public hearings
throughout the country to receive submissions. The opposition was not
keen on a prolonged and public enquiry. Jai Ram Reddy had told
parliament that ‘this widest possible consultation is unnecessary’
(Parliament of Fiji, Hansard, 22 September 1993). Mahendra Chaudhry
agreed, adding that ‘this was a concession that we made’. They perhaps
feared that a public enquiry would revive old hostilities, politicise the
review and derail the whole process.
Perhaps Reddy and Chaudhry were reminded of  Rabuka’s abortive
‘government of national unity’ proposal. A public enquiry would reveal
nothing new: what the different communities wanted, or did not want,
was already too well known to warrant detailed investigation—the
commission could revisit the arguments by reading submissions given to
previous enquiries. The commission did not share this view. It was
determined to make its own independent assessment, although it had
access to papers produced for earlier enquiries. It also knew that its report
would lack credibility without public input. The people of Fiji should be
bound into the review process, and not excluded from it—it was, after
all, their constitution that was being reviewed.
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The commission expected to hear discordant, even disquieting, voices
from time to time; there would be public posturing and grandstanding;
and some people might use the commission to promote their own causes.
Some of  our fears were realised, as both Mr Vakatora and I were vilified
by people seeking free publicity for their personal and political causes.
But that was the price of  living in an open, democratic society. As it
turned out, the consultation was exhaustive, and exhausting. From July
to November, commission members travelled the country by car, boat
and air, receiving over 800 oral and written submissions from individual
citizens, community, religious, cultural and other interest groups, and all
the major parties. A number of  organisations were set up with the express
purpose of  making submissions. One, the Citizens Constitutional Forum,
continues to do valuable work in educating the public about the
constitution. Most of  the submissions were made in open forum, and
are available to the public; but some individuals spoke in confidence,
and their presentations naturally form part of  the closed record.
Supplementing these data were commissioned research papers on a
range of  issues. One set of  papers dealt with local issues such as the
performance of  the economy, education, the relationship between state
and religion, land tenure, the structure and functioning of  Fijian
institutions, gender relations, minority concerns and the like. The aim
was to enrich commission members’ knowledge of the local context in
which the 1990 constitution functioned, and to deepen their
understanding of  some issues raised in the submissions. Another set,
written by eminent scholars from around the world, focused on systems
of power sharing in ethnically divided societies, alternative electoral
systems, indigenous and human rights in international law, protection of
fundamental rights, and so on. Both sets have been published (Lal and
Vakatova 1997).
Early in the commission’s deliberations, the need to view Fiji’s
constitutional experience in comparative perspective became clear.
Malaysia, Mauritius and South Africa seemed to offer experiences and
perspectives of particular relevance. Malaysia, which had grown close
to Fiji since the coups—some of its legislation, for instance, regarding
internal security, was adopted in Fiji—had experienced racial tensions,
culminating in riots in 1969, but later emerged as an economic superpower
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in Southeast Asia. Its pro-indigenous (bhumiputra) policies, legislative
protection of  indigenous interests and their integration into the country’s
political system, the special place of Malay culture and the overarching
role of Islam, the relationship between religion and state, all resonated
with issues raised in submissions to the commission.
Mauritius, like Fiji, was a multiethnic island state, lagging behind Fiji
in nearly all sectors of the economy when it became independent in
1968, just two years before Fiji. Three decades later it was ahead of Fiji
in all sectors of  the economy. The commission wanted to fathom the
reason for this transformation and see for itself  if  there was any
correlation between the constitutional system and economic performance.
South Africa was an obvious choice, in the mid 1990s undergoing perhaps
the most massive effort in constitutional engineering in modern times,
steering a deeply divided and racially polarised society from its brutal
apartheid system towards a non-racial, multiparty democracy. The
commission wanted to understand the nature of the problems that arose
out of the transition, particularly the use of the mechanism of a
government of national unity to effect the change.
This comparative exercise was immensely educative, reinforcing the
fundamental point that each country had devised unique constitutional
arrangements to suit their particular social and political needs. But there
were certain common threads. Everywhere, there was recognition of  the
need to share power among the various ethnic groups. Everywhere, there
was explicit recognition of  ethnicity. And everywhere, there was a strong
commitment to an overarching sense of  national unity, its importance
underlined by a history of ethnic conflict and tension.
The commission’s work received wide publicity in the media,
particularly on the (recently introduced) television where it was a regular
feature of  the evening news bulletin for weeks. Predictably, submissions
varied in tone and content, addressing some concerns and issues that
were tangential to the commision’s central project. The following sums
up the thrust of  what was presented to the commission. There was
widespread recognition, among both indigenous Fijians and Indo-Fijians,
that Fiji’s political and social structures, instead of  bringing people
together, had kept them apart for more than a hundred years, so that
people continued to live, think and work in racial compartments. Members
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of  both groups noted that, in rural communities, Fijians and Indo-Fijians
lived happily together, extending a helping hand to one another. Many
Indo-Fijian individuals and groups expressed their commitment to
working with Fijians towards restoring full democracy and establishing a
genuinely harmonious non-racial and multicultural society, assuming,
of course, that this was what Fijians themselves wanted. Racial
cooperation was better than confrontation. Some adverted to the
worldwide need to take account of  the rights of  indigenous peoples.
Fijians, too, stressed that while indigenous interests were paramount,
this should not affect the interests and traditions of  other communities.
No one should feel threatened in what was their own country. A
multiracial society was one in which different communities respected
one another, interacted, learnt each other’s culture and languages and
lived together in trust.
Some thought that a lasting solution would depend on foregoing racial
politics and building mutual trust, while others argued strongly that Fiji
must abandon the habit, introduced by the colonial government, of
thinking, making decisions, legislating and carrying out other activities
on a racial basis. The constitution should make people focus first on
belonging to the country and only after that on belonging to a particular
group. But that trust, some argued, should be built only on the confidence
of the different ethnic group: their own identity should be built in relation
to that of  the other groups. While the Indo-Fijian population was
increasing rapidly, there was genuine fear among the indigenous people
that they would be swamped and Fiji taken out of their control. However,
Fiji’s biggest asset was that, despite each group’s fears and mistrust, the
ordinary people were basically decent and considerate, which had enabled
Fiji to avoid violence so far.
Many Indo-Fijians expressed their commitment to social and economic
advancement for all the people of Fiji. They urged that a new constitution
should enable Fiji to solve its serious social and economic problems such
as access to land, unemployment, poverty and homelessness, in a spirit of
cooperation, trust, tolerance, sound planning, team work and the innovative
and creative use of  resources. The country’s enormous potential could not
be realised until its citizens were united in their diversity, and discussed
such concerns as those of the Fijians about not being in the main economic
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stream and of Indo-Fijians about mushrooming squatter colonies on the
fringes of  the urban centres. The Indo-Fijian business community could
take the initiative in training young Fijians in business and as apprentices.
It was necessary to move away from the stereotype that all Indo-Fijians
were educated and prosperous. Nor was it true that Indo-Fijians controlled
the economy. The banking sector was not in their hands, nor was the gold
mine. It was also wrong to suggest that Fijians had no significant role in
the economy. They were not well-represented in the visible aspects of
commercial life like shop-keeping, transport and tourism, but they owned
of  one of  the country’s most productive assets—land.
Many submissions pointed out that in many rural areas, members of
the two communities spoke each other’s language. Even so, a number of
Indo-Fijians acknowledged that they could have done more to learn Fijian
culture, tradition and language. Some Indo-Fijian schools already had a
large number of Fijian students, and were promoting the teaching of
Fijian to all students, but it was not an examinable subject for non-
Fijians. Multiethnic schools encouraged communication and trust among
the children. Although some schools were still categorised as ‘Fijian’ or
‘Indian’, almost 58 per cent of the 672 primary schools and almost 91
per cent of the 142 secondary schools were multiracial. However,
stereotypes still took the place of knowledge. The state had to be a
major player in promoting an understanding among the different
communities of  one another’s language and culture.
The subject of a common name was raised in many submissions,
which, it was said, was necessary to promote national identity. Among
Indo-Fijians and a few Fijians, there was support for the name ‘Fijian’,
but some thought that would be appropriate only if everyone spoke the
Fijian language. Some Fijians took the view that ‘Fijian’ should be
reserved for those registered in the Vola Ni Kawa Bula. Alternative
common names were ‘Fiji Citizens’, or ‘Fiji Islanders’. The suggestion
that indigenous Fijians should be known as ‘Taukei’ was deplored by
some on the assumption that only members of other groups would be
called Fijians, thus defeating the purpose, but welcomed by others on
the ground that it would free up ‘Fijian’ for use by all.
The relationship between church and state was hotly debated. A
number of Fijians, including the Methodist Church and many of its
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members, wanted Fiji to be declared a Christian state. Most saw no need
to give reasons, but those that did suggested that the principles of  the
Christian faith would be enriched and protected by the government;
Christianity would spread among non-Christians, and the introduction
of new cults under the guise of religion would be stopped. With one or
two exceptions, Fijians did not see the declaration of Fiji as a Christian
state as affecting the freedom of non-Christians to practice their own
religions. Many Fijians and predominantly Fijian religious groups expressed
support for the Sunday ban. They thought that Sunday should be a day
of  rest, except for travelling and the provision of  essential amenities.
Others, however, thought that the constitution should ensure that
Fiji remain a secular state. Some saw an element of compulsion in
declaring Fiji a Christian state as inconsistent with true Christianity.
Privileging one religion over others would not be conducive to an
atmosphere of  trust and understanding. Religion should not be used by
political leaders to further their own ends. The Sunday ban was opposed
on grounds of principle, such as the conflict with freedom of worship
and religious belief, and elements of  inconsistency and hypocrisy. It also
had socioeconomic consequences. Taken with a large number of  holidays,
the Sunday ban had caused a drop in production. The point was made
that the ban was imposed by parliament, not by the constitution. It was
therefore deemed to be a matter for parliament to resolve.
Citizenship was another issue that featured prominently in the
submissions. The majority of  those who addressed it, both Fijian and
Indo-Fijian, opposed the idea of  permitting dual citizenship. Belonging
to a place required commitment. The Fijian view was that ‘citizen’
denoted someone who was entitled to land, a right which a person should
not have in more than one place. Some, with backgrounds from all
communities, however, favoured permitting dual citizenship, arguing that
it would encourage skilled citizens who had chosen, or felt they had
been forced, to live and work abroad to return to Fiji. Others thought
that those registered in the Voka ni Kawa Bula should be allowed to
retain Fiji citizenship even if  they became citizens of  another country.
Many, particularly women, considered that the citizenship rights of
men and women should be the same. The foreign husband of a woman
who was a Fiji citizen should have the same right of entry to Fiji and
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access to citizenship as the foreign wife of a male citizen, whether the
right be citizenship by registration, or only permanent residence. They
also thought that the child of a female citizen born abroad should have
the same right to Fiji citizenship as the child of a male citizen. Such
distinctions were seen to infringe international conventions. The policy
reasons for treating men and women equally in matters of citizenship
included the need to facilitate the return of women students who married
overseas and the humanitarian need to allow a woman to choose whether
to live in her own country or that of her husband.
There was strong support, among men as well as women, to enshrine
gender equality in the constitution, and representatives of  women’s
groups urged that laws and practices that discriminated against women
be changed. These included rape laws, inadequate maternity leave and
the absence of paternity leave, the absence of family support benefits,
particularly for women, and the absence of laws against people
trafficking. Many women expressed anxiety about the growing violence
against women and children, particularly domestic violence, child abuse,
rape and other crimes. These problems stemmed partly from the fact
that women’s aspirations clashed with men’s cultural and traditional
values. There would be less violence if  women were recognised as having
a real part in decision-making.
Evidence was produced to show inadequate participation of women
in politics. The barriers were tradition, family commitments and an
underestimation of  women’s capabilities, as well as men’s intimidation
and desire for power. Others stressed the need to recognise the equality
of women at all stages of education, and to discourage gender
stereotyping. Indo-Fijian girls were doubly discriminated against in the
award of  scholarships. Women and men should have equal remuneration
and treatment, particularly in terms of  promotion to senior positions in
both public and private sectors.
Many submissions raised the question of land, which was sometimes
seen as a more important concern than the constitution. Many Fijians
wanted to be sure that their ownership would not be disturbed. Most
Indo-Fijians agreed. A number of Fijians thought that some or all state-
owned land should be returned to Fijians. Freehold land, alienated before
Cession, should also be returned to its rightful owners. Some submissions
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insisted that the renewal of leases to Indo-Fijians should be conditional
upon their accepting the principle of  Fijian political paramountcy. As
one submitter told the commission, ‘the question of Fijian leadership in
this country is an important equation in the debate [and] it would be
naive to ignore that point’. To ‘ignore the relation between tenancy and
political power would be to misunderstand the post 1987 Fiji’.
Others disagreed. For Indo-Fijians, the main issue was not ownership
but constitutional guarantee of security of tenure. They wanted the
constitution to place some obligation on the government to provide land
for those in all communities who became landless. For many tenants, a
30-year lease, as provided under ALTA, was insufficient to encourage
good husbandry and land improvement. They wanted longer leases.
Alternatively, if  the land-owning mataqali wanted the land returned, the
displaced tenant should be compensated to enable him to start again
elsewhere. There was deep concern that many leases were on the verge
of expiring and many were not likely to be renewed. They urged
constitutional machinery to resolve the problem.
On the nature and character of representation in parliament, opinions
divided sharply. Many indigenous Fijians saw themselves as having an
inviolable, God-given right to govern Fiji for all time, since it was their
leaders who had ceded Fiji to Great Britain in 1874. They argued that at
independence Fiji should have been returned to the Fijian people and
their chiefs. The newcomers, the vulagi, were entitled to remain in the
country where they were born, to work and prosper, but they had no right
to aspire to political leadership. Some Fijians saw the ownership of  the
land as giving them the right to control the state. As Sevoki Matanainiu,
of  the Taukei Movement, said, Fijians should have 86 per cent of  the
seats in parliament because they owned 86 per cent of the land (Daily Post,
3 April 1997). Unless Fijian paramountcy, understood as political control,
was accepted by the other communities, some Fijians suggested, Fiji would
be fated to go through another, possibly worse, crisis. They saw the 1990
constitution as near-perfect. It had been blessed by the Bose Levu
Vakaturaga. Through the preponderant number of  Fijians in parliament, it
assured their political leadership, thus protecting their traditional way of
life. For these reasons, many considered that the 1990 constitution should
remain unchanged. It was suggested that other races’ claim to equality of
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treatment was itself an abuse of the democratic right that those races had
been accorded. The other races, with their superior commercial skills,
should help the Fijians, not try to jump ahead of them.
Indo-Fijians saw the 1990 constitution as having been imposed on them.
They regarded it as discriminatory in not allocating seats to communities
on the basis of  their population ratio. Consequently they saw themselves
relegated to permanent opposition, to third-rate citizenship, to use their
words: a state of affairs which did not reflect their earnest desire to coexist
with all races and make a full contribution to the country and its government.
They saw the 1990 constitution as dividing the people along racial lines,
so that people focused on the advancement of their own community rather
than that of the nation. Because the government was required to be an
indigenous Fijian institution, it was perceived as having lost the ability to
mediate fairly between the communities. Indeed, some regarded the
constitution as a mandate for widespread arbitrary discrimination against
them. They wanted the new constitution to heal the wounds—to include
express recognition that there was a permanent place for them in the country
of their birth.
The submissions were deeply moving in the transparency of thoughts
and emotions they expressed. For the commission, listening to submissions
was profoundly educative and humbling. The country listened again to a
range of  often diametrically opposed viewpoints. The commission had
fulfilled an important role in restarting national conversation. And it had
acquainted itself  with a range of  viewpoints across the entire spectrum.
Armed with this evidence, it began to ponder its recommendations.
It is neither possible nor desirable to cover all areas in the commission’s
report. Here, two sets of issues will be discussed. The first, and perhaps
the most critical, concerns the election to, and composition of, parliament.
That question lay at the centre of  the ‘web’—Mr Vakatora’s phrase—
and was at the forefront of all the submissions, as the way power is
acquired and used lies at the heart of  politics. It was the one area of
central disagreement between the major parties and communities. The
second relates to the functioning of the institutions of government and
issues of  social justice and human rights.
From the outset, the commission believed that, unless the systemic
nature of  Fiji’s constitutional problem were clearly understood, there
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was little hope of devising arrangements that would not give rise to the
same problems in the future. From the evidence, the commission
concluded that it was Fiji’s constitutional arrangements that hampered
the process of nation-building and impeded effective cooperation among
the communities, which otherwise had shown remarkable tolerance and
respect for each other’s traditions. Fiji’s constitutional problems, the
commission concluded, arose from four features of  the country’s
constitutional arrangements. Two were understandable responses to Fiji’s
multiethnic society: the principle that Fijian interests should be
paramount, and the communal system of representation; and two
reflected the Westminster system of  government that Fiji inherited at
independence: the role of political parties and the principle that a
government must command the support of a majority in parliament.
These four issues underpinned the 1970 as well as the 1990 constitution.
The principle that Fijian interests should always remain paramount was
expressly enunciated by the colonial government from the early years of
this century, partly reflecting genuine concern for the position of  indigenous
Fijians, partly serving to deflect the Indo-Fijian demand for equal political
representation, and partly serving to guide political change at a pace
acceptable to the colonial state. Nonetheless the principle became an
accepted part of the political culture of Fiji. As Fiji moved towards self-
government in the 1960s, the principle of political paramountcy became
the focus of  negotiations among the main political actors.
The Fijian view on the eve of independence was that their interests would
be secure only if Fijians had political paramountcy as well. As other
communities dominated the economy, Fijian leaders pointed out, it was
only fair that Fijians should dominate in government. Indo-Fijian leaders
agreed to the entrenched legislative protection of  Fijian land ownership,
culture and separate system of administration, but did not see the
paramountcy of Fijian interests as involving the perpetual re-election of a
predominantly Fijian government. If the democratic process gave them the
opportunity, Indo-Fijian leaders saw no reason why they should not vote in
a government in which they could participate. Differing interpretation of
the meaning of  Fijian paramountcy, then, was one contentious issue.
Another was the system of representation in parliament. From the
very beginning, the electoral system in Fiji had been communal. This
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arrangement grew out of  the colonial government’s view that separate
representation of different communities was natural and desirable. And
the system enabled the government to keep the communities apart as
much as possible, accentuating its own role as an impartial and
indispensable mediator. Until 1966, Fiji had only communal rolls, with
voters in each community electing members from that community. Later,
the communal rolls were complemented by cross-voting rolls, allowing
members belonging to the three main communities to be elected by all
voters. This system also represented a compromise between the Fijian
and European desire for communal representation and the Indo-Fijian
commitment to a non-racial common roll. The compromise spawned
more problems than it resolved.
The third feature of  Fiji’s political arrangement was that all parties
were essentially ethnic. The National Federation Party, formed in the
aftermath of  the strike in the sugar industry in 1960, was based in the
Indo-Fijian community, attracting only a handful of  Fijian supporters
despite its non-racial political platform. The Alliance Party, formed in
1966 at the behest of  Governor Sir Derek Jakeway, was a Fijian-
dominated party supported by the General Electors Association and the
Indian Alliance. The Alliance was more multiracial, but at each election
the predominant ethnic basis of  the two main parties was clear.
The final feature of  Fiji’s political arrangement was the Westminster
system, where the prime minister is the leader of the party or combination
of parties that commands majority support in the Lower House. The cabinet
is drawn exclusively from that coalition or party. Through its direction of
the departments and other government agencies, the government of the
day has effective control of  policy. If  the party in power is defeated in a
general election, control of  government passes to the winning party.
These arrangements were reflected in both the 1970 and the 1990
constitutions. At the beginning, there were hopes for the development
of  multiracial politics. In the 1972 elections, both the Alliance and the
National Federation Party made genuine attempts, with limited success,
to attract voters from all communities; but communal politics gained
the ascendancy. This was a logical consequence of  the constitutional
arrangement, combining the Westminster system with communal
representation. The communal system provided little incentive or
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opportunity for voters or candidates to concern themselves with the
problems of  other communities. It followed that those elected from the
national (cross-voting) seats were not regarded as really legitimate
representatives. Third, political parties focused their energy on the
community whose interests they were formed to promote. Those parties
that were originally committed to multiracialism were inevitably driven
back to promoting the interests of the community from which historically
they derived their support.
Because the parties drew their support mainly from one community,
government by one party was seen essentially as ethnic government.
The defeat in a general election of the governing party by another party
or coalition thus came to be seen as the defeat of one community by
another. In 1987, when the Alliance was defeated by the NFP-FLP
coalition, many Fijians thought that their community was defeated and
their sacred institutions imperilled. Because so much weight was placed
on political paramountcy, Fijians were unwilling to accept the outcome
of the election, and saw the defeat of their party as a breach of the
Indo-Fijians’ tacit acceptance of that principle. By contrast Indo-Fijians
saw no inconsistency in their recognition of the principle of Fijian
paramountcy, as they understood it, and seeking to become government.
The result was the military overthrow of the coalition government.
Yet the outcome of  the 1987 election was entirely consistent with
the nature of  the 1970 constitutional arrangements. No democratic
constitution could guarantee government to a particular party. Nor could
it possibly guarantee that the majority party would always represent a
particular ethnic community. The essence of  a democratic system is the
ability of elections to change the government, to maintain their
accountability and responsiveness to the people.
The 1990 constitution embodied what Fijians believed to be the
remedy for their predicament. That constitution was a drastic response
to a drastic situation. Its underlying assumption was if Fijians had more
than half  the seats, they could govern in perpetuity. An indigenous Fijian
party winning all 37 seats could form a government where splinter Fijian
parties would submerge their differences and come together in the
interests of the larger Fijian cause. And Rotumans and general electors
could be counted on for support. That was the hope, but in fact there
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was considerable divergence of interests across occupations and regions,
created by the effects of  the money economy, which no amount of
political engineering could hide. Even with weighted representation,
Fijians could not form government without the support of  independent
members and members of  another party. Nor was the governing coalition
able to maintain its unity in all circumstances, clearly seen in the defeat
of  the SVT-led coalition in November 1993.
The lesson was clear. First, the goal of  permanent Fijian political
unity was unrealistic and efforts to pursue it had a high cost for Fijians
themselves. Second, in the absence of  unity, even a constitution as
heavily weighted as the 1990 constitution could not prevent a minority
of  Fijians from joining with an Indo-Fijian party or parties to form a
government. Third, trying to keep a predominantly Fijian government in
office in perpetuity was not the best way to secure the paramountcy of
Fijian interests. In short, the assumptions that underpinned the 1990
constitution had proved untenable, indeed counterproductive. Fiji would
need a new course to move away from the cul-de-sac of  communal politics.
The commission was convinced after listening to submissions that
the people wanted all communities to play some part in the cabinet, and
that voters should be able to cast votes for at least some candidates
from communities other than their own. They disagreed on the means
of achieving that end and the pace that should be adopted in the direction
of  multiethnicity, but it was agreed that this broad goal was widely shared.
The commission agreed that progress towards the genuine sharing of
power was the only way to resolve some of  Fiji’s constitutional problems,
the only way to attain racial harmony, national unity and the social and
economic advancement of  all communities. Constitutional arrangements
that promote multiethnic government should be the primary goal.
Such arrangements, moreover, should protect the rights and interests
of  all citizens, particularly of  the indigenous communities. And they
should provide incentives to parties to strive for multiethnic cooperation,
and for the political process to move gradually but decisively away from
communal representation. The principle of Fijian paramountcy should
be recognised, as in the past, in its protective role, in securing effective
Fijian participation in a multiethnic government, and in securing the
fruits of  affirmative programs of  social and ethnic justice based on a
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distribution of resources broadly acceptable to all. Fijian interests should
not be subordinate to those of  other communities. Ultimately, however,
the best guarantee of the interests of all communities was a constitution
that gave all parties a strong inducement to view the important interests
of  each community as national interests.
This goal of an inclusive, democratic, open and free multiethnic
society is reflected in a number of  the commission’s early
recommendations. Fiji should be named The Republic of  the Fiji Islands,
which would give all Fiji citizens, if they wished, the opportunity of
calling themselves ‘Fiji Islanders’. The constitution should accord Fijian,
Hindi and English equal status and, wherever possible, offer services to
the public in all three languages. The preamble should be broadly
acceptable to all citizens, touching on the history of  Fiji’s multiethnic
society and its shared beliefs and values. Perhaps most important, the
values and principles which should be taken into account when forming
governments should be stated in a compact, an artefact of moral, as
distinct from legal, force.
These included respect for the rights of all individuals, communities
and groups, including those protecting the traditional ownership of Fijian
land and the observation of  lease arrangements between landlords and
tenants; the right to freely practice religion, language, culture and
traditions; the right of the indigenous communities to governance through
separate administrative systems; political freedom and full and equal
citizenship rights for all; respect for the democratic process; fair and
inclusive government and the need to negotiate in good faith to reach
agreement to resolve differences and conflicts of interests; recognition
of the principle of the paramountcy of Fijian interests as a protective
principle to ensure that the interests of the Fijian community are not
subordinated to those of  other communities; and the need for affirmative
action and social justice programs to secure equality of access to
opportunities, amenities and services for the Fijian and Rotuman people,
as well as other communities, and for all disadvantaged groups, to be
based on an allocation of resources broadly acceptable to all ethnic
communities.
These principles were given concrete constitutional form in the
commission’s recommendations on the structure of  government. They
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represented significant shifts from the 1990 and 1970 constitutions. To
begin with, the commission recommended that the Bose Levu Vakaturaga
should not only be recognised in the constitution (as in 1990), but that
its composition, powers and functions should be further specified. There
was widespread support for this view, reflecting the respect that institution
was accorded. Some Fijians wanted to return the Bose Levu Vakaturaga
to its original status, restricting membership predominantly to chiefs and
according a privileged role to the descendants of those who had ceded
Fiji to the United Kingdom.
The commission regarded that view as impracticable and anachronistic.
It recommended instead that the Bose Levu Vakaturaga should consist
of a mix of members nominated by the three confederacies and those
elected by the provinces, besides five ex-officio members including the
president, the heads of the three confederacies, and the minister for
Fijian affairs. The Bose Levu Vakaturaga should continue to be an
advisory body, though with the important functions of  nominating
candidates for the office of president, and exercising veto power over
amendments of the entrenched legislation relating to Fijians, Rotumans
and the Rabi Island community or any other legislation that the attorney
general certified as affecting Fijian land or customary rights. To exercise
its functions impartially, the Bose Levu Vakaturaga should be independent
not only from government but also from any political party. It should
have its own secretariat and relative financial autonomy as well as electing
its own chairperson. The Indo-Fijian community wanted a body similar
to the Bose Levu Vakaturaga for itself. The commission recognised the
need for such a body but felt that this was a matter for the Indo-Fijian
community to take up in the first instance. It could be conferred statutory
or constitutional status if it proved its utility as a representative body of
Indo-Fijian opinion.
The commission recommended the retention of the office of the
president, with much the same powers as the governor general in the
Westminster tradition. Executive power would rest with the cabinet,
and the president would be bound to act on the advice of  ministers. The
ceremonial role of the presidency would continue to be important, with
the incumbent expected to symbolise the unity of the nation, command
the loyalty and respect of all the communities and be impartial in the
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discharge of  duties. It would be clearly spelt out on which matters the
president could act in his or her ‘own deliberate judgment’, but these
instances would be within the bounds of the conventions of the
parliamentary system of government.
Most submissions agreed that the president should continue to be an
indigenous Fijian, an important recognition of Fijians as the indigenous
people of  the land, but they suggested that this be balanced by the
provision that there should be a non-Fijian vice president. The president
(and the vice president, who would be the president’s running mate as in
the United States) would be elected without debate by the Electoral
College, comprising both houses of parliament, from a list of three to
five names submitted by the Bose Levu Vakaturaga. A President’s Council
of 10–15 distinguished citizens from all ethnic communities and walks
of  life would provide their well-informed, non-partisan views on issues
of national importance, without in any way imposing constraints on the
actions of the cabinet.
The commission recommended the retention of the bicameral
Westminster system which had been in existence in Fiji for nearly 30
years, but suggested important changes in the composition of  the two
houses as well as the method of election. Both houses should be elected.
The Upper House, to be renamed Bose e Cake, should comprise 35
members, two each from the 14 Fijian provinces, one from Rotuma and
six appointed by the president on the advice of the Electoral Commission
to represent communities and groups unrepresented in parliament
(religious and cultural organisations, women, youth). The commission
recognised that members of all communities have a strong sense of
territorial identity through birth and residence as well as shared or
complementary interests.
In rural areas, most people were able to speak both Fijian and Hindi;
indeed, in several places, some Indo-Fijians indicated their desire to make
their submissions in the Fijian dialect of  the area. For these reasons, the
commission recommended that members representing the provinces in
the Bose e Cake be elected by voters from all communities resident in
the province, to strengthen the sense of common identification with the
province and their economic, and sometimes social, interdependence.
Provincial concerns would be articulated from provincial rather than
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racial perspective. In terms of  its powers and functions, the Bose e Cake
would be similar to a house of  review in the Westminster tradition.
The arrangements for electing members of the House of
Representatives understandably attracted the greatest attention nationally
and internationally. The commission approached the delicate issue with
certain objectives in mind: they should encourage multiethnic
governments; comply with international standards of equal suffrage; be
based on a more open system of representation, and provide a gradual
but decisive means of  moving away from the present arrangements.
Applying these criteria made it clear that communal representation was
anachronistic and generally contrary to international practice. A study
of  the voting systems of  150 of  the world’s 186 sovereign states by the
International Parliamentary Union in 1993 showed that in only 25 states
are some members elected or appointed to the legislature to represent
particular groups; but in each case, the proportion of special seats is
very small.
Many submissions supported the existing arrangements, and many
Fijians wanted to see them even more heavily weighted in favour of the
indigenous community. Equally, many submissions from all communities
wanted at least some seats to be filled on a non-racial basis. Many
advocated a return to the cross-voting seats under the 1970 constitution,
but that arrangement was fraught and only marginally successful in
bringing about more conciliatory politics. The commission recommended
that a 70-seat Lower House, to be called the Bose Lawa, made up of 45
seats elected from open constituencies (with no restriction of race for
voters or candidates) and 25 from reserved seats: Fijians (including Pacific
Islanders) 12; Indo-Fijians 10, general voters 2 and Rotumans 1.
Communal representation is not inconsistent with international
standards, especially if it operates within the framework of individual
choice and the principle of equal suffrage, but the commission saw the
reserved seats as a transitional measure. Hence any deviation from the
principle of equality could be accommodated within the ‘margin of
appreciation’ that international law allows to states in applying human
rights standards. The allocation of  reserved seats is broadly based on
population figures, taking account of historical and other factors that have
affected the present and past allocations of  communal seats. The point
charting a new course
147
was that the allocation should be seen to be fair. The 25 reserved seats
represented approximately 36 per cent of the seats in the Bose Lawa and
the open seats 64 per cent, the minimum necessary to allow them to spur
the development of  multiethnic politics. As a further incentive to the
emergence of multiethnic governments, the commission recommended
that 45 open seats should be elected from 15 three-member constituencies,
the boundaries drawn in such a way as to ensure that the constituencies
are heterogeneous while taking traditional criteria into account, such as
geographical features, administrative and recognised traditional areas,
means of communication and mobility of population. That is, they should
be composed of members of different communities to force political parties
to appeal for votes from communities other than their own. The chances
of candidates of a community-based party succeeding would depend on
the extent of  support from other communities. The level of  heterogeneity
would naturally vary, given the nature of  population distribution, but the
principle of multiethnicity should be borne in mind when drawing
constituency boundaries. The commission took as the measure of
heterogeneity the inclusion within the constituency of a mixed population
ranging from a more or less equal balance between Fijians and Indo-Fijians,
to a proportion as high as 85–95 per cent of  one community. The average
distribution was 60 per cent of one community and 40 per cent of the
other. The evidence before the commission suggested that it was entirely
possible to draw such boundaries.
The electoral system also plays an important role in promoting
multiethnic cooperation. Fiji, like most ex-British colonies, inherited the
British voting system at independence, best known as first-past-the-post,
in which the winning candidate is the one who gets the greatest number
of  votes. A logical system when the choice is only between two
candidates, first-past-the-post is widely considered unfair where there
are more than two candidates. It also denies voters the possible range of
preferences. Because of  the disadvantages of  plurality systems, various
modifications have been proposed over the years to ensure that a winning
candidate gets an absolute majority of votes cast. Several of these systems
were put forward to the commission for its consideration.
Acknowledging the critical role of  electoral systems in determining
political outcomes, the commission identified and ranked a number of
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criteria against which available options could be evaluated. These, in order
of importance, included the encouragement of multiethnic government;
recognition of the role of political parties; incentives offered for moderation
and cooperation across ethnic lines; effective representation of constituents;
effective voter participation; effective representation of minority and
special interest groups; fairness between political parties; effective
government; effective opposition; proven workability; and legitimacy.
All electoral systems met some of these criteria, and some more than
others. The single transferable vote, which was recommended by the
Street Commission in 1975, for example, mitigates against the winner-
takes-all outcome of the first-past-the-post, and achieved better
proportionality of  seats to votes. But by requiring an extremely low
threshold to get elected in a three member constituency, a successful
candidate would need no more than 25 per cent—and by privileging the
representation of  community interests, it failed to meet the commission’s
most important criteria: the promotion of  multiethnic governments. The
list system’s proportional representation allocates seats to parties in
proportion to the number of  votes cast for the party. While it had
considerable merit, its weakness was that by treating the whole country
or major region as a single constituency, it failed to provide links between
the voter and his or her member. It also provoked fears of  small parties
exercising disproportionate influence.
In the commission’s view, the alternative vote, also known as
preferential vote, best met all the criteria. The alternative vote is based
on the same principle as second ballots, but avoids the need for a second
election at a later date. It is in effect a refinement of the first-past-the-
post system in that it requires voters to rank candidates in order of
preference. To be elected, a candidate must have a majority of  the votes
cast, that is, 50 per cent plus 1. If no candidate reaches the threshold
when first preferences are counted, then second and third preferences
are counted and allocated. The process of elimination continues until
one of the candidates has obtained the required quota. The alternative
vote system provides incentive for vote pooling by requiring the winning
candidate to obtain more than 50 per cent. In heterogeneous
constituencies, this threshold increases the need for a candidate to have
multiethnic support. The system allows parties to trade preferences.
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Again, only moderate parties with conciliatory policies would agree
to trade preferences, and persuade their supporters to honour the
agreement. The system therefore encourages such parties. Constituents
are effectively represented at least insofar as candidates represent
territorial constituencies, and citizens are given considerable opportunity
to affect the outcome by expressing preferences. As a majoritarian, rather
than a proportional system, alternative vote is likely to encourage the
emergence of a strong party or pre-election government. The commission
recommended that the alternative vote system be used in multi-member
constituencies, but there was nothing to stop its use in single member
constituencies.1
The commission recommended the retention of  the Westminster
system. The people were familiar with its workings and conventions.
Nonetheless, its adversarial nature, pitting an ‘Indian’ opposition against
a ‘Fijian’ government, elicited comment in the submissions. The
commission noted that in Fiji, opposition criticism of a government
proposal, no matter how valid or rational, was often portrayed essentially
as Indo-Fijian criticism of  Fijian performance. People asked the
commission to suggest ways of  minimising the harmful effects of  this
aspect of  the Westminster system and to allow the house to use the
talents of  all its members.
Fortunately, Commonwealth countries, including New Zealand, have
devised such ways by setting up sector committees that permit all
members of the Lower House, except ministers or assistant ministers, to
take part in national decision-making. Sector committees are structured
in such a way that all departments and other government agencies come
within the supervision of  some committee. The commission
recommended that in addition to the existing Standing Committees (such
as the Standing Select Committee on Sugar and the Public Accounts
Committee), there should be five standing Select Committees, each
dealing with one sector: economic services, social services, natural
resources, foreign relations and administrative services. These committees
would scrutinise all areas of  government activity, and consider bills
referred to them by parliament. Their overall membership should reflect
the balance of the parties in the house, with the chair and the deputy
chair to come from opposite sides of the house. All these mechanisms
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are designed to achieve an open, representative, inclusive and multiethnic
government that protects the interests and addresses the concerns of all
communities and groups. That was the only way all the people of  Fiji
could aspire to realise a prosperous and united future.
While questions surrounding the election of parliament occupy centre
stage in any constitutional review, other areas impinge on the daily lives
of the people. These include provisions for the acquisition and deprivation
of  citizenship, fundamental freedoms and a Bill of  Rights, the
independence and functioning of  the judiciary, the enforcement of
accountability in the public sector, and equal access to state services.
Often in these areas, the commission was required not so much to
formulate new proposals as to modernise or revise the existing ones in
the light of  new international conventions and practices.
To illustrate, the 1990 constitution already had a Bill of  Rights, called
fundamental rights and freedoms, adapted with few changes from the
one present in the 1970 constitution. But the independence Bill of Rights
was in a form developed by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and
was included, with only slight variations, in the constitutions of most
former British colonies. It reflected British caution about including
individual rights in a judicially enforceable constitution. Individual rights
and freedoms were seen as already enshrined in common law. The
emphasis was not on affirming their existence but on protecting them
from unjustified interference by the state.
The commission recommended that in keeping with modern trends,
the constitution should affirm rights and freedoms in positive terms,
that these should be judicially enforceable, binding the legislative,
executive and judicial branches of government at all levels, and that
they should not conflict with international human rights standards but
rather give effect to them where appropriate. It recommended that a
three-member Human Rights Commission be created to educate the
public about the nature and purpose of the Bill of Rights, make
recommendations to government about matters affecting compliance
with human rights and exercising any other functions conferred by the
Act. The commission adopted a similar approach to citizenship. Fiji’s
existing citizenship laws reflect the thinking of an earlier generation and
were in some important respects archaic. The independence constitution
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and its 1990 counterpart allowed non-citizen women the automatic right
to acquire Fiji citizenship on marriage to a male citizen, but did not
accord the same privilege to non-citizen husbands. Most women’s groups
who made submissions were adamant that discrimination against women
and children had to go, and the commission agreed.
In the Westminster system, a vital corollary to the power of  politically
appointed ministers to direct government policy is the expectation that
the administration of  that policy will be carried out economically,
efficiently and effectively by politically impartial state services. Although
the objectives of  economy, efficiency and effectiveness in state services
had a long history in Fiji, they were never expressly required in the
constitution. Because they were fundamental to the functioning of all
state services, the commission felt that they should be reflected in a
constitutional provision. A related issue was the ‘fair treatment’ of each
community in the number and distribution of entry appointment. The
1970 constitution directed the Public Service Commission to ‘ensure
that, so far as possible, each community in Fiji receives fair treatment in
the number and distribution of offices to which candidates of that
community are appointed on entry’. The 1990 constitution compelled
the government to ensure that each level of each department comprised
not less than 50 per cent of Fijians and Rotumans, and not less than 40
per cent members of  other communities. But this quota was not observed,
nor was it possible to achieve it at every level within every department.
Indo-Fijians complained of a significant reduction in their numbers
in the state services, particularly at the senior levels. They expressed
concern at their falling representation in the police force and their almost
total absence from the armed forces. Whatever the reason—occupational
preferences, active discouragement, emigration—the complaint was
empirically well-founded. The commission concluded that while
efficiency, economy and effectiveness should be the principal objectives
in managing state services, some more appropriate account must be
taken of  the overall representation of  different ethnic groups.
To that end, the commission proposed a new general provision in the
constitution. In recruiting and promoting members of  all state services—
including the public service, the police force and the military forces—
and in the management of  those services, the following factors were to
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be taken into account: ensuring that government policies are be carried
out effectively; achieving efficiency and economy; making appointments
and promotions on the basis of merit; providing men and women and
members of all ethnic groups with adequate opportunities for training
and advancement; and all levels of  services broadly reflecting the ethnic
composition of the population, taking into account occupational
preferences.
Closely related to the provision of  state services was the issue of
ethnic and social justice. Section 21 of the 1990 constitution enjoined
the government to introduce affirmative action programs for the Fijian
and Rotuman communities, notably in the areas of education, commerce
and participation at the higher levels of  the public service. These policies
had an effect. In 1985, Fijians made up 46.4 per cent of established civil
servants, Indo-Fijians 48 per cent, and general voters and expatriates
5.6 per cent. The corresponding figures in October 1995 were Fijians
57.3 per cent, Indo-Fijians 38.6 per cent, and general voters and
expatriates 4.11 per cent. In 1995, of  the 31 permanent secretaries, 22
were Fijians, 6 were Indo-Fijians and 3 general voters. Indo-Fijians
accepted the principle of  affirmative action to redress imbalances, but
wanted to include disadvantaged members of all communities, not just
the indigenous people. Their submission drew attention to the growing
levels of poverty among sections of their people, and their growing
numbers in squatter settlements.
The commission agreed that the government needed to continue
implementing policies and programs to reduce inequalities between
different ethnic communities, but since there were areas in which other
communities were also disadvantaged, social inequalities should not be
neglected. It was recommended that a social justice and affirmative action
program be implemented for Rotumans and Fijians and other ethnic
communities, and for men as well as women. This program would ensure
effective equality of access to education and training, land and housing,
participation in commerce and all aspects of  service of  the state at all
levels, and other opportunities, amenities and services essential to an
adequate standard of  living. The program should be authorised by an
artefact (following parliamentary debate) which would specify the goals
of the program, identify the persons or groups it was intended to benefit,
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and outline the means by which those goals would be achieved, and
highlight performance measures and criteria for the selection of  the
members of the group entitled to participate. In short, it was the
commission’s view that, in order to be effective, affirmative action
policies should be transparent, properly debated and carefully monitored.
For state services and institutions to be effective and impartial, they
needed to be subject to strict rules of  accountability. The commission
received many submissions proposing constitutional provisions to prevent
official corruption and achieving higher ethical standards from those
holding important offices of state. They were not accusations against
ministers or state servants; they were about public confidence in
government and the integrity of  its leaders. Existing statutes, regulations
and orders contained ethical standards and rules which applied to state
servants, members and officers of  statutory bodies, but the commission
was convinced of  the need to go further. It therefore proposed an Integrity
Code for the president, the vice president, ministers and all members of
parliament, and all constitutional office holders. Such a code would
require them not to place themselves in positions where they could have
a conflict of interest, compromise the fair exercise of their public or
official functions and duties, use their offices for private gain, allow
their integrity to be called into question, endanger or diminish respect
for, or confidence in, the integrity of government, or demean their office
or position. These principles were to be enshrined in an Act of Parliament,
which would make detailed and specific provisions to deal with the
various kinds of  conflicts of  interest in Fiji’s particular circumstances.
The commission also recommended that the Office of Ombudsman be
strengthened, allowing it to investigate allegations of  corruption or
mismanagement of public office. In an important and innovative stand,
the commission recommended that a new Constitutional Offices
Commission be created; this body would directly appoint the Solicitor
General, the Director of Public Prosecutions, the Secretary General to
Parliament, the Supervisor of  Elections and the Commissioner of  Police,
and would put forth recommendations to the President on the
appointment of the Ombudsman and the Auditor General.
A future constitution, the commission felt, should be generally
acceptable to all citizens; guarantee the rights of individuals and groups
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and promote the rule of  law and the separation of  powers; recognise the
unique history and character of Fiji; encourage every community to regard
the major concerns of other communities as national concerns; recognise
the equal rights of all citizens; protect the vital interests and concerns
of the indigenous communities and all the other groups, within the
inclusive and overarching framework of  democracy.
Note
1 Subsequent experience shows that political parties, including the Labour Party, would
trade preferences with anyone in order to win, including their sworn opponents.
a time to change
155
7
A time to change
The 1990s was a decade of unexpected political change in Fiji,
confounding conventional wisdom about power sharing arrangements
in that troubled country. For the sheer momentum and unpredictability
of  events, it rivalled the 1960s, Fiji’s decade of  decolonisation—a time
of industrial strikes where violence was threatened, keenly contested
elections and by-elections, and tense conferences about which
constitutional systems suited Fiji’s multiethnic society. The 1990s, too,
Fiji’s decade of  progressive political democratisation, had its tension
and turbulence, false starts and extended detours as its people grappled
with the unsettling aftermath of  the coups and struggled to devise a
constitutional order suited to its situation.
The decade began on a divided note, as the architects of the coups
of 1987 attempted to frame a constitution to entrench Fijian political
control within a nominally democratic framework. That goal was
enshrined in an interim constitution promulgated on 25 July 1990.
Contested and opposed by Indo-Fijians and others marginalised by it,
and denounced by the international community, who were affronted by
its disregard for universal human rights conventions, the constitution
was reviewed by an independent commission five years later. The
commission recommended a more inclusive, non-racial system of
representation while protecting the legitimate interests and concerns of
the different communities. Two years later, most of  the commission’s
recommendations, except for the significant reversal of the proportion
of  open and reserved seats, were incorporated in a new constitution
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approved unanimously by parliament and blessed by the all-powerful
Great Council of  Chiefs. Within ten years, Fiji had travelled the gamut
from coup to constitutionalism like few other countries.
In May 1999, Fiji went to the polls under the revised constitution.
‘Fiji’s general elections now under way are expected to see the three-
party coalition led by outgoing prime minister Sitiveni Rabuka emerge
as the largest block in the new House of Representatives’, wrote one
respected observer after voting began, echoing virtually every observer
of the Fijian scene. The report went on: ‘The coalition conducted the
most coherent campaign, making the most of the advantages of
incumbency, and Rabuka was clearly the dominant figure in campaigning’
(Pacific Report, 10 May 1999).1 The Fiji voters delivered a dramatically
different verdict, electing by a landslide a newly formed, fractious,
‘People’s Coalition’ consisting of  the Fiji Labour Party, the Party of
National Unity (PANU) and the Fijian Association Party (FAP), with
Labour winning 37 of the 71 seats in the House of Representatives,
enough to govern alone. The other coalition of the Soqosoqo ni
Vakavulewa ni Taukei (SVT), the National Federation Party (NFP) and
the United General Party (UGP), suffered a massive defeat, with the
NFP losing every seat, and the SVT winning only 8. The shock caused
by this would be felt for a long time.
Ironies abounded. Against all odds and all expectations, an Indo-Fijian,
Mahendra Pal Chaudhry, was appointed prime minister, a prospect that
would have appeared implausible just a few days earlier. More baffling
still was that Chaudhry had formed a coalition with the Fijian Association,
whose overtures for political support to form a government in 1992 he
had rebuffed. Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara, whom Chaudhry had regarded as
the evil genius behind the country’s recent political troubles, was now
hailed as an ally, a statesman providing sage advice to an inexperienced,
hastily cobbled together administration representing divergent agendas
and speaking with discordant voices. On the other side of  the divide,
NFP’s Jai Ram Reddy had joined hands with SVT leader Rabuka whom
he had refused to support—but whom Chaudhry had supported—for
prime minister a few years back.
The two dominant figures of contemporary politics, widely praised
for their leadership in the constitution review, became generals without
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armies. Rabuka resigned from parliament to become (a commoner)
chairman of  the Great Council of  Chiefs and the Commonwealth
Secretary General’s peace envoy to Solomon Islands. From coup-maker
to international peace negotiator—it was a remarkable journey. For
Reddy, also widely respected for his contribution to the country’s healing,
the results were a fateful replay of  history. His party, under A.D. Patel,
had played a leading role in Fiji’s independence struggle but was consigned
to the wilderness of the opposition benches for a generation. Now once
again, he and his party were dealt a crushing blow and seemed destined
to be consigned to the political margins after helping deliver the best
constitution Fiji had ever had and laying the foundations of  a truly
multiracial democracy. Parties which had played a marginal or negligible
role in formulating the new constitution were now poised to enjoy its
benefits. The vanquished of  1987 had emerged victorious in 1999.
The conduct of  the campaign and its outcome were determined by
specific provisions of the new constitution. The first important feature
was the provision for electing members of parliament, in particular the
House of Representatives (the Senate being an appointed body). Of the
71 seats in the house, 46 are elected on a reserved, communal basis, with
23 contested by Fijian communal candidates, 19 by Indo-Fijians, 3 by
general electors and 1 by the Council of  Rotuma. For these seats, the
candidates, as well as the voters, belong to the same ethnic category. The
remaining 25 are open (common roll) seats, with ethnic restriction for
neither voters nor candidates. These open seats are an innovation for Fiji,
designed to lead gradually but decisively away from communal to non-
racial politics. Under the 1990 constitution, all seats were communally
reserved for the three ethnic communities (37 for Fijians, 27 for Indo-
Fijians, and 5 for general electors). The 1970 (independence) constitution
had a curious mixture of communal and cross-voting national seats where
the ethnicity of the candidates was specified but all voted for them. The
way in which the open seats were contested proved crucial to the outcome
in some constituencies and helped determine the overall result.
The 1997 constitution also provided for a new alternative, or
preferential, voting system, to replace the archaic first-past-the-post
system inherited at independence. The alternative voting system was
recommended by the Constitution Review Commission. The ballot paper
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required voters to vote either above the line, accepting the party’s
allocation of preferences, or below the line, where they could rank the
candidates themselves. Most voted above the line, and this had an
important bearing on the outcome of the election.
The third feature of the constitution which affected the outcome of
the election was the mandatory provision for power sharing, entitling any
political party with more than 10 per cent of seats in the lower house to a
place in cabinet (in proportion to its percentage of seats). The party with
the most number of seats provides the prime minister, who allocates
portfolios in cabinet. Because of this provision for a multiparty cabinet,
the parties in the winning People’s Coalition formed only a loose coalition
among themselves, leaving the details of power sharing and leadership to
be decided after the elections. This tactic gave them flexibility and internal
leverage. The NFP, SVT and UGP, on the other hand, formed a binding
pre-election coalition in a more conventional mould.
The campaign was the most relaxed in living memory. Trading
preferences with other parties dampened what would have been a fiery
campaign. For once, race was relegated to the background because both
coalitions were multiracial. The constitutional provision for mandatory
power sharing also made political parties wary of  being too aggressive
towards each other because of the possibility of working together in cabinet
later. The multiparty cabinet concept also erased the winner-takes-all
mentality. The long and difficult negotiations preceding the promulgation
of the new constitution had created goodwill and understanding and cross-
cultural friendship among candidates facing each other in the election.
The fact that the constitution had been approved unanimously by the
parliament, endorsed by the Great Council of  Chiefs and warmly welcomed
by the international community also had a calming effect.
The fear that rights of the indigenous Fijians could be eroded if a
non-Fijian ruled had often been used to mobilise opposition against that
prospect, as happened in 1987. People were generally ignorant—or
uninformed—about the way their rights and interests were protected in
the constitution. That was no longer true. The new constitution was
homegrown, devised in a transparent manner after wide consultation
and in full glare of  national publicity and international scrutiny. This
was not the case with the 1970 constitution, which was negotiated in
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secrecy, approved in London and never subjected to a vote. The 1990
constitution was also promulgated by presidential decree with no popular
participation.
For the first time, the legitimate needs and concerns of  all communities
were protected in a manner broadly acceptable them. The Great Council
of Chiefs, whose constitutional role was recognised, could veto legislation
that affected issues of concern to the Fijian people; it nominated both
the president and the vice president; the ownership of Fijian land
according to Fijian custom was recognised along with their and the
Rotuman people’s right to governance through separate administrative
system. The compact, a set of principles which all governments were
enjoined to observe, stipulated that where the interests of  the different
communities were in conflict, ‘the paramountcy of Fijian interests as a
protective principle continues to apply, so as to ensure that the interests
of the Fijian community are not subordinated to the interests of any
other community’. And all communities were assured that affirmative
action and social justice programs would be ‘based on an allocation of
resources broadly acceptable to all communities’. Clarifying the principles
and procedures of  governance helped greatly in allaying fears and doubts.
Political parties
Twenty-one political parties contested the 1999 election.2 Many were
obscure in origin and purpose and insignificant in their impact. If they
were known at all, this reflected their entertainment value rather than
their vision. Among these were the Natural Law Party, the Coalition of
Independent Nationals Party, the Viti Levu Dynamic Multiracial
Democratic Party, the Tawavanua Party, the National Democratic Party,
and the Farmers and General Workers Coalition Party. The main actors
were in the two coalitions, and in the Christian Democratic Alliance,
which emerged on the eve of the campaign.
The SVT/NFP/UGP coalition
This was a predictable coalition of three self-described mainstream
parties representing the three main ethnic communities, standing on the
basis of  a firm pre-election agreement about power sharing. The members
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of the coalition had worked together, and they promised to continue
their dialogue and consensus. Sitiveni Rabuka and Jai Ram Reddy, leading
the two main parties, had contributed significantly in securing the
approval of the new constitution in parliament. Rabuka had invited Reddy
to address the Great Council of Chiefs to ask for their blessing of the
constitution. The two had set up a joint parliamentary committee to
resolve the complex issue of expiring leases under the Agricultural
Landlord and Tenant Act (ALTA). Rabuka and Reddy, so different from
each other in training and temperament—one a soldier, open and intuitive,
the other a lawyer, reserved and cautious—enjoyed a remarkable personal
rapport, which they promised to translate into continuing cooperation.
Both leaders extolled the virtues of a pre-election coalition. Reddy
said that a coalition that shares common goals, ideas and policies is
more likely to succeed than a post-election multiparty government of
hitherto mutually hostile forces.
[Another] compelling case is the need to bring together the different racial groups
as partners in the electoral process in order to reduce communal tensions that have
historically characterised our elections of  the past. We want to put an end to the
long years of political rivalry between our different communities and usher in a new
era of political cooperation—consistent with the aims and objectives of the
constitution. The valuable experience we have acquired during the making of the
new constitution and the immense goodwill that has been shown by the Fijian
people can be made the basis for solving many of our difficult problems such as
ALTA, crime, unemployment, health and education. They cannot be solved through
confrontation but by working together (Daily Post, 26 March 1999).
The coalition agreement, signed by Rabuka, Reddy and UGP leader
David Pickering, provided that the leader of  the SVT, whoever it might
be, would be the coalition’s nominee for prime minister, while the NFP
leader would become deputy prime minister, with the UGP being
guaranteed a cabinet seat. Second, the parties agreed to share the 25
open seats, with SVT getting 14 and NFP 11. The two parties agreed to
give their first preference to each other’s designated candidates for the
open seats, and not field parallel candidates or support independents or
other candidates. The coalition would last until the next election, with
the parties working together as coalition partners even if one party won
enough seats to govern alone. Finally, the agreement provided for regular
consultations to develop policy or resolve difficulties, but agreed to
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‘respect particular party positions in agreed areas where special group
interests may be affected’.
This escape clause was necessary because there were areas where the
two parties had diametrically opposed positions. The privatisation of
public assets was one, and it highlights the difficulty for the coalition in
mounting an effective campaign as a unit. What one partner advertised
as a major achievement, the other saw as a public policy disaster. The
SVT government had sold 49 per cent of  Amalgamated Telecom Holdings
Limited for F$253 million to the Fiji National Provident Fund, and 51
per cent of the National Bank of Fiji to Colonial Mutual Insurance
Company for F$9.5 million, ostensibly to promote competition in the
private sector. It had also sold 17 per cent of  Air Pacific for F$26.8
million to foreign airlines ‘to strengthen the airline’s international network
and [increase] tourist arrivals’, and 51 per cent of the Government
Shipyard for F$3.2 million to improve its ‘competitiveness and [win]
international orders’ (Ministry of  National Planning Information 1998).
These sales, the government argued, would free up resources for growth
in the private sector and enable it to ‘focus more on improving the
efficiency of its operations in the priority sectors, i.e. core and essential
services’. The NFP, on other hand, opposed the privatisation of  state
enterprises that were yielding high returns or covered strategic resources,
such as the international airport and shipping facilities, or those that
were undertaken purely to fund recurrent fiscal deficits. It supported
only those privatisation efforts where the state had no legitimate
economic interests or the enterprises were unprofitable or relied on
permanent grants and subsidies. The People’s Coalition was unambiguous
in its opposition: ‘strategic utilities such as water, electricity,
telecommunication and civil aviation facilities must remain in public
hands as viable units’ (People’s Coalition campaign material).
Another issue dividing the parties was the status of state land. There
are two types of  state (formerly crown) land: Schedule A (52,513 ha)
refers to land owned by landowning mataqali deemed to have become
extinct by the time of Cession in 1874; Schedule B (43,113 ha) land
which was unoccupied and had no claimants when the Native Lands
Commission met. This land was managed by the state. In the early 1990s,
facing pressure from landless Fijians and with a view to gaining political
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mileage, the government devised a bill to return this land to Fijians and
provide for land-management to be transferred to the Native Land Trust
Board, which also managed native land on behalf  of  Fijian landlords.
The NFP criticised the government’s proposal. It also opposed the policy
of  purchasing freehold land and giving it to the Fijians. It had been
particularly vocal in denouncing the setting up of the Viti Corps, a
government initiative to provide agricultural training to Fijian youth on
a freehold property it had purchased for F$7 million. Other areas of
disagreement included strategies for creating employment, strengthening
economic growth and poverty alleviation.
The coalition agreement compromised both parties. The SVT could
not highlight its pro-Fijian policies for fear of alienating supporters of its
coalition partner, while the NFP had to soften its public opposition to the
government. They were caught on the horns of a dilemma. As ethnic
parties they were expected to champion the sectional interests of their
communities; and yet, as parties which had worked together to fashion a
new constitution and lay the foundations of a new multiracialism. They
could not afford to adopt an ‘ethnicist’ position which might have sharpened
their appeal among supporters because this would hurt the larger cause of
reconciliation. The two parties were not standing on the joint record; they
were standing on their promise to work together in future. It was a critical
distinction that was lost on the electorate.
The People’s coalition
The People’s coalition was the other main multiracial coalition. Unlike
the SVT/NFP/UGP coalition, it was loosely structured, and details of
the agreement and internal understandings about power sharing were
never released to the public. The coalition consisted of the Fiji Labour
Party, the Party of  National Unity and the Fijian Association. Each had
its own history and agenda, but they were united by one common,
overriding ambition: to remove Rabuka from power and (for Labour) to
supplant Reddy and the National Federation Party as the party of  the
Indo-Fijians.
The Fiji Labour Party was formed in 1985 as a multiracial party backed
by the powerful trade unions. Dr Timoci Bavadra, an indigenous Fijian
medical doctor, was its founding president and leader, with the powerful
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Fiji Public Servants Association leader Mahendra Chaudhry as its
mastermind and general secretary. Labour won the 1987 election in
coalition with the NFP, only to be deposed in a coup a month later. The
partnership did not last long, the rift erupting into a bitter disagreement
over participation in the 1992 election. NFP participated, while Labour
decided not to, until the last minute. Labour’s support for Sitiveni Rabuka
as prime minister following the 1992 elections, drove the two parties
further apart. Although they returned to make a joint submission to the
Constitution Review Commission, the rift was widening. By the mid
1990s, Labour was a shadow of its earlier self, with most of its founding
members having left for other parties, including many Fijians. By the
time of  the election, it had enticed some back. The FLP, although
supported predominantly by Indo-Fijians, had continued to field Fijian
candidates in previous elections. And it kept nurturing its support base
among workers and farmers and the trade unions.
The spectacularly misnamed western Viti Levu-based Party of
National Unity was the brainchild of  Apisai Tora, the quintessential
maverick of  Fiji politics. In a political career spanning nearly four decades,
Tora had been a member of  nearly every political party in Fiji, beginning
with the Western Democratic Party in 1964, progressing to the National
Democratic Party, the National Federation Party, the Alliance, the All
National Congress and the Fijian Association Party. He had been a
founding member of  the nationalist Taukei Movement, and an
enthusiastic supporter of  the coups. But throughout his tortuous—not
to say tortured—career, he had been a fierce champion of western Fijian
interests, which, he argued, had been neglected in a government
dominated by chiefs of  the eastern establishment. PANU was Tora’s
latest vehicle to redress the longstanding grievance of the western Fijians
and to secure them an appropriate place in the Fijian sun. All the nation’s
wealth-generating industries were concentrated in the west: sugar, tourism,
gold and pine as well as the international airport and the hydro-electric
power stations, Tora argued; and he wanted a commensurate share of
national power.
PANU had the blessing of  prominent western chiefs, including the Tui
Vuda—the paramount chief  of  western Fiji and vice president—Ratu
Josefa Iloilo, Tui Nawaka Ratu Apisai Naevo, Tui Sabeto Ratu Kaliova
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Mataitoga, Tui Vitogo Ratu Josefa Sovasova and Marama na Tui Ba Adi
Sainimili Cagilaba. The list was impressive, but the chiefs’ support did not
carry as much influence as before (see The Review, May 1998). Tora broached
the idea of a coalition with the SVT first, and wanted a seat-sharing
arrangement that would recognise and consolidate his influence in the
west. He was rebuffed by western Fijian members of  the SVT, especially
Isimeli Bose and Ratu Etuate Tavai. Tora, they felt, was a spent force, his
reputation for integrity and probity irreparably tainted by his impressive
record of  political bed-hopping. Moreover, the seat-sharing formula sought
by Tora would have ended SVT’s influence in western Viti Levu, a prospect
no serious party aspiring for national leadership could countenance. Tora
then turned to Labour, which responded favourably. It was a coalition of
convenience; Labour gave Tora a wider platform on which, relying on his
cunning, he no doubt hoped to enlarge with his own agenda. Tora promised
Labour western Fijian support and assistance in resolving the issue of the
expiring leases. The land issue was serious. On the eve of  the election, Ba
chiefs, who command the largest province, wanted 87 per cent of the
leases not to be renewed (34,634 out of  39,725 ha) and in Sabeto, Nawaka,
Nadi and Vuda, the chiefs wanted 92 per cent of  the leases not to be
renewed (12,728 out of  13,704 ha). Tora held—or seemed to hold—
powerful cards.
The Fijian Association was the third member of  the People’s Coalition.
It was formed in the early 1990s by Fijians opposed to Rabuka, ridiculing
his leadership and attacking his moral character. Its founder was Josefata
Kamikamica, an affable, mild-mannered but politically naive long-term
head of  the Native Land Trust Board and a member of  the Mara-led
post-coup Interim Administration (in which he had served as finance
minister). He unsuccessfully challenged Rabuka for prime minister in
1992, and failed to get elected in 1994 and in later by-elections. After
his death in 1998, the Fijian Association was led by Adi Kuini Bavadra
Speed, the remarried widow of the founding Labour leader and herself
one-time leader of the Fiji Labour Party and president of the All National
Congress. The party’s social philosophy was broadly similar to Labour’s.
In fact, nearly all its leading Fijian candidates were former members or
friends of  the Labour Party. But the party also contained a strange
assortment of political refugees from other parties, with their own agendas
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and ambitions, united by the overriding desire to see Rabuka defeated.
Sometimes the Fijian Association gave the impression of having a
‘schizophrenic personality’,3 of  saying one thing and doing another. One
of its parliamentarians, Viliame Cavubati, was standing for the SVT
while another, Dr Fereti Dewa, missed out on selection and launched a
scathing attack on the party leaders. Its parliamentary leader, the ever-
unpredictable Ratu Finau Mara, had left politics for a diplomatic career.
The People’s Coalition had few common understandings, which
invited attacks from the rival coalition. Who would lead the coalition if
it won? ‘The party with the most seats’, the People’s Coalition responded.
Would that leader be a Fijian? The answer was similarly vague. The
coalition had an equally flexible arrangement about allocating seats in
the open constituencies. In some constituencies, they supported a common
candidate, while elsewhere it fielded parallel candidates. Where it fielded
parallel candidates, the coalition partners were given their second
preference. This worked well for the most part, but created problems in
some places. PANU, for example, expected to be allowed to field
candidates in western constituencies with substantial Fijian population,
but Labour disagreed and fielded its own, poaching some of  Tora’s
prominent supporters and potential candidates, among them Ratu Tevita
Momoedonu. Tora’s own seat was contested by Labour, whose candidate
beat him. Outmaneouvred, Tora refused to attend any of  People’s
Coalition rallies. Towards the end of  the campaign, he became a vocal
critic of  the Labour Party, chiding Labour president Jokapeci Koroi for
not forgiving Rabuka for his past actions and accusing Chaudhry of
treachery (Fiji Times, 7 May 1999). Tora refused to give preferences to
his coalition partner, the Fijian Association Party, which had fielded
candidates against his own. But by then, he mattered little. For once, the
Machiavellian politician had been marginalised.
Veitokani Ni Lewenivanua Vakaristo/Christian Democratic
Alliance (VLV/CDA)
This party was launched on 27 March, on the eve of the election, by
various Fijians opposed to Sitiveni Rabuka and his government. Its
support came from three sources. First, there were those who opposed
the 1997 constitution. Rabuka and his party had ‘failed the Fijian people
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miserably’, 4 the VLV charged. Rabuka had given away too much; he had
‘exploited the indigenous Fijian institutions for his own glorification,
even to the extent of selling out on the rights and interests of Fijians’.
Unless the ‘core interests’ of the Fijians were addressed, there would be
no political stability in the country.
We remind the PM of  the VLV’s primary platform that unless there is stability in
the indigenous Fijian community, there will be no stability in this country in the
future. It will all be fruitless and a waste of effort for all who have been trying to
build and make Fiji a better place for all to live in.
In essence, they wanted to restore those provisions of the 1990
constitution that would have kept power in Fijian hands and supported
Fijian paramountcy.
Other members and supporters came from sections of the Methodist
Church, who wanted to turn Fiji into a Christian state (Daily Post, 31
March 1999). The very public blessing given to the party by the affable
but malleable president of  the Methodist Church, Reverend Tomasi
Kanailagi, and the presence within it of such fire-breathing figures as
former president Manasa Lasaro and Taniela Tabu, was powerfully
symbolic. These people wanted the Sunday ban reintroduced, which
reversed the stance the church had taken when Dr Ilaitia Tuwere was
president in the mid 1990s. Tuwere had argued that turning Fiji into a
Christian state would not ‘make it a better place for everyone to live in.
It will neither further the cause of Christianity not adequately meet the
present wish to safeguard Fijian interests and identity’. And attention to
‘man’s careless disregard of  the environment’ was ‘more urgent than
Sunday observance’ (Daily Post, 31 March 1999). Much depends on the
character and vision of the person at the helm of the church. Nonetheless,
religion is close to the heart of many Fijians, and most would not oppose
the Christian state proposal. But others wanted to manipulate this deep
religious attachment for their own ends.
The VLV claimed the support of ‘members of the chiefly
establishment’. To prove it, they made traditional approaches to Ratu Mara
(Tui Nayau) and Adi Lady Lala Mara (Tui Dreketi), as well as Tui Vuda
Ratu Josefa Iloilo. Most people believed that the president silently supported
the party and encouraged his former supporters to do likewise.5 Close
members of his own family were contesting the election on the VLV ticket,
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including his daughter and son-in-law, and Poseci Bune, who was expected
to ‘strengthen and consolidate the Mara/Ganilau dynasty’ (Daily Post, 29
March 1999). Fairly or unfairly, the president was accused of  harbouring
dynastic ambitions. Many Fijians remarked on Mara’s cool relations with
Rabuka, and his desire to see the prime minister defeated. Many founding
members of the Fijian Association were known to the president as members
of  the Diners Club formed in the early 1990s with whom he shared his
experiences and reflections on politics. Rabuka had defeated Lady Lala for
the presidency of  the SVT, which was not forgotten or forgiven. And
Rabuka’s claims, made before and during the election, that he had been
used to stage the coup, raised questions about who else was involved,
including members of the chiefly establishment which now supported the
VLV. Rabuka had said that he was the ‘fall guy’ who refused to fall. His
comment, in Lau of all places, that a commoner candidate could be more
accessible than a chiefly one, raised further questions about his loyalty to
chiefs (Daily Post, 7 May 1999). Mara’s relations with Rabuka, never warm,
had become decidedly chilly.
As the campaign proceeded, the VLV attempted to distance itself
from its more extreme positions, and proclaimed its commitment to
socially progressive policies. These included reorganising and restructuring
regional development, improving the ‘economic, social and human
conditions in the rural areas’ by assisting the provinces to implement
‘infrastructure plans and projects, industrial, business and commercial
plans and projects, agriculture, forestry and fisheries plans and projects,
and social/human development plans and projects’ (whatever these
phrases, allegedly written in New York by an expatriate former Fiji public
servant (Peter Halder), might mean), facilitating Fijian ownership of
business, industry and commerce in each province and assisting Fijian
landowners to ‘utilise their lands for their own economic development
and upliftment’ (The Review, 14 April 1999). Bune, an experienced civil
servant and former representative at the United Nations, got himself
elected as party leader over Ratu Epeli Ganilau, the army commander
who had resigned to contest the Lau open seat; but his elevation was
contested by powerful party insiders who questioned his background
and personal and moral credentials.6 Nonetheless, the VLV fielded some
well known and experienced candidates, including Ganilau and Adi Koila
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Mara Nailatikau, Fijian academic Asesela Ravuvu, trade unionist Salote
Qalo, and lawyers Kitione Vuataki and Naipote Vere.
Among the smaller Fijian parties, the Fijian Nationalist Vanua Tako
Lavo Party was the most prominent. Led by longtime Fijian nationalist
Sakiasi Butadroka, it was the latest reincarnation of the original Fijian
Nationalist Party founded in 1975 to keep ‘Fiji for the Fijians’. Twenty
years later, it had changed little, except in name. The party rejected the
1997 constitution as a sell-out of Fijian interests, and wanted Rabuka
punished for betraying the aims of  the coup, which, they said, was to
entrench Fijian political control. Its manifesto proclaimed that ‘in addition
to the normal guarantees for 75 per cent support from the Great Council
of Chiefs for amendments concerning the Fijian people, we will ensure
that 100 per cent support will be needed from all 14 Provincial Councils
before any changes can be made to the iron clad guarantees affecting the
Fijian people’. The name of the country would be changed from the Fiji
Islands to Fiji because ‘we want to be identified overseas as Fijians not
Fiji Islanders’ (Daily Post, 16 April 1999). The Fijian language would be
taught in all schools, crown land returned to the indigenous people, and
special bodies would be set up to exploit natural resources in the interest
of the Fijian people. Fine words, but the party was now a caricature of
its former self, not a force of  consequence. Some leading members (Isireli
Vuibau) had joined other parties, while ex-Taukei Movement member
Iliesa Duvuloco was embroiled in financial difficulties. After the
elections, Butadroka changed his trademark blood-red bow tie signifying
violence if  Indians ever challenged Fijian right to rule, to a black bow
tie, mourning the political loss ‘of the Fijian race’.
Issues
For the SVT/NFP/UGP coalition, the main question was which party
or coalition was best placed to provide political stability. Reddy spoke
for the coalition.
Experience around the world shows that political stability is a precondition for
economic and social progress. Without political stability we will not be able to achieve
anything. Political stability will lead to enlightened and progressive policies which, in
turn, will generate business confidence, investment, economic growth and, above all,
jobs for our unemployed (Reddy’s final campaign address, 3 May 1999).
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The NFP had always been the majority party of the Indo-Fijian
community, while the SVT ‘is without doubt the majority Fijian party
representing the widest cross-section of the Fijian community’, and the
UGP was the largest party of  the general electors. This coalition, he
said, broadly based, representative, and with a record of working together
was ‘best placed to provide that political stability which will form the
foundation for progress on economic and social issues’.
The SVT paraded its achievements, reminding Fijians of its pro-Fijian
activities: more scholarships for Fijians, financial assistance, the promise
to revert crown land to Fijian landowners. It reminded them of  the new
hospitals and health centres in Kadavu, Lami, Nabouwalu, Rabi and
Rakiraki; improvements in infrastructure, including better shipping
services to the islands under the Shipping Franchising Scheme; completion
of  major bridges; rural electrification; improved water supply in rural
areas; the poverty alleviation scheme (F$4.4 million per year); and better
housing for low income earners. But these achievements did not impress
the voters, who remembered the scandals that had brought the country
into disrepute and close to bankruptcy. There was widespread suspicion
that a well-connected few had done well, rather than the bulk of the
citizens. In western Viti Levu, opposition parties said publicly that their
region had been neglected, as in the past, and that the bulk of the
development projects had gone elsewhere.
The SVT claimed credit for ‘wide consultation in the comprehensive
review and promulgation of the new constitution, which laid the
foundation for a united, free and democratic multiracial Fiji’ (Soqosoqo
ni Vakavulewa ni Taukei campaign material). It claimed credit for Fiji’s
readmission to the Commonwealth, and for restoring Fiji’s link with the
British monarchy. The Fijian electorate was unmoved. Many thought
that the revised constitution had somehow whittled down the Fijian
position and deprived them of  rights. The government claimed credit
for establishing the ‘framework for a multiparty government’, when most
Fijians wanted a Fijian government, with some participation from the
other communities, not equal partnership. The opposition Fijian parties,




Rabuka’s firm and decisive leadership had indeed been instrumental
in negotiating the constitution. Even his closest colleagues in cabinet
had opposed the report of the Constitution Review Commission, and
had tried to have the constitution amended at the last minute. Eight of
the fourteen Fijian provinces had rejected the report. The hero of 1987
had become the villain of 1999, deserted by close supporters, friends
and high chiefs with agendas of their own. They all wanted him defeated.
The NFP presented Rabuka to sceptical Indo-Fijian audiences as the
leader best suited to take Fiji into the next millennium. Rabuka responded
by apologising for the pain the coup had caused the Indo-Fijian
community, and espoused an inclusive vision.
I believe we cannot build a nation by tearing people down. No matter how they
arrived in Fiji, they are a part of  Fiji society. This is their land to till and make
productive. We owe it to the indentured labourers, to cotton planters for what we
have now. Let us leave our differences aside, have common interests in our hearts to
build a beautiful Fiji (Speech in Labasa, 10 April 1999).
Rabuka appeared genuine in his contrition, but it came late, and in the
heat of  an election campaign it sounded expedient. As one observer put
it, ‘commitment to multiracialism and forgiveness for sins past’ sounded
all too vague. ‘It is feel-good politics that blisters under the blowtorch
of the Fijian Association Party-Labour call for new direction’ (Fiji Times,
3 May 1999).
The promulgation of the new constitution became the main campaign
platform for the NFP. Much had been achieved through dialogue and
discussion with a mainstream Fijian party, and it promised to continue
that approach. If the Indo-Fijian people wanted to resolve the land lease
issue, they could only do so with the support of the main party of the
Fijian people. It urged voters to take a longer-term view. Much had been
accomplished, but much remained to be done. The NFP praised Rabuka
as the man who had risked his political capital among his own people.
They acknowledged his past misdeeds, but as Reddy said, ‘this is the
same person who has shown, by leading the revision of the constitution,
that he believes in genuine multiracialism, not just in parliament but
more importantly in government’ (Reddy’s final campaign address, 3 May
1999). He continued,
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[w]e are not in a partnership with token Fijians and general voters, as in 1987, after
which the coups took place. These parties will have the full force of their racial
groups behind them. This coalition will have real political authority and social
backing to tackle the problems of  our country, for example crime and ALTA (Reddy’s
final campaign address, 3 May 1999).
NFP wanted to eschew the confrontational politics that had ‘only
result[ed] in misery for people’. Instead, they wanted to pursue
‘moderation, reconciliation and tolerance of all races, regions and cultures
that grace this beautiful country of ours’. Reddy reminded voters of his
party’s record in opposition: ‘The country knows that we have been in
the forefront of  bringing these issues (corruption, mismanagement of
the economy and inefficiencies) to the attention of the public, whenever
the need has arisen’. Nonetheless, as Stewart Firth remarked, ‘no answer
could explain to an average Indian the reason why NFP leader Jai Ram
Reddy formed a coalition with Sitiveni Rabuka’s party’ (Fiji Times, 18
May 1999).
The NFP heavily criticised Labour’s allocation of  preferences. In 22
seats, Labour gave its first or second preferences to the VLV, a party
whose policies Labour had characterised as ‘abhorrent, contrary to the
spirit of our constitution and against the interests of the Indian
community’ (Fiji Labour Party campaign material). The VLV would
reintroduce the Sunday ban, make Fiji a Christian state and change the
constitution. The NFP placed the VLV last, and despite its competition
with Labour it placed that party above the VLV ‘as a matter of principle
or morality’. For Labour, however, the election was not about principle
and morality: it was about winning. To that end, it put those parties last
that posed the greatest threat. Among these parties was the NFP, its
main rival in the Indian communal seats. Labour’s unorthodox tactic
breached the spirit and intention of the preferential system of voting,
where like-minded parties trade preferences among themselves and put
those they are morally at odds with last. Political expediency and cold-
blooded ruthlessness triumphed. Reddy was right about Labour’s motives
when he said that Labour wanted ‘to get rid of Rabuka and the SVT
[and Reddy and the NFP as well] at all cost’.
The constitution, by which the NFP had placed such store, was for
Labour an accomplished fact and a non-issue. It made no mention of it
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in the manifesto. When this issue was brought to the fore, Labour belittled
Rabuka’s and Reddy’s roles, saying that the constitution was the work
of the Constitution Review Commission and the Joint Parliamentary
Select Committee. In any case, why should Rabuka be praised for
rectifying a grievous mistake he had made in the first place. As Sir Vijay
Singh put, ‘in restoring the democratic constitution’, Rabuka ‘did the
Indians no favour’. He ‘restored what he had stolen in the first place. He
is deserving of  some mitigation. If  you were a criminal in court and you
did some right thing, the court will deal with you lightly but it won’t
reward you’ (Fijilive, 19 May 1999). It was a harsh, unforgiving judgment
on Rabuka, which did not take account of the fact that he had
accomplished despite the difficult circumstances and the powerful
opposition from within his own party. Moreover, Rabuka was not alone
in carrying out the coups. Some of  Sir Vijay’s own former colleagues in
the Alliance Party (and now Rabuka’s bitter opponents) had joined the
colonel in 1987 to overthrow the 1970 constitution. But these subtle
points did not register.
Labour reminded the electorate of  SVT’s sorry record in government,
and implicated the NFP in the mess, calling it the Rabuka-Reddy record.
Labour catalogued the ills of the SVT government: mismanagement of
public office, corruption at the top echelons of  government, alarming
crime rates, high unemployment levels, enforced redundancies in public
enterprises brought about by privatisation and corporatisation, the high
cost of living in an economy deep in recession with two consecutive years
of  negative growth, and dreadful infrastructure. This, Labour said, was
the true record of  the SVT government. The electorate understood. The
sight of redundant workers at Nadi airport while the election was in progress
reinforced the image of the government as uncaring and arrogant. The
NFP said little; for Labour the pictures of the redundant workers were a
godsend. ‘The NFP’, Labour president Koroi remarked, ‘has been an
ineffective opposition, frequently and actively supporting the repressive
measures of a government whose sole aim is to remain in power
permanently’ (Daily Post, 2 April 1999). The electorate believed her.
Labour also promised policies and initiatives of its own. It would
remove the 10 per cent value-added tax and customs duty from basic
food and educational items, review taxation on savings and raise
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allowances for dependents, provide social security for the aged and
destitute, and lower interest rates on housing loans. If  elected, Labour
promised to repeal legislation requiring farmers to pay back the F$27
million cash grant and crop rehabilitation loan made to drought-stricken
farmers in 1998; establish a Land Use Commission, in consultation with
landowners and tenants, to identify and access vacant lands; and oppose
privatisation of  strategic utilities such as water, electricity,
telecommunications and civil aviation. ‘We also believe that the overall
control of the exploitation of natural resources such as forestry and
fisheries must remain in state hands to maintain their sustainability. We
will, therefore, reverse all moves to restructure and privatise them’.
Labour’s partners broadly shared its policy platform, but their main
target was Rabuka. The Fijian establishment, in whose name he had
carried out the coup, jettisoned him as an ambitious commoner unfit to
govern, a man who had overreached his authority and station. He had to
be defeated almost at any cost. For Chaudhry, removing Reddy and his
party was a priority.
Results
Voting in Fiji was compulsory for the 428,000 registered voters, but
only 393,673 voted. Of the votes cast, 8 per cent were invalid. There
were roughly equal number of invalid votes among Fijians (8.7 per cent)
and Indo-Fijians (8.5 per cent). The percentage of Fijians not voting
was slightly higher (10.9 per cent) than among Indo-Fijians (7.5 per cent).
The Labour Party won 37 of the 71 seats in the House of Representatives,
and thus was entitled to form a government in its own right. Its coalition
partner, the Fijian Association Party, won 11, PANU 4 and the Christian
Democrats 3. The UGP won 2 seats, the SVT 8 and the NFP failed to
win a seat. Fijian Nationalists won 2 seats and independents 4.
The Indian communal seats saw a two-way contest between Labour
and the NFP. Labour won 108,743 of  the 165,886 Indian communal
votes cast (65.6 per cent of first preference votes) and the NFP 53,071
(32 per cent). Independents and other parties got 4,030 (2.4 per cent).
Labour fared well in rural and urban constituencies, its electoral
dominance evenly spread. Among the Fijian parties contesting the
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communal seats, the SVT won 68,114 or 38 per cent of (first preference)
Fijian votes, VLV 34,758 (19.4 per cent), Fijian Association Party 32,394
(18 per cent), PANU 17,149 (9.6 per cent), independents 7,335 (4.1 per
cent), Nationalist Vanua Tako Lavo Party 16,353 (9.1 per cent) and
Labour 3,590 (2 per cent). Labour’s poor performance among Fijians
should be seen in context. Although it fielded some Fijian candidates,
Labour left Fijian constituencies largely to its Fijian partners. When the
votes in the open seats are taken into account, there is evidence of large
Fijian support for the party. There, of  the 360,085 valid votes cast—
428,146 were registered of whom 393,673 voted—Labour won 33.3
per cent of the votes, SVT 21 per cent, VLV 9.8 per cent, NFP 14.4 per
cent, Nationalists 4.2 per cent, Fijian Association Party, 10.8 per cent,
independents 2.1 per cent, United General Party 1.3 per cent and PANU
2.7 per cent.
Among general voters, 11,981 voted from a total of 14,029. That is,
14.6 per cent did not vote and of those who did, 8.2 per cent were
invalid. The United General Party won 5,388 votes (49 per cent), Fijian
Association Party 1,052 (9.6 per cent), independents 3,346 (30.4 per
cent) and the Coalition of Independent Parties 1,156 (10 per cent). The
strong support for independents centered on personalities (Leo Smith
and Bill Aull who were prominent sitting parliamentarians).
Why the massive swing to Labour? The NFP argued that Indo-Fijian
voters had taken revenge for the coups, that its pre-election coalition
with Rabuka cost them the election. If NFP had not allied itself with
the SVT and not revealed its hand, it would not have carried SVT’s
baggage. It would then have been able to mount an effective campaign
in its traditional constituency and win enough seats to become a player
in parliament. There is a grain of  truth in this assertion. Certainly Labour
advertised its campaign as a continuation of  a brutally interrupted
experiment of  1987, with Dr Timoci Bavadra’s official portrait adorning
many a campaign shed in western Viti Levu. Rabuka’s public apologies
unwittingly revived memories of  disrupted careers, lost incomes and
broken lives.7 The NFP’s pre-election coalition may have cost it votes,
but would an alternative strategy have made much difference?
The answer is not at all clear. In the public mind, Reddy was already
hitched to Rabuka through the constitutional review, and any attempt
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by the two leaders to distance themselves from each other, after having
worked so closely for so long, would have been counterproductive to
the purported aims of moderation and reconciliation they espoused. If
Reddy had publicly distanced himself from Rabuka, Labour would not
have let the matter rest. They would have prodded and provoked and
demanded to know why Reddy was not with the SVT leader. On the
other side, the Fijian nationalists, unhappy with the new constitution,
would have accused Reddy of  treachery, and of  using Rabuka and the
Great Council of Chiefs to amend the constitution to suit the interests
of  his own community. The Fijian supporters of  the SVT would have
felt used and discarded.
Reddy argued that his party had taken the correct decision to ally
with the SVT. The coalition, he said, was based on fundamental principles.
You don’t abandon your coalition partners because they have done something
wrong or they may be suddenly becoming unpopular. But I didn’t see it that way.
I saw the SVT as the mainstream Fijian party. They were founded by the chiefs.
They seemed to have the support of the Fijian people. The important thing is that
all these things we did with the utmost good faith. We did it because we believed in
something. We believed that Indian and Fijian people and everybody else must be
brought together in government (The Review, June 1999).
He had been honest with the electorate. His coalition decision was not
‘a grievous error of  principle as well as strategy’, as some commentators
noted, but a principled and courageous one.8
The NFP’s problem was not so much in the message as in its failure
to take it effectively to the voters. In hindsight, its focus on the
constitution—great achievement that it was—to the virtual exclusion
of any other issue was probably a mistake. Selling an untested
constitution, however good, to a sceptical, suffering electorate was not
the same as criticising a demonstrably flawed one, as it had done
successfully in 1992 and 1994. The fact that it could not use its solid
performance as an opposition party, now that it was in partnership with
the party in government, weakened its campaign. In short, the NFP was
caught in a trap. A frontal attack on the SVT would have polarised the
main communities, revived old hostilities and taken the country back to
the tired politics of  ethnic confrontation. By holding fire on the SVT,
the NFP opened itself to the charge of complicity and collaboration.
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Labour’s message was sharper and more effective, its criticism of
government relentless. Its focus on the bread and butter issues of
employment, better health, social welfare and accountable government
sat well with the electorate. Moreover, it had an extensive network to
communicate that message. The Fiji Public Service Association, of  which
Mahendra Chaudhry was the head, covered the public sector unions.
The National Farmers’ Union, of  which Chaudhry again was the head,
galvanised the farming community. And the Fiji Teachers’ Union, headed
by Pratap Chand, a Labour candidate, reached out to primary and
secondary teachers who play a pivotal social role in the community. They
shape opinion and influence events. Farmers, workers and teachers were
thus covered. The NFP’s structure was less focused. Its once powerful
working committees had become moribund, its decision-making and
consultative function taken over by the Management Board. This change
made the party more businesslike, but damaged its links to the grassroots.
Labour appealed to people who were desperate, direct victims of
government policies—400 redundant employees at the Civil Aviation
Authority, 15,000 garment factory workers and their families, squatters
and residents of low-cost Housing Authority flats, people threatened with
job losses at the Fiji Electricity Authority, Telecom Fiji, the Fiji Sugar
Corporation and in the public service, already reeling from the 20 per cent
devaluation of  the Fijian dollar. NFP’s appeal was less focused. The Indo-
Fijian community, whose interests it sought to protect, was increasingly
divided in its aspirations. The middle class, a constituency traditionally
receptive to its message of gradual progressive change and with a keen
eye on the long term, had been declining through migration. Many had left
since the coups while Labour’s base of  workers, farmers and teachers
remained intact. For them, the immediate social and economic concerns
were more important than saving for a rainy day. As one observer put it,
the ‘NFP’s achievements on the constitution and talk of  racial harmony
were abstract issues while Labour promised tangible gains’ (The Review,
June 1999). Such ‘tangible gains’ included reducing prices, increasing
exports and creating jobs. The NFP was perceived as a rich person’s party,
not caring about the concerns of ordinary people.9
In the sugar belt, the heartland of  the Indo-Fijian community, Labour
outmanoeuvred the NFP. The National Farmers’ Union had displaced
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the NFP-backed Fiji Cane Growers’ Association as the most effective
voice of  the farmers. Ironically, it was the NFP which had paved the
way for Chaudhry’s entry into sugar politics after the coups, handing
over to him a constituency that had long been the party’s own but which
Chaudhry would convert into his own solid base. To the drought-stricken
farmers, Labour promised relief  and concrete proposals: addressing the
problem of milling inefficiencies, improving the transportation system,
exploring diversification into agro-based industries, and writing off the
F$27 million crop rehabilitation loan. Labour told the farmers that Reddy
had opposed the cash grant, which patently misrepresented his position.
The NFP cried foul, but the damage was done. The sugar belt turned to
Labour as never before.
Rabuka’s defeat was caused by several factors. His government’s
scandal-ridden performance was one. For many ordinary Fijians, life had
not improved much since the coups. As Tamarisi Digitaki put it, at the
grassroots level
[t]he standards of  living have remained largely unchanged from ten years ago.
While his [Rabuka’s] government’s performance on the national and international
fronts has been commendable, it is in the rural areas that the goods have failed to
be delivered. Poor roads, water supply, communication services, education facilities
and shipping services to the islands only give rural people more reason to vote the
government out of  office (The Review, February 1998).
Rabuka conceded that the complacency of his parliamentarians and a
dormant party structure cost him votes, saying that ‘while party leaders
were busy resolving national issues, no one was really looking into bread
and butter issues affecting its supporters’ (The Review, June 1999). Labour
and its partners capitalised on this disenchantment affecting rural Fiji.
Rabuka’s pursuit of  moderate, conciliatory politics was always going
to risk being outflanked by more extremist parties. Parties that court
moderation in an ethnically divided society tempt fate. Rabuka was
accused of selling out Fijian interests, just as Reddy was accused of
playing second fiddle to the Fijians. Further, Rabuka was not fully in
command of  his party. The 23 Fijian seats are contested on provincial
lines, and candidates are selected in consultation with provincial councils.
In some cases, candidates preferred by the party were overruled by the
provincial councils, an example being the replacement of the highly
islands of turmoil
178
regarded Education Minister Taufa Vakatale by Jone Kauvesi for the
Lomaiviti Fijian seat. Provincial concerns take priority over party
interests. These problems of  divided loyalties are set to plague Fijian
politics as long as elections are fought from within provincial boundaries.
The political fragmentation of Fijian society distressed many Fijians,
and Rabuka regarded this as a major cause of his defeat. ‘Gone are the
days when Fijians worked in accordance with what was required of them
from their elders. Now when an order is given from an elder, they are
asked to give the reason and if they are satisfied, then they can act’
(Daily Post, 27 March 1999). He was referring to the influence of
urbanisation, multiracial education and the challenges and opportunities
of  a multiethnic society. The use of  the provincial boundaries for electing
members to parliament accentuated provincial rivalries and sentiments,
to the detriment of  a centralised party structure. The decline in the
number of Indo-Fijians through emigration and a lower birth rate diluted
the fear of Indian dominance, which had long unified politics in Fiji.
Finally, the absence from the national stage of  strong and powerful
chiefs—a Ratu Mara or Ratu Penaia or Ratu George and Ratu Edward
Cakobau—opened up opportunities for others. It is unlikely that Fijian
society will see the likes of these on the national stage in the near future.
The race to be prime minister
As the count proceeded and a change of  government appeared likely,
most people wondered what Rabuka’s next move might be. The SVT
leader conceded defeat with exemplary grace and dignity. His words are
worth recalling not only because of their symbolic importance but also
as a measure of the man Rabuka had become. The people of Fiji had
demonstrated to themselves and ‘to the watching world that we have
embraced democracy fully by the way the election was held and by the
very nature of  the result’. He congratulated the Labour Party, and told
his supporters: ‘Take heart that we have fought the good fight. We have
given all that we could. Let us now, without rancour and bitterness or
any sort of division, congratulate our fellow citizens who have won the
day’. Rabuka lamented the apparent block voting by the Indo-Fijian
community, but urged the new government to ‘govern us all’. He would
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lend support when necessary, promising to be ‘vigilant to ensure a just,
accountable and honest government’. He urged the people ‘to move to
the centre ground, the middle ground’, to ‘genuinely come together to
work for the common good of all our people’. It would be a terrible
tragedy to ‘dismantle the progress that we have made together’. Rabuka
thanked Reddy for his support. Reddy knew the risks he was taking in
coalescing with his party, but as leader with ‘deep conviction and strong
principles, he courageously stuck to our agreement and it has cost him
and his party dearly’. Not all was lost. ‘I now give my assurances to him
and his loyal supporters that their sacrifice and contribution in helping
to lay the framework for lasting national unity, stability and progress in
our country has not been in vain’.
To the Fijian people, he said,
[w]e must find a way to come together to allow our collective voice to be heard. And
to be a force in shaping the future of  our country. We have allowed ourselves to
splinter into different groups working against our common interest. We know the
wise words that a house divided amongst themselves cannot stand. We have a lot
of houses, our collective yavu and vanua have become divided. And the result is our
voice in Government has been diminished (Rabuka, unpublished speech).
Rabuka promised to keep a watchful eye on the government, but
before parliament met, he resigned his seat. In a stunning move, Rabuka
was then elected chair of the Great Council of Chiefs by polling—the
first time in history that chiefs had used secret ballot—32 votes to Tui
Vuda Ratu Josefa Iloilo’s 18. Rabuka described his victory as ‘a sign of
the chiefly support I have’ (Daily Post, June 1999). His name was moved
by Adi Litia Cakobau from the leading chiefly family of the Kubuna
confederacy and seconded by Ratu Tevita Vakalalabure, the Vunivalu
of Natewa.
Labour’s victory put Chaudhry in the driver’s seat. Within hours of
the election results becoming known, Chaudhry convened his Labour
parliamentary caucus, which elected him as the party’s nominee for prime
minister. Soon afterwards, he was appointed prime minister by Ratu Mara.
Chaudhry’s other coalition partners were not consulted or informed, and
they reacted angrily, claiming that Chaudhry’s appointment was a breach
of  an implicit agreement to have an ethnic Fijian as prime minister. Adi
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Kuini Bavadra Speed, the Fijian Association leader, asked Mara, through
Ratu Viliame Dreunimisimisi, to revoke his decision and appoint her as
head of government, because she was the leader of the largest ‘Fijian’
party in the winning coalition. Poseci Bune, the VLV leader, began
canvassing the possibility of heading a broad coalition of Fijian parties
in opposition. Tora threatened to pull out of  the coalition altogether.
The Fijian Nationalists proposed to march against the government.
Nothing happened. Chaudhry offered Speed the post of deputy prime
minister, which she accepted after Mara asked her to support Chaudhry,
and after Labour threatened to invite VLV into cabinet. Speed
capitulated, quoting Mara’s advice: ‘It was basically appealing to us as
leaders to consider the importance of cooperation rather [than] be at
loggerheads with the new government’ (Fijilive, 19 May 1999). Speed
had been outmanoeuvred. She could sit on the opposition benches with
Rabuka, possibly as leader of the opposition, or become deputy prime
minister. She chose the latter. Speed also opposed the VLV’s inclusion
in the cabinet, but was overridden. It was widely believed, but difficult
to prove, that Mara wanted Bune and Adi Koila Nailatikau in the cabinet:
that might have been the condition of  his surprisingly warm public
support for Chaudhry. Be that as it may, both were offered and both
accepted cabinet posts, as did members of  PANU, despite Tora’s
objections. Later, Chaudhry praised Mara for his critical role in getting
the Fijian dissidents to support his government. In truth, Mara did what
the constitution obliged him to do: to appoint as prime minister the
member of  the House of  Representative who, in his opinion, commanded
majority support. Chaudhry’s numbers bolstered his position—he was
unassailable; he could govern on his own. But a confluence of interests
brought Mara and Chaudhry together. The eastern chiefly establishment
had felt ignored by the Rabuka administration; it was now in a position
to be represented in cabinet. Mara’s waning influence was also
reinvigorated. For Chaudhry, the presence of  the president’s daughter in
cabinet, and Mara’s public support for his government, shored up Labour’s
credibility among Fijians who might otherwise have distrusted an Indo-
Fijian prime minister. Dislike of  Rabuka brought the men together—my
enemy’s enemy is my friend.
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In his first broadcast as prime minister, Chaudhry was at pains to
emphasise his government’s broad non-racial appeal. He stressed
repeatedly that he was prime minister ‘not for any[one] community’ but
‘for everybody’. He pledged his commitment ‘to complying with the
requirements of the constitution for the equitable participation of all
communities in government’, promising to ‘ensure that all communities
fully benefit from the nation’s economic development’. He would be
‘guided by the wisdom and counsel [of the Great Council of Chiefs] on
all matters affecting the interests and welfare of indigenous Fijians and
Rotumans’. The business community too had nothing to fear. ‘In working
to uplift the conditions of life of the poor, the workers, and the less
privileged in our society we are not being anti-business. We’re just being
pro-people’. His government believed in development with justice. ‘But
we are equally committed to laying down economic policies that will
encourage investors and business to grow’ (Chaudhry, Address to the
Nation, 19 May 1999).
Chaudhry acted astutely in forming his cabinet. Eleven of  the
seventeen ministers were ethnic Fijians, a gesture of reassurance to the
Fijians that their interests were adequately protected. However, he
himself controlled the key portfolios of finance, public enterprises, sugar
industry and information. His Labour ministers controlled foreign affairs,
education, labour and industrial relations, commerce, business
development and investment, national planning, local government,
housing and environment, justice, regional development and multiethnic
affairs and women, culture and social welfare. Chaudhry knew that his
success at the next election would depend on his handling of the domestic
social and economic agenda. People reacted cautiously and approvingly,
though some Fijian nationalists, as well as a few defeated SVT
parliamentarians, wanted to oust Labour from power immediately (Daily
Post, 28 May 1999). Rabuka was approached by people within his own
party, including former senior ministers, to lead a 1987-style coup, but
he rejected their overtures outright (Personal communication with
Rabuka). Things had changed, he said; the majority of the Fijian people
had rejected the SVT, and the overwhelming sentiment in the country
was to give the new government a chance to prove its mettle. ‘Fijians
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would not be fooled again’, a searching editorial in a Fijian weekly wrote.
It was typical of  the reaction throughout the country.
Sakiasi Butadroka and supporters of  the Nationalist Vanua Tako Lavo Party are being
mischievous and misleading in trying to scare the Fijians into believing the Indians
have taken over Fiji…Buta is saying Ratu Mara and Mahendra Chaudhry are selling
the rights of the indigenous Fijians. But we all know that no one on their own can sell
the rights of the Fijians. No one who is not a Fijian, even if he or she is head of the
government, can remove the rights of Fijians to their land and resources. This will
only happen if  the Fijians themselves agree to it (Volasiga, 31–6 June 1999).
The editorial then drew attention to the problems facing the Fijian
people, which, it added, had little to do with other groups. ‘When we
look at our schools and their academic results, we see it is mainly the
Fijians who are failing their exams. That’s because there are weaknesses
in our family life and within Fijian society’. The majority of those breaking
the laws were Fijians. The biggest victims of  sexually transmitted diseases
were Fijians. Teenage pregnancies and single mothers were
disproportionately Fijians. ‘Who then is Butadroka fooling in Fiji. We
are trying to catch up on the difficulties in life we are now facing and to
reverse the general opinion that we are lagging behind’. To many Fijians,
then, Chaudhry was not an adversary but an ally. It was their own leaders,
drunk on power and dulled into complacency, who had deserted them
Parliament opened on 15 June. In his opening address, the president
outlined the government’s policies for its first term. The government’s
‘two crucial and central challenges’ were to ‘further strengthen the bonds
of unity in our multiethnic and multicultural society’ and to ‘promote
economic growth and social progress’. These challenges, Mara said in a
televised speech,
…are to be undertaken with a strong sense of social justice to ensure that
development benefits all in our society, including the poor, the disadvantaged and
all those who, through no fault of  their own, need the helping hand of  the state.
Government will implement affirmative action and social justice programmes to
secure for all citizens and communities equal and equitable access to opportunities,
amenities and services to better their lives.
Over the next year or so, the Chaudhry government had its hands full,
attempting, albeit not always successfully, to deliver on its large, uncosted
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promises or explaining why it could not, at least for the time being.
Chaudhry made a concerted effort to assure the Fijian community
that he would not undermine their interests. Soon after the election, he
addressed the Bose Levu Vakaturaga, only the second Indo-Fijian leader
(after Jai Ram Reddy) to do so, seeking their blessing and expressing his
gratitude ‘for their immense contribution in laying the foundation for
freedom, democracy, unity and development in our country’ (Ministry
of  Information Press Release, 8 June 1999). His government agreed to
honour a request by the BLV to transfer all state Schedule A and Schedule
B to the Native Land Trust Board. The decision was widely praised in
the Fijian community. The government also pledged to continue the
special annual education fund of F$4.5 million for Fijian education, and
initiated programs to ensure that people on remote islands ‘are not denied
the benefits of development’.
But it was not all plain sailing. Chaudhry’s own transition from a trade
union leader to a national leader was rocky, leading to confrontation
with the media. His cabinet was weak and inexperienced and often spoke
with discordant voices. Deputy prime minister Adi Kuini Speed’s ill-
judged remarks during her maiden speech, that people should pray for
Chaudhry’s conversion to Christianity, embarrassed the government. Adi
Kuini’s decision to make Navosa, where she was a high chief, a separate
province was rejected by Chaudhry who told her to ‘focus on issues
which would bring Fijians together and not disunite them’ (Fiji Times, 4
June 1999). Adi Kuini was seen by some as a loose cannon—erratic and
autocratic—but she was not the only one in cabinet who harboured
personal ambition. Others also saw Chaudhry as a vehicle for their own
agendas. The opposition benches, occupied entirely by Fijians and general
electors, promised to play rough and hard, adopting expediently extremist
positions to sabotage government initiatives, especially in the eyes of
the Fijians whose support they needed to recover.
Meanwhile, away from the public gaze, disgruntled groups began to





1 These words are from the Pacific Report, but they are echoed in most reports on the
election.
2 These were the Fiji Labour Party, National Democratic Party, National Federation Party,
the Soqosoqo ni Vakavulewa ni Taukei, Fijian Association Party, General Voters Party,
General Electors Party, Vanua Tako Lavo Party, Vitilevu Dynamic Multiracial Party, Party
of  National Unity, Veitokani ni Lewenivanua Vakaristo Party, United National Labour
Party, Party of  Truth, Natural Law Party, Coalition of  Independent Nationals Party,
Nationalist Vanua Tako Lavo Party, Farmers and General Workers Coalition Party, and
Lio On Famor Rotuma Party.
3 I owe this description to Robert Norton.
4 All the quotations come from the Party’s campaign literature.
5 When Ratu Mara was confronted with this allegation, he said his ‘conscience was clear’.
6 Among them was Colonel Inoke Luveni and Manasa Lasaro. They argued that Bune
did not meet any of  the criteria the party had laid down for leadership. These stipulated
that the leader must come from a chiefly family and should be the offspring of a
marriage, must not be divorced or separated from his wife and have a stable and happy
family, not have ‘produced children’ outside of  marriage, be a Christian and a regular
churchgoer, and must believe that Fiji should become a Christian state and that the
Sunday Ban be reimposed (see Daily Post, 21 April 1999).
7 Rabuka offered the first of many apologies at his coalition rally in Lautoka on 26 April
1999. At that meeting, he also said he was ‘supposed to be the ‘fall guy’ but I’d like to
tell them that I am the fall guy that refuses to fall’. His implication was that others high
in the Fijian hierarchy were involved in the coups.
8 Among those who saw the coalition as an error was Sir Vijay Singh (see Fiji Times, 18
May 1999).
9 Reddy acknowledged this perception in his first post-coup press conference, but he saw
this ‘partly [as] the result of very successful propaganda’, noting that in recent years, his





Around 10am on 19 May 2000, seven armed gunmen, led by George
Speight, stormed the Fiji parliament taking Prime Minister Mahendra
Chaudhry and his ill-fated government hostage. May 19 marked the
government’s first anniversary in office. The seizure of  parliament followed
a series of  protest marches by a variety of  aggrieved Fijian nationalist
groups and defeated politicians opposed to the People’s Coalition
government and committed to its overthrow. Still, the hostage crisis seemed
improbable. Speight, a part-Fijian failed businessmen, due to be arraigned
in court on a bankruptcy charge, was a little-known player on the local
scene. And, unlike 1987, no recognisable group or institution claimed
immediate responsibility for the deed, including the recently revived Taukei
Movement headed by the perennial dissident Mohammed Apisai Tora. In
1987, the Royal Fiji Military Forces, under then Lt Col. Sitiveni Rabuka,
took responsibility for the coup and was, in turn, held accountable for it.
A case could be made that the 1987 coup was carried out on behalf of,
and blessed by, the Fijian establishment, including the Methodist Church
and sections of  the Great Council of  Chiefs. In 2000, George Speight and
his men carried out a coup against the Fijian establishment, or at least
without their overt blessing. If  1987 was about shoring up indigenous
Fijian power and preserving Fijian political unity, Speight’s intervention
had the effect of fostering Fijian political fragmentation on an
unprecedented scale. George Speight’s dramatic intervention altered the
fundamental dynamics of  Fiji—and indigenous Fijian—politics.
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The hostage crisis left in its wake an impressive list of  casualties. The
1997 constitution, approved unanimously by a parliament dominated by
indigenous Fijians, blessed by the Great Council of  Chiefs and warmly
welcomed by the international community, was abrogated, albeit briefly.
One of the coup supporters’ demands was that the constitution be revised
to entrench Fijian political supremacy. Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara, president
of the republic, a central figure in contemporary Fijian public life and a
paramount chief  in his own right, was asked by the army to step aside,
while the Republic of  Fiji Military Forces assumed executive control of
the country. After he was presented with a customary forgiveness-seeking
tabua (whale’s tooth), Mara was sent under the cover of  darkness, guarded
by soldiers, on a patrol boat heading towards the Lau Sea. It was a sad
end to a distinguished though not uncontroversial career, marking the
final eclipse of the long reign in Fiji politics of powerful paramount
chiefs tutored for national leadership by the colonial government in the
years following World War II. The democratically elected government
headed by Mahendra Chaudhry was unceremoniously and
unconstitutionally dismissed. While the prime minister endured the
longest period of  captivity in modern Pacific islands history, his
freedom—or lack of  it—was curiously overshadowed by other struggles
for power taking place in Fijian society.
The crisis also ruined the reputation of  once sacred institutions of
Fijian society in previously unthinkable ways. Among them was the
military, with a proud record of  service in the jungles of  the Solomons
in World War II, in Malaya against the Chinese communist insurgents in
the 1950s, and as peacekeepers in the Middle East in the 1970s. In the
face of  the coup, the army stood divided and confused, unable, or, worse
still, unwilling, to uphold the constitution or protect the security of the
state. The security forces were shown to be infected by the virus of
provincialism and regionalism.1 It took a great deal of personal courage
on the part of its leaders, in particular Commodore Bainimarama, to
restore a semblance of  order and professionalism in the army, but this
came at great cost. The sight of Fijian soldiers shedding Fijian blood
during the attempted mutiny of November 2000 has left deep scars in
the collective memory of the nation.
george speight’s coup
187
The Great Council of Chiefs, who had sought in recent years to enlarge
its role and status as the guardian of national, and not only indigenous Fijian
interests, failed the test of  national leadership. They sympathised with
Speight’s self-defined ambition for the Fijian people, but then backed
President Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara to lead the country out of  the crisis. They
vacillated while the country awaited their wise counsel, which never came,
or came too late. Their deliberations were embroiled in traditional
confederacy and provincial politics, their proceedings dominated by younger,
more assertive chiefs wanting their own place in the Fijian sun, leading to
further division and fragmentation. As army spokesman Col. Filipe
Tarakinikini put it, the chiefs were ‘riddled with personal agendas’, and were
incapable of impartial, decisive action (The Australian, 4 June 2000).
However it is looked at, the hostage crisis-cum-coup was a disaster
for Fiji. The economy, which was just beginning to recover from the
downturn of the 1990s, was once again poised at the precipice.
Investment ceased, factories closed and hundreds of workers, often at
the bottom of the economic ladder and therefore the most vulnerable,
were been laid off, especially in the handicraft, garment and tourism
industries. Investment in the improvement of  essential services—health,
education, water supply, electricity—stopped, and thousands of  Fiji
citizens queued up at foreign embassies to migrate, taking with them
skills the country could ill-afford to lose.
Some costs, though, were less easily measured. Within the indigenous
Fijian society, for instance, old assumptions about the traditional structure
of  power were questioned in novel and potentially significant ways. It is
almost a truism now to say that this crisis, as it unfolded, became more
about intra-Fijian rivalries than about race. Even George Speight himself
admitted that ‘the race issue between Fijians and Indians is just one
piece of the jigsaw puzzle that has many pieces’ (Fiji Sun, 10 June 2000).
In this respect, it was unlike the crisis of 1987, which was seen largely as
an ethnic conflict between Fijians and Indo-Fijians. Then, there was
much sympathy for the Fijian ‘cause’ across the Pacific whereas now
there was outright condemnation.2 Some have argued that Speight
represented the interests of the Kubuna confederacy against the long
ascendancy of the traditional hierarchies of the Koro Sea. Fijian political
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analyst Jone Dakuvula’s claim to this effect brought upon the local
television station broadcasting his remarks the wrath of the Fijian mob
allied to George Speight, as they pillaged its premises and killed a
policeman on duty.
Then, as the crisis dragged on, the western chiefs, long aggrieved
about their absence from the national centre of power threatened—yet
again—to secede from the state of Fiji, failing which they promised to
settle for a much-cherished and long-demanded fourth confederacy, the
Yasayasa Vaka Ra. The west, they said, drove the engine of  the national
economy. Sugar, pine, gold and tourism are produced from its soil, and
they wanted representation in national councils proportionate to their
contribution to the national economy. The east–west divide exists, but
it is not a sharp, clear line, extensively criss-crossed now by marriage and
kinship ties that blur distinction of old. The threatened secession of
western Viti Levu was followed by a declaration of partial autonomy by
the province of  Cakaudrove proposing to set up a separate Tovata state,
but the declaration lacked conviction or authority (Sunday Times, 11 June
2000). The declaration was probably a stunt, but it did indicate the
willingness of the Fijian people to contemplate ideas that would have
been unthinkable in the twentieth century.
Race relations were severely strained just at the point when things
looked to be on the mend in the wake of the successful review of the
constitution. The wounds of the crisis—reflected in the images of looting
and violence on the streets of Suva, the fleeing of terrorised Indo-Fijians
from parts of the Rewa delta to safe havens in western Viti Levu, the
destruction of  schools and desecration of  places of  worship, the unruly
Fijian mob roaming the neighbourhoods around the parliamentary
complex—would take a long time to heal. The attempted coup raised
deeper questions than I can deal with here, questions about culture and
history and identity. The Fijian, the taukei, the indigenous owner of  the
land, who has lived side by side with his/her Indo-Fijian neighbour, still
regards him/her as a vulagi, a foreigner, welcome to stay and enjoy the
hospitality of the host but who must always be aware of whose house it
is (New York Times, 8 June 2000). Even the chiefs of  western Fiji who
opposed Speight, and had—or should have had—a better understanding
of Indo-Fijian fears and aspirations, wanted Fiji to be declared a Christian
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state so that Hindus, Muslims and Christians could all solve their problems
in the proper Christian way. They blamed Australia and Britain for
introducing Indians into Fiji; this revealed a lack of appreciation of the
Indians’ role in Fiji’s economic development—without their labour Fijians
might have shared the fate of some dispossessed and marginalised people
in parts of the Pacific. Indo-Fijians, now fourth or fifth generation, were
hurt to be still regarded as outsiders in the land of their birth, threatened
with the denial of  equal citizenship and equal protection under the law.
Sometimes, those who applauded the indigenous Fijians for
maintaining their culture and tradition asked the Indo-Fijians to subjugate
theirs in the cause of assimilation. Salman Rushdie, writing about the
Fiji crisis makes a telling point. ‘Migrant people do not remain visitors
forever’, he has written. ‘In the end, their new land owns them as their
old land did, and they have a right to own it in their turn’ (New York
Times, 14 June 2000).
The 2000 crisis was far worse than its 1987 counterpart in terms of
violence and damage to property. In 1987, the army was held responsible
for the maintenance of  law and order. To its credit, it did manage to
contain the mobs. In 2000, the mobs had free reign, directed, if  they
were directed at all, by invisible hands in the parliamentary complex,
armed and energised by Speight’s racial rhetoric, terrorising the rural
Indian countryside for food and fun, as they did in the hinterland of
Nausori. The main targets unsurprisingly were Indo-Fijians in outlying
rural areas; their cattle slaughtered and root crops stolen. After 1987,
some 100,000 migrated from Fiji, most of them Indo-Fijians, mostly to
Australia, New Zealand, Canada and the United States. It is often said
that there is hardly an Indo-Fijian family in Fiji that did not have at least
one member outside the country. Kinship became a multinational or
transnational corporation, sustaining those left behind on money remitted
from abroad. ‘I would rather be a dog in America than an Indian in Fiji’,
said a broken man whose house had been demolished and his possessions
taken by Fijian mobs.
The public face, though not certainly the principal instigator, of this
crisis was George Speight. A businessman with a career littered with
failures in Australia and Fiji (and possibly elsewhere as well), the 45-
year old Speight wandered on the fringes of the local commercial circles
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on the eve of the coup (Fiji Times, 23 May 2000). He had been sacked by
Agriculture Minister Poseci Bune as Chairman of  the Fiji Pine
Commission and the Hardwood Corporation. Shortly before he stormed
parliament, he had been negotiating on behalf of the American company
Trans Resources Management to win a tender for harvesting the country’s
massive mahogany forests valued at over F$300 million (Sunday Times,
11 June 2000). The government chose the Commonwealth Development
Corporation, who had a proven record in the exploitation of natural
resources. Speight was declared an undischarged bankrupt and was about
to face court proceedings when he launched his assault on parliament.
Clearly, Speight had his own private grievances, which he carefully hid
behind a fiercely nationalist rhetoric. Like Sitiveni Rabuka in 1987,
Speight portrayed himself  as a faithful servant of  the Fijian cause, an
anointed saviour of the Fijian ‘race’. Speight, however, was no Rabuka,
as even his most ardent supporters admitted. Indeed, an important reason
why the international community—as seen in Australian Foreign Minister
Alexander Downer’s reaction—was so severe in its condemnation of
Fiji was because George Speight had presented himself as the face of
indigenous Fijian nationalism. A part-European of Fijian descent, head
shaved, Speight was articulate, engaging, bantering with the international
media, reading emails and Fiji news on the internet before his press
conferences; for all that, he remained an unconvincing Fijian hero, though
probably not in his own eyes.
George Speight was not acting all on his own. If he were, the crisis
would have had a limited and inconsequential life. He was the front man
for others. Behind him, in the shadows, were individuals and groups,
writing his speeches, drawing up position papers, building up his support
base, and orchestrating the crowds—people who had little to lose but
everything to gain from the overthrow of the Chaudhry government and
from the mayhem that followed. Among them were politicians defeated
at the last elections or otherwise excluded from power, seeking redress
and probably revenge. Apisai Tora and Berenado Vunibobo come readily
to mind. The Fijian opposition leader Ratu Inoke Kubuabola was there
as well, and so, strangely enough, were factional leaders of  Fijian political
parties in coalition with Chaudhry’s Labour Party. Fijian Association
Party’s Adi Kuini Vuikaba Speed was the deputy prime minister, but
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Ratu Cokanauto Tua’akitau was seen with Speight’s group. Apisai Tora,
the founder of  the Party of  National Unity, wanted Chaudhry’s head,
but three members of his party were in the cabinet.
Speight was also supported by people like himself—young
businessmen on the make, who rode the gravy train of the 1990s, benefited
from opportunistic access to power, secured large, unsecured loans from
the National Bank of Fiji, but who then found their prospects for
continued prosperity dimming on the election of a new government.
Prominent local businessmen-cum-politicians in the previous SVT
government supported the destabilisation campaign. For them, it was
important that the Chaudhry government went before it managed to
entrench itself. In this group of the ambitious and upwardly mobile, I
would also include what I call the ‘children of 1987’. This group included
those who had benefited from the post-coup racially based affirmative
action programs—sanctioned by the 1990 constitution—in the award
of  scholarships, promotions in the civil service and training opportunities.
They were the children of privilege, sons and daughters of the well
connected. Many of them had come of age in the mid 1990s, at the
height of  SVT government’s reign.3 This new generation of  fast-tracked
Fijian middle class had a narrow, limited experience of  multiculturalism,
and little taste or patience for it. They contrasted starkly with an earlier
post-independence generation of the 1970s, which grew up working in a
multicultural environment, dedicated to professionalism and the principles
of good governance, under governments publicly committed to a unifying
vision.4 The ‘children of 1987’ did not understand nor approve of the
spirit of the 1997 constitution.
While the indigenous Fijian middle class, or at least sections of it,
provided the brains for Speight’s agenda, the Fijian social underclass
contributed the brawn. The bedraggled unemployed, unskilled Fijian
youth—armed with sticks, knives, bamboo spears, stones and sometimes
guns looted, burned and trashed Suva, terrorised the countryside, and acted
as human shields for Speight and his men—had little understanding of the
larger, hidden personal agendas and complex forces at work. They were in
some sense the human casualties of globalisation and economic rationalism,
and, more immediately, the victims of  the structural reform policies
pursued by the Rabuka government in the 1990s. They could not
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understand why they remained behind, mired in poverty and destitution,
while others had moved on. Without hope and without a future, they fell
easy prey to George Speight’s mesmerising rhetoric and easy solutions:
getting rid of the Indians, reverting to tradition and putting Fijians in
political control would mean all would be well. Speight gave them a
purpose, an explanation, a mission and a brief spot in the Fijian sun. They
in turn responded enthusiastically to his clarion call of  racial solidarity.
How did this crisis come to a head? To understand this, it is necessary
to look at events over the previous 12 months, beginning with the 1999
general elections that took place under the revised 1997 constitution.
As shown before, Chaudhry’s Labour Party won 37 of  the 71 seats in its
own right. Together with his other coalition partners, Party of  National
Unity (PANU), Fijian Association Party (FAP) and Veitokani ni
Levenivanua Vakaristo (VLV), the People’s Coalition won altogether 58
seats. The unexpectedly convincing victory was due to two factors: an
effective campaign against the outrages and excesses of the Rabuka
government, of  which there were many, and a sharp, carefully calibrated
focus on the bread and butter issues affecting ordinary working and middle
class people. Labour promised to roll back the structural reform programs
of the Rabuka government that had caused massive unemployment,
introduce minimum wages, lower interest-rates, provide social security
for the elderly, and resolve the long-festering issue of  expiring agricultural
leases. These uncosted but electorally appealing policies were effective
on the hustings, but they came to haunt the party when it came to power.
The opposition National Federation Party (NFP), Fiji’s oldest political
party who had long been the champion of Indo-Fijian interests, did not
win a single seat, and opportunistically kept the government’s heel close
to the fire. To counteract criticism and keep its support base from
fragmenting, the Chaudhry government embarked on a hectic program
of  legislative reform, setting up commissions (Education and Human
Rights), instituting inquiries (into corruption), staffing statutory
organisations with competent staff (Housing Authority).
The appearance of movement and change was impressive, but it also
embroiled the government in a hugely counterproductive tussle with the
media. Small issues were magnified in an atmosphere already rife with
suspicion and distrust about the government’s motives. Why did Chaudhry
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appoint his own son, not a civil servant, as his personal assistant on the
public payroll? Here was a man who, as long-term secretary of  the Fiji
Public Service Association, had given scathing assessments of  nepotism
and corruption in previous governments, but once in power, had begun
to ignore his own wise counsel about transparent governance and public
accountability. There was nothing illegal in the appointment: a prime
minister can, of  course, appoint anybody he or she wants. But the
perception of the government favouring its own was created, which stuck
despite repeated denial. Fijian civil servants, appointed under the Rabuka
government when ethnicity and loyalty were privileged over merit and
seniority, complained about being unconsulted or marginalised in
important decision-making.
Faced with intensifying opposition, the governed battened down the
hatches. To every question and all opposition, it chanted—to its
opponents with constant, arrogant regularity—the mantra of having a
mandate to do what it had promised in its election manifesto. The
government did have a mandate, but its mandate was one among many
mandates in Fiji. The parliament is not the sole source of all power in
Fiji: the Native Land Trust Board has its mandate to look after native
land, the Great Council of Chiefs has its own mandate under the
constitution, and the army has its own. It was the failure, or perhaps the
unwillingness, to balance the complex equation of competing mandates
that compounded the government’s problems. Chaudhry’s own forceful
personality, forged in the long years spent in the trade union movement,
also played its part in galvanising the opposition. Chaudhry was a highly
intelligent and resourceful person, tenacious and uncompromising
(confrontational to his opponents)—a born fighter who was a painful
thorn in the side of  the Rabuka government for years. He was feared by
Fijians, but not trusted. He was a strong and decisive leader of  a generally
weak cabinet, and his opponents, rightly or wrongly, saw his unmistakable
imprint on every policy decision of the government
Another problem facing the government was the fractious nature of
the People’s Coalition itself. As mentioned, the coalition was a loose
structure made up of  four parties: Labour, PANU, FAP and VLV. Some
of  these parties espoused philosophies directly contradictory to Labour’s.
But what they all had in common was their adamant opposition to Sitiveni
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Rabuka. Opposition to a common enemy, then, rather than commitment
to a common agenda, brought the disparate groups together. And when
Rabuka was defeated, the difficulties of internal cohesion came to the
fore, almost immediately after the election. Chaudhry rightly took steps
to become prime minister: his party had an outright majority in parliament.
The FAP cried foul, accusing Labour of  reneging on a deal that a Fijian,
one of its own members, would be chosen prime minister by the coalition.5
Chaudhry was helped unobtrusively and opportunistically by Ratu Mara
who urged the Fijian parties to rally behind him, but Chaudhry’s ascension
also split the coalition. A faction of  the FAP disregarded Adi Kuini’s
leadership and informally aligned itself  with other Fijian opposition
parties, eventually going so far as to back George Speight. Tora became
a fierce rabble-rousing critic of the government, expressing his
disgruntlement by leading a revived Taukei Movement.
The issue that united the Fijians was land. Land, as I have said before,
has always been a sensitive issue in Fijian politics. The question always
has been the use rather than the ownership of  land. Now, 83 per cent of
all land in Fiji—3,714,990 acres—is held in inalienable rights by
indigenous Fijians, 8.2 per cent is freehold, 3.6 per cent is state freehold
and 5 per cent is crown or state. Much of  the country’s agricultural
activity—in particular sugar cultivation—is carried out on land leased
from Fijian landowners. The country’s 22,000 cane growers, the
overwhelming majority of whom are Indo-Fijians, lease native land under
the Agricultural Landlord and Tenant Act. This Act, which came into
existence in 1969 provided for 30-year leases, whose renewal was
negotiated between the tenants and landlords on the expiry of  the leases.
These leases were beginning to expire, and some, but by no means all,
landlords want their land back—either to cultivate the land themselves,
rezone it for commercial or residential purposes, or use the threat of
non-renewal to extract more rent. They were led by the head of the
Native Land Trust Board, Marika Qarikau. He was, by all accounts, a
hardline, abrasive nationalist who has used every means available to
push his agenda, from addressing the provincial councils to using the
network of the Methodist Church, to rallying Fijian landowners behind
him and against the government. The NLTB was Qarikau’s power base,
and he, too, claimed a mandate: to protect native Fijian land. Three
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weeks after the coup, Qarikau circulated a 20 page ‘Deed of  Sovereignty’
which demanded, among other things, the return of all state and freehold
land to native ownership.
Chaudhry did not contest the landowners’ desire to reclaim their land.
Nor, on other hand, could he—or any other government for that matter—
ignore the human plight of the tenants, unskilled, uneducated, poor, evicted
from land their families had cultivated for four or five generations. The
government offered the displaced tenants F$28,000 to start afresh in some
other occupation, and about F$8,000 to the landlords who repossessed
their former leasees’ land to become cultivators themselves. Meanwhile, it
also resuscitated the idea of a Land Use Commission, mentioned in his
party’s manifesto but with a history going back nearly forty years, to work
with landowners to identify idle land and to put it to productive use,
including, if  possible, for resettlement of  the displaced tenants. With the
NLTB on a warpath, the government went directly to the Fijian landlords.
Early in 2000, it sent a delegation of Fijian landowning chiefs to Malaysia
to familiarise themselves with the work of a similar commission there.
The chiefs returned impressed but, by then, Qarikau had already
orchestrated a move among the provincial councils to reject the concept
outright. Poseci Bune, the agriculture minister, recalled the malicious
misinformation spread among the people. In one province, he was told
the Land Use Commission was a ploy by Chaudhry to bring Indians to Fiji.
Apparently Air India had expressed an interest in opening an office in
Suva. But this was a false front. The main aim behind setting up an Air
India office was to bring Indians from India to settle on land identified for
development by the Land Use Commission. Faced with this malicious
propaganda, the government then did what it should have done in the first
place: it took the proposal to the Great Council of Chiefs, which approved
it in principle but asked the government and the NLTB to develop it further
cooperatively. It was a hard fought victory for the government.
Just when the government seemed to be gaining the upper hand, as
shown by approval levels in the polls, Tora’s Taukei Movement resurfaced
in western Viti Levu, fuelling and galvanising extreme Fijian opinion
against the government. The Cakaudrove Provincial Council passed a
vote of no-confidence in the government, and others followed. Ratu
Tevita Bolobolo, Tui Navitilevu, formed a landowners’ council, Matabose
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ni Taukei ni Vanua, attacking the government and threatening non-
renewal of  leases. Ratu Tevita had lost to Labour in the 1999 general
election. Taniela Tabu, former Taukei Movement stalwart and a trade
unionist with a chequered career, formed the Viti National Union of
Taukei Workers and attacked the Chaudhry government for ‘Indianising
the public service’. The charge was baseless—the upper echelons of  the
public service, and nearly 90 per cent of  the permanent heads of
government departments, were dominated by indigenous Fijians—but
proved effective among many Fijians already distrustful of  the
government. The Christian Democrats labelled the government—in
which it was partner—anti-Fijian over its hesitation to renew the work
visa of expatriate Fiji TV head Kenneth Clark, because the Fijian
provinces held the majority shares in the company headed by Clark.
The protest movement, small and disorganised at first, gained
momentum and focus as May drew near. The government continued to
repeat the refrain of mandate and refused to acknowledge that trouble
was in the offing, dismissing the marches as the work of a few miscreants
and misguided people. The police commissioner Isekia Savua’s public
warning to the government to raise its political antenna to catch the
grumbling on the ground was ignored, so he claimed, and Savua was
chastised for daring, as a public servant, to advise the government on
questions of  policy.
Convinced that its policies were beginning to bear fruit and were
popular with the electorate, who had learned the hard lessons of 1987,
the government adopted a business-as-usual approach as tension
mounted around the country. Ignoring all the warning signals, it sent the
commander of the military forces, Commodore Frank Bainimarama, to
Norway on an official trip. The police commissioner was on holiday, and
the president was in Lau celebrating his eightieth birthday. When the
parliament met on 19 May, marking the first anniversary in government,
no special security precautions were taken; no special police forces were
deployed around the parliamentary complex. The police force focused
on the protest marchers downtown heading towards Government House
to present a petition to the president. At 10am Speight and his men
stormed parliament, led by 20-year SAS veteran Major Ilisoni Ligairi
and members of  the Counter Revolutionary Warfare Unit he had set up
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at the request of the 1987 coup leader Sitiveni Rabuka.
At 1.20pm that day Speight spoke to a stunned nation.
People of Fiji in their desire to achieve self-determination and control of their
future destiny in all matters pertaining to their livelihood and the affairs of the
Republic of  the Fiji Islands. We executed our actions this morning, there were a
small number of us but as I speak and as I sit to make these announcements to
you I speak on behalf of every individual member of the indigenous Fijian
community. Through these actions I am stressing ownership, am asserting control
and I am asserting executive power over Fiji. We have revoked the constitution and
have set that aside. We have revoked the powers of  the President of  the Republic
of Fiji. The executive control of this country of ours currently resides in my hands
(Fijilive, 19 May 2003).
Soon afterwards, he announced the make-up of his administration. All,
without exception, were known nationalists, including many ‘children of
1987’. Ratu Timoci Silatolu (FAP, Rewa) was appointed prime minister,
Ratu Naiqama Lalabalavu (SVT Cakaudrove) was made minister for Fijian
affairs, Ratu Rakuita Vakalalabure (SVT, Cakaudrove), minister for home
affairs. Three others had no portfolio: Simione Kaitani (SVT Lomaiviti),
Isireli Leweniqila (SVT, Tailveu), Levani Tonitonivanua (Nationalist,
Serua). Speight himself  had his eye on the presidency, but that was not
officially announced. A fuller list, announced two days later, demoted
Silatolu to deputy prime minister, but added the more recognisable names
of  Berenado Vunibobo, Ratu Tu’uakitau Cokanauto and Ratu Inoke
Kubuabola. Whether these individuals had agreed to serve in the Speight
administration was not known, but there was no doubt that they sang the
same nationalist tune as the architects of  the coup.
Speight had hoped for a speedy acceptance of  the proposals. A meeting
of the Great Council of Chiefs would be convened, the proposed list of
names presented and endorsed, the hostages released, and the country
run by a Taukei Civilian Administration. But events took a different,
perhaps unexpected, turn. Late in the afternoon of  19 May, as a rampaging
mob burned and looted Suva, President Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara declared
a State of  Emergency. ‘There are democratically recognised avenues for
airing grievances in accordance with the laws and the Constitution’, Mara
told an anxious national television audience. ‘I urge all those who lay
claim to be leaders of this dissenting group to follow lawful means in
raising their dissent’. His words fell on deaf  ears. The president lacked
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the power to enforce his will. The army was still in the barracks, divided
in its loyalty, and the police force was confused, under-resourced and
effectively leaderless—and, in the view of some, guilty of colluding
with Speight’s supporters.
After being persuaded that Rabuka did not have foreknowledge of
the coup, Ratu Mara engaged him as his mediator with Speight. Rabuka
was an occasional golfing partner of  Speight’s and the hijackers had
reportedly trained on his estate in Vanua Levu. Some of  them were from
his own province of  Cakaudrove. As events unfolded, Rabuka’s lack of
active support in the May uprising became clearer; outwardly, he was
almost a bystander in the unfolding drama. Of all the major players on
the Fijian side, he was the only one then who stood uncompromisingly
by the constitution. Mara suggested through Rabuka that Chaudhry
should voluntarily step down in favour of an indigenous Fijian. Deputy
Prime Minister Tupeni Baba was the name Mara had in mind as the
Fijian replacement. Speight welcomed the suggestion, but asked Mara
to step down as well. When Rabuka conveyed that demand to Mara, the
president agreed to oblige but only if the Great Council of Chiefs backed
that demand. Speight also wanted to meet the president but Mara refused
unless the hostages were released first. As Mara recalled, ‘he was going
to tell me that if I don’t follow what he says, he will start executing
hostages one-by-one and when I said what does he really want I was told
that he wants me to step down and allow his group to run the country. I
said I will not be able to oblige’. But while refusing dialogue under duress,
in a nationally televised address Mara gave Speight and his supporters
his ‘personal guarantee as executive head of the Republic that the issues
you have raised will be dealt with fully and your position as the indigenous
community will be protected and enhanced’.
This was an important victory for Speight: the president had conceded
the need to amend the constitution to ‘protect and enhance’ Fijian
interests. But Mara wanted to achieve that goal through constitutional
means. More was still to come. Mara also hinted that Mahendra Chaudhry
might not be reinstated as prime minister. ‘I can’t say that I will put back
the government that caused all these problems…What I intend to do is
to talk to them (government members) and say “you’ve seen what has
happened” so what’s your possible solution’ (Fiji Sun, 23 May 2000).
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Whatever Mara’s motives, his public doubts about Chaudhry’s return to
government served to strengthen the hostage takers’ resolve that their
goal was now within reach. Unwittingly or otherwise, the president had
shown his hand. He was—or was seen to be—essentially on the same
side as the broad spectrum of  Fijian nationalists; they differed only in
their methods.
While Mara sought to assert his executive authority, Speight began to
build a human fortress around him by transporting in hundreds of
supporters from southeastern Viti Levu—men, women and children. They
sang and danced and cooked food on the grounds of the parliamentary
complex—food (cattle and root crops) stolen from Indo-Fijian farmers
in the Rewa delta and brought to Suva in police vans. The carnival
atmosphere kept up the spirit of the gradually increasing crowd, but
their presence in large numbers also ruled out a hostage rescue operation.
When the police force sought to control the crowd at the parliamentary
complex, they were chased away by armed youths. The crowd gave the
impression of a growing groundswell of support for Speight, especially
to the international community; Speight himself emerged as an articulate
and effective manipulator of the media.
With the deadlock between Mara and Speight, all attention shifted to
the meeting of the Great Council of Chiefs convened on 23 June. What
transpired in that deeply emotional meeting is not known, although it
was later reported that the Tailevu chiefs presented a tabua to the Great
Council of  Chiefs to seek forgiveness for George Speight’s insulting
remarks about them. Speight wanted the chiefs to justify their decisions,
saying they had lost touch with the grassroots whom he now claimed to
represent. After two days of talk, Ratu Mara was able to sway them to
his side. He assured the chiefs that he would return the country to
normalcy but would address the concerns that Speight and his supporters
had raised with him, though by what authority he did not say.
The chiefs agreed. They expressed full confidence in the president
and the vice president, endorsing Mara as the leader of his proposed
interim administration but asked that his proposed council of advisors
include some of  Speight’s group. The chiefs asked for the hostages to be
released immediately and all stolen arms to be surrendered to the army.
They also recommended a pardon for all those involved in the hostage
takeover. And finally, they urged Mara to
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…give full and urgent attention to the grievances as raised by the various taukei
groups during the recent protest marches with special attention given to ensuring
that the position of president and prime minister together with other senior
government positions (unspecified) shall always be held by indigenous Fijians and
Rotumans (Council of Chiefs, press release 23 June 2000).
Speight had got most of what he wanted, but he was still unsatisfied.
He had not wanted a pardon but complete amnesty; there was always
the hint that he expected to hold office in a new government. Mara
agreed to consider it, but only after a proper trial. Speight was not satisfied
with an amendment to the 1997 constitution as the chiefs had
recommended; he wanted it abrogated. And, knowing Mara’s political
cunning, he wanted the president to step down as well, fearing that he
might appoint to his council of advisors people personally loyal to him.
Mara proceeded with his plan to assume executive control. With
Chaudhry incarcerated, the Labour coalition had elected Ratu Tevita
Momoedonu as its interim leader and spokesman. Mara swore him in as
acting prime minister ‘solely to enable me to take three steps’ (Fijilive 29
May 2000). The first was to advise the president under Section 99(1) of
the constitution to dismiss all cabinet ministers, paving the way for him
to appoint a caretaker prime minister and other advisors. The second
was to advise the president to prorogue parliament, buying him time to
‘set things in order’. And the third was for the acting prime minister to
tender his resignation, handing over executive authority to the president
to run the country in the absence of  a prime minister, a cabinet and a
sitting parliament. Ostensibly to save the constitution, the President
sacrificed the prime minister and his duly elected government. Chaudhry,
Mara said, ‘is not only absent from duty but also he’s unable to perform
the functions of that office’. He invoked Section 106 of the constitution:
‘The president may appoint a minister to act in office of another minister,
including the prime minister, during any period or during all period when
the minister is absent from duty, or is for any other reason unable to
perform the functions of  the office’. Mara’s action was constitutionally
flawed. The constitution, following the normal Westminster convention,
severely limited the power of the president to act without ministerial
advice. The constitution did prescribe the circumstances in which the
president may act in his or her own deliberate judgement, but as far as
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the dismissal of a prime minister is concerned, Section 109(1) of the
constitution explicitly stated
[t]he president may not dismiss a prime minister unless the government fails to get
or loses the confidence of the House of Representatives and the prime minister
does not resign or get a dissolution of parliament.
Chaudhry was a hostage; he had not vacated his office, and he still enjoyed
the confidence of the House of Representatives—he was still prime
minister. But Mara had assumed otherwise ‘as a matter of  political reality’,
to use the fateful words of  Chief  Justice Sir Timoci Tuivaga who had
advised him.6
In hindsight, it seems that Chaudhry’s fate was sealed the moment
Speight and his gunmen entered parliament. Sadly for him, neither the
president nor the chief justice were prepared to stand by the constitution
or the democratically elected government. The chief  justice’s behaviour
invited the wrath of the Fiji Law Society which accused him of acting
hastily in assuming that the 1997 constitution was in fact abrogated. His
authorship of the Administration of Justice Decree, a decree that
abolished the highest court in the land, the Supreme Court, and made
the chief justice a judge of the Court of Appeal of which he was
previously not a member and where he would now take precedence when
the court sat, was severely criticised by the society. ‘The eyes of  the
profession, the nation and the world are upon the judiciary’, Peter Knight,
the President of  the Law Society, reminded the chief  justice. ‘It cannot
be seen to openly condone criminal activity. It should as a matter of
record [note] that it will continue to occupy and function in its judicial
role in the same uncompromising manner as it had done prior to 19
May’.7 The chief justice remained unmoved.
Ratu Mara’s action was equally controversial, having decided on his
own shortly after the takeover of the parliament that the 1997
constitution needed to be amended to accommodate the wishes of the
Fijian nationalists. Yet, two years before, the president had praised the
constitution as a fair and just charter for the nation. Perhaps Mara sensed
that the Fijian opinion generally supported Speight’s position, and, as in
the past, he wanted to be where his people were. As Mara so often said,
a chief  without his or her people’s support was not a chief. In 1982,
Mara had behaved in a similar manner, refraining from condemning a
islands of turmoil
202
motion passed by the Great Council of Chiefs demanding Fijian control
of  parliament. Be that as it may, Mara’s action dismayed many, among
them the United Nation’s Special Envoy Sergio Vieira de Mellor and
Commonwealth Secretary General Don McKinnon who were reportedly
‘stunned by Mara’s endorsement of  Speight’s nationalist views’ (Sydney
Morning Herald, 25 May 2000). And Pratap Chand, the minister for
education, reminded Mara that the effect of  his intervention would be
to ‘legitimise the overthrow of a constitutional and democratically elected
government by terrorists’ (Fijilive, 29 May 2000). But Mara was determined
to pursue his course of  action while the world speculated on his motives.
On the streets, where Speight’s men marauded freely; these
constitutional manoeuvres mattered little. On 28 May, they trashed the
local TV station that ran a program drawing attention to the partial,
provincial base of  Speight’s support. And in the melee that followed, a
police officer was shot dead and shots were fired at the president’s residence.
The following day, Speight’s supporters planned to march from the
parliamentary complex to the president’s house demanding his resignation;
the march called off  at the last minute on the advice of  the army which
feared a violent conflict after hearing rumours of  Lauans gathering in Suva
in support of their paramount chief. Despite his public pronouncements,
the president’s authority was weak. The police were outgunned; the army
was divided and unwilling to back the president fully.
Part of the reason, according to Commodore Frank Bainimarama,
was that emotionally many soldiers were in Speight’s camp but did not
support the methods he had used. Many were not prepared to risk their
lives for a man, Ratu Mara, whom they distrusted for a variety of  reasons.
They regarded Mara as the man who stood between them and the goal
of  Fijian paramountcy—an autocratic leader who, in Speight’s words,
was ‘imposing his will and controlling the Great Council of Chiefs through
fear as he has done to the cabinet, the civil service, the vanua over the
years, despite the will of the people’ (Fiji Sun, 10 June 2000). Speight,
like many others in Fiji, suspected that the president harboured dynastic
ambitions, that he supported the Chaudhry government because his own
family members were in it. Mara, for them, was a part of the problem
not a part of  the solution; he had to go. When that decision had been
reached, four senior army personnel, lead by the commander as well as
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Ratu Mara’s son-in-law and former army commander Ratu Epeli Ganilau,
approached Mara late on 29 June in the traditional Fijian way, presented
him a tabua in forgiveness, and asked him to step aside.
Commodore Bainimarama assumed executive leadership and imposed
martial law at 6pm on 29 May. An immediate curfew was imposed. A
new military council was appointed to run the country for up to three
years during which a new constitution would be drawn up and elections
would be held under it. The army named former commander and Mara’s
son-in-law Ratu Epeli Nailatikau as its choice for prime minister. But it
was a poor choice that added fuel to fire. Speight and his supporters saw
in his nomination the continuation of the Mara dynasty and the Fijian
establishment although Nailatikau himself came from a high-ranking
chiefly family of  Bau. Speight’s group had at first welcomed the military’s
intervention. ‘I suppose for the maintenance of  law and order and for
the safety of the lives of the public that was the only option for the
military to take’, Ratu Timoci Silatolu told Radio Fiji on 30 May. ‘And
we are keen to negotiate with them, someone who understands the
hostage situation—an institution that is totally Fijian’.
The optimism of  a breakthrough, however, was short lived: Speight’s
group wanted the new interim administration to be dominated by their
followers. The opposition forced the army to delay naming its military
council and withdraw Nailatikau’s name.
As the third week of the crisis ended, the impasse continued. The
military attempted to consolidate its support among the provinces by
promising that their demands for political paramountcy would be
accommodated in the new constitution. George Speight himself did not
find a place in the civilian administration although his supporters did.
But Speight had made other achievements: most significantly, the
acceptance by a broad cross-section of the indigenous Fijians that the
1997 constitution, and the spirit that underwrote it—the spirit of
multiethnic cooperation, of  equal rights under the law, of  equal
citizenship, of  enlarging the common space through representative
democracy—could not be sustained in a country divided along racial
lines for so long.
Fiji had travelled that route before under the 1990 constitution, ending
up in a cul-de-sac. Speight and his supporters wanted self-determination
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for the indigenous Fijians, but they had had autonomy—and veto power
in parliament—over matters of internal governance since independence.
They had their traditional chiefly institutions intact, including the Great
Council of Chiefs, and other separate administrative systems set up for
their governance under the Fijian Affairs Act. Invoking international
conventions on the rights of indigenous people was similarly unhelpful.
The clear inference from them was that at the national level, the political
and other rights of indigenous peoples are on exactly the same footing
as those of  other members of  society. These conventions saw the special
rights of indigenous peoples as distinct communities as supplementing
the fundamental human rights and freedoms they already enjoy and share
with other citizens. Nothing in these conventions gave an indigenous
people superior or paramount rights in taking part in the government of
the country. Fijian nationalists want Fijian paramountcy recognised as a
right, but there was no basis on which the paramountcy of Fijian interests
or Fijian political paramountcy could be elevated into a right.
Concepts of  ‘self-determination’ and ‘sovereignty’ gave no support
to that proposition. They wanted numerical dominance in a
democratically elected parliament. But no constitution could guarantee
political paramountcy of a particular ethnic group in a multiethnic state
unless, of course, it abandoned all claim to be democratic. The 1990
constitution was weighted in favour of Fijians, but even it could not
regulate the distribution of  political power among Fijian parties. For
that reason it could not ensure that Fijians would always be able to form
an exclusively or predominantly Fijian government. Rabuka’s government
fell in 1993 because of political fragmentation among indigenous Fijians,
and it fell for a similar reasons in 1999.
The army imposed martial law and returned the country to a semblance
of  normalcy. Power was handed to an interim administration. The rebels
were rounded up.
George Speight was tried for treason and received life sentence. Many
of his co-conspirators were also sent to prison for varying lengths of
time. Soldiers who participated in the mutiny have also been punished
but there is a lingering suspicion in Fiji that many people who worked
behind the scenes, even some of  the masterminds, have escaped
punishment and are enjoying the fruits of  Speight’s handiwork. In April
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2004, the chiefs sentenced to imprisonment for their role in the mutiny
of  November 2000 were released on compulsory supervision order after
serving a only week in jail. And the government proposed a new
legislation, ‘Outside Dispute Resolution’, which would absolve chiefs
from criminal prosecution if  they were deemed to have intervened to
resolve a dispute, even if their participation was illegal. Creating two
sets of laws, one for the chiefs and one all others, was myopic and
dangerous, as was the proposal to increase the powers of the Great
Council of Chiefs from its currently advisory role. They would one day
return to haunt Fiji.
Notes
1 See Col. Filipe Tarakinini’s statement on Fijilive, 4 June 2000: ‘The army is just a reflection
of  society, so what is happening there [fragmentation] is happening in the army as well;
you can’t deny that’.
2 With some eccentric exceptions as the Maori lawyer Anthony Sinclair who said, without
irony, ‘we believe that revolution is a legitimate part of  the democratic process’ (Fijilive,
3 June 2000).
3 Representatives of  this group would include Rakuita Vakalalabure, Saimone Kaitani,
Timoci Silatolu and Filipe Tuisawau.
4 This group would include Josefa Kamikamica, Savenaca Siwatibau and Mosese
Qionabaravi.
 5 This is confirmed by Chaudhry’s deputy Tupeni Baba who thought the party had
agreed to have him (an indigenous Fijian) as prime minister. See his book, Tupeni,
Unaisi and Field 2005).
6 The quote is from the Chief  Justice’s letter to Peter Knight, President of  the Fiji Law
Society, 14 June 2000.




In George Speight’s shadow
On 25 August 2001, Fiji once again went to the polls, under the 1997
multiracial constitution that George Speight and the Fiji military forces
had declared abrogated, but which had been upheld by the High Court
and subsequently by the Fiji Court of Appeal. The holding of the elections
was a significant achievement in the circumstances. Nonetheless, instead
of  resolving the country’s political difficulties and healing wounds, it
ended up polarising ethnic relations even further, embroiling major
political parties in an acrimonious debate about power sharing mandated
by the constitution.
A record twenty-six, mostly indigenous Fijian, political parties registered
to contest the elections, but only eighteen fielded candidates for the 71-
seat lower house. Interim Prime Minister Laisenia Qarase’s Soqosoqo ni
Duavata Lewenivanua (SDL), launched on the eve of the elections, won
32 seats, deposing Mahendra Chaudhry’s Fiji Labour Party who won 27.
The coup-supporting Conservative Alliance Matanitu Vanua (CAMV),
among whose successful candidates was George Speight himself, won 6
seats, the National Federation Party one and the breakaway New Labour
Unity Party (NLUP), formed by Dr Tupeni Baba, deputy prime minister in
the People’s Coalition government, and independents won two each. The
smaller splinter parties failed to make an impact. What was surprising was
the failure of more established parties which had fared well in the past,
including the Fijian Association Party (FAP), a senior partner in the People’s
Coalition government, and the Soqosoqo ni Vakavulewa ni Taukei (SVT),
the party in power for much of  the 1990s.
in george speight’s shadow
207
George Speight, awaiting trial for treason, cast a long shadow over
the campaign. Indigenous Fijian political parties competed with each
other to court his supporters, promising to fulfil his agenda of enshrining
Fijian political paramountcy in perpetuity. Otherwise, there was little
public enthusiasm for the election. The electorate was genuinely
pessimistic and apprehensive. On the Indo-Fijian side, there was a
pervasive feeling of  fear and anxiety; the memory of  May 19 was still
fresh. ‘Fijians will do whatever they want’, a voter told me. ‘What’s the
point of voting?’ The low voter turnout—78.6 per cent—and a
surprisingly large number of  informal votes, indicated indifference and
protest. On the Fijian side where the voter turnout was equally low,
there was dismay and disillusionment at the large number of parties,
with divergent and sometimes diametrically opposed agendas, despite
the efforts of the Methodist Church to forge a semblance of political
unity. Public confidence in the most important institutions of  the state
was at its lowest ebb, their reputation for professionalism, independence
and integrity tainted or otherwise compromised. Among them was the
police force. The Daily Post summed up the popular perception.
The force remains under-paid, badly equipped, lacking in skills, demoralised, lacking
in a leader with the moral authority to preach to his men and women, let alone the
people of Fiji. The force under Mr [Isikia] Savua has been linked with complicity in
last year’s political crisis. Many a police officer has said that the police did not act
when they were needed during the riots in Suva city because they had not received
the relevant instructions from the top (Daily Post, 21 August 2001).
Isikia Savua was eventually cleared of illegality and complicity in the coup
by a closed tribunal headed by Chief  Justice Timoci Tuivaga, but without
abating public scepticism. One observer called the inquiry ‘a fraud’
facilitated by the chief justice, a ‘person who has come under attack from
legal sources in Fiji and internationally for facilitating the abrogation of
the constitution and for continuing to frustrate legal challenges to the
abrogation of the constitution’ (Fiji Sun, 11 August 2001). Labour Party
president Jokapeci Koroi accused Savua of having ‘deliberately misled
the government by giving assurances that there was nothing to worry about.
Mr Savua must go’ (Fiji Sun, 13 August 2001). Savua continued for a
while as police commissioner, with a tarnished reputation, until he was
posted to the United Nations as Fiji’s permanent representative.
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The army, too, was diminished in public esteem. It managed to restore
law and order after the hostages were released from 56 days of
incarceration, but not before it was shown to be infected by the dangerous
virus of  indiscipline, insubordination and provincialism. Members of
the army’s Counter Revolutionary Warfare Unit, established by Sitiveni
Rabuka after the 1987 coups, was instrumental in the execution of  the
coup. Several senior military figures professed public sympathy for
Speight’s agenda but disapproved of  his method, though precisely what
method they would have approved they did not specify. In November
2000, a section of  the army mutinied, killing five soldiers and injuring
scores of  others. The brutal violence that the army used to quell the
mutiny remains a source of great bitterness and tension in the Fijian
community—who were unable to comprehend the possibility of the Fijian
army ever fighting Fijian civilians. President Josefa Iloilo granted immunity
to the regular soldiers, while mutineers were tried and sentenced to various
periods of imprisonment.
Another institution that lost credibility in their independence and
integrity in the immediate aftermath of  the coup was the judiciary, with
a local daily newspaper pleading with the judges to ‘wake up, grow up
and, importantly, stop bickering’ (Fiji Times, 29 August 2001). The role
Chief  Justice Tuivaga, played or did not play—the advice he gave the
president in resolving the crisis which later proved to be unconstitutional,
his early acceptance that the constitution had been abrogated, his
authorship of a decree abolishing the Supreme Court—became matters
of intense public dispute, leading the Fiji Law Society to call for his
immediate resignation. The chief justice rebuked judges who disagreed
with his interpretation or otherwise showed independence, and rewarded
those who sided with him. His unexpectedly harsh attack on Justice
Anthony Gates of the Lautoka High Court, who had upheld the
constitution, was typical. Tuivaga accused Gates of  not ‘recognising
and respecting the hierarchy of administrative power and authority with
the judiciary of this country’, and advised him to ‘explore other work
environment where the rules of  administrative propriety do not apply’
(Fiji High Court File CJ/WF/9 as cited in Fiji Times, 28 August 2001).
Tuivaga defended himself. ‘I have been chief  justice for 20 years, in the
driver’s seat, and I know what is good for this country and what I did
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was good for the country’ (Daily Post, 1 September 2001). He had accepted
the de facto government as ‘a matter of  political reality’, and intervened
to ‘ensure that the maintenance of law and order and justice in this
country was not to be frustrated by any ineffective administrative court
machinery’ (Supreme Court File CJ/WF/9). The Court of Appeal,
however, thought otherwise.
The social costs of the political crisis were visible. These included
poverty, joblessness, prostitution, growth in the population of  squatter
settlements fringing major urban centres, people evicted from expiring
leases living in makeshift camps in Valelawa in Vanua Levu and at the
Girmit Centre in Lautoka, women from broken homes, single mothers,
unemployed with the closure of  garment factories established under
lucrative tax regimes in the 1980s. Since the crisis of  2000, there was a
marked increase in the suicide rate, particularly among women (Pacnews,
31 August 2001). Many workers suffered from pay cuts and reduced
working hours, thus completing the vicious cycle of  poverty and despair.
The economy, which was beginning to show signs of  growth after the
1999 elections, suffered a severe downturn, with a projected 1 per cent
growth rate. Foreign investment once again dried up, and many local big
businesses yet again moved their financial assets overseas. A few large
ones are now operating in Fiji as foreign companies. Investor confidence,
severely shaken by the crisis and continuing uncertainty about Fiji’s
political stability, took a dive, while the economy suffered from the huge
cloud over the sugar industry, which provided over 40 per cent of  the
country’s export earnings and 15 per cent of  the gross domestic product,
and employed nearly 150,000 people (P. Lal 2000). The anticipated loss
of preferential access to the European Union was one problem.
But the more immediate issue was the fate of  farmers whose leases
under the Agricultural Landlord and Tenant Act (ALTA) began to expire.
The government and the Native Land Trust Board wanted ALTA to be
replaced by the Native Land Trust Act (NLTA) because they saw ALTA
as favouring tenants—making the termination of  expiring leases more
difficult and remuneration for landlords less attractive. The essential
difference between the two was that NLTA provided for rolling 5–30-
year leases, rather than minimum 30-year leases, giving landowners the
opportunity to reclaim their land earlier if  they so chose. Under ALTA,
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the rent was assessed at a fixed 6 per cent of the unimproved capital
value, while under NLTA, it was to be assessed at the current market
value and a percentage of  production, to the benefit of  landowners.
Other provisions of  the Act generally favoured the landowners. The
land problem is inevitably politicised, both by the leaders of  the farming
community and by those representing the landlords, to the detriment of
the economy. In many cases where leases were not renewed, land was
lying fallow, slowly turning to bush, while the displaced tenants, dismayed
to see their life’s work ruined, sought shelter in refugee camps and looked
for alternative employment.
The fabric of national society was strained. While ostensibly things
looked calm—people went about their business, intermingled in the
workplace, on the sports field, around the yaqona bowl, more so in parts
of Fiji not directly traumatised by the events of 19 May—but hidden
behind the rhetoric of multiculturalism and reconciliation lay deep
suspicions and raw prejudices, more widespread now than in Fiji’s recent
past. People who once had genuinely moderate views sought shelter and
succour in extremist ethnic camps. Many Indo-Fijians, although politically
opposed to Mahendra Chaudhry, supported him as ‘their only hope’ against
the Fijian nationalists. Many Fijians similarly supported Laisenia Qarase.
Some might see the widening divide between the two ethnic groups as
confirming the historical pattern of  race relations in Fiji history, but that
would be a mistake. The two communities have cooperated in the past;
the prominent example being in the review of the 1990 constitution.
And there was genuine regret on all sides at the racial turn Fiji politics
had taken.
I have already said that in Fiji, race relations tend to get polarised at
election times. The race card has long been a part of  the zero-sum game
politicians have played. A semblance of  normalcy returns as political
tempers cool. While relations were tense, it would be a mistake to draw
a picture of two solidly united groups, at the edge, at each others’ throat,
ready to explode. The truth is that both the communities are internally
divided by class, regional origins and culture. Not all Fijians, for instance,
wanted the 1997 multiracial constitution revoked, nor Fiji to be turned
into a Christian state. Some demanded special affirmative action programs
for Fijians, while others did not. Some wanted George Speight and his
in george speight’s shadow
211
co-conspirators pardoned while others insisted on a proper trial. The
deeper cracks, the confederacy and dynastic politics which surfaced in
the aftermath of  the coup, are still there, papered over for the moment.
Fijian leaders recognise that the political unity of all Fijians under a
single banner is an evanescent dream. Fijians rallied behind Rabuka in
the early 1990s only to fragment later. Large numbers supported Qarase
in 2001 but over a dozen Fijian political parties, including the newly
launched the National Alliance Party, will contest the general elections
scheduled for 2006.
Strong support for Chaudhry among Indo-Fijians should be read in a
similar light. They rallied—and continue to rally—behind him because
of the spectre of violence and discrimination that threatens them at the
hand of  the Fijian nationalists. But deep divisions exist. In the 2001
election campaign, more than in previous ones, there was open talk of
the difference between Gujaratis and the descendants of  the girmitiyas,
and between North and South Indians. The National Federation Party
was portrayed as a party of  the Gujaratis and the South Indians. Several
community leaders spoke with dismay about the damage reference to
regional and cultural origins during the election campaign had done to
social relations at the local village level. Whether, or how, the internal
frictions and divisions manifest themselves in future political realignments
would be watched with interest.
The turnout at the polls in 2001 was low; a mark of  fear, apathy,
indifference and protest and, possibly, the absence of  fear of  non-
collectable fines for not voting. Many Indo-Fijian voters also stayed away
because of intimidation, fearing reprisal from Fijian landlords as well as
the nationalists if they voted for Labour, which everyone assumed they
would. The percentage of  invalid votes was a staggering 11.69 per cent
compared to 8.69 in 1999. The campaign itself  lacked the verve and
excitement normally associated with election campaigns in Fiji. There
were a few large rallies in selected centres, but most of the campaigning
was done in small pocket meetings. Television advertisement played a
larger role this time than before, featuring party manifestos and policy
positions. There was lengthy debate among leaders of  all the major parties,
though this generated more heat than light. Interestingly, all the major
parties used the internet, several with their own web sites, publicising
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their manifestos and accomplishments. The internet was largely for
overseas supporters and fundraisers as few outside the major urban centres
in Fiji had access to computers. The calibre of  candidates among Indo-
Fijians was markedly inferior to the 1999 line-up, featuring a lacklustre
list of  retired schoolteachers and public servants and others looking for
a second career. This was in contrast to the calibre of  Fijian candidates,
especially in the SDL, which featured accomplished, if politically
inexperienced, professionals most of  whom had served in the interim
administration. Fijians saw a future in politics; Indo-Fijians did not, at
least not with any expectation of  taking a leading part in the nation’s
affairs. Many had sent their families abroad, and they themselves would
migrate if they could.
The road to the August elections began with the hijacking of the
Fijian parliament on 19 May 2000 holding members of  the People’s
Coalition government hostage for 56 days. George Speight and his wide
circle of supporters, defiant and uncompromising, sought to have
themselves installed as the new government, preferably with the
endorsement by the Great Council of  Chiefs. A number of  appointments
to an interim administration were in fact announced but then abruptly
withdrawn and lists revised when negotiations failed. The besieged
president, Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara, sought, albeit unconstitutionally, to
wrest control of the unfolding events, offering an olive branch to the
rebels with the promise to review the constitution to take account of
their concerns. He failed because the rebels saw him as a part of  the
problem—an aging, imperious leader unwilling to give up power, out of
touch, seeking personal advantage for himself and harbouring dynastic
ambitions. Unable to stamp his customary authority, Mara vacated office
under armed protection on 29 May, allowing the army to impose martial
law and a curfew in the urban areas.
Following Mara’s resignation, the army installed a military government
headed by Commodore Voreqe (Frank) Bainimarama. He became
executive head of government, and was advised by a Military Court of
Advisors. Their main aim was to secure the release of  the hostages and
the return of  stolen weapons. After a long and frustrating series of
meetings with the rebels, the military managed to negotiate the Muanikau
Accord, which freed the hostages. The rebels were promised amnesty if
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they surrendered the arms stolen from the military’s armoury. But when
the rebels reneged, making further impossible demands from their new
holdout at Kalabu, the army, its reputation already bruised and battered
by the hostage crisis, its inaction the subject of derisive comment about
its much-vaunted professionalism, retaliated with a brutality that shocked
the Fijian community. The army eventually subdued the rebels and
established a semblance of  law and order, but its brutal tactics left a
legacy of bitterness among Fijians, planting the seed for a violent mutiny
several months later.
On 3 July, the interim military government announced a 19-member
cabinet to run the country till 2002; it hoped that by then a new
constitution would be in place and fresh elections could be held under
it. The military saw the main task of the interim administration as
rehabilitating the economy, and drawing up the terms of  reference for a
new constitution review commission. The commission would ‘consider
particular constitutional issues of concern to indigenous Fijians’,
including strengthening the role of the Great Council of Chiefs ‘in the
national affairs of  the state’, a race-based affirmative action for Rotumans
and Fijians, and recognition of traditional and customary laws of the
indigenous community (Pacnews, 3 July 2001). The commission began
hearings in mid August 2000, but met immediate public opposition, both
for the manner in which it was appointed, by an unconstitutional interim
administration without consultation with the major political parties, and
for the composition of  its membership. The four Indo-Fijians on it were
all Christians, representing only a tiny percentage of the Indo-Fijian
community, and none enjoyed the confidence of  the community at large.
The chair of the commission was Asesela Ravuvu, a long time advocate
of  Fijian paramountcy and one of  the vocal hardline Fijian nationalists.
His presence and unguarded utterances compromised the commission,
with the Indo-Fijians boycotting the hearings en masse.
The commission was suspended in January 2001 following a high
court ruling upholding the 1997 constitution and declaring its appointing
authority, the interim administration, illegal. Nonetheless, a small four-
member subgroup prepared a summary report that, for the most part,
blamed the Indo-Fijians for the problems facing the Fijian people. The
Indo-Fijians were characterised as vulagi, visitors, who should, but did
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not, accept their proper culturally sanctioned role to serve, or at least be
subservient to, the taukei, the owners of  the land. Indo-Fijians used
‘democracy, equality, and human rights to discourage and outmanoeuvre
Fijian political efforts and aspirations to regain that nationalism and the
power which had been ceded in 1874’, the report argued. The Indo-
Fijians, moreover, ‘did not consider the Fijian people’s demands for the
paramountcy of their interests and the return of all government authority
into Fijian hands’. The solution to Fiji’s political problems? Fijians ‘must
rule it [Fiji] and feel secure that they shall not be dominated in their own
house. This is the only solution to long-term political stability, peace
and prosperity’. The political leadership of the country should always
remain in Fijian hands, the authors argued ‘within a time frame to allow
others to be eventually assimilated and accepted as Fijians’.1 Laisenia
Qarase promised to be guided by the spirit of the report, adding
provocatively that since Fijians owned 83 per cent of the land, they
should have proportionate dominance in parliament.
On the economic front, the government promised a number of
initiatives to revive the stagnant economy. It proposed to lower the corporate
tax rate for all tax payers, introduce investment and accelerated depreciation
allowances, lower duty rates on construction materials and capital items,
permit exporters access to world priced inputs, introduce a duty suspension
scheme for all regular exporters with a record of  compliance. Four months
later, following the example of the post 1987 initiatives, the Qarase
administration embarked on a ‘Look North’ policy, seeking export markets
and fresh investment input from East Asia (Fiji Times, 5 December 2000).
Fiji backed Japan’s effort to become a permanent member the United
Nations Security Council, and supported China’s membership of  the World
Trade Organization. China gave the Royal Military Forces F$1.8 million
dollars, and Japanese aid similarly increased. But not for long. The financial
crisis humbled the Asian tigers and the promised large-scale investments
did not materialise. Given the imperatives of international financial
investment, it is fair to surmise that they never will.
These initiatives were overshadowed by, or subsumed under, the
interim administration’s ‘Blueprint for the Protection of  Fijian and
Rotuman Rights and Interests, and the Advancement of their
Development’, presented to the Great Council of Chiefs by Qarase on
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13 July 2000. The blueprint proposed to transfer all crown or state land
to the Native Land Trust Board, set up a Land Claims Tribunal to ‘deal
with long-standing historical land claims’ for ‘land acquired for public
purposes’, establish a Development Trust Fund for Fijian training and
education, give Fijian landowners more royalty for resources extracted
from their lands, the payment determined by the cabinet and not
parliament, exempt Fijian-owned companies from company tax for a
period of  time, reserve 50 per cent of  the licences (import, permits) for
Fijians as well as 50 per cent of  government contracts. These initiatives
were not new. Many such schemes had been tried in the past and had
failed, but the administration was less concerned about the internal
coherence and viability of its proposal. It was more attuned to the
blueprint’s appeal among Fijian voters.
In May 2001, the administration announced a ‘Blueprint for Affirmative
Action for Fijian Education’. Long on vision and rhetoric but short on
specifics, the blueprint proposed a ten-year affirmative action program for
the ‘development of a new generation of indigenous Fijians, proud of
their traditions and cultural heritage, and imbued with a hunger for education
for individual development and success; and of a national society with
indigenous Fijians competing successfully in all fields of endeavour towards
national socioeconomic development’. The aim was to
…develop and transform all Fijian schools into centres of cultural and educational
excellence to promote, facilitate and provide the quality education and training
Fijian students need for their own individual development, and to adequacy equip
them for life in a vibrant and developing economy. To inculcate into Fijian parents
the understanding that education is the key to success in life and to therefore place
the education of their children highest on their list of priorities.
These would be realised through the establishment of an advisory Fijian
Education Board, strengthening community participation, providing
access to quality education and training at all levels, upgrading the
qualification of Fijian teachers, mounting special programs to meet the
needs of  Fijian school leavers, strengthening education in rural areas,
and providing for a system of review to monitor the progress of the aims
of the blueprint.
As shown in earlier chapters, Fijian education has long been a national
problem. Failure rates, especially at secondary and tertiary levels have
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been alarming for years, despite nearly four decades of  affirmative action.
An estimated 90 per cent of Fijian students dropped out between 1988
and 2000. In 1988, 11,000 Fijian children enrolled in class one, but
thirteen years later, only 1,247 were in form seven. There has been little
proper accounting for the failure rate, and the allocation of more money
would not necessarily solve the problem. The interim administration’s
‘racial’ approach neglected certain complexities of educational activity
in Fiji. Only Fijian schools, so designated, were eligible for funds
earmarked for Fijian education. Yet, there were many non-Fijian schools
which Fijian children attended; in some instances—Pandit Vishnu Deo
Memorial School in Samabula, DAV Girls College and Suva Sangam
High—they comprised the largest numbers. Yet, these schools did not
qualify for special assistance, discouraging Fijian parents from sending
their children to non-Fijian schools, shielding them from a competitive
learning environment they would inevitably encounter later in life.
The interim administration had its critics who saw the blueprint as
Qarase’s ploy to pay off  militant elements who were behind the 19 May
event. Dr Isimeli Cokanasiga of the Fijian Association Party argued that
the blueprint would ‘not benefit Fijians who were hardworking,
successful, talented, smart and ambitious’, but those who were ‘blue-
blooded, losers, lazy, dumb and ambitious’ (Fiji Times, 13 November
2001). Qarase was undeterred. His policies, backed by all the advantage
of incumbency and the state purse, proved popular among Fijians and
accounted for the party’s victory in the elections. Buoyed by popular
support and unable to form a united Fijian political front, Qarase, a
politically inexperienced merchant banker of mixed record, launched
his own political party, the Soqosoqo ni Duavata ni Lewenivanua, in
May. Qarase targeted the Fijian voter as his first electoral priority, and
brazenly committed the public purse to that end.
There was much movement and activity on the Labour side as well.
Released from captivity, the members of  the deposed government pleaded
their cause to the international community already outraged by Speight’s
coup. Australia, New Zealand and the United States responded with
trade and ‘smart’ sanctions banning coup supporters from entering their
countries. In July, Labour filed a case in the Lautoka High Court before
Justice Anthony Gates challenging the abrogation of the constitution. It
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argued that the attempted coup of May was unsuccessful, the declaration
of a state of emergency invoking the doctrine of necessity by President
Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara unconstitutional, and the purported abrogation
of  the 1997 constitution void. The People’s Coalition government
remained the legitimate government ‘in view of the [inability of the]
interim military government and Speight’s group to reach an agreement
on governing the country’.2 For its part, the interim administration argued
that the applicant, Chandrika Prasad, a farmer fleeing terror in Muaniweni
in southeastern Viti Levu, who had sought temporary shelter at the
refugee camp at the Girmit Centre, and in whose name Labour had
instituted the legal proceedings, had no locus standi to mount the court
case. His action was an ‘abuse of process’, ‘scandalous, frivolous and
vexatious’.
Justice Gates, however, thought otherwise. He agreed that the coup
had failed. ‘It never achieved any legitimacy’, he declared, because it
had breached established procedures for amending the constitution. He
then turned to the contentious ‘doctrine of necessity’, on which the
state had rested its case. The doctrine justified extra-legal intervention
in exceptional circumstances, through military takeover, for instance, to
preserve peace, order and a semblance of  government when the state is
paralysed. But it could not be used to legitimise or consolidate the extra-
legal usurpation of  the power of  the state. ‘The doctrine does not permit
necessity to be used as a means of subverting the existing constitutional
structure either by abrogating the existing legal order or by bypassing the
path laid out for lawful amendment’. ‘Whatever is done however should
be done in order to uphold the rule of  law and the existing constitution’,
Gates ruled. ‘Necessity cannot be resorted to in order to justify or support
the abrogation of  the existing legal order. The doctrine is valid only to
protect not destroy’.
The interim administration, too, was illegal, in Gates’ opinion. The
‘rule of  law means that the suspended state of  affairs and the constitution
return to life after the stepping down of a responsible military power
and after the conclusion of its work for the restoration of calm for the
nation. The nation has much for which to be grateful to he military, and
may yet have further need for its assistance to maintain stability. There
is no constitutional foundation of legality for the interim administration’.
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The pre 19 May parliament was still in existence. Ratu Mara still remained
president. The ‘status quo is restored. Parliament should be summoned
by the president at his discretion but as soon as possible’.
Gates’ was a courageous decision that caught the interim
administration, and most people in Fiji, by surprise. Nonetheless, to its
credit, and against the advice of some hardliners, the administration
agreed to appeal the decision before the Fiji Court of  Appeal, Fiji’s highest
court after the abrogation of  the Supreme Court following the May coup.
The full bench met in March, chaired by Sir Maurice Casey of New
Zealand, and consisting of Justices Ken Handley of Australia, Gordon
Ward of  Tonga, Sir Maori Kapi of  Papua New Guinea and Sir Ian Barker
of New Zealand. The interim administration was represented by two
Queen’s Counsel (Nicholas Blake and Anthony Molloy) and the
respondents by Australian legal academic George Williams and the high
profile human rights lawyer Geoffrey Robertson, QC. The appearance in
the court of case of such a distinguished cast ensured high drama and
unusual amounts of international interest.
The court first considered the state’s contention that the abrogation
of the constitution was justified because the electoral system—
preferential voting—had produced an outcome detrimental to Fijians,
that the first-past-the-post method of voting would have given a more
balanced result, that 1997 constitution had weakened protection of
indigenous Fijian rights guaranteed under previous constitutions, ‘so that
the new government under an Indo-Fijian prime minister could disregard
and erode the rights of indigenous Fijians’. On the system of voting, the
court concluded that under the first-past-the-post system, one of the
Fijian parties, the SVT, would have won more seats (from 8 to 17), and
Labour three fewer (34 instead of  37), but overall, the People’s Coalition
would have won 45 seats (increased to 47 with the addition of two VLV
candidates to the cabinet). ‘Whichever system had been used, the voting
figures would have made the FLP the largest individual party by a
substantial margin’. The court similarly rejected the claim that Fijian
rights could be eroded by the government of  the day, noting the ironclad
guarantees in the constitution. No significant issue touching indigenous
concerns could be passed without the consent of the Fijian people
themselves, specifically without the support, in the Senate, of 9 of the
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14 senators nominated by the Great Council of  Chiefs. Any ‘attempt by
the government to change the law in relation to land or to indigenous
rights by stealth was impossible under the 1997 constitution and any
suggestions that it needed to be replaced on that ground cannot be
substantiated’. Nor did the court uphold the doctrine of necessity as a
justification for abrogating the constitution.
Had a new legal order been created by the coup? Had the revolution
succeeded? The interim administration argued that it had. It was now
firmly in control of  the country, it claimed that the machinery of
administration was functioning, and the population had acquiesced. Fiji’s
continued diplomatic relations with the international community also
attested to its legitimacy and authority. The court ruled otherwise. Several
human rights and community organisations had presented affidavits
showing curtailment of  basic freedoms. The existence of  emergency
legislation inhibiting pubic expression of dissent was proof enough of
continuing public disquiet about events in the country. ‘The people must
be proved to be behaving in conformity with the dictates of  the de facto
government’, the court concluded, and the interim administration had
not furnished convincing evidence to support its claim, thus failing the
test of  acquiescence. Summing up, the Fiji Court of  Appeal ruled that
the 1997 constitution remained the supreme law of  the country. It had
not been abrogated. And the parliament had not been dissolved but
prorogued on 27 May for six months. But on one issue—whether the
president had in fact resigned of  his own accord—the court ruled that
he had, contradicting Gates’ judgment. Ratu Mara was no longer the
President of  Fiji. The vice president, Ratu Josefa Iloilo, had assumed the
office of president.
The much anticipated decision of the Court of Appeal did not create
the havoc in the country that some had predicted (or hoped for). Instead,
the Great Council of  Chiefs, the interim administration and the military,
after some public misgivings about its ability to maintain law and order,
agreed to respect the decision. What was the way forward? The court’s
decision divided the Labour Party. One faction, led by Deputy Prime
Minister Tupeni Baba, preferred a broad-based government of  national
unity from among the members of the deposed parliament. Baba, a
politician of thwarted ambition with a shaky power base, whose strident
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criticism of  Mahendra Chaudhry’s style was public knowledge, would
lead that government with other Fijian parties, including the SVT. What
Fiji needed, he said, was more breathing space to heal the wounds of the
coup, not another acrimonious election in an heightened atmosphere of
racial tension.
Chaudhry disagreed. He would never agree to be a part of any
government that included people who were ‘connected even remotely’
to the coup (Pacnews, 5 March 2001). But some in the Labour Party
tentatively explored the possibility of having the Christian Alliance,
Speight’s party, in a multiparty Labour government.3 The national interest,
Chaudhry said, ‘would best be served if  we were to go for fresh elections’.
Accordingly, Chaudhry advised the president to dissolve the parliament
after reconvening it to deal with constitutional issues raised by the
opposition parties. Astonishingly, in his letter to the president, he even
agreed to reconsider the alternative vote system, of which had been
staunchly opposed. ‘The People’s Coalition has an open mind on this
and is prepared to discuss changes to bring back the first-past-the-post
system’ (People’s Coalition government media release, 7 March 2001).
The president disregarded the advice of  both the factions. Instead,
he listened to the senior officers of  the army who met him soon after the
Appeal Court’s ruling. The military expected the president to observe
the spirit of the constitution, but added emphatically that ‘as a matter
of national interest we cannot afford to have Mr Chaudhry and his group
back’ (Fiji Sun, 4 March 2001). The army, now a central part of  the
Fijian political equation and the ultimate guarantor of  public security,
could be ignored only at the country’s peril. Even Chaudhry’s own
colleagues agreed, including his deputy prime minister, Adi Kuini Speed,
who urged her former leader to ‘use good sense and realise that it is
going to be very unstable if  he returns as prime minister. It will be very
dangerous because of what has happened’ (Fiji Times, 5 March 2001). In
an act of astounding constitutional contortion, President Iloilo swore in
his nephew, People’s Coalition Minister Tevita Momoedonu as acting
prime minister, and asked him to advise dissolution of parliament, which
Momoedonu did. Iloilo accepted the advice and Momoedonu’s prompt
resignation, and reappointed the Qarase’s caretaker administration to
prepare the country for general elections. Chaudhry challenged the
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constitutionality of  the president’s action, but was unsuccessful.
The announcement of elections in August paved the way for the next
phase as political parties geared up for elections. Fragmentation and
confusion were the order of  the day. The People’s Coalition fractured.
Tupeni Baba resigned from the Fiji Labour Party in May to form his own
New Labour Unity Party, accusing his former leader of  trampling on
‘dialogue, compromise and consensus’, of being insensitive to Fijian
concerns and problems, of an absence of ‘fair and equitable distribution
of  power’ within the party. Chaudhry, Baba said bluntly, was a ‘dictator’
(Fiji Labour Party campaign material). The disunity among Fijians was
worse. In western Viti Levu, Apisai Tora, ever-mercurial, formed yet
another political party, the Bai Kei Viti, to challenge the Party of  National
Unity; the party that he himself  had launched to contest the 1999 elections.
Competing for the same vote, on an almost identical platform, they
cancelled each other out, thereby decreasing western Fijian voice in national
affairs both were keen to secure. The SVT regrouped under the leadership
of  Filipe Bole, but it was pale shadow of  its former self, unsure of  its
identity, uncertain about its future direction, confused about its electoral
tactics and strategy, and contradictory in its political pronouncements.
The Fijian Association, under its ailing leader, Adi Kuini Speed, was
divided and drifting, unable to articulate a coherent vision. The
Nationalist Vanua Tako Lavo Party had its predictable agenda for Fijian
nationalism and political control appropriated by other ‘mainstream’
political parties. Among them was the newly formed Conservative
Alliance Matanitu Vanua Party, conceived on the island of  Vanua Levu
by supporters of  George Speight and the coup. The party wanted the
1997 constitution replaced with one that gave Fijian political control.
‘We can’t have immigrant people run the government; political control
must be related to the ownership of resources that fuels Fiji’, thundered
one of  its leaders, Ratu Rakuita Vakalalabure (Fiji Sun, 5 September
2001). The party rejected the ALTA, demanded greater landowner control
over the exploitation of natural resources (forests, fisheries, minerals),
and compensation for past government projects on alienated Fijian land.
It also wanted Speight and his co-conspirators granted amnesty. Speight,
the party claimed, was not a terrorist but a political prisoner, not a traitor
but a hero of the ‘Fijian cause’, a latter-day Sitiveni Rabuka.
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Laisenia Qarase’s Soqosoqo ni Duavata ni Lewenivanua was the
mainstream Fijian ‘nationalist’ party. Its unabashedly pro-Fijian agenda
and deep animosity to Mahendra Chaudhry, which intensified as the
campaign progressed, increased its appeal among Fijian voters. The SDL
portrayed itself as the party best positioned to realise the aims of the
Speight coup, trumpeting the undoubted wealth of  bureaucratic and
technocratic talents among the rank of  its candidates. It, too, would
review the constitution to entrench Fijian paramountcy. It would set up
a Land Claims Tribunal to investigate land claims by landowners. The
Fijian Blueprint was its manifesto for the indigenous community, and
the SDL committed itself to its full implementation. And the Qarase
administration blatantly used the advantage of incumbency to the
maximum: practising pork-barrel politics at its worst (or best), improving
roads, building bridges, donating money to schools in marginal Fijian
constituencies, providing farming implements, brush cutters, outboard
motors and generators (Sunday Times, 2 September 2001). Loyalists were
placed in strategic decision-making positions in the public service and
statutory organisations. The powerful Methodist Church lent the party
its own considerable support, ‘threatening eternal damnation for those
not supportive of whomever it support[ed]’ (Sunday Times, 2 September
2001). Well funded, sharply focused, uncompromising and strident in its
defence of  Fijian interests, the SDL easily out-gunned its Fijian rivals.
Apart from the advantage of  incumbency, Qarase was helped by the
division and lack of  drive in other Fijian parties. A good example was
the performance of  the SVT. Its new leader, Filipe Bole, a veteran
politician, adopted a moderate, multiracial stance. He defended the 1997
constitution and criticised Qarase’s nationalist rhetoric. Bole also saw
no problem working with Chaudhry. The party’s manifesto emphasised
social and economic issues—health, education, jobs, infrastructure,
reforming the value-added tax system, helping first-time home buyers
(Daily Post, 29 July 2001)—making its platform virtually indistinguishable
from that of  its rivals.
But many in his own party did not share Bole’s vision. Among them
was former SVT leader, a coup-supporting nationalist, Ratu Inoke
Kubuabola, for whom there was a ‘Fijian consensus that the 1997
constitution does not adequately safeguard the indigenous rights and
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aspirations’ (Daily Post, 16 August 2001). On Chaudhry, Kubuabola
declared the Labour leader ‘must accept reality; he is not a man of peace,
he is for confrontation; he is trying to take what is not his for the taking.
The reality should tell Mahendra Chaudhry why he just doesn’t qualify
to lead this country’ (Daily Post, 24 August 2001). Mere Samisoni, the
SVT candidate for Lami, was an ardent supporter of  the Speight coup,
supplying food to rebels at the parliamentary complex. Berenado
Vunibobo, with nationalist leanings, was likewise linked to the Speight
camp. He was, moreover, a member of  the Constitution Review
Commission that were lobbying for the constitution changed. The SVT
also suffered the indignity of its sponsorship by the Great Council of
Chiefs being severed on the eve of  the elections. The party which had
started with much promise and which had been in power throughout the
1990s was clearly hobbled by doubt about its purpose and identity, unable
to articulate a vision that resonated with its primary constituency, the
indigenous Fijians. That role had been usurped by the SDL. And the
SVT’s newly minted but generally unconvincing politics of  moderation
was undermined from within its ranks and attacked by other Fijian parties.
Labour’s success in winning 16 seats was due to its own innate strengths
as well as the weaknesses of  its opponents. Baba was unable to entice to
the NLUP other senior members of Labour equally displeased with
Chaudhry’s style and who had been reprimanded for indiscipline and
purported insubordination (Krishna Datt and Pratap Chand, for example).
Baba, a former academic prone to ponderous intellectualising, had no
political base of his own, and Labour supporters accused him of treachery
at a time when unity was imperative. The party’s new style election
campaign, featuring pop singers and football players, was ridiculed by an
electorate demanding, and accustomed to, a more serious approach to
political campaigning. Baba’s handing out of  food parcels to squatters and
other urban poor, smacked of vote buying, similar to the tactic adopted by
the SDL. Perhaps most damaging of  all to NLUP’s claim to be clean and
transparent was the revelation that a convicted fraud, Peter Foster, had
bankrolled the party’s campaign to the tune of  F$200,000 (Pacific Island
Report, 13 August 2001).4 This revelation made a mockery of  Baba’s call
for transparency, accountability and good governance, and he paid the
price. Baba lost his seat, although two of his colleagues won.
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The other major threat to Labour was the National Federation Party.
In 1999, NFP had won a third of  the Indo-Fijian votes to Labour’s two-
thirds. The NFP had much ground to cover, and ultimately it was not up
to the task. One problem was leadership. The retirement from politics
of  its long-term leader, Jai Ram Reddy, had left a huge gap. The resignation
of Biman Prasad, an academic economist and newcomer to politics, just
two days after being elected leader compounded the problem. His
replacement, Attar Singh, a trade unionist, was unable to erase the image
of  a weakened, drifting party searching for a leader. The NFP’s moderate
and conciliatory approach, its emphasis on social and economic issues,
which looked suspiciously like a facsimile of  Labour’s manifesto, lacked
appeal in an atmosphere charged with racial tension. Chaudhry could,
and did, claim the mantle of  Indo-Fijian leadership.
The NFP’s electoral tactic of  highlighting its role in the political and
economic development of the country—its role in the achievement of
Fiji’s independence, in the Dening Arbitration, which had caused the
departure of the Colonial Sugar Refining Company from Fiji, in the
negotiation of  the Agricultural Landlord and Tenant Act, even its role in
the successful review of the 1990 constitution—carried little weight
with voters reeling from unemployment and poverty, and profoundly
ignorant of  history. The NFP’s traditional support base had eroded over
the years, captured by Labour—the sugarcane growers were with the
Labour Party-affiliated National Farmers’ Union, as were public servants,
teachers and workers. The emigration of  thousands of  Indo-Fijians since
the coups of 1987 had robbed the party of supporters who might have
been more sympathetic to NFP’s moderate stance and multiracial vision.
Labour’s claim that the NFP was yesterday’s party, supported by rich
businessmen, some of  whom had allegedly supported the Speight coup,
did not help. In the end, the NFP was unable to capture the imagination
of people looking for a party to lead them into the future, not one harking
to its past glories.
The other minor Indo-Fijian parties were similarly ineffectual. Among
them was the Justice and Freedom Party, formed by Dildar Shah after
the May coup. Holding the United Kingdom and Australia responsible
for the introduction of Indians to Fiji and, by extension their present
troubles, the party demanded compensation from them as well as
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permanent residence for Indo-Fijians in Australia. The plight of  Indo-
Fijians in the camps in Lautoka and Vanua Levu served to heighten the
appeal of their position. But the single-issue tactic failed, its cause
emotionally appealing but legally unsustainable. The indentured workers
had come under a contract, an agreement, which entitled them to return
to India at the end of five years, at their own expense, or at the
government’s expense after ten. Most had chosen, voluntarily, to stay on
in Fiji, acquired Fiji citizenship and participated in the affairs of the
country as full citizens. To be sure, indenture was a harsh, brutalising
experience, but it was not slavery, at least in the technical sense. Voters
sympathised with the party’s cause but rightly thought its realisation
impractical.
But Labour won seats not only because of the weakness of its
opponents. Chaudhry was an astute, skilful politician, perhaps the most
adroit in the country, and the only Indo-Fijian political leader of  national
stature. Many rallied to him for that reason, just as many Fijians supported
Qarase. To some Chaudhry appeared arrogant and confrontational, but
his supporters saw him as strong, fearless and principled. There was an
enormous amount of  emotional sympathy for what Chaudhry and his
colleagues had endured at the hands of the parliament hijackers: the
humiliation and the beatings, the imminent threat to their lives. And yet,
despite it all, they had remained undaunted. As Chaudhry said at his
rallies, ‘they put a gun to my head and I didn’t flinch. Why should you be
afraid to vote for me?’.
Leadership aside, Labour’s other campaign claim was its record of
government. They had removed value-added tax on essential food items,
generated employment (6,400 jobs) and investment (F$300 million worth
of  hotel projects approved), improved infrastructure, cracked down on
tax evaders, achieved a remarkable 6.6 per cent of economic growth,
and F$47 million budget surplus in just the first three months of 2000.
They were overthrown not because they had failed but because some
vested interests (and others who felt otherwise marginalised) felt
threatened. Labour wanted to complete the task they had begun. They
had done nothing wrong; they were the wronged party. The Indo-Fijian
electorate listened sympathetically, understood the message and
responded overwhelmingly in support, especially those who were
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desperately poor and without hope. The Fijian nationalists’ shrill attack
on Chaudhry stiffened their resolve.
The election produced a stalemate, with neither SDL nor Labour
winning an outright majority of  seats. Both parties then began negotiations
with the Conservative Alliance, the moderates and the independents to
form a multiparty government required by the constitution. That Chaudhry
was seeking a coalition with the party whose members had masterminded
the coup against his government a year earlier was full of  irony, but then,
in 1992, Chaudhry had supported Sitiveni Rabuka, the architect of the
1987 coups. Initially, the Conservative Alliance grossly overplayed its hand
by demanding amnesty for Speight and his co-conspirators, a voice in senate
nominations and, most improbably, deputy prime ministership for Speight.
To their credit, both Qarase and Chaudhry flatly refused the amnesty
demand. Realising their strategic error, the Conservative Alliance dropped
their demands and agreed to join Qarase’s SDL government; political
opportunism won over political principles. Qarase also successfully enlisted
two independents (Savenaca Draunidalo and Marieta Ringamoto) and New
Labour Unity Party’s Kenneth Zinck to his side. He had formed a multiparty
government, as the constitution demanded.
That, however, was not enough. The constitution (Section 99)
provides that in establishing the cabinet, the prime minister must invite
all parties whose membership in the House of Representatives comprises
at least 10 per cent of the total membership of the house to be represented
in proportion to their members in the house. If the party declined the
invitation, the prime minister could then nominate members of his own
party or a coalition of parties to fill the places in the cabinet.
As the leader of the largest party in parliament, Qarase was thus
constitutionally obliged to invite the Labour Party to join his cabinet.
This he did, reluctantly, hoping that Chaudhry would decline the
invitation. According to the formula provided for allocating the number
of seats in the cabinet in the Korolevu Declaration (Parliamentary Paper
15/1999), Labour was entitled to 8 of the 20 cabinet seats and SDL 12.
Qarase, who had already stated that the idea of working with Chaudhry
as an anathema, argued that Labour’s and SDL’s policies were
diametrically opposed, as they indeed were, and that Labour’s inclusion
in cabinet would be a prescription for political paralysis.
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The policies of my cabinet will be based fundamentally on the policy manifesto of
the Soqosoqo Duavata ni Lewenivanua, as the leader of this multiparty coalition.
Our policies and your policies on a number of key issues of vital concern to the
long-term stability of our country are diametrically opposed. Given this, I genuinely
do not think there is sufficient basis for a workable partnership with your party in
my cabinet’ (Daily Post, 14 September 2001).
Chaudhry, however, thought otherwise. He accepted the invitation. ‘What
fool in politics would like to be in opposition when he can be in
government’, he observed (Fiji Times, 11 September 2001). Personal
differences between the two leaders were of secondary importance,
Chaudhry wrote to Qarase. ‘We believe that common conviction on
rebuilding the nation in a spirit of reconciliation must supersede all else.
The issue of policy difference can be resolved in a frank and fair
discussion designed to reach consensus and understanding’ (Daily Post,
17 September 2001). Qarase was unmoved. He argued now that
Chaudhry had laid down conditions that he found unacceptable.
Chaudhry, he said, wanted to have a hand in the allocation of  cabinet
portfolios. He wanted to act as ‘opposition’ within cabinet, thus
undermining the principle of  consensus and collegiality. Chaudhry denied
Qarase’s charge of  conditionality, and pressed for urgent negotiation,
pointing out that as prime minister he had invited into his cabinet parties
whose policies, too, were different from Labour’s but who had managed
to form a coherent government. When Qarase refused, Chaudhry sought
the president’s intervention. But the frail president, increasingly
dependent on advisors openly sympathetic to the cause of Fijian
nationalism, refused, swearing in Qarase and his cabinet.
Qarase’s intransigence was the predictable result of  many factors.
Among them is his personal antipathy to Mahendra Chaudhry. Qarase
would have been able to work with another Indo-Fijian leader, his
supporters say, less abrasive, less confrontational, someone like Jai Ram
Reddy. But personality was only a part of  the equation. Political survival
was at stake too. Qarase knew that if  he did not deliver on his electorally
appealing but poorly costed promises to the Fijians and appease the
nationalist fringe he would suffer the same fate as his predecessors.
Qarase’s main aim was to keep Fijians united and on his side. To that
end, he worked hard to co-opt all potential Fijian adversaries and
dissidents into his circle. Apisai Tora, the opportunistic western Fijian
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rebel, was appointed to the senate. Ratu Tevita Momoedonu, another
westerner, was appointed Fiji’s ambassador to Beijing. Ratu Epeli
Nailatikau, the amiable high Bau chief and a loyal deputy prime minister
in the interim administration, was appointed speaker of the House of
Representatives. The president of  the Methodist Church, Reverend
Tomasi Kanailagi, a powerful figure in the Fijian community and privately
a staunch supporter of the coups, was rewarded with a seat in the senate.
The nationalist chair of the Constitution Review Commission, Asesela
Ravuvu, was there as well. Ratu Finau Mara, the jobless son of the
former president, was made the roving Ambassador to the Pacific Islands.
The politics of  patronage knew no bounds.
Meanwhile, Mahendra Chaudhry filed a motion before the Court of
Appeal against the government for breach of Section 99 of the
constitution. When the Court of  Appeal ruled in Labour’s favour, the
government appealed to the Supreme Court. By the time the Supreme
Court delivered its verdict, a year had passed. During this period, attempts
were made, notably by the Honolulu-based East West Center, to initiate
dialogue through ‘talanoa’ sessions of  informal consultations. Nothing
happened, except restatement of  hardened positions. In parliament the
government continued to pursue its pro-Fijian policies, while some of
its ministers indulged in inflammatory rhetoric. For instance, the minister
of  social welfare and women’s affairs likened Indo-Fijians to ‘noxious
weeds’ but she was not reprimanded. A plea made to the chief justice to
expedite the Supreme Court case fell on deaf  ears. Neither the chief
justice nor the Qarase government was in a hurry for an early resolution
of  the constitutional crisis.
The Supreme Court heard the case on 18 June 2003 and delivered its
judgment a month later (Supreme Court of  Fiji Civil Appeal no.
CBV0004/20025, 18 July 2003). The case relied on the interpretation
of Section 99 of the constitution. The section provided, among other
things, the prime minister must establish a multiparty cabinet whose
composition ‘should, as far as possible, fairly represent the parties
represented in the House of Representatives’. The parties entitled to be
in cabinet should have at least 10 per cent of the seats in the house. The
prime minister could invite parties with less than 10 per cent membership
of the house, but the selection would be deemed to have been from the
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prime minister’s own party. And, importantly, in selecting persons from
other parties for appointment as ministers, the prime minister ‘must
consult with the leaders of  those parties’. The government’s case turned
on narrowly technical grounds. It argued that the word ‘invitation’ created
no entitlement for any party to participate in cabinet, that the prime
minister’s invitation was ‘no more than a mandatory first step before the
commencement of good faith negotiations for a multi-party government’,
and that the principles of  Westminster system of  absolute secrecy of
cabinet deliberations and the collective responsibility of cabinet to the
House of Representatives would be severely compromised in a multiparty
arrangement where the parties did not pursue a common policy but instead
contemplated opposition within cabinet and the government.
The Supreme Court ruled otherwise. The constitution was not an
abstract impractical document, as the state had argued. It had been ‘drawn
up with an eye to political realities and likelihoods. The construction to
be placed on it in accordance with its spirit should not be directed or
heavily influenced by the possibility of circumstances which the framers
may have discounted as highly improbable’, it ruled. The prime minister
was under precise, emphatic obligation to invite all parties that met the
10 per cent threshold to be part of the cabinet. The invitation was more
than a ‘mandatory first step’. ‘This is not simply an invitation for their
members to be there without any agenda or policies of their own. This is
a provision which advances the central constitutional purpose of power
sharing’.
Was a multiparty cabinet inherently unworkable? Again, the Supreme
Court did not think so because cabinet deliberations were ‘subject to the
requirements of collective responsibility and confidentiality which are
recognised in the constitution as aids to effective government’. Everyone
accepted that. ‘This may mean a more difficult cabinet to manage than a
cabinet whose members belong to the same party or coalition that has
worked out some consensus before its formation. But this is the kind of
cabinet that is envisaged by the constitution and it cannot be rejected as
unworkable in principle because of that difficulty’. Division of opinion
in cabinet was nothing new, the court argued, and the constitution, in
particular Section 99, aimed to ‘encourage debate on contentious policies
including debate across party lines’. Finally the court ruled that there
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was an obligation on the prime minister to ‘negotiate in good faith at
least to the extent necessary to ensure that his invitation is a genuine
invitation and is maintained as such. An invitation issued on conditions
which are incapable of  satisfaction will not meet that obligation’. Political
posturing that Labour had allegedly engaged in when Qarase offered the
invitation was not to be construed as rejection of  the offer. The spirit of
power sharing which lay at the heart of the constitution had to be
honoured.
The government accepted the Supreme Court ruling. The prime
minister outlined three options at his disposal (Pacific Island Report, 24
July 2003). He could call for a fresh election, but that would not only be
expensive but also would not resolve the issue at hand unless both parties
agreed jointly to amend the power-sharing provision. He could ‘start
with a clean slate’, resign and then, on reappointment, establish a new
cabinet. The third option was to retain the present numbers and add to
them the appointments from the Labour Party. Qarase rejected the second
option because, with only 32 seats in a 71-member House, he could not
be certain of  reappointment. ‘Politics in its fundamental form is about
survival. If  you don’t survive, you cannot carry through on your policies
and serve the people’. Nor could he jettison his other partners in the
government, for that would be tantamount to political suicide. ‘The
political reality’, Qarase said, ‘is that we are not free to make changes to
our policies without first consulting the members of our parties, right
down to the constituency level. We are bound by the trust people have
placed in us’.
He settled upon the third option. He offered 14 seats to Labour in a
cabinet of 36. Labour argued that it was entitled to 17 ministers, and
mounted further legal challenge only to be told that the prime minister
could invite members from the upper house to the cabinet in excess of
those prescribed in the formula. Qarase had observed the letter of  the
law, but not its spirit. He offered Labour minuscule ministries with
insignificant budgets: an ‘insulting offer’ Labour called it. Consultation
stipulated in the constitution did not mean ‘concurrence’, Qarase argued,
with Supreme Court support, and proposed to select members from the
Labour party without Chaudhry’s approval. Chaudhry himself  along with
some of his other high profile colleagues would be kept out.
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The problem in the end was not constitutional. The constitution was
clear about the rules of  the game. The real problem was political. Power
sharing, although difficult, is achievable given goodwill and understanding
and a desire to develop a common ground. But it is fraught when the
major players are constantly at loggerheads about the most basic issues
of  public policy. Labour wanted the perpetrators of  the coup to face the
full brunt of  the law; the government had within its ranks many who
were openly sympathetic to, or actual participants in, the violence that
overthrew the Chaudhry government. Labour wanted an independent
enquiry into the plundering of the public purse for political purposes;
the government was reluctant to probe misconduct because the politics
of patronage and support for local interests aided its election. Labour
wanted race-based affirmative action policies abandoned; government
regarded them as non-negotiable pillar of its political agenda. The two
had contrasting views on land-leasing arrangements. The list of  differences
is endless. Professor Yash Ghai, the eminent constitutional expert, put
the issue succinctly. ‘No constitution will work properly if  those who
operate it have regard only for sectional interests; the constitution poses
a more explicit challenge than most to work in the interest of the whole
nation. It speaks—are the politicians listening?’ (Sunday Times, 16
September 2001). Evidently not.
Notes
1 A copy of  this never publicly released report is in the author’s possession.
2 For a lawyer’s account, see Williams 2000.
3 A senior Labour Party member has confirmed that this option was canvassed, but no
formal offer was made.
4 Foster was jailed for 18 months by a British court in 1996 for a fraudulent weight-loss





Peace, peace is what I seek, and public calm:
Endless extinction of unhappy hates.
Matthew Arnold
Fiji is a paradox and a pity. A paradox because this island nation endowed
with wonderful natural resources, a talented and multiethnic population
with a high literacy rate, a once-sophisticated, but now crumbling, public
infrastructure where drinkable piped water was once guaranteed, public
roads had few potholes, poverty and crime and squatters were visible
but contained, hospitals were uncrowded, children went cheerfully to
school, and respect for law and order was assured: this nation is tragically
prone to self-inflicted wounds with crippling consequences. One coup is
bad enough for any country, but three in thirteen years—two in 1987
and one in 2000—staggers the imagination. And a pity because there is
no genuine resolution in sight for the country’s deep-seated political and
economic problems as its leaders dither and the country drifts divided.
The battle lines are clearly drawn in a deadly zero-sum game. The militant
nationalists, happily unconcerned about the destructive implications of
their actions, threaten violent retribution if their agenda for political
supremacy is marginalised in mainstream public discourse. Compounding
the problem on top of all this is a manifest lack of collective political
will to exorcise the country of the demons that terrorise its soul.
The tragedy of modern Fijian politics has been that rosy rhetoric for
global consumption has always won over the hard realities on the ground,
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blinding its people to the deep-seated problems that beset the country,
or at least causing them a sense of slight unease in probing too deeply
into the darker recesses of national body politic lest they discover some
discomforting truth about themselves that they would rather ignore (Scarr
1984; Lal 1992; Sutherland 1992). If the emperor had no clothes, it was
better not to find out. And so Fiji portrayed itself  as a marvellous model
of  functioning multiracial democracy, largely free of  ethnic tension and
conflict that plagued many developing countries, the way the world should
be, as Pope John Paul II intoned after a fleeting visit to the islands in
1985. Few publicly acknowledged intra and interethnic tensions, and
the deep reservations the different communities had about the structure
of  power relations in the country, and the deeply contested struggle for
a definition and clarification of Fijian political identity that preceded
independence. The illusion of  harmony and amicable understanding in
the post-independence era was just that, an illusion, and just as misleading
and fraught and dangerous as the impression of balance and equilibrium
and harmony conveyed by an earlier metaphor of  Fiji as a three-legged
stool (Sukuna 1984).
The brutal truth, of  course, was that Fiji never had a genuinely shared
sense among its citizens about what kind of constitutional arrangement
was appropriate for it. It was an issue that had bedevilled the country’s
politics since the late 1920s. Indigenous Fijian and European leaders,
with active official support, argued for separate racial representation.
For them, primordial loyalties were paramount. The Indo-Fijians, on the
other hand, championed a non-racial common roll, privileging sectarian
ideology over ethnicity. The issue dominated political debate throughout
the 1960s, leading to boycott of the Legislative Council and tense
elections and by-elections (Norton 1990; Lal 1992; Mara 1997). The
communal voice won in the end, largely because of Fijian and European
opposition but partly also because of the Indo-Fijian leaders’ lack of
genuine commitment to the idea of common roll, following the death of
A.D. Patel. (Lal 1997). Their compromise was enshrined in the secretly
negotiated independence constitution, which retained ethnicity as the
principal vehicle of political participation while making half-hearted




Unsurprisingly, race dominated post-independence politics. The two
main political parties, the Alliance and the National Federation, were
essentially racially divided, the former among Fijians and general electors
and a sprinkling of Indo-Fijians, and the latter predominantly among
Indo-Fijians. In time, virtually every issue of  public policy came to be
viewed through a racial lense: affirmative action, poverty alleviation,
allocation of scholarships for tertiary education, opportunities for training
and promotion in the public service. The intent to create a more level
playing field, to assist the indigenous community to participate more
effectively in the public sector, was laudable, but race-based, rather than
needs-based, policies inevitably corroded interethnic harmony. Public
memory was racially archived even though the plain reality of daily life
questioned the salience of race. Citizens were asked (as they still are)
for their ‘race’ when they opened a bank account, took out a driver’s
licence, left or entered the country. ‘Race is a fact of  life’, Ratu Sir
Kamisese Mara, Fiji’s first and longest serving prime minister, kept
reiterating. Under his administration, it almost became a way of  life.
Political leaders on both sides opportunistically championed moderate
multiracialism, but privately—and sometimes not so privately—actually
played the race card on every occasion to secure power.
With time, other realities intruded, questioning the legitimacy and
value of  a political edifice constructed on the foundations of  ethnic
compartmentalisation. Forces of  change, rapid in their pace, were fast
eroding old, exhausted assumptions of public discourse. The television
and video brought new and strange images into people’s homes.
Urbanisation proceeded apace, spawning problems that transcended race,
and attenuated traditional social and cultural links and attachments.
Improved roads speeded up communication, and cash cropping fostered
individualistic values. As R.G. Ward put it, ‘the combined introduction
of  new skills, new technology and money have weakened the functional
cement which binds native Fijian village society. This does not mean
that the structure has collapsed, or will do so in the near future. It does
mean that the risk of disintegration exists if other factors shake the
edifice’ (Ward 1987:124). Decades earlier, O.H.K. Spate, R.F. Watters
and C.S. Belshaw, among others, had made essentially similar points, but
were dismissed as being insensitive by traditionalists afraid of change,
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and ignored by a colonial government too timid or too tied down to
orthodoxy to embrace potentially progressive ideas (Spate 1959; Belshaw
1964; Watters 1969). An opportunity was thus missed to enable and
empower the Fijians to embrace the forces of modernity engulfing their
lives. For this failure, they would pay dearly later.
Things came to a head in 1987, the year of the first two military coups,
when a democratically elected, nominally left leaning, Labour-National
Federation Party coalition was ousted after a month in office. Some
commentators saw the crisis as a straight-out ‘racial fight’ between the
Fijians and Indo-Fijians (Scarr 1988). Others saw the conflict fundamentally
as a class struggle between the haves and the have nots, Fijian commoners
and Indo-Fijian working class joining hands against the dominance of chiefs
and the Indo-Fijian business élite (Robertson and Tamanisau 1988). The
importance of both race and class is acknowledged, as it has to be, but the
coups were also an effort to turn the clock back, to fortify old structures
and values which sustained them against forces of change, to shore up the
importance of  rural areas as well as the power of  traditional leaders at a
time when the new government was determined to democratise elements
of the traditional order (Lal 1988). As Dr Timoci Bavadra, the deposed
Labour prime minister, told his campaign rallies in 1987, the individual’s
democratic right to vote did not mean a compulsion to vote for a chief. It
was a free choice.
By restricting the Fijian people to their communal way of lifestyle in the face of a
rapidly developing cash economy, the average Fijian has become more and more
backward. This is particularly invidious when the leaders themselves have amassed
huge personal wealth by making use of their traditional and political powers’ (Fiji
Times, 17 November, 1987).
These were revolutionary words in the context of the time and the place,
a call to action by an indigenous Fijian no less, against a system already
feeling itself  under siege. They had to be nipped in the bud quickly.
The traditionalists rallied to restore the status quo. The post-coup 1990
constitution, decreed by presidential edict, and prepared without
widespread consultation, predictably privileged rural Fijians over their
urban counterparts, allocating 30 of the 37 Fijian seats to them and only
seven to urban and peri-urban areas, even though nearly 40 per cent of
Fijians were urban dwellers. Moreover, a candidate had to be registered
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in the Vola Ni Kawa Bula (the Register of  Native Births) of  the
constituency in which he or she was standing, further entrenching
provincialism in Fijian politics (Lal 1998; Robertson 1998). Provincial
and regional affiliations, often opening up pre-colonial social cleavages
and questioning the structure of  power distribution in Fijian society,
acquired an unprecedented public and symbolic significance that tested
the colonially created notion of an overarching Fijian cultural and social
identity. It also had the seriously deleterious effect of  weakening the
operation of  political parties among Fijians. The provincial councils
selected candidates, and their first loyalty therefore was to their provincial
power wielders. Leaders of  political parties had limited influence over
their selection and even less power to discipline them for insubordination
or breach of party discipline. The predictable result was an undisciplined
proliferation of  political parties among Fijians, formed by disgruntled or
discarded candidates flying regional flags or conveniently camouflaging
their private agendas under the guise of ‘Fijian interest’.
To prevent fragmentation, Fijian leaders had the Great Council of
Chiefs sponsoring a single political party to unite disparate indigenous
opinion and interests under one umbrella (Lal 1998). That party, the
Soqosoqo ni Vakavulewa ni Taukei (SVT), was launched in 1990 but
the hope for unity was predictably still-born, as many openly questioned
the wisdom of a chiefly body getting embroiled in party politics and the
highly contestable assumption that Fijians were of one mind on all things
political. Would a Fijian opposed to the SVT be any less ‘Fijian’ than
one who supported it? In an ironic twist, a commoner, albeit an
uncommon one—Sitiveni Rabuka—was elected president of the party
over one of the highest-ranking chiefs of Fiji, Adi Lady Lala Mara.
Unsurprisingly, dissension built up, opposition emerged, rival factions
developed, and alternative parties were launched, such as the Fijian
Association Party, privately supported by Mara, and All National Congress
and later the Party of  National Unity in western Viti Levu formed by
Apisai Tora, the perennial chameleon of  Fiji politics. The SVT was
dislodged from power in 1999 by a combination of factors, but among
the most important was the political fragmentation of the Fijians (Lal
2000). That trend, which shows little sign of abating, will continue to
hobble party politics among the Fijians, especially now that provincialism
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is back in business and flourishing and Fijian leaders are seeking to
institutionalise provincial administration along the Melanesian model.
‘We are still coming out of  provincialism’, Rabuka says, ‘and having that
form of  system will be counter to creating national cohesiveness’ (Sunday
Post, 20 April 2003). He is right, but sadly in a marginalised minority.
The party presently in government, Soqosoqo Duavata ni
Lewenivanua, launched after the 2000 coup on an explicit nationalist
platform to woo the supporters of  the coup, was able to win power by
adopting a fiercely pro-indigenous platform and by outbidding other
moderate Fijian parties that failed miserably at the polls. Its effort to
consolidate its position included a promise to review the constitution to
entrench Fijian political control, and pursue race-based, pro-Fijian,
affirmative action policies in commerce, education and the public service
(Lal 2002). It also bought off potentially troublesome opposition by
diplomatic postings and through other employment opportunities. Ratu
Inoke Kubuabola, a key nationalist and coup supporter, is now Fiji’s
High Commissioner to Papua New Guinea. Isikia Savua, police
commissioner at the time of  the 2000 coup, and allegedly involved in it,
is Fiji’s Ambassador to the United Nations, and Adi Samanunu Talakuli,
a known Speight supporter from the Kubuna Confederacy, is Fiji’s High
Commissioner to Malaysia. Berenado Vunibobo, a George Speight
sympathiser, has recently handled several diplomatic assignments for
the government. Several people publicly known to have supported the
coup—Apisai Tora, Ratu Josefa Dimuri, Ratu Inoke Takiveikata,
Reverend Tomasi Kanailagi—are in the senate. Ratu Jope Seniloli, the
coup leader George Speight’s choice for president, is vice president (but
now serving time in jail for taking an illegal oath of  office). Political
patronage has yielded the government much needed short-term benefits,
but what will happen when the well runs dry, when there are no more
perks to be distributed, or when the purchase price for silence or
compliance rises beyond reach? How will the disgruntled elements be
pacified then?
The present government has made a review of the constitution a key
plank in its political platform. Indeed, while heading the interim
administration set up soon after the 2000 coup, Laisenia Qarase
established a constitution review committee headed by Professor Asesela
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Ravuvu, a known nationalist-leaning former University of  the South
Pacific academic, to recommend changes (Ravuvu 1992). But the
committee, set up without public consultation, criticised from the
beginning, and filled with handpicked men of dubious credibility
(certainly in the Indo-Fijian community) lacked legitimacy and was
unceremoniously disbanded after a few months. A summary of  its
report—the full report, although taxpayer-funded, has not been
released—suggested a hardline nationalist position requiring vulagis—
guests, foreigners such as Indo-Fijians—to accept the primacy of the
taukei—the indigenous people, the first settlers—in politics. The
fundamental nationalist argument is that Fiji ‘belongs’ to the indigenous
Fijians, and its political leadership should therefore always be Fijian.
Others can live in Fiji and work and pay taxes but should never aspire to
political leadership. That acceptance, the nationalists argue, is an absolute,
non-negotiable precondition for political stability.
Although that position is unpalatable to liberal democrats, many
indigenous Fijians will, I suspect, broadly embrace it as a symbolic
recognition of  the indigeneity of  the country. There was political stability
in Fiji from independence to 1987 because a Fijian, who had the
confidence of  his people, was at the helm, many Fijians say. When his
hold on power was threatened, as in 1977 and again in 1982, retribution
was threatened. And when he actually lost power in 1987, violence was
sanctioned to reinstate him. In other words, democracy would be viable
only with an indigenous Fijian at the helm. Perhaps. But Ratu Mara led
the country under a constitution forged through consensus, flawed though
it was. Astute and skilful manipulation of  the electoral system put the
Alliance Party in power, not a constitutional requirement for an
indigenous Fijian as head of government. Any constitution that breaches
human rights conventions embraced by the international community will
be rejected outright. That much is absolutely certain. A constitution
that sanctions racial discrimination is doomed from the start—dead before
the ink has dried.
There are other issues as well. Fijian society is much more diverse
now than ever before. It is criss-crossed with a host of class, regional,
provincial and rural–urban interests that contest the claim of  unity
(Dakuvula 1992). There is no one leader who commands the respect
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and loyalty of all Fijians as Ratu Mara once did, or Ratu Sir Lala Sukuna
before him. The question is not really about having a Fijian head of
government, but rather which Fijian leader would be acceptable to a
particular group of Fijians at any given point in time. Dr Timoci Bavadra
was a Fijian, and Fijians ousted him in a military coup. Rabuka was a
Fijian, and he was defeated by indigenous Fijian votes, first in 1994 and
then again in 1999. Ratu Mara was a high chief—paramount chief of
the province of Lau—and he was turfed from office after the 2000 coup
by a group of  Fijians. Commodore Frank Bainimarama is a Fijian, but
his leadership of  the armed forces was challenged by Fijian members of
the military in a bloody mutiny in November 2000. George Speight claims
indigenous ancestry—he now prefers to use his Fijian name Ilikini
Naitini, though of course a Speight by any other name is still a Speight—
and he is languishing in jail for a crime whose beneficiaries are ruling the
country.
Fijians of all ranks and backgrounds talk wistfully about the urgent
need of  forging indigenous political unity, but, as the Reeves Commission
argued, that goal is now  unattainable, if  it ever was. In the past, Fijians
lived in villages, for the most part isolated from the other communities
and dependent on subsistence agriculture. They had their own ‘native
regulations’ and programs of work under the leadership of traditional
leaders. But Fijian society has changed dramatically in the years since
independence. Now, over 40 per cent live in urban or peri-urban areas,
participate in the cash economy, enjoy the benefits of  tertiary education,
and are well represented in the professions and the public sector (Prasad,
Dakuvula and Snell 2001). A sizeable and rapidly growing self-made
Fijian middle class is an undeniable social fact in contemporary Fiji. It is
therefore unrealistic to expect one political party to accommodate and
represent a whole multiplicity of  complex and competing interests.
The emphasis on unity also constrains the choices available to Fijian
people who will not be able to vote a Fijian government from office if it
does not deliver on its promises. Fijians, like other citizens, have the
same regard for effectiveness and efficiency. ‘The idea that a Fijian
government must be maintained in office at all costs has grave
consequences for political accountability’, the commission argued. ‘It
requires setting aside the normal democratic control on a government’s
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performance in office. This is bad for the Fijian community as well as
for the country as a whole’ (Reeves, Vakatora and Lal 1996).
But perhaps, as Stewart Firth suggests, Fijian politics increasingly is
not about delivering on promises but rather about taking turns at the helm
balancing regional, provincial and social interests by virtue of traditional
power calculations rather than competence or merit (personal
communication 2003). In this equation, non-Fijians matter little.
Demographic reality dictates that future direction of Fiji politics will be
influenced predominantly by indigenous concerns and calculations. The
projected population of Fiji in 2002 was 824,596 of which indigenous
Fijians numbered 441,363 (53.5 per cent), while the Indo-Fijians,
328,059, constituted 39.8 per cent. This trend will continue with
accelerating Indo-Fijian migration and a lower birth rate in the community.
Provincial and regional calculations will, as they already do, determine
appointments and promotions and other opportunities in public life.
Commodore Bainimarama, from the Kubuna confederacy, was appointed
commander of  the Fiji Military Forces in part, people say, because the two
previous holders of the position, Sitiveni Rabuka and Ratu Epeli Ganilau,
were from Tovata. Rabuka complained how, under the 1990 constitution,
under which Fijian members were elected to parliament from the provinces,
he had to ensure the presence of all the provinces in the cabinet, irrespective
of ability and talent. Not to do so would have been interpreted as a slight
on the province’s name and incur their wrath. But as Fijian numbers
increase, the Fijian people will realise that good governance and not the
calculations of  provincial representation will serve their interests better.
Many Fijians privately do, but are fearful of  expressing dissent when the
strident talk of  ‘Fijian interests’ fills the air.
Leadership is a problem for both the Fijian as well as Indo-Fijian
communities. Among Fijians, the era of  the dominance of  paramount
chiefs with overarching influence across the whole spectrum of
indigenous Fijian society, tutored for national leadership by the British
in the post-war years, has ended. The paramounts are gone: Ratu George
Cakobau, Ratu Edward Cakobau, Ratu Penaia Ganilau and Ratu Mara
are all dead. These Fijian leaders brought with them practical experience
of  public service—Mara was a district officer in the predominantly Indo-
Fijian sugar district of Ba—and had a broad educational background in
reflections
241
Fiji and overseas (Mara 1997). Whatever else may be said of them and
their politics, they generally believed in the principles of good,
accountable governance, no doubt a legacy of their experience in the
colonial civil service. They also had a multiracial circle of  friends, and
were committed to the principles of  democracy, even if  it was on their
own terms.
Their successors lack their broad experience and background. Many
latter-day Fijian leaders went from racially exclusive provincial primary
schools to predominantly Fijian secondary schools, such as Queen
Victoria or Ratu Kadavulevu, their formative years uninformed and
uninfluenced by any meaningful exposure to the cultures of other
communities (Dean and Ritova 1988; Sharpham 2000). They are thus
culturally ill-equipped to meet the leadership challenges of building a
multiracial nation, embroiled as they often are in provincial and regional
politics to carve out an inclusive, more embracing national personality
for themselves. In civil administration, too, senior military leaders who
were facing dead-end careers but were politically well connected, were
plucked from the armed forces to become district commissioners, serving
in areas and among people whose culture and way of life they did not
understand, unlike their colonial counterparts who were expected to have
some fluency in the dominant language of the area (Hindustani or Fijian
as the case might have been). That trend is likely to continue in a public
culture dominated by the politics of racial patronage.
Indo-Fijians have leadership problems of their own. Over the years,
there has been a marked shift in the social and educational background
of  Indo-Fijian leaders. At the time of  independence—and before—the
majority of Indo-Fijian politicians were lawyers or businessmen or
landlords. Now, the base has diversified, with increasing numbers coming
from the trade unions and the academia and from the ranks of retired
schoolteachers and civil servants looking for second careers. They, too,
for the most part, are handicapped by cultural limitations similar to those
of  the Fijians. Few politicians, for instance, are fluent in the indigenous
language, more specifically Bauan, although those from rural areas with
substantial Fijian populations such as Bua, Savu Savu, Taveuni, Levuka
and Nadroga do speak the local dialects. And not many of  them have a
direct experience of Fijian culture. Those who do are few and are not
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always appreciated. When a Labour parliamentarian made his maiden
speech in his Nadroga dialect, there were disapproving voices among his
own colleagues. The minister of  multiethnic affairs, George Shiu Raj,
was a fluent Fijian speaker, at ease in both cultures, but his cross-cultural
skill was sadly derided. The message seems to be that you cannot be an
‘authentic’ Fijian or Indo-Fijian if you are cross-culturally fluent or
transgress ethnic and cultural boundaries. Such is the nature of  public
discourse in a racially segregated society.
The trade union culture, at least the way it has evolved in Fiji, muddies
the already troubled currents of  national politics. That was one of
Mahendra Chaudhry’s most severe handicaps as prime minister. Few
disagreed with his prognosis of the problems facing Fiji, but they disliked
the manner in which he articulated them: forthright, testy, even
confrontational, with little appreciation that the Fijian mode of both
private and public discourse is allusive and tempered by protocol. In
trade union politics everywhere, ends often justify the means, but in
national politics, the means, articulated in the glare of intense, unrelenting
public scrutiny, is probably just as, if  not more, important as the end.
Chaudhry often chanted the mantra of electoral mandate to justify his
uncompromising pursuit of  his election promises. To be sure, he had the
mandate from the voters, but that, he discovered to his enormous cost,
was only one mandate among many. The Great Council of  Chiefs had its
mandate for the indigenous community; the Native Land Trust Board
had its mandate, the Fijian dominated army its own. The art of  political
leadership in such a situation lay in negotiating one mandate among
many competing and often incompatible mandates. Chaudhry’s tragedy
was that he ignored this crucial fact or at least showed an insufficient
appreciation of it. This did not cause his downfall, but it made its
contribution.
Multiethnic societies, with divergent traditions of discourse, are prone
to miscommunication and misunderstanding among its people and leaders.
Fiji is no exception. Indo-Fijian politicians revel in open, robust public
debate often conducted without subtlety or irony. Their sledgehammer
approach is direct and confrontational, and applauded by their supporters
drunk on the rhetoric of  polarised politics. The Fijian tradition of  public
discourse, on other hand, is generally the opposite: allusive, indirect and
reflections
243
hedged-in by cultural protocol and sensitive to person and place. In that
context, sometimes what is not said is probably just as important as what
is. The gap is accentuated by the colonial legacy of  racial
compartmentalisation, the absence of shared cultural traditions and
language (except English), attachment to different faiths and, more recently,
the corrosive effects of  the coups. Leaders talk at each other rather than
to each other, and even then often through the media. Of course, Fiji is
not alone in this, but its peculiar history compounds the problem.
Misunderstandings are not only linguistic but cultural as well. Let me
illustrate. Most Indo-Fijians routinely assert that Fijians have over 80
per cent of  all the land in Fiji. That is statistically true, but only a small
percentage of it is economically useful. Moreover, land is not owned by
one monolithic entity but by thousands of social units scattered
throughout the islands. Thus, some Fijians have ample land, while others
are effectively landless. But these internal facts of  uneven patterns of
native landownership and land distribution escape Indo-Fijian
comprehension beyond the most generalised understanding of their
complexity. There is something more.
To most non-Fijians, land is an item of  economic utility, a basis for an income, to be
acquired, used and disposed of, if the occasion arises, without much emotional
wrench. To most Fijians, on the other hand, and almost every rural Fijian, it is part of
his being, his soul; it was his forebears’ and shall be his progeny’s till time immemorial.
And the Indian sees large stretches of land between Suva and Sigatoka and Nausori
and Rakiraki lying idle and can’t understand it. He even becomes angry and bitter
when he sees his former flourishing farm is now, after he was denied renewal of  his
lease, bush and scrub. The Fijian does not see it that way. Sufficient for him that it is
there (Singh 1988:2, see also Overton 1988 and Kamikamica 1997).
Singh’s characterisation of  the problem may have an element of  deliberate
exaggeration to underscore the difference in perception of  the two
communities, but the larger truth holds about two essentially competing
and often incompatible notions of land as commodity and land as cultural
inheritance.
But just as Indo-Fijians do not grasp the Fijians’ almost mystical
attachment to their vanua (Ravuvu 1985), indigenous Fijians have little
understanding of  the deeper cultural and moral impulses that inform the
Indo-Fijian mind-set. The two most crucial concepts in Indo-Fijian
thought are izzat (honour) and insaf (justice) (Gillion 1977; Lal 2000).
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‘Do what is right, not what is opportunistic’, the Bhagvada Gita teaches.
Islam sanctions jihad in the face of oppression. Death is preferable to
dishonour. ‘A no muttered from the deepest convictions is better and
greater’, A.D. Patel told his rallies in the 1960s, quoting Mahatma Gandhi,
‘than a yes muttered merely to please, or worse, to avoid trouble’, because
in the end, truth will triumph (Satyame Vijayte). I believe that Indo-Fijians
would accept an outcome, even if it is politically disadvantageous to
them, provided it is transparently fair and does not affront their sense of
dignity, honour and self-respect. Indo-Fijian leaders pushed for a common
roll of voting in the 1920s when they were a minority in the population.
As H.L.S. Polak told the Colonial Office in 1929, ‘everywhere they
[Indians] stand by the principle of the common franchise as symbol of
equal citizenship’ (Gillion 1977:138). In the 1960s, the overwhelming
majority rallied to that cause because the cause was just, not necessarily
because it was politically advantageous or indeed achievable. Privately,
many Indo-Fijians would probably accept a Fijian head of government
if that outcome were achieved through political negotiation, but never
as a constitutional right. In 1997, for example, Indo-Fijians put aside
their longstanding demand for political parity with the Fijians and
accepted proportionality in the reserved seats (23 Fijian and 19 Indo-
Fijian) because the allocation was based on the demographic size of the
two groups. It is difficult to convey how deeply offensive the words
‘second class citizenship’ are to the Indo-Fijians’ sense of honour and
self-worth.
Many Fijians feel that the Great Council of Chiefs should play a more
active role in national politics (Madraiwiwi 2002). Since its formal
establishment after Cession in 1874, it has been the principal advisor to
colonial and post-colonial governments on matters relating to the
indigenous community. In the 1970 independence constitution, its
nominees in the senate enjoyed the power of veto over all legislation
touching indigenous Fijian interests and concerns. The 1997 constitution,
for the first time, recognises the Great Council of Chiefs as a
constitutionally established institution (as opposed to one established
by an Act of Parliament). Its 14 nominees in an upper house of 34
members enjoy veto powers similar to the provisions of the 1970
constitution. The General Council of Chiefs also nominates the president
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and the vice president of Fiji. In short, its role and authority are an
important political as well as constitutional fact and, perhaps more
important, beyond dispute or debate.
The council’s supporters see it as an important force for good in
restraining ethnic chauvinism, in facilitating ethnic accommodation, and
bridging the ethnic divide (Norton 1999). Perhaps, though, the actual
evidence is contestable. In 1987, the General Council of Chiefs convened
to legitimise the overthrow of the Labour Coalition government, its
proceedings dominated by its more hardline, violence-threatening
elements. Rabuka was hailed as a cultural hero and inducted into the
council as a life-member. In 2000, it similarly convened, at the behest of
Speight supporters, to demand changes to the 1997 constitution–the
very constitution it had unreservedly blessed—to accommodate the
nationalist Fijian demand. Such inconsistency or blatant opportunism
undermines the council’s moral authority and legitimacy among non-
Fijians. The current chair of  the General Council of  Chiefs, Ratu Epeli
Ganilau, says he is a ‘keen to involve Indian leaders in the chiefs’ council
to discuss sensitive issues such as land’ (Fiji Times, 14 April 2003). That
is a welcome gesture in the right direction, but it would require a
consistent effort to ensure that the Indo-Fijians are able to make genuine
representation of  their concerns, interests and aspirations. There are,
however, some Fijian chiefs such as Adi Litia Cakobau who have argued
that the chiefly council should represent the concerns of the indigenous
community exclusively, and that anything else would detract from its
central purpose and mission.
Unfortunately, there are few avenues available for interethnic dialogue
outside the political arena where talk is inevitably shrill and antennas
are tuned to ethnic partisanship and sectional advantage. Religious
organisations have few opportunities for regular interfaith conversation.
The Methodist Church, to which the majority of Fijians belong, has
been strongly nationalistic since the 1987 coups, except briefly when it
was led by Dr Iliata Tuwere. In 2003, the Church was pleading for the
pardon of the soldiers involved in the 2000 mutiny as a part of the
reconciliation process. In the mid 1990s, the various faiths—Hindu,
Muslim, Christian—were able to overcome their differences to establish
an ‘interfaith search’ to seek common ground to pave the way for national
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healing and reconciliation, but corrosive effects of ethnic and religious
politics have eroded its foundations (Hurley 2000). Fijians have their
traditional avenues for intra-Fijian dialogue and dispute resolution through
district and provincial councils, and through the machinery of the Fijian
administration. But these are closed to the Indo-Fijians. The Girmit
Council, an organisation of various Indo-Fijian social and cultural
organisations formed in 1979 to mark the centenary of  Indian arrival in
Fiji, is virtually defunct, while the Indian Summit, convened in the
aftermath of  the 2000 coup, has vanished without a trace. Indo-Fijians
have their village committees and voluntary social and cultural
associations, but these are ill-equipped to facilitate cross-cultural,
interethnic dialogue. What is urgently required is a proper and properly
equipped forum for an exchange of  views between the two communities
outside the political arena (Vakatale 2000).
Perhaps in this context, a recommendation of the Reeves Commission
is worth revisiting. A number of  Indo-Fijian organisations and community
leaders asked the Commission to recommend the creation of a
representative Indo-Fijian umbrella body similar to the Great Council
of  Chiefs. The commission reported
[w]e endorse the principle behind the suggestion, but think that, initially, it should
be taken up informally by the Indo-Fijian community. If  there is agreement about
the basis for the selection of  the members of  such a body, and it is able to meet and
work in a way that demonstrates broad support for its composition and role,
consideration should then be given to providing it with a statutory constitutional
base (Reeves Commission 1996:263).
But the Fiji Labour Party has already rejected the idea. An Indian Council,
it says, would ‘only serve to further divide the people [and]
compartmentalise through the creation of racial institutions’ (Daily Post,
24 April, 2003). That is true, just as it is true that a properly functioning
council could also conceivably challenge the party’s power base in the
Indo-Fijian community. Be that as it may, the prospects look bleak.
The one bright light in an otherwise dim scene is the work of various
multiethnic, non-government organisations. Fiji Women’s Rights
Movement and the Women’s Crisis Centre have done much to educate
the public about issues of gender and domestic violence, even though
both are urban-based. The Ecumenical Centre for Research, Education
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and Advocacy has sponsored important research on sensitive issues of
social justice (Ratuva 2002). The Fiji branch of  Moral Re-armament has
played its part in trying to build cross-cultural bridges. But perhaps the
most important, certainly the most controversial, has been the multiracial
Citizens Constitutional Forum. Formed in the mid 1990s, it has convened
numerous meetings and sponsored conferences, workshops and
publications to educate the public about their constitutional and human
rights (Cottrell 2000; Griffin 2002). It successfully challenged the legality
of  the Qarase government’s unwillingness to form a multiparty
government with the Labour party as provided for in the constitution.
The Citizens Constitutional Forum has consistently been a sharp critic
of  the government’s race-based affirmative action policies. Stung by
Citizens Constitutional Forum’s criticism, the government deregistered
it, but the organisation’s spirit remains undaunted, and it continues its
battle for a non-racial, democratic Fiji. I believe that organisations like
these, which seek non-violent resolution to the country’s deep-seated
problems through non-racial means, have much to contribute to the
difficult task of  nation building.
Recent crises have severely tested the fabric of race relations in Fiji.
On the surface things look calm. People play and work together, mingle in
the markets, and children attend mixed schools, but the underlying tone is
one of  apprehension and anxiety. The government’s affirmative action for
indigenous Fijians, approved in some form or other by many Fijians, is
resented by most Indo-Fijians because they are not transparent and based
on assumptions that defy the experience of daily life: large sections of the
Indo-Fijians live in desperate poverty. They look in dread at the glass
ceiling in the public sector. Sugarcane growers, for the most part uneducated
and unskilled, are forced to relocate and start all over again as leases expire
and their formerly productive fields revert to bush, generations of  effort
vanishing at the stroke of the pen or an official edict. The talk of reviewing
the constitution to further entrench Fijian control causes them deep anxiety.
I asked a prominent Indo-Fijian lawyer married to an indigenous Fijian
what the future held for the Indo-Fijians. Her response: ‘There is little
future for them here unless the present government changes its policies’.
That looks unlikely in the short term. Unwanted and uprooted, Indo-Fijians
leave. Since 1987, over 80,000 have left, and more would leave if they
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could, draining the country of skills and resources Fiji can ill-afford to
lose (Bedford 1989; Gani 2000; Mohanty 2002). But now, more and more
indigenous Fijians are leaving as well, to give themselves and their children
a better future. The Indo-Fijians are caught in a bind. They are leaving
because they don’t see in Fiji a future for themselves and especially their
children, and the government is reluctant to spend money on training and
educating a group it knows will one day go. A tragic catch-22 situation, if
ever there was one.
To heal the wounds, the government has set up a Department of
National Reconciliation and Unity to promote racial harmony and cohesion
through social, cultural, educational and sporting activities. But interethnic
reconciliation is only one part of  the government’s effort. An important
role for the department is to ‘promote greater unity within the indigenous
Fijian community through various programs and activities at village, tikina,
provincial and national levels’. Political self-interest and survival instincts
drive the reconciliation effort; the government knows that its chances of
electoral success depend crucially on Fijian unity, however elusive that
prospect might be. It is precisely for that reason that, however much it
may wish it, and I know that members of the government at the highest
level want justice done, the government cannot afford to be seen to be
proactive in pursuing the perpetrators of injustice. It is for that reason that
the government reportedly asked the military to be lenient on those
convicted of  mutiny. It is for that reason that coup supporters have been
dealt with lightly, and why the government is loathe to reprimand ministers
who utter racist remarks under the cover of ‘parliamentary privilege’. The
government recognises that having aroused Fijian expectations with
ambitious but costly promises it cannot now retreat. To appear to be making
compromises in the national interest would be seen as a sign of defeat. In
short, the government is riding a tiger it cannot dismount at will.
True and enduring reconciliation, which all the people of  Fiji want,
will come only when the truth of  the past is confronted honestly and
dispassionately. In 1987, opportunistic leaders looked the other way when
the coup took place. Sitiveni Rabuka was hailed as a cultural hero of the
Fijian people—‘Steve: The Hand of God’ the t-shirts proclaimed. What
interests and concerns supported the overthrow of the Labour Coalition
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government were never investigated. Fiji is again reluctant to look too
deeply into the heart of  its problems. Thirteen years later, Fiji experienced
another, and more, violent overthrow of a democratically elected
government. And if the causes of the present crisis are not investigated,
Fiji will, as surely as night follows day, encounter more violent turbulence
on its ill-fated journey into the future. The politicisation of  the military,
the police force and the public service will have to cease. The culture of
corruption and nepotism nourished after 1987 will have to be confronted,
the political ambitions of the ‘Children of 1987’ to take the front seat as
a matter of ethnic right curtailed. Regard for law and order would have
to be reintroduced to groups of people, often young, unskilled,
marginalised in the march to modernisation and vulnerable to emotional
exploitation by would-be politicians. Only then will a solid base for
economic development and investment be built.
Beyond that, the people of Fiji would have to reexamine the foundations
of  a political culture they have inherited. It is my firm view that a very
large part of  Fiji’s problems derives from having a political system based
on race (see also Naidu 2000). An obsession with race encourages ethnic
chauvinism, poisons multiethnic discourse, and hinders the search for
solutions to Fiji’s deep-seated social and economic problems, which have
little to do with race but everything to do with colour-blind forces of
globalisation. I am not saying that ethnic sentiments are not authentic or
deeply felt, or that it is a ‘false consciousness’ that will disappear with
‘modernisation’. Ethnicity has its proper place in public discourse. But I
do have a problem with a discourse that sees an individual as nothing
more than the sum total of  his or her ethnicity, to the exclusion of  every
other formative influence. I do have a problem when the central pillars of
state institutions are constructed solely on the edifice of  ethnic exclusivity.
To put it another way, if  ‘race is a fact of  life’ in Fiji, it is but one of  the
many facts of  life. Gender inequality, poverty and social deprivation,
mismanagement and corruption, the abuse of  public trust, the impinging
forces of  globalisation, are others.
The inescapable truth is that using race as a scapegoat will lead Fiji
nowhere. Indo-Fijians do not threaten the foundations of Fijian culture




The new political system emphasises equal opportunity and individual rights, which
diminish the status and authority of chiefs. Equal opportunities in education and
equal treatment under the law have further diminished the privileges which chiefs
enjoyed under colonial rule and traditional life before ... Although village chiefs are
still the focus of many ceremonial functions and communal village activities, their
roles and positions are increasingly of a ritualistic nature’ (Ravuvu 1988:171).
Sitiveni Rabuka
I believe that the dominance of customary chiefs in government is coming to an
end and that the role of merit chiefs will eventually overcome those of traditional
chiefs: the replacement of traditional aristocracy with meritocracy’ (Fiji Times, 29
August 1991).
And so it goes. One can turn the hands of  the clock back, but it
won’t do the clock any good, as the distinguished humanist Oscar Spate
used to say. To reclaim the potential that is surely hers, Fiji will have to
reject the old, exhausted orthodoxies of the past, old ways of thinking
and doing things. There is no alternative coexistence. A past unexorcised





Fiji went to the polls in mid May 2006, the tenth time since independence
in 1970. In what was widely expected to be a contest marred by internal
political fragmentation among indigenous Fijians and a surge of
independents—18 political parties were registered on the eve of the
elections and an unprecedented 68 independents contested—the elections
delivered a result that defied most predictions. The ruling Soqosoqo
Duavata Lewenivanua (SDL) party won 36 seats of the 71 seats in the
House of  Representatives, a clear win over rival Fijian parties. The Fiji
Labour Party won 31 seats, its appeal far outweighing that of its long
time rival the National Federation Party. The United Peoples Party and
independents each winning two of the remaining four seats, the latter
joining the government to boost its numbers. Of  the total 479, 674
registered voters 256,014 (53.4 per cent) were Fijians, 204, 470 (42.6)
were Indo-Fijians, 5,373 (1.1 per cent) were Rotumans, and 13,817 (2.9
per cent) were Generals (that is, all those not included in any of the
other categories).1
The voter turnout, despite early fears to the contrary, was high: 87.7
per cent compared to 81 per cent in 2001. The turnout was uniformly
higher among all ethnic groups: 90 per cent in Fijian provincial
constituencies in 2006 compared to 82 per cent in 2001, 89 per cent
among Indo-Fijians compared to 81 per cent in 2001, an increase of 10
per cent among Generals 73 per cent to 84 per cent and from 76.4 per
cent to 88 per cent among Rotumans. Of  the total votes cast, 8.8 per
cent were declared invalid; this is a high figure but lower than that of
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2001, 12.5 per cent. Finally, the pattern of  racial polarisation at the
polls was evident in this election as in others in the past. The SDL
received 80 per cent of all the ethnic Fijian votes and only one per cent
of Indo-Fijian votes, while Labour won 83 per cent of Indo-Fijian votes
and 6 per cent of  indigenous Fijian votes. In the May 2006 election, the
SDL’s considerable appeal to Fijian voters was evident—whereas, in
2001 it had got only 51 per cent of  indigenous votes. On the Indo-Fijian
side, there was a similar story. The majority of  Indo-Fijians rallied behind
Labour, seeing it as the only political party capable of matching the
Fijian-dominated SDL and adequately representing Indo-Fijian concerns
and interests. Labour’s rival for Indo-Fijian votes, the NFP, got only 13
per cent of  the Indo-Fijian communal votes.
More significant than the low-key election was what followed soon
afterwards. Before all the results were officially declared, SDL leader,
Laisenia Qarase, claimed victory and proceeded immediately to the
Government House to be sworn in as the next prime minister. He then
invited Labour to join his multiparty cabinet as mandated by the
constitution. He had done this in 2001 as well, but at that time had offered
Labour insignificant ministries, a proposal that Labour had rightly rejected
as ‘insulting’. This time, Qarase observed both the letter as well as the
spirit of the power-sharing provision of the constitution and offered Labour
substantial portfolios, including Labour and Industrial Relations, Commerce
and Trade, Health, Employment Opportunity, Local Government and
Urban Development, Agriculture, and Energy and Minerals.
The offer caught everyone by surprise. During the campaign, Qarase
had said that he ‘detested’ the idea of a multiparty cabinet: multiethnic
cabinet yes, multiparty cabinet no. It would not work, he said, because
the manifestos of the two major parties were poles apart, and he would
not deviate from his own manifesto in any multiparty cabinet. His
personal hostility towards Labour leader Mahendra Chaudhry was
palpable. But he changed his mind after claiming victory, saying that the
multiparty cabinet idea was God’s plan for Fiji and he was wholly and
enthusiastically committed to it. ‘The undertaking I am giving to the
country,’ he said, ‘is that the cabinet will not fail through anything I do or
anything I say’. The multiparty idea was a ‘possible master key to a door
that had always remained closed’ (Fiji Sun, 19 July 2006).
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Qarase’s offer put Labour in a quandary. At first, Chaudhry balked,
saying that while the portfolios offered were substantial, they were all
‘in a mess’, and they would place an extra burden on Labour ministers
while the SDL would oversee the most lucrative ministries. But public
opinion, both Fijian and Indo-Fijian, solidly supported the concept of
multiparty cabinet, leaving Labour no choice but to participate. Soon
afterwards, however, the senior leaders of the party were divided over
the manner in which the multiparty concept should work. Chaudhry
insisted that Labour ministers in cabinet should strictly pursue the interests
and priorities of the Labour Party while others, especially senior party
members and ministers, including Krishna Datt and Deputy Leader Poseci
Bune, advocated a more inclusive, non-partisan and less confrontational
approach to making the concept work. At this writing, Labour is grappling
with its deepening internal tensions and challenges.
Of the 18 parties that contested the elections, only a handful had any
hope of  success. The main contenders were the SDL, Party of  National
Unity (PANU) and the National Alliance on the Fijian side and the FLP
and National Federation Party on the Indo-Fijian side.
As the party in government, the SDL had the obvious advantage of
incumbency. In the previous five years in office, it had dipped into the
public purse to keep its ethnic constituency intact. A classic example
was the F$16 million scam in the Agriculture ministry. The Auditor
General regularly reported on the misuse of public office and public
funds but to little avail. The government also sought to implement its
20-year development plan to ensure effective Fijian and Rotuman
participation in ‘all areas of  our economic development’. To that end, in
its 2005 budget it allocated F$4 million for the Fiji Development Bank
Interest Subsidy Scheme for Fijians, F$1 million capital grant to the Native
Land Trust Board and F$8 million for Fijian Affairs Board scholarship
(Sunday Post, 9 January 2005).
The Qarase government took a number of steps to keep its fractious
nationalist junior partner in government, the Christian Matanitu Vanua
Alliance (CAMV), on side. It used the Compulsory Supervision Order
to secure the early release of its members who were gaoled for their role
in the 2000 coup. Among those released in this manner were Ratu
Naiqama Lalabalavu, a paramount chief  of  Cakaudrove (Tui Cakau),
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(currently Minister of Fijian Affairs and Provincial Development) and
Ratu Josefa Dimuri (presently a Minister of State for Agriculture—
Alternative Livelihood). The controversy caused by this ‘abuse’ of the
system was ignored by the government. The move was popular where it
mattered most: the politically important Fijian heartland.
Perhaps the most controversial initiative that the government mooted
was the Reconciliation, Tolerance and Unity Bill, designed, its critics
argued, not so much to heal the wounds caused by the 2000 coup and
related subsequent events, but to tamper with the judicial system to gain
the early release and pardon of the gaoled coup perpetrators and
accomplices. The government denied the allegation, but the
overwhelming sense in the country was that this was indeed the
government’s intention. The Bill provoked sustained protest across the
community, who wanted to the judicial process to take its course. As an
editorial in the Fiji Sun put it, ‘[t]he implementation of such a Bill is
going to create a wrong impression among the people that it is okay to
execute a coup or go against the security force. This is because they will
bank on such a Bill to protect them’ (Fiji Sun, 4 January 2006). Although
publicly the government stood by the Bill, privately it agreed to take a
more moderate stance, agreeing, for instance, to table it after the election.
But the desired political result had been achieved: the perpetrators of
the coup were assured that although the government’s moves had been
thwarted, those in power were looking after their interests.
The government’s support of  the Bill brought it into direct and open
opposition to the military. The relations between the two had soured
soon after the 2001 elections. Some in the ruling party wanted
commodore Frank Bainimarama and others to be prosecuted for removing
Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara from Government House at the height of the
2000 crisis and for attempting to abrogate the constitution (Fiji Sun, 18
December 2004). Bainimarama made no secret of his desire to have the
Home Minister Josefa Vosanibola and his Chief  Executive Officer Lesi
Korovalavala removed; actions that the government was loath to do
(Fiji Sun, 27 December 2005). On several occasions, Bainimarama
publicly criticised the government’s policies, including those which were
racially lopsided in favour of  Fijians. ‘This government continuously
brings in racist policies and programs to justify its existence to the
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indigenous community’, Bainimarama said, adding, ‘[t]he military is
willing to return and complete for this nation the responsibilities we
gave this government in 2000 and 2001’ (Fiji Sun, 9 January 2006). Qarase
called the army’s ‘continual interference’ ‘undemocratic and unwarranted’
saying the ‘Commander’s stated intention of  involving the military in
the national election campaign is a threat to peace and stability, and the
conduct of free and fair elections’ (Fiji Times, 15 March 2006). But that
was as far as the prime minister was prepared to go, ignoring those who
called for the commander to be reined in. The country shuddered at the
prospect of  another upheaval caused by military intervention
Nor would Bainimarama allow the government to nominate Ratu Jope
Seniloli, former Vice President, who was gaoled for taking a wrongful
oath of  office but released before serving out his term, to his old office
(Fiji Sun, 20 February 2006). The army announced that the Unity Bill
would ‘never’ be allowed to pass in parliament. ‘The RTU Bill is not going
to happen’, Bainimarama thundered ominously (Fiji Sun, 22 December
2005). On the eve of the election, Bainimarama openly urged voters not
to vote for the SDL and sent teams of  army officers throughout the country
to ‘educate’ rural Fijians about the government’s ‘misguided’ policies. The
day that parliament was dissolved in March, 500 soldiers armed with
automatic weapons and wearing camouflage held a parade through Suva
to ‘show the people of Fiji that we are here to provide security’ (Fiji Sun,
28 March 2006) The senior officers in the army backed their commander,
although there was one (unsuccessful) challenge to Bainimarama’s
leadership from within the ranks, led by Jone Baledrokadroka in January
2006.
The army’s active intervention in the campaign caused great anxiety.
Labour President Jokapeci Koroi endorsed, on television, the view that
her party would welcome moves by the army to remove the SDL from
power, a strange proposition from a political party which itself had been
the victim intervention by the army in 1987. The army’s defiant public
stance against the government encouraged many voters in the Indo-Fijian
community to come out and cast their votes. ‘The army is with us’,
Labour told its rallies. ‘Vote without fear. There will not be another coup’.
The government argued that the army was overstepping its boundaries,
meddling in affairs that were none of its concern. It wanted the military
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to observe the well-established Westminster convention of  civilian
control of  the armed forces; the army’s role was to enforce the peoples’
will, not pre-empt or freely interpret it. For its part, the military saw its
role as being in charge of the ‘security’ of the nation, very broadly defined.
One senior officer told me that instead of  the army having to ‘clean up
the mess after the fact’, as it had to do in the past, it was better to
prevent it in the first place. Pakistan was cited as a model.
Post-election, especially with the multiparty cabinet in place, the army’s
public profile has been lowered and there signs of reconciliation between it
and the government. How long this lasts remains to be seen. If the government
moves to implement the recommendations of a White Paper calling for a
reduction in the size of  the army or seeks to bring the military under proper
civilian control once again, relations between the two could sour.
On the eve of the election, the fear of the fragmentation of Fijian
votes appeared to be well founded and SDL’s prospects looked to be
threatened. The unknown factor was the impact that the independents,
many of  whom had unsuccessfully sought tickets from the party, might
have in closely contested constituencies. Perhaps the most visible challenge
to the SDL was the New Alliance Party, which espoused a radically different
vision for a multiracial Fiji. The New Alliance Party was headed by Ratu
Epeli Ganilau, former army commander, president of  the Great Council
of  Chiefs, son of  a former president, and a high chief  in his own right.
Launched on the eve of the election, the party promised to remove all
vestiges of racial discrimination from public policy and criticised the
government for pandering to the whims of the Fijian nationalist fringe. It
tried to reclaim the middle ground by advertising itself as the legitimate
successor to the former Alliance Party whose leaders included Ratu Sir
Kamisese Mara, Ratu Sir Penaia Ganilau, Ratu Sir Edward Cakobau and
Ratu Sir George Cakobau—scions of the Fijian establishment. The party
attracted favourable media attention, but failed to win a seat. Its politics
of moderation was decidedly at odds with the ascendant politics of racial
polarisation that the SDL practised to great effect.
The fear of fragmentation led some senior Fijian figures, including
former Reeves Commissioner Tomasi Vakatora and hotelier Radike
Qereqeretabua, to form a Fijian ‘Grand Coalition’ in August 2005
(formally launched on 15 February 2006) to encourage Fijian parties to
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share preferences among themselves. Vakatora argued that Fijian political
unity was the prerequisite to political stability in Fiji. ‘When Fijians get
rattled, they rattle the country’, he said. He was criticised by many,
including by the National Alliance Party, because his views went against
the thrust of  the Reeves Commission, which recommended the formation
of  multiethnic alliances. Vakatora’s assessment was based on a shrewd
and realistic assessment of the realities on the ground as they were, not
as they out to be. Even the Vice President, the widely respected Ratu
Joni Madraiwiwi, said that ‘[m]ost indigenous Fijians believe that their
interests can only be protected by Fijian political control’, adding that
‘[n]either the constitution nor the rule of  law is sufficient for their
purposes because they can be impugned by whoever is in power’ (Fiji
Sun, 16 February 2006). Vakatora was essentially saying the same thing.
The idea of a Grand Coalition failed to materialise. The National Alliance
rejected the idea, PANU was loosely associated with the Labour Party, the
nationalist Vanua Tako Lavo Party fizzled out and the Soqosoqo
Vakavulewa ni Taukei (SVT), in power for much of  the 1990s as the party
sponsored by the Great Council of  Chiefs, was a shadow of  its former
self, fielding, in the strangest of ironies, only one candidate—an Indo-
Fijian. The failure of the minor Fijian parties was not an accident; it was
in large part orchestrated by the SDL, which campaigned as the main
Fijian party and as the defender of  Fijian interests. Its pro-Fijian policies
were championed. Qarase stated repeatedly that Fiji was not ready for a
non-Fijian prime minister, a sentiment with which many Fijians across the
political spectrum agreed. The Fijian people are ‘the majority community
in Fiji numerically, and they are also the majority landowning community
in the country’, Qarase argued in justification (Fiji Times, 4 May 2006).
Qarase’s trump card was Mahendra Chaudhry. Sensing a deep distrust of
the Labour leader among many Fijians, Qarase told his audiences to ‘vote
for me and my party if  you don’t want Chaudhry as prime minister’. Tupeni
Baba, Chaudhry’s former deputy prime minister and now a SDL candidate,
said, ‘[a] vote for Chaudhry is a return to 2000’, adding ‘all of us Fijians in
the Labour Party from the beginning had left him as we cannot see [that]
Chaudhry will protect the Fijian interests’ (Sunday Sun, 23 April 2006) The
tactic worked. In the last days of the campaign, SDL came across strongly
as a party of  and for the Fijians.
islands of turmoil
258
Just as Fijians rallied behind SDL, so the overwhelming majority of
Indo-Fijians supported Labour. A part of  the reason for Labour’s popularity
was the weakness of  other Indo-Fijian parties, especially the NFP. Its
voice of moderation, calling for dialogue and consensus, fell on soil tilled
for racial polarisation. The party seemed to make some inroads in the cane
belts, a Labour stronghold, in the early part of  the campaign, but Labour’s
final campaign, stating that a vote for minor political parties was a vote
wasted, and that the main players in the political arena were itself and
SDL, appealed to many voters. The NFP was underfunded and unable to
compete effectively with its much better organised rival. The fact that the
party did not have a clearly identifiable leader, but a triumvirate consisting
of  Attar Singh, Raman Singh and Pramod Rae, did not help matters. Labour,
on the other hand, had in Mahendra Chaudhry a leader with a track record
and a household name. Its list of candidates consisted of people who had
strong connections with the grassroots. Its effective television
advertisements focused on issues of every day concern to ordinary people:
collapsing infrastructure, bad water supply, pot holes on main roads,
bourgeoning squatter settlements, inadequate housing, rising poverty levels,
increasing unemployment. The NFP also raised these issues, but in the
media war, it could not match Labour.
With Labour and SDL emerging as the two main contestants, the
campaign turned to just a handful of  issues. There was no room for
nuance and subtlety, no opportunity to discuss the fundamental problems
facing Fiji. And there were many. One obvious issue was the fate of  the
country’s sugar industry, hobbled by non-renewal of  leases, the impending
end to the preferential access to the European Union and the perennial
breakdown of  ancient equipment at the main mills. The government
mooted a plan to restructure the sugar industry, with the assistance and
advice of a technical team from India, but the topic was never seriously
raised in the campaign. Equally ignored was the question of non-renewal
of  leases. Labour wanted leases renewed under the Agricultural Landlord
and Tenant Act (ALTA), which slightly favours the tenants according to
Fijian landlords while SDL pushed for the Native Land Trust Act (NLTA),
which gives more favourable consideration to the interests of  landlords.
The NFP proposed a ‘master plan’ under which government would lease
land from the landlords under the provisions of  NLTA but then re-lease
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them to tenants under ALTA. But this idea, too, remained in the
background. I got the distinct feeling observing the campaign that both
the major parties actually shied away from difficult issues in favour of
simple messages sharply delivered.
Acutely aware of the changing demographics, the SDL played the
race card effectively. With the electoral system favouring ethnic voting
(46 of the 71 seats are contested on racial lines), and with the percentage
of Indo-Fijians in the total population under 40 per cent, playing the
race card made political sense, at least in the short term. Indigenous
Fijians should control political power in Fiji, the SDL told the voters,
while Labour quietly told its supporters that with the army on its side
and with Indo-Fijian numbers decreasing, this might be the last chance
for an Indo-Fijian to become prime minister. Shorn of  all the campaign
rhetoric, this issue, above all others, remained at the forefront of voters’
consciousness.
The campaign itself was mild, lacking the drama of some previous
elections, such as the Flower-Dove battle of  1977 or the Four Corners
program about Australian involvement in Fijian politics, or even the
Labour–NFP battles of  the 1990s. Large campaign rallies, on the decline
since the 1990s, were largely absent in this election, with most of the
campaigning taking place in ‘pocket meetings’ and in debates on radio
and television. Voting is compulsory in Fiji, but voters still expect to be
transported to the polling booths, given food and drink and assistance
with private problems. Most candidates agreed that the cost of  the
campaign was between F$10,000 and F$20,000, exorbitant by Fiji
standards, with most expense associated with the purchase of yaqona.
Voter apathy and avarice are problems of  which all political parties are
aware but are afraid to take any action for fear of retribution. There
were some allegation of  vote rigging, especially in closely contested seats,
and two cases are before the courts, but international observers from
the Commonwealth Secretariat and Forum Secretariat declared the
election free and fair.
As indicated at the beginning, the real drama began once the election
was over and the results were known. Qarase’s offer to Labour to join
his multiparty cabinet caught many by surprise, most of all Labour leader
Mahendra Chaudhry. The national mood favourable toward power-sharing
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notwithstanding, Chaudhry was wary of  joining Qarase’s cabinet. At
first he tried to woo the two independents (Jioji Konrote and Robin
Irwin) to form a Labour-led government. When that failed, he submitted
nine Labour names for inclusion in the multiparty experiment, but insisted
that as the parliamentary leader of  the Labour Party, he should decide
the allocation of  portfolios for his members.
Qarase flatly rejected the idea on the sensible and entirely defensible
grounds that the prerogative of deciding the allocation of portfolios
should be his as prime minister (Fiji Sun, 23 May 2006). He had made
the same point three years earlier when he had argued that the right of
consultation with the opposition leader did not mean concurrence. ‘I do
not require Mr Chaudhry’s agreement on whom I choose as ministers.
The choice is the prime minister’s’ (Pacific Islands Report, 24 July 2003).
Poseci Bune was moved from Labour’s preferred Agriculture portfolio
to Environment, Lekh Ram Vayshenoi from Local Government and
Urban Development to Mineral and Energy, and Gyani Nand swapped
portfolios with Bune. ‘The Prime Minister is not acting in good faith’,
Chaudhry thundered. ‘It is not a master–servant relationship’ (Daily Post,
23 May 2006). This language was reminiscent of past politics and
curiously jarring in the optimistic atmosphere of the post-election period.
Unable to force the prime minister’s hand, Chaudhry sought to have
himself appointed Leader of the Opposition, reportedly asking a Ba high
chief, Tui Ba Ratu Sairusi Nagagavoka, to intercede with the president,
his paramount chief, on his (Chaudhry’s) behalf  (Fiji Times, 5 July 2006).
That Chaudhry lead the opposition while eight of his members were part
of the government was a strange proposition. Attorney-General Qoriniasi
Bale insisted, and the president was so advised, that by joining the multiparty
system, Labour had effectively become a part of the government.
Chaudhry’s demand was contrary to the provision of  the Korolevu
Declaration of 26 January 1999, which Chaudhry himself had signed.
That document provided that any party which participated in cabinet would
not be deemed to be in opposition (Fiji Times, 23 June 2006). Chaudhry
repudiated both the letter as well as the spirit of the Korolevu declaration.
Finally, in a sad display of  petulance, he refused to vacate the leader of
the opposition’s office in the parliamentary complex, forcing Mick Beddoes,
the duly appointed opposition leader, to remain in his much smaller office.
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These incidents, insignificant in themselves, were symbolically
important—they sent the signal that Chaudhry was a reluctant supporter
of the multiparty concept. His fears were real. He risked losing influence
over his ministers in cabinet, losing control of the broad direction of the
party, becoming a guest in his own house. He was also acutely aware of
the political dangers of playing second fiddle to Qarase. Parties that had
joined his Peoples’ Coalition in 1999 (Christian Democrats and the Fijian
Association Party) were defunct. The same fate befell the CAMV which
had joined Qarase’s government in 2001. Labour would not disappear; it
was too big and established for that, but Chaudhry feared a diminished
role for himself  and his party. In his first parliamentary speech, Chaudhry
drew the line. ‘The FLP does not wish to be tainted with the scams,
corruption, wastage of  public funds and the incompetence that
characterised the part Government’. He would set a timeframe and expect
Labour’s concerns to be addressed urgently. These included the enactment
of a comprehensive code of conduct for all holders of high public office,
the removal of  racial discrimination from the affirmative action programs
and the adoption of  tough anti-corruption practices (Hansard, 8 June
2006).
Labour’s dilemma was well summed up by Vice President Jon
Madraiwiwii in his address to the thirty-fourth annual Congress of the
Fiji Institute of Accountants on 23 June 2006.
The Fiji Labour Party faces dilemma of enormous proportions. Should it continue
to cooperate, conceding to the Prime Minister much of the credit flowing therefrom?
Is it not better that it withdraw from the Government and consolidate its position
as the Opposition? Politics is about advantage, manoeuvre and counter-manoeuvre.
Given demographics and continuing high levels of emigration, its core support
base will continue to diminish. There is little prospect that voting patterns will alter
significantly over the next decade. Therefore, unless the FLP is able to attract significant
Fijian support, it runs the real risk of remaining on the sidelines (Fijivillage, 4 July
2006)
Tensions surfaced early. One of  Chaudhry’s staunchest supporters in
the Labour caucus, Lekh Ram Vayeshnoi, Minister for Energy and Mineral
Resources, insisted that his loyalty lay totally with Chaudhry and that he
would insist on pursuing Labour policies in cabinet. Several of his
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colleagues, eager to make the new concept work, demurred publicly,
causing further tension. Chaudhry supported Vayshnoi: ‘the FLP
constitution states quite categorically that every member, whether a
backbencher MP or a cabinet minister, must uphold the principles and
objectives of  the party. The directive here is very clear—we must be
guided by party policies and principles in conducting ourselves’ (Sunday
Post, 25 June, 2006). Sitiveni Rabuka supported Chaudhry, saying that
the Labour leader was
…right in demanding that FLP cabinet ministers remain committed to party policies.
Let us remember they have gone to join a multiparty cabinet, not an SDL Cabinet.
They need to work on unity rather than uniformity as they are there with the
mandate of the people who voted them in on the FLP policies that appealed to
them (Fiji Times, 1 July 2006).
Krishna Datt, Labour Minister and one of the founders of the Labour
Party, disagreed, saying in parliament that those leaders—he clearly had
Chaudhry in mind—who could not work cooperatively in a multiparty
set-up, who wanted to persist with their old ways, ‘must pass on their
batons to others who are willing to try and I am very serious about that
(Hansard, 8 June 2006). Responding directly to Chaudhry’s demand that
FLP interests must be given priority by its Labour ministers, Datt said,
‘[t]his is one of the guiding principles of the Fiji Labour Party—to work
in the public interest, in national interest and that is what we, FLP MPs
who have accepted the cabinet posts, are required to do’ (Daily Post, 22
June 2006). For their part, Chaudhry loyalists in parliament boycotted
Datt’s speech in parliament introducing the Employment Relations Bill.
Emboldened, some other senior members began to talk about the
need for Chaudhry to change his confrontational style. Said Felix Anthony,
one of the rebels,
I believe that the leadership style has to change. It has to be much more democratic
in our decision making process. We need to practice what we preach to the world
about transparency, democracy and accountability’ (Fijilive, 6 July 2006).
Chaudhry rejected the suggestion outright, and reverted to his old ways
of  unilateral decision making. He submitted his list of  eight nominees for
the senate, but doing so directly to the President rather than through the
leader of the opposition whose nominees they technically are. The well-
regarded former Senator Dr Atu Emberson-Bain was dropped in favour
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of  the lesser known Sachidanand Sharma who happened to be a relative
of  Chaudhry’s. A former Vuda parliamentarian (Vijay Singh) was not
included in the list even though Chaudhry had promised him a senate seat
if  he agreed to let Felix Anthony contest his seat. Nor were any of  the
senior members of  the party’s Management Board consulted about the
nomination (Fiji Sun, 29 June 2006). While Chaudhry was away overseas,
some of them submitted a different list to the leader of the opposition,
but withdrew it when Beddoes stuck with Chaudhry’s list. Some of  the
rebels did the unthinkable by questioning whether Chaudhry was in fact
the parliamentary leader of  the Labour Party, as he had not been elected
to that position after the election, which is the normal Westminster
convention.
With the split now out in the open, Chaudhry sought ways to discipline
the dissidents. The Nasinu branch of  the Labour Party expelled Datt
from the party, and similar moves were afoot elsewhere. Chaudhry has
promised to haul his wayward colleagues before the party’s National
Council, which consists largely of his supporters from the National
Farmers Council. Chaudhry has many options at his disposal. He could,
though with some difficulty, have the rebels sacked from the party, which
would prompt a by-election. Or he could submit a new list for the cabinet,
though the dearth of talent in the parliamentary Labour Party is
conspicuous by its absence. There is no doubt that Labour’s image has
suffered a dent, for this is the first time in its twenty year history that
there has been such a massive questioning of  Labour leader’s style and
the party’s direction from within its own ranks. Chaudhry is still popular
with the rank and file of  the party, but he is no longer viewed as invincible
or indispensable.
Chaudhry’s misery contrasts markedly with Qarase’s position. The
SDL leader is not the diffident man was he was when he assumed office
in 2001. He is now decisive, confident of his political skills and in the
driver’s seat. He has risen in national esteem for the magnanimous manner
in which he has conducted himself, and especially for the apparent
sincerity with which he has pursued the multiparty cabinet. But he must
resist the temptations of hubris by insisting on the implementation of
his election manifesto or by bringing controversial legislation before
parliament early in its term. Doing so may damage the developing
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amicable atmosphere in cabinet and give Mahendra Chaudhry the excuse
he needs to opt out of government.
The multiparty cabinet is a novel concept for Fiji, but it has been
practised in many European countries that practice forms of
consociational democracy. It can work in Fiji if  there is a will to make it
work. Its success will require a change in the adversarial political culture
spawned by the Westminster system since the advent of  party politics in
the 1960s. And it will require a more enlightened leadership with a
genuinely overarching national vision for Fiji. The multiparty idea is
Fiji’s great challenge and also its great opportunity.
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